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PREFACE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration is of course one of those issues in respect of which international courts 
and tribunals increasingly exercise their jurisdiction. Still how they perceive this task 
is not altogether clear, going so far as to switch between judicial passivism and ac-
tivism.  
In detail, according to a more orthodox approach, which considers the judge to 
be a mere executor of the law, the main or exclusive function of a tribunal lies in 
deciding a given case in accordance with the law (judicial passivism). This kind of 
approach may be observed in a series of judgments passed by the EU Court of Justice 
such as that on the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement (see Chapter No. 13 – Antoniazzi). 
And indeed, in this case, moving from the assumption whereby the Statement would 
be a measure adopted by EU member States and could not be regarded as an act of a 
European Institution (in line with Art. 263 of the TFEU), the Court declared its lack 
of jurisdiction and accordingly refrained from ascertaining whether the Statement 
had a mere political nature or, quite the opposite, was a veritable treaty producing as 
such binding legal effects.  
From a different perspective, the judge is not meant to limit him/herself to the 
settlement of the dispute in hand but should, where possible, identify the issues of 
particular interest, and in this regard make “general pronouncements […] that may 
enrich  […] the law”.1 This is the way the so-called judicial activism may be carried 
 
1
 See GERALD FITZMAURICE, “Hersch Lauterpacht – The Scholar as Judge”, British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law, 1961, p. 14 ff., p. 15.  
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out and thereby promote the progressive development of law (both domestic and 
international). In the field of migration law, a clear manifestation of this activism can 
be found in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, i.e. in its attitude 
both to identify some fundamental general principles, like that of non-refoulment 
(see Chapters Nos. 5 – Gatta – and 7 - Rinaldi), or to resort to evolutionary interpre-
tation, for example with the view to using a gender perspective in the application of 
pre-existing international rules and standards of refugee law (see Chapter No. 10 - 
Katsoni).  
Yet if one accepts a broad notion of judicial activism, it will manifest not only in 
the case where some issues are decided using general solutions that go beyond the 
dispute, but also where some issues are not decided at all. In this sense also the de-
cision on the EU-Turkey Statement might be regarded as symptomatic of judicial 
activism, viz. as the Court of Justice’s desire “to accommodate itself to political re-
ality and the Member States’ intentions, without having to rule on their compliance 
with EU law”.2  
All these manifold expressions of judicial activism are taken into account in the 
present volume, whose ultimate aim is to provide a comprehensive review of the 
international judge’s role as to the development and/or application of migration law; 
and in that respect to foster a critical debate among experts, scholars and policy mak-
ers. 
 
A Reader’s guide 
 
This volume is intended to collect selected contributions on the role of interna-
tional Courts and Tri-bunals in the development and/or application of migration law, 
fostering a dialogical approach among scholars, experts and policy makers in ad-
dressing relevant issues of judicial practice in the field.  
It provides a comprehensive critical review of international case-law on both gen-
eral and specific questions arising in specific domains of international law related to 
human migration, such as the contours of international responsibility for refugee pro-
 
2
 See GOLDNER LANG, “Towards ‘Judicial Passivism’ in EU Migration and Asylum Law? Preliminary 
Thoughts for the Final Plenary Session of the 2018 Odysseus Conference”, EU Immigration and Asylum 
Law and Policy, 24 January 2018, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/towards-judicial-passivism-
in-eu-migration-and-asylum-law-preliminary-thoughts-for-the-final-plenary-session-of-the-2018-odys-
seus-conference/>. 
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tection, migrants’ human rights at sea, judicial standards on the protection of vulner-
able groups.  
A key aim of the collection is to contribute to the assessment of the extent to 
which international judges have played or could play a law-making role in the field 
of international migration law: the authors use the analysis of international judicial 
practice as a perspective from which to engage in the evaluation of current migration 
law challenges taking into account crosscutting matters on dialogues, consistencies 
or clashes among international (and supranational) jurisdictions and supervisory 
bodies, as well as normative interactions with rules of both international human 
rights law and other fields of international law.  
In this context, each essay’s scope covers specific issues elaborating in depth 
upon questions arising within its main focus: a variety of views and approaches 
emerges from the arguments raised by different authors engaged with selected topics 
of migration law before international courts and tribunals.  
Special attention is paid throughout the volume to issues of human rights, given 
their centrality in international adjudication on migration and refugee law in times 
of crisis (suffice it to mention massive movements of people at sea, as well as de 
facto or de iure emergency situations in Europe and beyond).  
The volume is opened by a chapter (Lingaas) on the role of courts in the creation 
of a European identity, The author observes the jurisprudential attitudes on migration 
issues of the ECtHR and the CJEU in a wider perspective, questioning if and how 
the European regional courts contribute to the construction of a (perceived) Euro-
peanness, based on shared European values.  
The following pair of chapters (Staiano and Wissing) tackle general questions of 
international law, respectively going into the problems of jurisdiction and attribution 
in the context of multi-actor operations and analyzing the case-law on refugee pro-
tection through the responsibility lens.  
Stoppioni’s chapter highlights the limits, potentials and paradoxes of fragmented 
legal regimes regu-lating transnational maritime migrations: drawing on Balibar’s 
“droit international de l’hospitalité” in light of traditional theoretical approaches, he 
critically addresses normative and philosophical questions on migrants’ effective 
standards of protection as developed by international jurisdictions.  
The successive bunch of chapters pertains to the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) on specific migration issues (Gatta, on collective expul-
sions of aliens; Continiello Neri, with a thorough perusal of Strasbourg Case-law on 
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the Russian Law on migration) and its interactions with other regional and suprana-
tional counterparts, taken from the European Union legal order (Rinaldi, Antoniazzi, 
Pergantis). 
The contributors grapple with much-disputed topics in international and Euro-
pean Laws of migration (such as the non-refoulment), providing a thorough analysis 
of recent developments in international and national jurisprudence.  
The protection of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants forms an integral part 
of international law, and both States and the EU have clear obligations to protect any 
person fleeing persecution or serious risks, to rescue people in distress and to ensure 
that their rights - including the right to life and to protection from refoulment - are 
upheld. Nevertheless, in recent years certain European States have exten-sively 
adopted restrictive attitudes towards refugees and migrants. Investigating national 
and supranational courts case-law clearly shows that judicial approaches have con-
solidated these legal obligations. Whilst States undoubtedly have the right to control 
their borders and ensure security, they also have the duty to effectively protect the 
rights enshrined in human rights, migration and refugee law, whether at an interna-
tional or European level.  
A picture of the Inter-American judicial approaches is drawn in a specific chapter 
(Paladini and Carrillo Santarelli), to show the ‘essence’ of the contribution of the 
Inter-American system of human rights to protect human rights of migrants.  
 Several reading paths can be followed by the readers of this book, due to the 
variety of the issues covered by the authors. The first and most comprehensive one 
goes into the case-law of the European international and supranational courts, the 
ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), at times compared 
each other or to national courts approaches. This allows the reader to detect the 
ways through which a European approach to these problems can be built, also con-
fronting it with the strategies and views elaborated in other regional contexts.  
This path goes from general issues to special and particular ones: a focus is de-
voted to judicial prac-tices on vulnerability and migration, also explored under gen-
der-sensitive approaches (Katsoni, De Vido). The volume includes contributions on 
women and children rights in migratory contexts (Rinaldi, La Spina, Pappalardo) 
aiming at detecting tailored standards in refugee protection. This track begins with 
Rinaldi, exploring the case-law of the ECtHR to better understand the role of the best 
interest of the child as a pivotal tool in judging cases where migrant minors are in-
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volved, whereas La Spina elaborates on the distinction between a “sensitive ap-
proach” and a “sensible approach” in the evolution of in-ternational judicial practice 
concerning law stories dealing with parental relations. Katsoni looks into the ways 
existing rules of international refugee law could amount to acceptable standards of 
female refugees’ and asylum seekers’ protection; De Vido investigates on how and 
to what extent the notion of gender-based violence, as defined by the 2011 Istanbul 
Convention, can be equated to persecution as defined in the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion. Pappalardo offers an insight of selected national and international case-law on 
migrant women sketching from judicial approaches a risk assessment frame to be 
tested when examining asylum seekers’ cases.  
Further relevant issues on the understanding of Common European Asylum Sys-
tem at courts are thoroughly investigated by Antoniazzi, Morgese, Pergantis, Molnar. 
Their reflections on CJEU’s ap-proaches on migration and refugee law suggest some 
provocative critiques of the application of the Dublin system, as exemplified by the 
EU Turkey statement before European courts (Antoniazzi), the ambiguities of the 
solidarity rationale laying behind the overall EU model (Morgese), the paradoxes of 
the ‘sovereignty clause’ in the field (Pergantis) and the conundrums raised by the 
Return directive (Molnar).  
Going through the pages of this book will show how challenging and multifac-
eted is the analysis of international courts’ approaches to these issues and offer a 
vivid picture of their contribution to the def-inition of a transnational judge-made 
legal regime.  
Eventually, at least another reading path can be traced from these collected essays 
and it is precisely the one inspired by what is common use to define as a transnational 
law driven perspective. As a matter of fact, all the judicial materials, attitudes and 
trends commented below amount to a comprehensive approach to migration issues 
which is ultimately not just international nor national, but rather transna-tional. In 
other words, the reflections gathered can also be read, even if they were not intended 
to be, as essays in transnational law: their narratives and legal reviews show, in a 
thought-provoking manner, the pivotal role of judicial actors and judicial law-mak-
ing in the reassessment of inedited legal regimes towards a transnational ius mi-
grandi. 
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1. 
JUDICIAL RESPONSES  
TO THE MIGRATION CRISIS: THE ROLE  
OF COURTS IN THE CREATION  
OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY  
 
Carola Lingaas* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction – 2. Approaches, Hypotheses and Choice of Method – 3. Checks and 
Balances – 4. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the Case-law of the European Courts – 
5. Immigration, Borders, and Human Rights – 6. Migration, Human Rights, and Values – 7. 
Constructing a European Identity: ‘Otherness’ in the Case-law of the ECtHR – 8. Migration, 
Expatriation, Globalisation – 9. Conclusion 
 
1. – Introduction 
Europe has been struck by what is commonly described as a ‘migration crisis’.1 
The crisis has resulted in the upsurge of far-right and nationalist parties, supported 
by their voters’ fear and resentment of migrants.2 However, in the assessment of mi-
gration and the perception thereof, the jurisprudential pillar is commonly overlooked. 
 
* The author would like to thank Armin Khoshnewiszadeh for his research assistance. 
1
 CARDWELL, “Tackling Europe’s Migration ‘Crisis’ Through Law and ‘New Governance’”, Global 
Policy, 2018, p. 73 on the fact that migration is presented as a crisis, and less a humanitarian one than a 
security threat. Similarly: BOELES et al., European Migration Law, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2014, p. 28. 
2
 Several studies suggest the existence of a link between integration policies and public opinion on 
immigrants. For an overview, see CALLENS, “Integration Policies and Public Opinion: In Conflict or in 
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This chapter aims to (partially) fill that gap by examining if and how the European 
regional courts contribute to the construction of a European identity, based on shared 
European values. It is in times of crisis that identity changes are most probable,3 but 
is this true for jurisprudence too? In taking a foremost human rights-based approach 
to analysing the treatment of migrants, this chapter seeks to advance knowledge and 
insight into the role of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and, to a 
lesser degree, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) for the construc-
tion of a (perceived) European identity. Based upon ostensible differences between 
‘us’ and ‘them’, this European identity is contrasted to the one of the ‘others’ from 
beyond Europe. 
The chapter will draw attention to the manner in which the European courts con-
tribute to the creation or reinforcement of a (perceived) Europeanness, which has a 
reciprocal impact on (foreign) policy considerations.4 The law and the jurisprudence 
of the regional European courts are highly effective tools to influence and change 
popular and political understandings of migration.5 While especially the ECtHR tra-
ditionally maintained a strong institutional standing, the Court does increasingly seek 
the approval of its constituencies, the State Parties, and can therefore not be viewed 
as isolated from the political forces, among other populism and increasing national-
ism, surrounding it.6 
The chapter will, among other, scrutinize the language used in judgments of the 
European courts in their discussion of migration.7 There are some indications that the 
ECtHR attaches a positive connotation to migration from within Europe, consistent 
 
Harmony?”, LISER Working paper No. 2015-02; ALSTON, “The Populist Challenge to Human Rights”, 
NYU School of Law Research Paper No. 18-05, 2018, pp. 7 and 11. 
3
 LEEK, MOROZOV, “Identity Beyond Othering: Crisis and Politics of Decision in the EU’s Involvement 
in Libya”, International Theory, 2018/10, p. 123. 
4
 On the central role of foreign policy for the production of identity, see LEEK, MOROZOV, cit. supra 
note 3; CAMPBELL, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Minneap-
olis, 1992. 
5
 See related LANGFORD, “International Courts and Public Opinion”, 28 February 2018, available at: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3131863>. 
6
 STOYANOVA, “Populism, Exceptionality, and the Right to Family Life of Migrants under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights”, European Journal of Legal Studies, 2018, pp. 90 and 122-123; 
BAUMGÄRTEL, Demanding Rights: Europe’s Supranational Courts and the Dilemma of Migrant Vulnera-
bility, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 102 and 156. 
7
 On the importance of linguistic practices for the creation of identities in politics, see LEEK, MOROZOV, 
cit. supra note 3, p. 126.  
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with the principle of free movement, a right granted to citizens of the European Un-
ion (‘EU’). The ECtHR’s favourable approach to migration from within is illustrated 
by the use of positively loaded terms such as ‘opportunities’, ‘positive’, ‘globalisa-
tion’, while reverting to negative connotations in discussing migration from beyond 
(‘challenges’).8 Paradoxically, the positive effects of globalism seem to be limited to 
the European context only, and, hence, ‘globalisation’ acquires a distinctively re-
gional rather than universal flair in the case-law of the court.9 
This chapter discusses two strands of arguments: the first strand explores the rule 
of law and whether the courts are influenced more by political guidelines rather than 
the law. The second strand looks at what the European regional courts consider tra-
ditional European values, and whether these values are a judicial creation in response 
to the migration crisis.10 In the context of this discussion, is the ECtHR still worthy 
of its designation as the “lighthouse” for those who seek protection?11 Is the Court 
really the “crown jewel”12 and “flagship”13 of the Council of Europe, as certain of its 
Member States see it? Indeed, the question arises whether the lighthouse does not 
guide individuals into safe haven any longer. Does, rather, the ship increasingly sail 
under the flag of Euronationalism and thus contribute to the polarization of Europe-
ans and migrants, who as ‘others’ do not share the same set of European values? 
 
 
8
 See for instance, European Court of Human Rights, Shindler v. The United Kingdom, Application 
No. 19840/09, Judgment of 7 May 2013, paras. 37-59. 
9
 Research on European legal culture to a certain extent confirms this hypothesis. See GRØDELAND, 
MILLER, European Legal Cultures in Transition, Cambridge, 2015, p. 6. 
10
 On the alleged judicial activism of the ECtHR in the field of migration: LAVRYSEN, “Is the Stras-
bourg Court Though on Migration?”, 5 December 1992, available at: <https://strasbourgobserv-
ers.com/2012/12/05/is-the-strasbourg-court-tough-on-migration/>. 
11
 MIJATOVIĆ, “Continued Reform of the European Human Rights Convention System: Better Balance, 
Improved Protection”, Address by Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 April 2018, 
Document No. CommDH/Speech (2018), p. 3.  
12
 MÄLKSOO, “Introduction Russia, Strasbourg, and the Paradox of a Human Rights Backlash”, in 
MÄLKSOO, BENEDEK (eds.), Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect, Cam-
bridge, 2017, p. 3. 
13
 As referred to by the Norwegian government, in: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrik-
ssaker/menneskerettigheter/innsikt/norge/id578539/> (all translations by the author). The Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe reconfirmed its commitment to the ECHR and the ECtHR in the recent 
Copenhagen Declaration, available at: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Copenhagen_Declara-
tion_ENG.pdf>.  
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2. – Approaches, Hypotheses and Choice of Method 
This chapter works with the hypothesis that the European regional courts, although 
formally independent from the legislative and executive of the European Council and 
the EU, respectively, are nonetheless influenced by the current political sentiments. 
The point of departure is the assumption that the European courts play a significant, 
yet not well-recognised and severely under-researched role in the construction of a 
European identity. This chapter is apprehensive that the courts, in their case-law, 
clearly position themselves as to the question of migration and the human rights of 
marginalized people not fitting into the understanding of an European ‘us’.14 As such, 
it resonates Marie-Bénédicte Dembour’s concerns that the ECtHR implicitly shares a 
discourse, and arguably also values, that conceive migrants a threatening others.15 
With an ever-increasing caseload, including numerous cases dealing with migra-
tion, the courts assume an important responsibility for a common European response 
to migration. Judgments and decisions do affect and reflect back on the Member 
States, their administration, their citizenry, and the migrants themselves. As such, 
focus should be shifted from analysing the effects of the executive (and to a lesser 
degree the legislative) powers in Europe, to increasing the scrutiny of the judiciary. 
Thus, this chapter has the underlying objective to create a consciousness of the role 
that courts play in the creation of a European identity. Interconnected, this chapter 
also urges an increased attention of legal scholarship to the use of non-binding soft 
law, as contained in policy documents, and its reference in the case-law of the ECtHR 
and the CJEU.16 
This chapter applies traditional legal methodology in analysing treaty law, case-
law and legal doctrine. However, being situated in the borderland between law and 
politics, it will also draw on scholarship from the political sciences and related dis-
ciplines. Same is valid for academic publications on migration, group identities and 
so-called ‘othering’, if considered useful to strengthen the arguments. Beyond schol-
arly writings, this chapter critically examines official reports, documents, and web-
sites of the EU and the European Council. 
 
14
 See for a similar concern, STOYANOVA, cit. supra note 6, pp. 83, 125. 
15
 DEMBOUR, When Humans Become Migrants, Oxford, 2015, p. 504. 
16
 On the growing significance of soft law for the legal treatment of migrants, see CARDWELL, cit. 
supra note 1, pp. 68, 71-72. 
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3. – Checks and Balances 
“The fundamental principles of the separation of powers and judicial independ-
ence are considered central tenets of all liberal democracies, everywhere and in every 
time. And rightly so”, said Marta Cartabia, Vice President of the Italian Constitu-
tional Court, in her speech in occasion of the opening of the ECtHR’s judicial year 
2018.17 In reverting to Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws, Cartabia emphasised that 
the separation of powers and judicial independence are basic conditions for the ef-
fective protection of individual rights and liberties, in order to guarantee to each in-
dividual an effective remedy against any breach of rights.18 A traditional nation State 
is structured upon the separation of powers, according to which the executive, legis-
lative and judiciary branches are separated and independent from each other.19 In a 
functioning State, it would accordingly be worrisome if the executive or legislative 
could directly influence the outcome of the judiciary’s decisions. Note that the leg-
islative indirectly influences the judiciary, since it adopts laws that the courts apply. 
As a matter of fact, the laws of a democratic State will always reflect the current 
electorate and political tendencies. For obvious reasons, same is valid for regional or 
international institutions. On the supranational level, in our case the EU, a similar 
system of checks and balances is put into place. Article 2 of the consolidated version 
of the Treaty on European Union (2008) explicitly links the rule of law with the 
notion of human rights: “the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law”.20 It is broadly acknowledged 
that these principles include the idea of a separation of powers.21 Yet, the separation 
of powers is less clear-cut at the EU level than in many of its member States, partic-
ularly with regard to the legislative and executive branches. CJEU Judge and Profes-
sor of Law Allan Rosas points out that legislation is passed by the EU Council, which 
consists of a ministerial representative of each Member State. In many cases, how-
ever, the Council acts jointly with the European Parliament, consisting of elected 
 
17
 CARTABIA, The Authority of the Judiciary Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence: Current 
Challenges, 26 January 2018, p. 1, available at: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Speech_20180126_Cartabia_JY_ENG.pdf>.  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/checks-and-balances>.  
20
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 115, 9 May 2008, p. 13 ff.  
21
 ROSAS, “Separation of Powers in the European Union”, The International Lawyer, 2007, p. 1034. 
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representatives.22 This process of so-called ‘codecision’, where the Council acts to-
gether with the Parliament, is used for areas of exclusive competence of the EU, or 
shared competence with the Member States.23 Thus, the responsibilities of the exec-
utive and the legislative are blurred, with a risk of jeopardising the rule of law. It is 
this structural configuration of the EU that demands increased attention, as it reflects 
in the jurisprudence of the European courts. In her above mentioned speech, Cartabia 
requests the preservation of the main dividing line between political institutions and 
institutions of protection. In her view, the judicial independence is put at risk when 
the clear duality between government and the judicial branch is distorted. Although, 
in her speech, Cartabia probably did not have the ECtHR and the European political 
institutions in mind, her call for preservation is equally valid for them. Thus, not only 
the executive and the legislative, but also the executive and the judicial branch are 
not as clearly separated as one would expect. Importantly, Cartabia points out that 
judge-made law is an important factor that can unhinge checks and balances, since 
judges act as law-makers rather than law-appliers.24 If the parliamentary legislation 
is of poor quality, the interpretative power of judges expands “hugely, in the form of 
value-oriented interpretation”,25 a matter of particular significance to the present dis-
cussion on the interpretation of ostensible European values. Given that the ECHR is 
a living instrument, which is subject to dynamic interpretation, such law-making is 
acceptable within certain limits. Considering that human rights law aims at protect-
ing individuals from excessive State power, an expansion of the individuals’ rights 
by means of a dynamic interpretation generally seems justified. While the Court has 
to decide on how to interpret imprecise provisions or adopt the laws’ application to 
new, unforeseen circumstances, it may nonetheless not trespass the boundaries of 
what the law is meant to regulate. Erik Voeten points out that the inherent subjectiv-
ity of judicial discretion of a rights review is understood as a political defeat: the 
Russian president Vladimir Putin, for example, claimed that the Ilaşcu decision by 
the ECtHR was a “purely political decision, an undermining of trust in the judicial 
international system”.26 It could be argued that the ECtHR’s dynamic interpretation 
 
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/>.  
24
 CARTABIA, cit. supra note 17, p. 2. 
25
 Ibid.  
26 VOETEN, “Politics, Judicial Behaviour, and Institutional Design”, in CHRISTOFFERSEN, MADSEN 
(eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, Oxford, 2011, pp. 61-62. See 
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is a Pandora’s box that creates more problems than it solves. Disregarding, for the 
sake of the argument, the already controversial relationship between the ECtHR and 
Russia,27 judicial interpretations that are considered subjective judge-made law could 
be seen as counterproductive to the whole human rights system. Since the concerned 
States, for whatever (legal, political or moral) reason, do not recognise the judgment 
as impartial, they are unwilling to acknowledge the decision, thereby leading to a 
backlash for human rights of the affected individuals.28 Oddly, both side make the 
argument of politicization: the Court holds that the respondent State disregards its 
decisions for political reasons (e.g. in order to continue with human rights viola-
tions), while the State claims the Court is interfering with its politics (e.g. by not 
respecting the margin of appreciation) by politicizing the law.29 The non-compli-
ance30 of States with judgments rendered by the ECtHR in cases of migration is ar-
guably also tainted with politics. The stronger the pushback against the migrant ‘oth-
ers’ in the domestic political sphere, the more unlikely the respondent State is willing 
to respect and comply with supranational decisions that determine a violation of the 
migrants’ freedoms and rights, especially if these decisions entail a liberal, inclusive, 
and non-nationalist interpretation of the law. 
Matej Avbelj convincingly argues that the CJEU, prior to the adoption of the 
Treaty of Maastricht, in a similar manner developed and introduced an unwritten, 
hence judge-made, standard of human rights protection for the EU and its institu-
tions. In what he terms a human rights “inflation”, Avbelj shows that the EU in the 
case of Wachauf v. Germany expanded this standard beyond the institution itself to 
 
European Court of Human Rights. Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, 
Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
27
 For an analysis of the relationship, see: MÄLKSOO, “The European Court of Human Rights and 
Russia: Quo Vadis?”, 22 November 2018, available at: <http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2018/11/the-eu-
ropean-court-of-human-rights-and-russia-quo-vadis/>. 
28
 MÄLKSOO, cit. supra note 12, pp. 3-25, concluding that realism has to prevail in dealing with States 
with anti-liberal history and ideology. Mälksoo considers the weakness of theories of human rights social-
ization that they tend to suggest universal models without duly taking into account the specific country 
contexts. 
29
 For the case of Russia, see, GRIFFIN, Russia could withdraw from European Convention on Human 
Rights, state news agency RIA reports, 2018, available at: <https://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-echr-human-rights-european-convention-putin-kremlin-eu-
a8234086.html>. 
30
 On the non-compliance, see the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, DE 
VRIES, Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Doc. 13864 09, September 
2015, available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?fileid=22005>. 
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become a binding norm for all its member States in their implementation of EU law.31 
Although the intent assumingly was good, it nonetheless led to an adverse reaction: 
the EU Member States and particularly their constitutional courts considered this 
judge-made law an illegitimate interference, a threat to their sovereignty, and a 
breach of the principle of legality that prescribes the foreseeability of the law.32 
The following sections will further discuss whether the separation of powers is 
in jeopardy and whether the judges of the European Courts have created a concept 
of shared ‘European values’ and a common ‘European identity’, innate to ‘us, the 
Europeans’, but lacking to the ‘others, the migrants’. 
4. – Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the Case-law of the European 
Courts 
Not only the boundaries of the branches of the EU and the Council of Europe 
tend to be blurred, also the interface between community and human rights law, 
which is highly relevant for the discussions of the different European organs’ com-
petence, has become more unclear. Initially, the two areas of law were not con-
founded. However, already in 1969, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared 
that fundamental rights, although at the time not explicitly codified, formed part of 
the general principles of community law, the observance of which the Court en-
sured.33 Two decades later, the ECJ decided that the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) had “particular significance”,34 
and finally in the 1990s, the ECJ started to cite individual judgments of the ECtHR 
to back up its interpretations.35 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was 
proclaimed in 2000 and became legally binding in 2009 with the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In its chapeau, the Charter 
 
31
 AVBELJ, ‘Human rights inflation in the European Union’, in VIOLINI, BARAGGIA (eds.), The Frag-
mented Landscape of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe: The Role of Judicial and Non-Judicial 
Actors, Cheltenham, 2018, pp. 10-11. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm - Sozialamt, 12 November 1969, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, 
para. 7. 
34
 Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v. Commission of the European Communities, 21 Septem-
ber 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, para. 13. 
35
 Case C-13/94, P v. S & Cornwall County Council, 30 April 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:170, para. 16. 
See extensive discussion in: ROSAS, cit. supra note 21, p. 1041; AVBELJ, cit. supra note 31, pp. 12-13. 
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“reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union (…), the rights as they 
result (…) from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, (…) and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
of the European Court of Human Rights.” 
Interestingly, the Charter connects the notions of powers, constitutional traditions 
with international obligations arising from the ECHR, and the case-law of the CJEU 
and ECtHR. With the adoption of the Charter, the EU has clearly, on a political and 
on a legal level, confirmed its commitment to human rights and the corresponding 
jurisprudence of the European regional courts. In Article 52(3), the Charter guaran-
tees the rights corresponding to the ones contained in the ECHR.36 In doing so, it 
prevents different standards of human rights in the national implementation of EU 
law.37 Moreover, the increasing referral of the ECtHR to the CJEU’s case-law further 
streamlines the human rights standard in Europe.38 Indeed, the human rights approach 
of both European courts appears to be largely, if not fully, coherent. At first glance, 
it seems as though this consistency of the human rights approaches is beneficially 
for the individuals concerned, in being accorded the same rights by the different ju-
dicial institutions of the European community. Nonetheless, a different scenario 
might be conceivable: what if this coherence is detrimental to migrants? There are 
indications that the case-law coming out of both courts would take a coordinated 
approach. If the ECtHR increasingly discusses migrants as the unwanted ‘others’, 
this jurisprudence would reflect in the case-law of the CJEU, thus amplifying their 
negative perception. In turn, if the hypothesis is correct that courts’ decisions can 
influence the public opinion and thereby also policy makers, then the migrants’ sit-
uation is further deteriorated. 
 
36
 Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 364, 18 December 2000 p. 1. The official commentary to Art. 
52(3) holds that the scope of the guaranteed rights is determined by the law itself as well as the case-law 
of the ECtHR and the CJEU (OJ C 303, 14 December 2007, p. 33). 
37
 LOCK, “The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts”, The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2009, p. 283; BOELES et al., cit. supra note 1, p. 
45, pointing out that the ECHR is not legally binding within the ambit of EU law and that the EU is not 
party to the ECHR. 
38
 E.g. see European Court of Human Rights, Maslov v. Austria, Application No. 1638/03, Judgment 
of 23 June 2008, para. 42; Id., Pellegrin v. France, Application No. 28541/95, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 
of 8 December 1999, para. 66; Id., Goodwin v. United Kingdom Application No. 28957/95, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber) of 11 June 2002, para. 43. Furthermore: LOCK, cit. supra note 37, p. 380. 
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In addition to its intra-European efforts, including the consistency of the human 
rights jurisprudence of the regional courts, the EU is committed to cross-regional 
work on positive human rights narratives.39 This commitment is in line with the hu-
man rights priorities of the United Nations (‘UN’) and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (‘SDG’) that the world leaders agreed upon in 2015. The SDG No. 10 has the 
aim of reducing inequalities and calls upon all States to “[f]acilitate orderly, safe, 
regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the im-
plementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.40 The UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, by which the SDG officially came into force, 
furthermore recognises the positive contribution of migrants and calls for full respect 
for their human rights and humane treatment, irrespective of their migration status.41 
Thus, the EU is not only bound by positive law to protecting human rights as con-
tained in the TFEU and the ECHR, it is also devoted to observing the human rights 
regime of the UN. This commitment of a supranational organisation is praiseworthy 
and probably uncontroversial, given that its Member States without exception are 
members to the core UN human rights treaties and, as such, legally bound to fulfilling 
their provisions. This commitment across treaty regimes is undoubtedly part of a 
trend, in which international and/or supranational organisations pledge to adhere to 
international (human rights) treaties to which they formally cannot accede because 
they lack statehood.42 Although the conflation of treaty regimes entails a harmonisa-
tion of the law, it at the same time also causes interpretational headaches for the law-
applying bodies. The ECtHR, for instance, will be forced to interpret legal sources 
that it does not formally have jurisdiction over. The Court will also have to refer to 
case-law that originates in cases that do not deal with human rights violations. 
In returning to the UN approach to migration, the UN Secretary General in a 
report of 2017 on ‘Making Migration Work for All’ emphasizes its links to the 2030 
 
39
 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights 
Fora, Doc. 6346/18 of 26 February 2018.  
40
 See goal target No. 10.7. Available at: <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/>. 
41
 General Assembly of the United Nations, “Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development”, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 of 21 October 2015, para. 29. 
42
 A similar development occurred in the field of international criminal law: the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and Art. 21(3) Rome Statute commit to respecting human rights law, a treaty regime with a 
very distinct aim and nature than international criminal law. The ICC, as an international organisation, 
cannot become member to any human rights treaties that are tailored to prevent the misuse of State power 
over individuals. 
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Agenda for Sustainable Development. He acknowledges a shared responsibility of 
States to address the needs and concerns over migration and to protect the human 
rights of migrants.43 Although highlighting the positive aspects of migration as “an 
engine of economic growth, innovation and sustainable development” that assists to 
create bonds between countries and societies, the Secretary General also stresses that 
migration is a “source of division within and between States and societies” and, as 
such, “one of the most urgent and profound tests of international cooperation”.44 He 
hoped that the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted in 
the following year, would bring the challenges of migration between Member States 
under control and bridge the divide between their policy implementations and ambi-
tions. Moreover, he sadly acknowledged that “xenophobic political narratives about 
migration are all too widespread”, a fact that remains valid today too.45 In December 
2018 then, the UN General Assembly by resolution adopted the Global Compact.46 
The resolution acknowledges the existence of “misleading narratives that generate 
negative perceptions of migrants”, a development that must be countered by provid-
ing research and access to objective, evidence-based, and clear information on mi-
gration.47 The intrinsic connection between the perception of the migrant ‘others’, 
who are different than ‘we’, and xenophobic, misleading narratives – to borrow the 
wording of the UN documents – cannot be underestimated. In this connection, re-
searchers have pointed out that the understanding of a European identity based on 
common values could be lopsided if it is mobilized against European integration, 
claiming that the ‘others’ lack our shared memories, traditions, and myths.48 This 
dangerous development of othering that has been explored in the social sciences, 
foremost social psychology and sociology, has to be taken on board by legal and 
political sciences too. Note that the importance of research is highlighted throughout 
the Global Compact, a call that we in academia cannot be left unanswered.49 
 
43
 Report of the UN Secretary-General, “Making Migration Work for All”, UN Doc. A/72/643 of 12 
December 2017, para. 5. 
44
 Ibid., para. 1. 
45
 Ibid., para. 9. 
46
 General Assembly of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/RES/73/195 of 19 December 2018 (based 
upon General Assembly Resolution A/RES/72/244 of 24 December 2017). 
47
 General Assembly of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/RES/73/195, cit. supra note 46, para. 10. 
48
 CICEO, “The Difficult Path Towards Europeanness: Assessing the Politics of Culture and Identity in 
the European Union”, On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe, 2016, p. 10. 
49
 Cit. supra note 46, paras. 17, 17(f) and (k), 21(j), 35(c), and 66.  
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5. – Immigration, Borders, and Human Rights 
Borders represent the belonging and the exclusion, the interiority and the exteri-
ority.50 The functions and usefulness of borders in the civic space is, according to 
Étienne Balibar, becoming more problematic because they allow for the crystallisa-
tion of collective identities: the ‘us’, the ‘Europeans’, the ‘majority’. Simultaneously, 
these borders fill functions of imaginary protection, in separating ‘us’ from ‘them’.51 
Yet, in the state-centred sphere of international and European law, States are free to 
exercise border controls due to their sovereignty.52 In recent years, the border controls 
at the external border of the EU have been increased and led to tighter removal pro-
cedures for nationals of non-EU Member States.53 However, the jurisdiction over 
immigration and decisions of whom to allow access to the national territory does not 
free a State from its liability for any human rights violations occurring during the 
performance of these tasks.54 Thus, the recognition of a State’s jurisdiction at its bor-
ders runs parallel to its obligations under and the applicability of human rights trea-
ties, which include “affirmative measures to guarantee that individuals subject to 
their jurisdiction can exercise and enjoy [their] rights”.55 In other words, its sovereign 
right of border controls by no means impedes the respective State’s human rights 
obligations and can, as such, not be promoted as an argument to curtail these rights. 
This understanding also resonates in the judgment on the case of Khlaifia and Others 
v. Italy, which deals with the internment of Northern African refugees on the Italian 
island of Lampedusa in 2011. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR made clear that it 
 
50
 BALIBAR, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton, 2004, p. 
5; KESBY, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law, Oxford, 2010, p. 103. 
51
 Ibid., p. 110. Similarly, DEMBOUR, KELLY, “Introduction”, in DEMBOUR, KELLY (eds.), Are Human 
Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United 
States, Abingdon, 2011, p. 5. 
52
 See e.g. discussion in European Court of Human Rights, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 May 1985, para. 67. 
53
 GRANT, “Irregular Migration and Frontier Deaths: Acknowledging a Right to Identity”, in 
DEMBOUR, KELLY (eds.), cit. supra note 51, p. 59. 
54
 OCHR, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders, avail-
able at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/migration/pages/internationalborders.aspx>, pt. 22 (discussed in 
European Court of Human Rights, M.A. and others v. Lithuania, Application no. 59793/17, Judgment of 
11 December 2018, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 19). 
55
 Report on the Human Rights Situation of Refugees and Migrant Families and Unaccompanied Chil-
dren in the United States of America, p. 30, para. 42 (discussed in European Court of Human Rights, M.A. 
and others v. Lithuania, cit. supra note 54, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 19). 
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“an increasing influx of migrants cannot absolve a State of its obligations”.56 Alt-
hough this specific case dealt with the prohibition of torture, the same logic will 
apply to any other freedom and right of migrants within the jurisdiction of the High 
Contracting parties to the ECHR (see Article 1 ECHR). The Court moreover pointed 
out that the “objective difficulties related to a migrant crisis” cannot function as a 
legitimate excuse of the violation of human rights.57 The Court thereby acknowledges 
both the European States’ struggles in dealing with the sudden influx of migrants and 
the migrants’ human rights that need to be respected, especially given their vulnera-
ble situation. The ECtHR’s sister court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
explicitly recognized that “immigrants are ‘the most vulnerable to potential or actual 
violations of their human rights’”.58 Henceforth, the interpretation of their human 
rights and freedoms has to take into consideration their vulnerability and heightened 
need for protection.  
Despite the fact that irregular arrivals to Europe have been brought down to so-
called ‘pre-crisis levels’, a notable reduction of 90% since the height of the migration 
crisis in 2015,59 certain Member States of the European Council still consider migra-
tion as the biggest threat to Europe.60 Equally, in the view of Europeans, immigration 
remains the main concern facing the EU, and is mentioned twice as often as terror-
ism.61 Arguably, as long as migration is perceived as a threat, the governments of the 
respective Member States will not approve of a liberal jurisprudence of the European 
courts regarding the rights of migrants and immigrant minorities. The adverse polit-
ical climate regarding migrants and the interrelated mounting pressure on the ECtHR 
on the part of certain European governments is even explicitly noted by Judge Pinto 
 
56
 European Court of Human Rights, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber) of 15 December 2016, para. 184.  
57
 Ibid. 
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 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, Judgment of 23 November 
2010, para. 98. 
59
 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2018/12/13-14/>. On the reduc-
tion see:< https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/>.  
60
 See, “Migration Biggest Threat to Europe, Says Defence Minister”, available at: <https://hungary-
today.hu/migration-biggest-threat-to-europe-says-defence-minister/>. 
61
 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 90: Public opinion in the European Union, Report 
(2018), p. 12. 
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de Albuquerque in a very recent judgment.62 This trend is yet another worrisome 
challenge to the rule of law in Europe and correlates with research on the progressive 
interpretation of human rights law on the national level: in the post-war era, Euro-
pean domestic courts expanded the rights of minorities and migrants, foremost by 
transplanting national rights with universal human rights.63 Yet, it appears that the 
more the courts expanded the rights of the migrants, the stronger the pushback was 
against an acceptance of these ‘others’ in society. Current developments on the Eu-
ropean regional level suggest that the European courts curb the attribution of rights 
and, thus, adjust to expectations and perceptions of their constituency.64 Most re-
markably, this ostensible development, whereby the European governments adjust 
to their constituency’s fear of the migrant ‘other’ and increase pressure on the EC-
tHR, cannot be reproduced statistically: the general attitudes of Europeans toward 
immigration did not become more negative during the years of the “refugee cri-
sis”, quite contrary to what most media and right-wing politicians suggest.65 
Migration is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Minority immigrant communities 
have often been successfully integrated, and new national identities have developed 
over time.66 In more recent years, however, migration has been associated with inter-
group conflicts and violence, with incompatible national identities, with the rise of 
populism, xenophobia, and nationalism.67 “[A]t some point in our lives or another, 
we are all minorities”, remarked Stavros Lambrinidis, the EU Special Representative 
for Human Rights at the United Nations Human Rights Council in February 2018. 
“If, when in the majority”, he stressed, “we are tolerant when ‘minorities’ we may 
 
62
 European Court of Human Rights, M.A. and others v. Lithuania, cit. supra note 54, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 16. See an extended discussion of his concurring opinion 
below. 
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Court of Human Rights”, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2018, pp. 20 and 23. 
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 Ibid., p. 22. See also: DEMBOUR, cit. supra note 15, pp. 117-119. 
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 CAUGHEY, O’GRADY, WARSHAW, “Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics, 1981-2016”, Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 2019; KUSTOV, LAAKER, RELLER, “The Stability of Immigration Attitudes: 
Evidence and Implications”, 1 May 2019, available at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3322121>. 
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not ‘like’, or that may not be ‘like us’, are repressed, then beware: We are opening 
the floodgates to our own future repression and discrimination as well”.68 The UN 
Secretary-General, António Guterres, equally stressed the importance of reversing 
those trends and of recommitting to the protection of the rights of all migrants.69 
The concurring opinion of the ECHR Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in the recent 
M.A. and others v. Lithuania case resonates the same chorus. In unusually strong 
language, the judge compares the treatment of migrants who have been rejected at 
land borders and who are returned without an individual assessment of their claims 
with the treatment of animals: “Migrants are not cattle that can be driven away like 
this”.70 The judge might be talking figuratively, but the image of the unwanted ‘oth-
ers’ who are treated not like humans, but like beasts, is haunting. It reverberates re-
search from social sciences on othering, especially of cases of dehumanisation, 
where the ‘others’ are perceived as lacking a human essence. They are seen as infe-
rior, unworthy of dignified treatment, and of a lesser value.71 If the ‘others’ — the 
migrants in our case — are understood as animals, ‘we’ will never be able to accept 
them as equals, as humans with the same inherent rights. The full recognition of the 
‘other’ migrants as humans with inalienable human rights is crucial for their approval 
and integration in ‘our’ society. Interrelated, the acceptance of the rights of ‘others’ 
is considered one of eight key domains that comprise positive peace.72 Hence, the 
recognition and enforcement of the human rights of migrant ‘others’ appears to have 
a positive effect on peace. 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque is clear in his opinion that the ECtHR must ensure 
the effective protection of migrants. Furthermore, he holds that land borders are not 
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 EU Special Representative for Human Rights, High-level segment by Stavros Lambrinidis at the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, 27 February 2018, available at: <https://eeas.europa.eu/delega-
tions/un-geneva/40477/hrc-37-high-level-segment-statement-he-mr-stavros-lambrinidis-eu-special-repre-
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69
 Report of the UN Secretary-General, “Making Migration Work for All”, cit. supra note 43, paras. 
1, 4(b), 5 and 39. 
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 European Court of Human Rights, M.A. and others v. Lithuania, cit. supra note 54, Concurring 
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zones of exclusion or exception from States’ human-rights obligations. What is re-
markable in this case, is the continued and strong emphasis of the judge that the 
ECtHR must remain the “conscience of Europe”, especially considering that he con-
curs with the majority’s judgment.73 It could, indeed, be argued that there is no need 
to further dwell on what the majority already has decided, especially since Pinto de 
Albuquerque agrees with their conclusion. However, his concern with the respect of 
the migrants’ rights and the Court’s corresponding jurisprudence could be explained 
by an undeniable trend of increased nationalism, which is fuelled by populist views 
and results in attitudes of fear and hate.74 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque clearly goes 
beyond a restrained, objective legal analysis, when he takes a passionate stance on 
current developments and urges the Court not to surrender to destructive political 
developments. His fervent appeal merits a quote in full length: 
“In the wake of a new and dangerous ‘post-international law’ world, this opinion is a 
plea for building bridges, not walls, for the bridges required by those in need of international 
protection, not walls arising from the fear that has been percolating in recent years through 
global sewers of hatred. Although justified as an attempt to curb illegal immigration, human 
trafficking or smuggling, these physical barriers reflect an ill-minded isolationist policy and 
represent, as a matter of fact, the prevailing malign political Weltanschauung in some corners 
of the world, which perceives migrants as a cultural and social threat that must be countered 
by whatever means necessary and views all asylum claims as baseless fantasies on the part 
of people conniving to bring chaos to the Western world. The culture of fear, with its deliri-
ous ruminations against ‘cosmopolitan elites’ and ‘foreign’ multiculturalism, and its most 
noxious rhetoric in favour of ‘our way of life’ and ‘identity politics’, has burst into the main-
stream.”75 
Pinto de Albuquerque probably oversteps the tasks assigned to him as a judge of 
the ECtHR on the bench of the M.A. and others v. Lithuania case, namely the inter-
pretation and application of the ECHR (see Article 32(1) ECHR). Although his plea 
could arguably be considered a breach of his duties, the judge demonstrates a very 
“high moral character”, as required by Article 21(1) ECHR. He points to several 
noteworthy developments that have been topic of research in numerous disciplines, 
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albeit not so much from law: hatred, threat, and fear of the ‘others’ that stand in 
opposition to ‘our’ identity. These are issues worth highlighting because of their po-
tential to negatively affect our society, a democratic order and the respect of human 
rights. The perceived threat of the ‘others’ is also one of the characteristics of violent 
clashes, among other before the outburst of genocides.76 The analysis of this chapter, 
by no means, has an intention to imply the imminent danger of a genocide. However, 
it concurs with the worries of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque on how issues of identity 
politics permeate the Weltanschauung of a growing number of individuals in Europe, 
and elsewhere.77 The pledge equally reveals a fear of a weakening ECtHR, a court 
that surrenders to developments of the political mainstream, a court whose jurispru-
dence reflects ‘our’ view of the ‘others’ that are not welcome to Europe. Of a court 
that becomes a part in the political game rather than remaining an independent pillar 
and the guardian of everyone’s human rights within the territories of the member 
States of the Council of Europe.  
6. – Migration, Human Rights, and Values 
The promotion and protection of human rights is at the heart of multilateralism, 
a central pillar of the UN system, and a core and founding value of the EU itself.78 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU or ‘Treaty of Lisbon’) 
vows to draw inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, from which the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of 
the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law have devel-
oped.79 Yet, do these ‘inalienable rights’ today apply to European citizens only and 
are the ‘universal values’ in fact regional values? This section will briefly explore 
the value system that underlies the European human rights regime and how it is in-
terpreted in the case-law of the courts. 
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The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of 
2016 (EU Global Strategy), a non-binding policy document, reconfirms the EU’s 
commitment to human rights as embossed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.80 
Albeit its vow to human rights, the EU Global Strategy, unlike earlier strategic doc-
uments, treats migration as a challenge and reveals the internal crisis that the EU is 
facing due to migration inflows. Research has shown that the Global Strategy pro-
vides different narratives of migration, for instance in connection with purported val-
ues.81 The Global Strategy even explicitly emphasises that “remaining true to our 
values is a matter of law as much as of ethics and identity”.82 Importantly, such value 
narratives are indicators of the community’s understanding of social relations and 
factors legitimising political decisions.83 Thus, the value system of strategic docu-
ments can influence the European polity, and, arguably, also its judiciary. The Global 
Strategy is so recent that it has not found its way into the case-law of the ECtHR or 
the CJEU. But it is not unlikely that either court, in the near future, will refer to the 
Global Strategy in a case that concerns migrants. By way of comparison, take, for 
instance, the ECtHR judgment in the case of Shindler v. UK. It scrutinises on more 
than five pages (of a total length of 39 pages) resolutions and recommendations of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe regarding migration issues. In 
addition, on  two more  pages, the judgment discusses the take of the Committee of 
Ministers on migration, globalisation, and development. Although the Parliamentary 
Assembly terms itself a “hotbed of ideas” and a “factory of radical ideas”,84 its rec-
ommendations can hardly be considered of a legal nature and, as such, not a source 
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of law for the ECtHR. The reference of the Court to political documents is problem-
atic. Not only does it interfere with the check and balances, as discussed above in 
section 3, the narratives of migration contained in such documents will in all proba-
bility be reflected in the case-law of the courts.85 
7. – Constructing a European Identity: ‘Otherness’ in the Case-law of 
the ECtHR 
Any law contains certain values and interests.86 Courts, in turn, interpret the re-
spective legislation by reference to the preparatory work in order to determine these 
underlying values. Yet, should courts even be legitimised to make value judgments, 
beyond the obvious intent of the drafters as manifested in the drafting history? The 
question arises whether the courts, in their legal reasoning, revert to values beyond 
the ones expressly stated by the drafters, such as inherent ‘European values’ that 
imply a difference between ‘us’ (Europeans) and ‘them’ (the others from beyond our 
borders).87There is also a possibility that the judges refer to ‘European values’ as the 
implicit values contained in the ECHR, values upon which the European human 
rights system was erected. From an interpretative point of view, such teleological 
approach is hardly debatable. However, a seemingly unresolvable issue arises: a ref-
erence to values that guided the drafting of the ECHR in 1950 might stand in contrast 
to a dynamic interpretation of today. At the same time, it should not be ruled out that 
a dynamic interpretation could reflect current anti-migratory sentiments, which, in 
return, stand in contrast to the original telos of the ECHR. 
The reasoning of the courts is, at times, based on moral rather than legal norms. 
While high morals are part and parcel of an international judge’s desirable charac-
teristics,88 there are (at least) two downsides to reverting to ethical arguments in a 
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judgment: first, moral standards are exposed to changing values and, second, due to 
the principle of legality the judges cannot build their legal arguments on moral stand-
ards that are not embossed in binding law. Two dissenting opinions to two judgments 
of the ECtHR exemplify these issues. They do, notably, not deal with issues of mi-
gration. Yet, since migration is an area that is bound to evoke issues of values, 
(in)justice, and ethics, similar challenges could arise. In his dissenting opinion in the 
case of Ždanoka v. Latvia, Judge Zupančič ferociously holds that the ECtHR “must 
take an unambiguous and unshakable moral stand on [aggression deriving from re-
gressive nationalism]”.89 In the view of the judge, inter-ethnic tolerance is a categor-
ical imperative of modernity and from intolerance too many violations of human 
rights derive.90 While his argument is important and laudable, he nonetheless does 
not base it on law, but rather on ethics, hence making it more susceptible to attacks. 
The second judgment is in the case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania. The minority judges 
Villiger, Power-Forde, Pinto de Albuquerque and Kūris cautioned against a too for-
malistic line of reasoning in the fight against impunity, because of the ECtHR’s role 
as “the conscience of Europe”.91 Yet, if judges do not apply the law formalistically, 
but rather based on conscience or ethics, their decisions become void of legitimacy. 
A weakening of the legitimacy risks entailing a lack of adherence to the law given 
that its application and interpretation is not foreseeable and not governed objectively 
or formalistically. Such unpredictability is not advisable. Because while in both cases 
above, the judges had the best of intentions in guarding the interest of the weaker or 
suppressed party, the pendulum might swing the other way and be detrimental, for 
example to migrant, who claim a breach of human rights before a court. 
Indeed, research indicates that the ECtHR in recent times has shown increased 
willingness to depart from its standard jurisprudence in order to accommodate the 
shifts in attitude of its fractured national audience.92 Whether this adjustment occurs 
as a response to the backlash against the Court or is an expression of a new realist 
jurisprudential attitude has yet to be determined.93 The nature of the ECHR as a living 
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instrument arguably enables an adaptation of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence to any pre-
sent-day conditions.94 Yet, if a change of values occurs at the level of the national 
constituencies, which in turn is mirrored in the respective elected governments, will 
the courts adjust their interpretation of the law accordingly, in order to accommodate 
‘modern’ ideas? What if these contemporary ideas contradict the original high stand-
ards of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties – and as such are 
detrimental to the rights of migrants? According to recent scholarship there is indeed 
a risk of a politicization of the ECtHR.95 Moreover, as indicated above, the intrinsic 
value narrative of many a political document will be reflected in the case-law of the 
Court by way of reference. Thus, the value question will become part of the legal 
interpretation of human rights law.96 With regard to migration, scholars have pointed 
to the incoherence and disharmony between a value-led polity and the respect of 
national, European, and international law that is central to the EU’s values; they 
identify a recent tendency of increasing restrictive legislation that “seem to pay lip 
service to largely shared fundamentals of international law (…), while instead serv-
ing the EU’s interests.97 Conversely, as discussed above in Section 4, if the EU and 
the Council of Europe streamline their (human rights) jurisprudence and pledge to 
respect the UN human rights regime, then international law is harmonised and, 
largely, builds on the same values. The question remains how susceptible these con-
structions are to a change in values. 
8. – Migration, Expatriation, Globalisation 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR reveals a paradox: some judgments, in discuss-
ing expatriation and migration, emphasize their positive aspects on globalisation. 
Yet, these positive sides are seemingly limited to pan-European movements of indi-
viduals only. For instance, in the case of Shindler vs. The United Kingdom, the EC-
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tHR holds that “expatriation could be a positive effect of globalisation that contrib-
uted to building diverse, tolerant and multicultural societies”.98 Is the globalism that 
the Court refers to limited to Europe only and, in the interpretation of the Court, is 
globalism a regional development rather than a global one? Expatriation within Eu-
rope is associated with a dynamic, modern, positive, and economic development, 
while expatriation from beyond Europe’s borders is perceived as a threat. It might 
seem as though migration, expatriation, and globalisation are considered positive if 
related to citizens of the EU Member States. The migration of EU citizens is, notably, 
protected under the rights of free movement (Article 45 TFEU). Yet, the court does 
not stop with the acknowledgment of this fundamental right. Rather, the Court ap-
plies a string of positively loaded words like ‘opportunities’, ‘multi-culturalism’, 
‘tolerant’ in its discussion of the movement of individuals within the legal boundaries 
of Europe.99 Several scholars, however, raise concerns of the not only positive effects 
of globalisation. Arjun Appadurai, for instance, stresses that globalisation exacer-
bates uncertainties where the lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ have been blurred. He 
points to a development of two Europes: the inclusive and multicultural one, and the 
anxious xenophobic other one, in which minorities activate worries about belong-
ing.100 In his dissenting opinion in the above-mentioned case of Ždanoka v. Latvia, 
Judge Zupančič choses to accentuate the negative effects of globalisation. In refer-
ence to the Harvard legal scholar, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, the judge asserts that 
the current developments of preserving national identity (or nationalism) are a reac-
tion to globalisation. Zupančič equally discerns a parallel trend of more aggressive 
attitudes towards minorities in a society, such as the Roma in Bulgaria (Nachova and 
Others v. Bulgaria), the Serbians in Croatia (Blečić v. Croatia), and immigrant work-
ers in Germany and France. He concludes that in “many of these realms, we detect 
the unhealthy trend from [sic] patriotism on the one hand, to nationalism, chauvinism 
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and racism on the other”.101 Thus, although migration within the borders of Europe 
is associated with (economic) prosperity and a paradoxical construct of ‘regional 
globalism’, the downside of peoples’ movements, particularly if they are perceived 
as members of a minority group of ‘other’ Europeans, is incontestable. 
9. – Conclusion 
“If nationality is the mirror image of citizenship which defines the individual in 
international law (...), to what extent can citizenship of the [European] Union be con-
sidered to have such an identity?”, asks Elspeth Guild.102 Traditionally, citizenship 
has been attached to the belonging to a nation State, defined by its stable territory, 
sovereignty, and population.103 This belonging entailed a number of rights and duties 
of the individuals and formed their collective national identity.104 At the same time, 
this national citizenship – by a territorially bound population – also defined who was 
excluded therefrom. The borders that delimit a national as well as a regional belong-
ing, inevitably contain a system of exclusion.105 This chapter examined several as-
pects of (non-) belonging to Europe, the identity of Europe, and the creation of Eu-
ropeanness within the jurisprudence of the European regional courts. In particular, 
this chapter worked with a hypothesis that the European regional courts are influ-
enced by the current political sentiments and, as such, reflect value judgments against 
migrants in their judgments. The case-law coming out of the European regional 
courts does, so far, not openly discuss migrants as the ‘others’. It also refrains from 
deliberating on common European values and thereby tries to function as a bulwark 
against exclusionism: However, there are a number of indications that call for atten-
tion. The detrimental effect of the ECtHR jurisprudence on migrants is particularly 
apparent in the area of immigration control, where States enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation, and where the human rights of migrants are curtailed on behalf of State 
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sovereignty.106 The European courts’ current jurisprudence does, unfortunately, not 
“offer a reliably effective venue for promoting migrant rights”.107 The fact that dis-
senting and concurring judges in separate opinions fervently urge the ECtHR to resist 
the treatment of migrants as ‘others’ in their case-law, points to the Court’s suscep-
tibility to political pressure.108 At the same time, the judges have to maintain strict 
adherence to the law under their jurisdiction only, without surrendering to (purely) 
ethical arguments, no matter how passionate they are about the matter at hand. The 
high legal standards and the legitimacy of the courts are at risk if the judges cross the 
boundaries assigned to them. It remains to be seen how the courts will manage the 
balancing act between their judicial impartiality, the expectation of the constituency, 
and the aim of being ‘the lighthouse for those who seek protection’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106
 For a in-depth discussion of ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence and how the judgments provide dif-
ferent levels of protection to migrants, see: BAUMGÄRTEL, cit. supra note 6, p. 46 ff., and 101 ff.; ALAN, 
“The Private Life of Family Matters: Curtailing Human Rights Protection for Migrants under Article 8 of 
the ECHR?”, European Journal of International Law, 2018, pp. 261-265; DEMBOUR, “Human Rights Law 
and the National Sovereignty in Collusion: The Plight of Quasi-Nationals at Strasbourg”, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, 2003, pp. 68-69. For a (short) discussion of CJEU case-law, see, COSTELLO, 
“European Justice for Migrants and Refugees”, 14 June 2015, available at: <https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-
ropean-justice-for-migrants-and-refugees-2/>. 
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 For a partial confirmation, ibid. 
BRUNO, PALOMBINO, DI STEFANO (eds.), Migration Issues before International Courts and Tribunals, Rome, CNR 
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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction – 2. The Application before the ECtHR – 3. Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion and the Concept of ‘Overall Effective Control’ on the High Seas – 4. Attribution of 
Conduct and the Allocation of Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts – 5. Con-
cluding Remarks. 
 
1. – Introduction 
On 8 May 2018, the Global Legal Action Network (‘GLAN’) and the Association 
for Juridical Studies on Immigration (‘ASGI’) filed an application before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) concerning an incident which had taken 
place off the coast of Libya on 6 November 2017.1 The applicants, in particular, were 
sixteen Nigerian nationals and one Ghanaian national, two of which also applied on 
behalf of their deceased children. The application submitted that on the mentioned 
date a rescue operation directed at approximately 150 migrants on board of a rubber 
 
1
 European Court of Human Rights, S.S. and Others v. Italy, Application No. 21660/18, Communicated 
Case, 26 June 2019. The content of the application was also illustrated during a press release held on 8 
May 2018 at the Foreign Press Association in Rome. The video of the press release is available at: 
<https://www.asgi.it/allontamento-espulsione/respingimenti-libia-ricorso-cedu/>. The author’s observa-
tions concerning the content of the application and its legal reasoning should be understood as referred to 
the communicated case itself and to what was presented in this press release. 
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dinghy - carried out by the non-governmental organisation (‘NGO’) ship Sea Watch 
3 - had been hindered by the Libyan Coast Guard. The intervention of the latter had 
been coordinated by the Italian Coast Guard’s Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(‘IMRCC’). It was argued that during this incident at least twenty migrants had died, 
and that some of them had been brought back to Libya where they had suffered seri-
ous physical harm. The application alleged, among other claims, Italy’s responsibil-
ity for breaches of the right to life and of the prohibition of torture, inhuman or de-
grading treatment respectively under Arts. 2 and 3 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (‘ECHR’).  
This chapter reflects on two main issues of international law raised by this appli-
cation, namely, jurisdiction and attribution of conduct. These questions are crucial 
in a case such as the one at hand, which presents some new elements in comparison 
to what the ECtHR has examined so far. As will be illustrated in detail in this chapter, 
the events at issue occurred outside of Italy’s SAR zone and in fact most likely out-
side of any State’s SAR zone. Moreover, the involvement of Italian authorities in 
this case did not entail any direct contact with intercepted migrants but only consisted 
in coordination activities carried out by the IMRCC on land. The ECtHR, therefore, 
will be required to determine whether the events submitted by the application oc-
curred within Italy’s jurisdiction, and whether relevant conducts can be attributed to 
Italy for the purpose of establishing its responsibility for the alleged human rights 
violations. In this light, a first part of this chapter will be devoted to the question of 
jurisdiction. This section will consider whether Italy’s jurisdiction may be estab-
lished on the grounds of the models of extraterritorial jurisdiction elaborated by the 
ECtHR in its jurisprudence. A special attention in this context will be paid to the 
meaning and scope of the notion of effective control as understood by the ECtHR 
itself. A second part of the chapter, then, will critically examine the possibility to 
attribute conducts of the Libyan coastguard to Italian authorities and more broadly 
the question of allocation of responsibility in the context of multi-State interception 
activities on the high seas. To this end, this section will particularly focus on the 
concept of intent within the definition of aid or assistance under Article 16 of the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts 
(‘ARSIWA’). Lastly, some final conclusions will be drawn. Regardless of the out-
come of the specific application under comment, questions of jurisdiction, attribution 
and allocation of responsibility will be posed with increasing frequency and urgency 
in the near future. The increasing diversity of actors involved in search and rescue 
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activities as well as in interception on the high seas for purposes of contrast of mi-
grant smuggling and trafficking of human beings suggest the need for a serious and 
continuous reflection on these issues whenever human rights violations are commit-
ted in these contexts.  
2. – The Application before the ECtHR 
According to the application under review, on 6 November 2017 the IMRCC 
received a distress signalisation from a rubber dinghy off the territorial waters of 
Libya and within its contiguous zone. The applicants were on board of the dinghy. 
The Sea Watch 3, a ship belonging to its eponymous NGO Sea Watch, was author-
ised by the IMRCC to approach the dinghy and rescue those on board. According to 
a Report by Forensic Oceanography,2 the Italian coastguard communicated the posi-
tion of the dinghy to the Sea Watch and warned it to proceed with caution because 
the Libyan coastguard (which had been equally notified by the IMRCC) was also 
present nearby with its ship Ras Jadir. When the Sea Watch came close to the dinghy, 
which in the meantime had started to sink, the Libyan coastguard contacted the Sea 
Watch 3 to inform them that they had on-scene command. The Sea Watch refused to 
suspend its rescue operation. While Sea Watch 3’s rigid hull inflatable boats 
(‘RHIBS’) were approaching persons who had fallen in the water, the Libyan coast-
guard agents started to take persons on board of the Ras Jadir from the sinking din-
ghy. The Report submits that during these rescue activities persons on board of the 
dinghy experienced difficulties in staying out of the water, and that at least one per-
son drowned in an attempt to reach the RHIBS and escape from the Ras Jadir. Ac-
cording to the Report, at least twenty people died before and during the rescue oper-
ation. Fifteen of the applicants, some of which escaped from the Ras Jadir, managed 
to board the Sea Watch 3. The other two applicants remained on the Ras Jadir. They 
reported being beaten and threatened by the crew, and later on taken to a detention 
camp in Libya where they were subjected to violence and ill-treatment before being 
sent back to Nigeria.  
 
2
 Forensic Oceanography (Forensic Architecture agency), Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s unde-
clared operation to stem migration across the Mediterranean, Goldsmiths, University of London, May 
2018, available at: https://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/sea-watch/#toggle-id-3. The application be-
fore the ECtHR under review submitted evidence from this Report. Accordingly, the facts of the case as 
discussed in this chapter were extracted not only from the communicated case before the ECtHR but also 
from the description of relevant events in the Report.  
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The application submitted to the ECtHR that Italy was responsible for the viola-
tion of several human rights recognised by the ECHR, and in particular of the right 
to life under Article 2 ECHR as well as of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3 ECHR and of the prohibition of slavery under Article 4 
ECHR. Among other allegations, all of the applicants argue that by allowing the Ras 
Jadir to take part to the rescue operations, the Italian authorities put their lives in 
jeopardy and exposed them to the risk of suffering from ill-treatment at the hands of 
the Ras Jadir crew, as well as to that of being sent back to Libya and being subjected 
to inhuman and degrading treatment and to slavery. The group of applicants who had 
boarded the Ras Jadir submit that they had been subjected to ill-treatment by its 
crew. Lastly, two of the applicants allege that they had been illegally refouled to 
Libya where they were subjected to torture as well as inhuman and degrading treat-
ment in breach of Arts. 3 ECHR and Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR. 
Before examining the merits of the application, it will be necessary for the EC-
tHR to determine whether either the spatial or the personal model allow it to conclude 
that the relevant conducts occurred within Italy’s jurisdiction. Beyond its substantive 
aspects concerning the existence of breaches of the abovementioned ECHR provi-
sions, there are two preliminary and crucial matters of interest raised by application 
under review – namely, the questions of attribution and of jurisdiction. First, the 
ECtHR will be required to establish Italy’s jurisdiction over the alleged facts. Under 
Article 1 ECHR, State Parties must secure the rights and freedoms established in the 
ECHR “to everyone within their jurisdiction”. Second, the ECtHR will need to de-
termine whether the conducts allegedly in breach of Arts. 2, 3 and 4 ECHR are at-
tributable to Italy, and thus whether Italy bears responsibility for the actions of the 
Libyan coastguard agents in the events at issue. 
The application under review does not appear to separate questions of jurisdiction 
from those of attribution. Instead, it merges jurisdiction and attribution, arguing that 
Italian jurisdiction and its responsibility can be established on the grounds of the 
effective control exercised by Italian authorities over the facts that constituted a vi-
olation of its obligations under Arts. 2, 3 and 4 ECHR. In particular, in the applicants’ 
view Italian authorities exercised effective control because the IMRCC carried out 
the overall coordination of the actions of the involved naval units. Indeed, the 
IMRCC had alerted all naval units close the rubber dinghy in distress and had asked 
the Libyan coastguard to assume on-scene coordination. Moreover, the application 
argues that Italy retained effective control over interdiction at sea as well as search 
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and rescue activities on the grounds of legal and financial means. In particular, the 
application recalls the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Italy and Libya, 
which envisaged that Italy would provide assets to the Libyan coastguard as well as 
training to its personnel. The application also highlights in this context that in re-
sponse to requests by Libya to strengthen the operational capacities of its coastguard, 
Italy extended the Operation Mare Sicuro through the establishment of Operation 
Nauras and the creation of a vessel harboured in Tripoli which the application qual-
ified as a floating IMRCC for Libya. Therefore, in the applicants’ view Italy exer-
cised overall effective control over the Libyan coastguard’s search and rescue activ-
ities, since the latter was fully dependent on Italy’s financial support.  
In support of this argumentation, the application refers to the ECtHR judgments 
of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom3 and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy.4 
In the Al-Skeini judgment, the ECtHR found that the United Kingdom had jurisdic-
tion over the actions of its troops in Iraq during the period of time between the re-
moval from power of the Ba’ath regime and the accession of the interim Iraqi gov-
ernment. Among the various criteria for the recognition of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, the ECtHR referred to state agent authority. Indeed, at the time of the events the 
United Kingdom had assumed the exercise of some of the public powers normally 
exercised by a sovereign government – namely, the authority and responsibility for 
the maintenance of security in south-east Iraq. Because in such circumstances British 
soldiers exercised control and authority over individuals who had been killed during 
security operations, these events fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. 
The criterion of state agent authority and control was also recalled in Hirsi Jamaa. 
Here, indeed, the ECtHR recalled the well-established principle in its jurisprudence 
whereby state agent authority and control is identifiable with respect to acts carried 
out on board of vessels flying that State’s flag. In this judgment the ECtHR also 
rejected Italy’s view that the control exercised by its authorities had been minimal 
and thus insufficient to justify jurisdiction. In the ECtHR’s view, the applicants had 
been under the “continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian 
authorities”5 from the moment they had boarded Italian armed forces’ ships to the 
moment when they were handed over to Libyan authorities, regardless of the nature 
 
3
 European Court of Human Rights, Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 
55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011. 
4
 Id., Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012. 
5
 Ibid., para. 81. 
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and purpose of the intervention of Italian ships on the high seas. 
The merging of questions of jurisdiction and attribution in the application under 
review is not surprising. In fact, the ECtHR itself has often failed to distinguish be-
tween these aspects. In the vast majority of its judgments, this was due to the fact 
that the facts of the case did not raise specific problems of attribution. In these cases, 
the ECtHR’s recognition of state responsibility for breaches of human rights pro-
tected by the ECHR implied the assessment that relevant conducts were attributable 
to that State.6 Yet, the application under review is likely to stand out from the gener-
ality of cases presented to the ECtHR. One of its most striking peculiarities lies in 
the clear distinction between questions of jurisdiction and questions of attribution 
raised by the fact of the case. Differently than in the judgments which the application 
itself recalls (namely, Al-Skeini and Hirsi Jamaa), in the present case the lamented 
conduct of the State does not consist in actions or omissions of state organs. More 
specifically, both the Al-Skeini and the Hirsi Jamaa judgments concerned actions 
directly carried out by state agents (respectively, members of the British armed 
forces in Iraq and Italian military personnel on board of vessels of Italian armed 
forces). While the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the respondent States 
was analysed by the ECtHR in both judgments, there was clearly no issue of attrib-
ution. Therefore, this question remained in the foreground. In the application under 
review, instead, it will be appropriate to deal with the matter of attribution as a sep-
arate question from that of jurisdiction. Indeed, this application appears to rest on the 
argumentation that Italy is responsible for the conduct not of its own agents or organs 
but for the conduct of the Libyan coastguard. This responsibility is grounded in the 
application on the financial and logistical support of Italy to the Libyan coastguard’s 
activities and on the IMRCC’s coordination of rescue activities on the high seas, 
which allegedly suggest that Italian authorities exercised overall control over the 
conducts under comment. 
In examining this case, then, the ECtHR should be careful to distinguish the ques-
tion of jurisdiction (and thus of whether relevant conducts occurred within Italian 
jurisdiction on the grounds of effective control or state agent authority) from that of 
 
6
 MILANOVIC, “Jurisdiction and Responsibility: Trends in the Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court”, 
in VAN AAKEN and MOTOC (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights and General International 
Law, Oxford, 2018, pp. 103-107; BESSON, “Concurrent Responsibilities under the European Convention 
on Human Rights: The Concurrence of Human Rights Jurisdictions, Duties and Responsibilities”, in VAN 
AAKEN and MOTOC (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law, 
Oxford, 2018, pp. 157- 158. 
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attribution and allocation of responsibility (and thus of whether the conduct of the 
Libyan coastguard agents can be considered as a conduct of Italian authorities). This 
distinction is not simply conceptual. Rather, the two concepts of jurisdiction and at-
tribution raise different questions as to the State’s effective control over the actions 
of individuals. This chapter will delve into such questions. Paragraph 3 will enquire 
on the possibility to establish Italian jurisdiction on the grounds of the criterion of 
effective control. In search of an answer to this question, it will examine available 
legal and policy sources as well as the specific circumstances of the incident under 
consideration. Paragraph 4 will reflect on the applicability of criteria of attribution 
and allocation of responsibility established by ARSIWA to the incident under re-
view. In particular, it will reflect on the concepts of direction and control under Ar-
ticle 8 ARSIWA and on the appropriateness of this framework as a ground of allo-
cation of responsibility to Italian authorities. 
3. – Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Concept of ‘Overall Effective 
Control’ on the High Seas 
The ECtHR has faced the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction on many occa-
sions. From its jurisprudence, it emerges clearly that while territorial jurisdiction is 
the norm, extraterritorial jurisdiction of a State may be recognised exceptionally on 
the grounds of two main criteria – namely, ‘state agent authority and control’ and 
‘effective control’.7 These two grounds for the recognition of extraterritorial juris-
diction have also been qualified respectively as the “personal model” and the “spatial 
model”.8 In other words, the ECtHR has recognised that certain acts committed by 
state agents outside the territory of that State must be considered within its jurisdic-
tion when the State exercises authority and control over individuals (the personal 
model) or when the State exercises effective control over the territory or area where 
relevant actions took place (the territorial model).  
In cases concerning the interception of vessels by a State outside of its territorial 
waters, the ECtHR has recognised this State’s jurisdiction on the grounds of the per-
 
7
 KIM, “Non-Refoulement and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: State Sovereignty and Migration Controls 
at Sea in the European Context”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 2017, p. 48 ff. 
8
 MILANOVIC, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, 
Oxford, 2011, pp. 127- 199. 
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sonal model. In the abovementioned Hirsi Jamaa judgment, the ECtHR rejected It-
aly’s view that its authorities had exercised such a minimal control over the discussed 
events that these could not be considered as falling within its jurisdiction. In response 
to this argumentation, the ECtHR observed that the applicants had been “under the 
continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities”,9 and 
thus the events at issue occurred within its jurisdiction. Similarly, in the judgment of 
Medvedyev and Others v. France10 (which concerned the interception of a vessel sus-
pected of illegally carrying drugs) the ECtHR held that the events at issue had oc-
curred within French jurisdiction. In support of this conclusion, the ECtHR recalled 
that France had retained “full and exclusive control” over the intercepted vessel and 
its crew “in a continuous and uninterrupted manner” from the time of interception to 
that of their trial in France.11 Therefore, the applicants had been “effectively within 
France’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention”.12 
One fundamental feature of the events analysed by the ECtHR in Hirsi Jamaa and 
Medvedyev, however, sets them apart from those at issue in the application under re-
view. These judgments concerned acts of interception carried out directly by state au-
thorities, albeit outside of their respective States’ territorial waters. In the case under 
comment, on the other hand, the conduct considered to be incompatible with the rights 
enshrined in the ECHR was carried out by the authorities of a State (Libya) which is 
not the respondent State before the ECtHR. By recalling the Hirsi judgment, this ap-
plication appears to argue that the personal model of jurisdiction may also ground Ital-
ian jurisdiction over acts of the Libyan coastguard on the high seas. To reach this con-
clusion, however, it is necessary to establish that Italian authorities exercised effective 
control over intercepted migrants through the coordination activities of the IMRCC. 
As discussed in the previous paragraph of this chapter, in support of this interpretation 
the application recalls the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya 
(‘MOU’) as well as the financial support of the former to the latter. The MOU was 
signed on 2 February 2017 by Italy and by the Libyan Government of National Accord. 
Its Article 1 establishes, among other things, both Parties’ obligation to initiate coop-
eration activities to stem “illegal migration fluxes” as well as Italy’s commitment to 
provide technical and technologic support to the Libyan institutions in charge of the 
 
9
 See European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa case, cit. supra note 4, para. 81. 
10
 Id., Medvedyev and Others v. France, Application No. 3394/03, Judgment of 29 March 2010. 
11
 Ibid., para. 67. 
12
 Ibid.. 
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fight against irregular migration, including the Libyan coastguard. Moreover, Article 
4 includes a general obligation for Italy to finance the initiatives mentioned in the 
MOU or those proposed by a mixed committee composed by an equal number of mem-
bers for both parties. According to Article 4, this financing cannot entail any additional 
expenses beyond those already envisaged within Italy’s budget, but Italian authorities 
may use available EU funding for this purpose. It is also important to recall that the 
adoption of the MOU was presented in its Preamble as also aimed at the implementa-
tion of Article 19 of the Treaty of Friendship between Italy and Libya of 2008.13 This 
provision in particular is devoted to the cooperation between Italy and Libya on the 
fight against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and irregular migration. With 
reference to irregular migration, it envisages the creation of a system of control over 
the land border of Libya as well as a cooperation between the Parties in the definition 
of initiatives aimed at the prevention of irregular migration within countries of origin. 
At domestic level, in 2017 the Italian Government adopted two decisions concerning 
its support to the Libyan coastguard. On 14 January 2017, the Government established 
Italy’s participation through military personnel and financial support to a bilateral mis-
sion of assistance by the Italian coastguard to the Libyan one with the aim to contrast 
irregular migration and trafficking of human beings.14 With a second decision on 28 
July 2017, the Italian Government responded to the request of support by the Libyan 
Government of National accord. The decision granted this support “to the Libyan se-
curity forces for the activities of control and contrast of irregular migration and traf-
ficking of human beings”. For this purpose, it reallocated naval and air units originally 
deployed in the context of the Mare Sicuro Operation and assigned them the task 
(among others) of carrying out “connection and consulting activities in favour of the 
Libyan Navy coastguard”. The decision also envisaged the establishment of a maritime 
 
13
 Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between the Republic of Italy and the Great So-
cialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, signed on August 30th 2008 and ratified by Italy with law No. 7 
of 6 February 2009, G.U. No. 40 of 18 February 2009. 
14
 Deliberazione del Consiglio dei ministri, Autorizzazioni e proroghe di missioni internazionali, 14 
January 2017, DOC. CCL n. 1, pp. 37-38.  The decision clarified that these measures were adopted to 
implement the Protocol for cooperation between Italy and Libya of 29 December 2007 on irregular migra-
tion and trafficking of human beings as well as the Additional Technical-Operational Protocol of 29 De-
cember 2009 concerning training activities for the Libyan coastguard as well as patrolling on board of naval 
units donated by the Italian Government.  
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operational centre on Libyan territory entrusted with the task of coordinating joint ac-
tivities.15 
The legal framework described so far envisages generic duties of support for Italy 
in relation to the Libyan coastguard as well as specific obligations of financial sup-
port voluntarily taken on by Italy for the purpose of reinforcing the Libyan coast-
guard’s operational capacity in relation to the contrast of irregular migration and hu-
man trafficking at sea. From a strictly legal point of view, therefore, nothing in this 
framework appears to suggest the exercise of effective control by Italian authorities 
over the activities of the Libyan coastguard. Italy’s logistic and financial support to 
the Libyan coastguard does not seem to be formally subject to any precondition, least 
of all the exercise of some form of operational control or command by Italian au-
thorities over the latter’s activities. 
Nonetheless, one may also argue that in presence of certain factual elements the 
conduct of Italian authorities could amount to an exercise of effective control. This 
interpretation might be possible, but the crucial hurdle of the absence of physical 
custody in the present case should be taken into careful consideration. Indeed, the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence so far suggests that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion can be established when national authorities have direct physical custody of in-
volved individuals. The same conclusion may not necessarily be reached in case of 
indirect involvement of the same State in the context of joint operations or in case of 
support of patrolling activities by third States.16 
To overcome this obstacle, several solutions have been tentatively proposed. For 
instance, it has been argued that the personal model and thus the criterion of state 
agent authority and control might be applicable to cases of substantial participation 
of a State to a joint operation. More specifically, according to this construction the 
deployment of large assets by a State has been considered as an exercise of a suffi-
cient degree of control to satisfy the threshold of the exercise of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction as understood by the ECtHR.17 An alternative proposition suggests that the 
 
15
 For a thorough review of the decisions by the Italian Government, see MANCINI, “Italy’s New Mi-
gration Control Policy: Stemming the Flow of Migrants from Libya Without Regard for their Human 
Rights”, Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2017, p. 259 ff. 
16
 See KIM, cit. supra note 7, pp. 61-63. See also GIUFFRÈ, “State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What 
Legal Basis for Italy’s Push-backs to Libya?”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2013, p. 692 ff. 
17
 FINK, Frontex and Human Rights: Responsibility in 'Multi-Actor Situations' Under the ECHR and 
EU Public Liability Law, Oxford, 2018, pp. 157-161, who also cautions on the need for the ECtHR to adopt 
a more lenient approach in order for this model to be feasible. 
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exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be recognised whenever the State has 
the power to decide on the admission of foreigners on its territory, even when the 
procedures for authorisation to enter the national territory occur outside said terri-
tory.18 According to this view, Italian jurisdiction should be recognised whenever the 
IMRCC instructs NGO vessels to stand down and communicates the position of 
boats in distress to the Libyan coastguard, because the IMRCC has jurisdiction to 
decide which unit should carry out rescue activities and to determine a safe port of 
disembarkation.19 This interpretation, however, would require the ECtHR to take fur-
ther steps towards a more extensive understanding of extraterritorial application than 
the adopted so far in its jurisprudence. Indeed, it is true that in the case of Kebe and 
Others v. Ukraine20 (on which this theory relies) the ECtHR recognised Ukraine’s 
jurisdiction over an Eritrean asylum seeker on board of a Maltese vessel on the 
grounds of the respondent State’s exercise of its power to control the entry of for-
eigners on its territory. However, in this case there was hardly any question of extra-
territorial jurisdiction in the first place, since the State’s border guards had boarded 
the vessel (which was docked in a Ukrainian port) and had met with the applicant. 
In fact, the question of jurisdiction was relatively uncontroversial between the par-
ties, because both had agreed that from the moment the border guards had embarked 
the vessel the applicants had been under Ukrainian jurisdiction. 
These observations point to the difficulty of identifying the exercise of jurisdic-
tion in the context of joint operations on the high seas – regardless of whether they 
are aimed at search and rescue, push-back or pull-back of irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers. In the light of the ECtHR’s persistent focus on physical custody, the 
definition of the minimum threshold of control from a distance for the purpose of 
establishing the presence of effective control and thus the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion appears as a difficult task. This is more attributable to the novelty of the case 
under comment than to a clearly identifiable willingness of the ECtHR to establish 
effective control exclusively on the grounds of physical presence. The case under 
review is likely to raise new questions before the ECtHR, concerning the necessary 
degree of involvement of state authorities in joint operations on the high seas were 
 
18
 DE VITTOR, “Responsabilità degli Stati e dell’Unione europea nella conclusione e nell’esecuzione 
di ’accordi’ per il controllo extraterritoriale della migrazione”, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2018, 
p. 5 ff. 
19
 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
20
 European Court of Human Rights, Kebe and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 12552/12, Judg-
ment of 12 January 2017. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Fulvia Staiano 
 
 
national units are not directly deployed for the purpose of identifying that State’s 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. With this respect, it should also be noted that 
a further novelty of the case at hand concerns the fact that the vessel in distress was 
not only outside the Italian Search and Rescue region (‘SAR region) but possibly 
also outside any State’s SAR region. Indeed, at the time of events Libya had notified 
its designation of a SAR region to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
However, both the existence of this Region as well as of the Libyan Rescue Coordi-
nation Centre were not officially reported by the IMO until June of 2018. Therefore, 
the facts of the case occurred in the context of an uncertain situation concerning the 
applicable legal framework.21 In the context of a decision concerning a different mat-
ter, the Tribunal of Ragusa rejected an argumentation concerning the illegitimacy of 
the assumption of on-scene coordination by the Libyan Coastguard on the grounds 
of the lack of an officially recognised Libyan SAR region. In the Tribunal’s view, 
the unilateral declaration of a SAR region by coastal States was accepted in state 
practice as sufficient to establish it for all legal purposes, regardless of its publicity 
by the IMO.  Therefore, it concluded that the Libyan coastguard bore the responsi-
bility of the coordination of rescue operations, regardless of the IMRCC initial com-
munications to an NGO vessel.22 
In the light of these observations, it remains to be seen whether the ECtHR will 
recognise that the facts of the case occurred under Italy’s jurisdiction. Even in case 
of a positive answer, however, the ECtHR will still need to determine whether rele-
vant conducts which in the applicants’ view amounted to violations of their human 
rights could be attributed to Italian authorities. The next paragraph will delve into 
this question, enquiring on the possibility to qualify Italy’s actions as a form of aid 
or assistance to the wrongful conduct of the Libyan coastguard. To do so, it will refer 
to some of the principles enshrined in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for International Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). 
4. – Attribution of Conduct and the Allocation of Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 
The application under review also raises important questions of attribution and 
allocation of responsibility for violations of human rights occurred in the context of 
 
21
 CILIBERTO, “Libya’s Pull-Backs of Boat Migrants: Can Italy Be Held Accountable for Violations of 
International Law?”, The Italian Law Journal, 2019, p. 489 ff., p. 506. 
22
 Tribunal of Ragusa, decision of 16 April 2014, pp. 13-14. 
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multi-State operations. The applicants in this case ultimately seem to argue that the 
conduct of Libyan authorities during the incident at issue (which they believe to be 
contrary to their right to life, to the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment and to the prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced labour) is attributa-
ble to Italy on the grounds of the coordination activities carried out by the IMRCC. 
As clarified above, this argumentation is merged with that concerning Italian juris-
diction and is grounded mainly on the effective control allegedly exercised by Italy 
over the conduct of the Libyan coastguard on the high seas. Nonetheless, the matter 
of attribution and allocation of responsibility raises different questions than that of 
jurisdiction. This paragraph will reflect in particular on the possibility to recognise 
Italy’s responsibility for the violations of the ECHR lamented in the application 
within the framework of ARSIWA. 
A first possibility for the recognition of Italy’s responsibility in the case at issue 
would be that of qualifying the Libyan coastguard as placed at the disposal of Italian 
authorities and of the IMRCC in particular. In this case, Article 6 ARSIWA would 
apply. According to this provision, the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of 
a State by another State must be considered as act of the former State, provided that 
this organ acts in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the former 
State. The potential applicability of this framework was actually analysed by the EC-
tHR in the case of Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania,23 which rejected this 
possibility. This case concerned an alleged breach of Article 2 ECHR in relation to 
the death of Albanian migrants on board of a vessel who had sank due to a collision 
off the Italian territorial waters with an Italian warship that was attempting to board 
and search it. The ECtHR considered the case inadmissible. In its view, the conduct 
of Italian authorities could not be attributed to Albania merely on the grounds of 
bilateral agreements between these States which (among other things) envisaged a 
naval blockade and authorised Italian military ships to board and search in interna-
tional waters all vessels that transported Albanian citizens who had eluded controls 
in Albania. This case is also explicitly recalled in the Commentary to ARSIWA by 
the International Law Commission, to clarify that Article 6 does not apply to “ordi-
 
23
 European Court of Human Rights, Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania, Application No. 
39473/98, Decision on Admissibility of 11 January 2011. 
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nary situations of inter-State cooperation or collaboration, pursuant to treaty or oth-
erwise”.24 The Commentary indeed  explains that in order to be considered as placed 
at the disposal of another State, an organ of a State must act under the exclusive 
direction and control of the former State and not on instructions from the sending 
State. It is clear that in the International Law Commission’s view the participation 
of a State to joint operations is not in itself sufficient to satisfy this threshold. 
Another possible framework for the recognition of Italy’s responsibility in the 
case under review could be provided by Article 16 ARSIWA. The latter establishes 
the responsibility of a State for aiding or assisting another State in the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act in presence of two conditions. First, the aiding or 
assisting State must have knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act. Second, the act must be contrary to international obligations of the 
aiding or assisting State, in the sense that the act would be internationally wrongful 
if committed by that State. The Commentary to Article 16 clarifies that in order for 
the responsibility of the aiding or assisting State to be recognised, “the aid or assis-
tance must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of the wrongful act, 
and must actually do so”. According to the Commentary, this requirement refers to 
the fact that the aiding or assisting State will only be responsible under Article 16 
ARSIWA if it intends to facilitate the commission of the wrongful act by another 
State, which then actually commits it. The aid or assistance does not need to be es-
sential, and can simply constitute a significant contribution to the wrongful act.  
Among the requirements of Article 16 ARSIWA, this element of intentionality 
presents the hardest challenges to the recognition of Italy’s responsibility in the con-
text of the events at issue. Before delving into this question, however, a brief exam-
ination of the other, less controversial elements of the conduct described by Article 
16 is in order. First, in order for Article 16 to apply it will be necessary to identify 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the aided or assisted State – in 
the case under review, Libya. This State is evidently not a Party to the ECHR, and is 
therefore not bound to respect the obligations enshrined therein. However, at least 
some of the human rights recalled in the application under comment, such as the 
right to life and the prohibition of torture, enjoy the status of norms of customary law 
 
24
 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts, with commentaries, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, 
p. 44. 
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or even of peremptory norms of international law and therefore they are binding on 
all States, including of course Libya.25 Second, in order for Article 16 ARSIWA to 
apply it will be necessary to demonstrate that Italy was aware of circumstances that 
made the conduct of Libya an internationally wrongful act and thus of the circum-
stances in which its aid or assistance would be used by Libya. With this respect, it is 
important to recall that in Hirsi Jamaa the ECtHR found Italy in breach of Article 3 
ECHR because the Italian authorities had returned migrants intercepted on the high 
seas to Libya despite being fully aware that they would be exposed to a real risk of 
ill-treatment. To assess knowledge of this risk, the ECtHR took into consideration a 
number of reports from international and non-governmental organisations highlight-
ing the dire living and detention conditions of irregular migrants in Libya. With re-
spect to the case under review, it is sufficient to recall that further reports concerning 
the situation of irregular migrants in Libya have highlighted that similar situations 
persisted at the time when the incident of 6 November 2017 occurred.26 Third, Article 
16 ARSIWA would require proof that the conducts of the Libyan coastguard would 
be internationally wrongful if committed by Italy itself. There is little doubt that the 
obligation to respect the right to life, to prohibition of torture or inhuman and de-
grading treatment as well as the prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced labour 
bound Italy as a Party to the ECHR. From this point of view, it would then be nec-
essary to prove that had Italy carried out the same behaviour submitted by the appli-
cants in the present case, this conduct would have breached this obligation. By using 
the Report submitted by Forensic Architecture in relation to the circumstances of the 
events of 6 November 2017, the applicants would have to demonstrate that the Lib-
yan coastguard put rescued migrants’ life at risk through dangerous manoeuvres, or 
that it had put in place violent behaviour towards migrants taken on board. 
In sum, the question of Italy’s awareness of the circumstances in which its aid or 
assistance is used by the Libyan authorities, and that of the existence of international 
 
25
 See for instance DIMITRIJEVIC, Customary Law as an Instrument for the Protection of Human Rights, 
ISPI Working Papers, 2006, available at: <https://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/wp_7_2006.pdf>; DE 
WET, “The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and Its Implications for National 
and Customary Law”, European Journal of International Law, 2004, p. 97 ff. 
26
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights - United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 
Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya, 2018, 
available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf; Amnesty Inter-
national, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-Bound Refugees and Migrants, 2017, 
available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF>. 
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human rights obligations binding Italy, appear less complex and potentially less con-
troversial than that of the degree of its intent to facilitate the commission of a wrong-
ful act through the provision of aid or assistance. The crucial question for the ap-
plicability of Article 16 ARSIWA to the case at hand will then be that of establishing 
whether, by the financial and logistical aid given to the Libyan coastguard, Italy in-
tended to facilitate the occurrence of human rights violations by Libya. The meaning 
and scope of the requirement of intent has been widely discussed by international 
law scholars, also with specific reference to Italy’s assistance to Libyan authorities 
in the context of maritime interception. In this context, the applicability of Article 16 
ARSIWA as a framework to allocate international responsibility to Italy for human 
rights violations in the context of activities of interception of migrant on the high 
seas in coordination with the Libyan coastguard has encountered wide support.27 
With this respect, the most appropriate interpretation appears to be that of ap-
proximating intent to knowledge, and thus of considering intent to be present when-
ever the aiding or assisting State is shown to be aware of the circumstances of the 
wrongful act committed by the aided or assisted State. This solution has been sup-
ported in both general terms28 and in relation to Italy’s aid or assistance to the Libyan 
coastguard. With this respect, references have been made to the concept of a State’s 
constructive knowledge that its aid or assistance will be used by the aided or assisted 
State to breach its obligation,29 while others have argued that in the case of Italy 
actual knowledge is also identifiable with respect to violations of irregular migrants’ 
and asylum seekers’ human rights by Libya.30 While grounding complicity on con-
structive knowledge might excessively stretch the scope of application of Article 16 
ARSIWA, actual or near-certain knowledge is closer to intent and thus offers a bal-
anced interpretative solution.31 In addition to being logically sound, this construction 
 
27
 GAUCCI, Back to Old Tricks? Italian Responsibility for Returning People to Libya, EJIL:Talk!, 
available at: <https://www.ejiltalk.org/back-to-old-tricks-italian-responsibility-for-returning-people-to-
libya/>; PIJNENBURG, “From Italian Pushbacks to Libyan Pullbacks: Is Hirsi 2.0 in the Making in 
Strasbourg?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2018, p. 396 ff. 
28
 PUMA, Complicità di Stati nell’Illecito Internazionale, Torino, 2018, pp. 101-120. 
29
 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deter-
rence”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2015, p. 236 ff., pp. 278-281. 
30
 DASTYARI and HIRSCH, “The Ring of Steel: Extraterritorial Migration Controls in Indonesia and 
Libya and the Complicity of Australia and Italy”, Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming). 
31
 On this matter, see MOYNIHAN, Aiding and Assisting: Challenges in Armed Conflict and Counter-
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also allows to conceive of a more reasonable threshold of proof, focusing on an ob-
jective element (actual or near-certain knowledge) rather than on an extremely sub-
jective and ineffable one (intend of a state organ).32 Moreover, this interpretation is 
supported by the fact that the inclusion of the subjective element of fault within the 
notion of internationally wrongful act was thoroughly discussed and ultimately dis-
carded by the International Law Commission.33  
These conclusions are also reconcilable with the criticism that doing away with 
intent altogether in the context of complicity would lead to a confusion between aid 
or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act and ordinary forms 
of cooperation, introducing a risk-based responsibility for complicity. In any case, in 
relation to the case at hand this risk appears to be less present than in other instances.34 
Without going so far as identifying an explicit intent of the Italian Government to 
aid and assist Libya in committing serious breaches of international human rights 
law, it is at the very least possible to conclude that Italy was aware not simply of a 
risk of ill-treatment but of actual human rights violations occurring at the hands of 
the Libyan authorities at the time of events. Therefore, the proposed interpretation 
of Article 16 ARSIWA appears to be particularly apt to support the recognition of 
Italy’s responsibility in aiding and assisting the Libyan coastguard in the specific 
case under comment.  
5. – Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has analysed questions of jurisdiction and attribution raised by the 
application brought before the ECtHR against Italy in relation to serious human 
rights violations committed during a specific incident in the context of maritime in-
terception carried out by the Libyan coastguard under the coordination of the 
IMRCC. The chapter has argued that due to its peculiar features, this case present 
 
terrorism, Chatham House Research Paper, 2016, available at < https://www.chathamhouse.org/publica-
tion/aiding-and-assisting-challenges-armed-conflict-and-counterterrorism>; MOYNIHAN, “Aiding and As-
sisting: the Mental Element Under Article 16 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2018, p. 455 ff. 
32
 LANOVOY, Complicity and its Limits in the Law of International Responsibility, London, 2016, pp. 
101-103; PUMA, cit. supra note 28; MORENO-LAX and GIUFFRÈ, “The Raise of Consensual Containment: 
From ‘Contactless Control’ to ‘Contactless Responsibility’ for Forced Migration Flows”, in JUSS (ed.), 
Research Handbook on International Refugee Law, Cheltenham (forthcoming). 
33
 LANOVOY, cit. supra note 32. 
34
 AUST, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 230-249. 
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new questions before the ECtHR. This case also suggests to the importance of dis-
tinguishing between the matter of Italian jurisdiction over conducts carried out by 
another State’s agents outside of its territorial waters and that of attribution to Italy 
of said conducts for the purpose of the recognition of its responsibility for the alleged 
human rights violations. Two main arguments have been put forward in this chapter. 
First, in cases such as the one at issue it is difficult to establish Italy’s jurisdiction on 
the grounds of either the spatial or the personal model of jurisdiction embraced by 
the ECtHR. In particular, the IMRCC’s coordination activities may hardly satisfy the 
threshold of effective control for this purpose. Second, provided that Italian jurisdic-
tion is recognised, another obstacle to the recognition of a violation of the ECHR by 
Italian authorities concerns the matter of attribution of conduct for the purpose of the 
allocation of responsibility for the commission of an internationally wrongful act. 
This article has argued that the most appropriate framework for this purpose appears 
to be that of Article 16 ARSIWA, provided that the requirement of intent in this 
context is interpreted as conclusive or near-certain knowledge. Accordingly, refer-
ence to Article 16 ARSIWA would entail the need to prove that Italian authorities 
were aware or near-certain that their aid or assistance to the Libyan coastguard would 
be used by the Libyan coastguard to commit violations of the right to life or of the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment against intercepted mi-
grants and asylum seekers.  
The question of Italy’s jurisdiction might constitute a significant obstacle to the 
success of the application under comment. The latter indeed does not simply chal-
lenge the traditional understanding of jurisdiction as territorial, but also the spatial 
and personal models of jurisdiction so far applied by the ECtHR. This article has 
shown that one of the principles established by the ECtHR with this respect appear 
to be equipped to capture Italy’s involvement in joint operations of interception on 
the high seas in the way desired by the applicants.  
More broadly, these observations raise doubts on the suitability of the ECtHR as 
the most appropriate judicial realm for the recognition of human rights violations 
perpetrated by States during interception activities on the high seas. A related ques-
tion, then, concerns whether an application before the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’) for said internationally wrongful acts might bear different results. Support 
for the opening of a preliminary investigation by the ICC into crimes suffered by 
asylum seekers and migrants (including in the context of interception at sea) is in-
creasingly gaining steam in both academic and institutional realms. In February 
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2018, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment recommended that States and the ICC Prosecutor examine the 
possibility to investigate on crimes against humanity (including torture, ill-treatment 
and other serious human rights violations) suffered by migrants “also as a direct or 
indirect consequence of deliberate State policies and practices of deterrence, crimi-
nalization, arrival prevention, and refoulement”.35 In this context, the Special Rap-
porteur specifically discussed push-back and pull-back operations. These observa-
tions, in turn, have led some international law scholars to argue that an ICC investi-
gation should also concern Italy’s aiding and abetting to the crime of trafficking of 
human beings under the framework of Article25(3) of the Rome Statute, and even 
the possible role of the EU itself in this context.36 
Clearly, this proposition presents its own hurdles. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to analyse the implications and possible difficulties of this choice. In this 
context, it is sufficient to recall that the identification of perpetrators, the qualifica-
tion of all human rights violations suffered by involved migrants as international 
crimes, as well as questions of state jurisdiction and state responsibility are only 
some of the aspects that a potential ICC judgment would need to consider. While in 
different terms than those examined so far, questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and allocation of responsibility (including the problem of shared responsibility) in 
particular would equally be raised before the ICC. To be sure, the search of judicial 
avenues of redress for migrants and asylum seekers whose lives and physical integ-
rity have been put in danger by interception activities on the high seas is likely to 
dominate legal and political debates on extraterritorial jurisdiction and attribution in 
the years to come. These discussions are the product of a dissatisfaction with current 
legal categories and criteria of allocation of state jurisdiction and attribution which 
appear incapable of capturing the complex interactions of state and non-state actors 
in this field, undermining victims’ access to justice and their possibility to obtain 
redress. 
 
35
 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, 26 February 2018, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/50 of 26 February 2018, p. 20. 
See also General Assembly, “Unlawful death of refugees and migrants”, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
of the Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. A/72/335 of 15 
August 2017. 
36
 MANN, MORENO-LAX and SHATZ, Time to Investigate for Crimes against Migrants in Libya, 
EJIL:Talk!, available at: <https://www.ejiltalk.org/time-to-investigate-european-agents-for-crimes-
against-migrants-in-libya/>. 
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1. – Introduction 
International law has restricted States’ national sovereignty by according rights 
to refugees.1  A State’s responsibility to respect and protect those rights is triggered 
whenever a refugee finds himself within that State’s jurisdiction. 
However, this jurisdiction-based criterion for responsibility allocation, com-
bined with States’ migration policies directed at avoiding responsibility by keeping 
refugees out of their jurisdiction, have led to an unequal distribution of responsi-
bilities for refugee protection among States.  International refugee law has not de-
veloped a distribution mechanism for States to each take up an equitable share of 
the responsibilities towards refugees. The result is a continued asymmetric burden 
on countries of first asylum or transit: 84 percent of the world’s refugees are in 
developing countries.2    
Despite some successful historical precedents and recent endeavours in develop-
ing a responsibility-sharing framework,3 the political will to structurally handle the 
issue and to go beyond ad hoc emergency systems and voluntary pledges seems to 
be lacking.4  
 
1
 The term ‘refugee’ is used in the chapter in its broadest sense, including not only recognised status-
holders under the 1951 Refugee Status Convention, but also de facto refugees who are not recognised as 
such, holders of a regional protection status (e.g. subsidiary protection in the EU) and other forcibly dis-
placed migrants. Refugee law also deals with forcibly displaced migrants that are not Convention-refugees, 
but are protected under regional ‘international protection’ law or international human rights law.  
2
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), Global Trends. Forced Displacement 
in 2018, 2019, p. 18, available at: <www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018>.   For numbers on the unequal dis-
tribution of asylum applicants, refugees and other ‘burdens’ related to refugee protection within the EU, 
see: WAGNER, KRALER, BAUMGARTNER, “Solidarity – an Integral and Basic concept of the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System”, ICMPD Working Paper, June 2018, available at: <ceaseval.eu/publications>.  
3
 For an overview of historical precedents: SUHRKE, “Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: 
The Logic of Collective versus National Action”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 1998, p. 396 ff.; TÜRK and 
GARLICK, “From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2016, p. 656 ff. 
The most recent global initiative is the UN Global Compact on Refugees: Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees Part II Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II) (2018). 
4
 Examples of critique on the lack of political commitments: DURIEUX, “‘Success under the GCR’: 
Can it be measured?”, RLI Blog on Refugee Law and Forced Migration, 29 January 2019, available at: 
<rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2019/01/29/success-under-the-gcr-can-it-be-measured>; COSTELLO, “Refugees and 
(Other) Migrants: Will the Global Compacts Ensure Safe Flight and Onward Mobility for Refugees?”, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018, p. 1 ff., p. 5; DOWD and MCADAM, “International Cooperation 
And Responsibility-sharing To Protect Refugees: What, Why And How?”,  International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 2017, p. 863 ff., pp. 865-866; European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), “ECRE 
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This chapter looks at international jurisprudence for potential solutions. Have in-
ternational and regional courts come up with criteria for responsibility allocation 
other than territorial jurisdiction?   
A first avenue this chapter looks into is the evolving concept of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in international human rights law, and its potential beyond the models of 
spatial and personal control. Besides those developments related to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, there is little international case-law that deals directly with refugee 
rights or even migration issues, let alone with issues related to non-substantive rights 
such as the inter-state distribution of refugee protection obligations.5   
The chapter therefore also analyses two other legal mechanisms from general and 
other branches of international law, which encompass criteria to attribute or allocate 
responsibilities to States beyond their jurisdictions. First, I asses the principles of 
cooperation and solidarity and their implementation in international and regional ref-
ugee and human rights law, to enquire its potential beyond voluntary commitments 
in crisis situations. Then, I evaluate the potential of the Responsibility to Protect-
doctrine and the specific obligations it imposes on States to help other States protect-
ing populations against atrocities.  
The findings of the chapter are no ready-made solution that provides global ref-
ugee protection policy with an allocation mechanism that is structural, a priori, eq-
uitable and legally enforceable. This is a mapping exercise in which I want to assess 
under which conditions the proposed mechanisms might apply by analogy to inter-
national refugee law and what the assets and obstacles are for each mechanism’s 
legal viability in global refugee protection. 
Whether the alternative criteria also have the legal potential to eventually bring 
about an equitable distribution of refugee protection burdens among States, or 
whether they might be usefully deployed in litigation settings by individual refugee 
or hosting States against (other) States: those are questions for which satisfying an-
swers also depend on extra-legal aspects, such as political feasibility and free riders-
 
Comments on the Commission Proposal for a Dublin IV Regulation COM(2016) 270”, October 2016, 
available at: <www.ecre.org/ecre-comments-on-commission-proposal-for-reform-of-the-dublin-system>.  
5
 For an overview of substantive rights under the 1951 refugee Status Convention and applicable hu-
man rights regimes, see: HATHAWAY, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge, 2005. 
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problems, to name just a few.6 It will be impossible to be conclusive on the distribu-
tive and litigation potential of the proposed mechanisms in global refugee policy 
within the scope of this chapter; these are areas for future research. 
Neither is it the intention to conclusively clear the terminological fog hanging 
over some of the discussed concepts, such as solidarity, cooperation, responsibility- 
and burden-sharing, but also refugee protection or responsibility. Those terms some-
times have different meanings in different contexts or other branches of international 
or regional law. The lack of exact definitions adds to the already difficult identifica-
tion of normative content,7 but also makes the notions “attractively void of precise 
meaning”.8 Where there is need for clarity, I will justify the working definitions I 
adopt or let cited case-law speak for itself. 
In two short introductory sections I will first clarify for which refugee rights 
States bear responsibility (Section 1), and how this responsibility is traditionally at-
tributed to States on the basis of jurisdiction and how they try to avoid it (Section 2).  
Then I will explain which criteria there are to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction 
(Section 3), what alternative criteria the principles of cooperation and solidarity (Sec-
tion 4), and the Responsibility to Protect-doctrine (Section 5) could come up with, 
and what distributive potential these mechanisms might have among States with re-
gard to responsibilities for refugee protection. 
2. – Refugee Protection and State Responsibility 
Refugees are migrants, by definition. Access of migrants to the territory of a State 
and their residence traditionally are considered to fall under the national sovereignty 
of States. First bilateral agreements, and later human rights law have long since im-
posed restrictions on the absolute and discretionary meaning attached to this princi-
ple before.9 The concept of sovereignty now no longer only describes national States’ 
 
6
 See e.g.: BETTS, “Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugee Protection: The Role of the 
Joint-Product Model in Burden-Sharing Theory”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 2003, p. 274 ff.; NOLL, “Pris-
oners' Dilemma in Fortress Europe. On the Prospects of Burden Sharing in the European Union”, German 
Yearbook of International Law, 1997, p. 405 ff.; SUHRKE, cit. supra note 3. 
7
 INDER, “The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime”, Inter-
national Journal of Refugee Law, 2017, p. 523 ff., pp. 528-530.   
8
 NOLL, “Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in the Asylum Field”, Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 2003, p. 236 ff., pp. 236-237.   
9
 HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 5, pp. 75-153. 
See also, Permanent Court of International Justice, France v. Great Britain (Nationality Decrees), 
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competence and powers, but also their legal responsibility under contemporary in-
ternational law.10  
States now undisputedly have a legal responsibility towards refugees: contempo-
rary international refugee law imposes obligations upon States to respect, secure and 
fulfil rights of refugees – besides additional regional commitments, such as under 
the European Union (‘EU’) asylum acquis. Some of those rights have the status of 
international customary law, and are specific to their status as migrant (most notably, 
the non-refoulement principle),11 or as human being (such as non-discrimination or 
the prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment);12 others are treaty-based gen-
eral human rights or rights of a specific category of forcibly displaced persons,13 or 
established by case-law.14   
The – in this chapter further unspecified –15 totality of those refugee rights and 
corresponding State obligations towards refugees can be referred to as ‘refugee pro-
 
Advisory Opinion 7 February 1927, p. 24: “[…] in a matter which, like that of nationality, is not, in prin-
ciple, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by 
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States. In such a case, jurisdiction which, in prin-
ciple, belongs solely to the State, is limited by rules of international law.” 
10
 CHETAIL, “The transnational Movement of Persons under general international law- Mapping the 
customary law foundations of International Migration Law”, in CHETAIL and BAUDOZ (eds.), Research 
Handbook on International Law and Migration, Cheltenham, 2014, p. 1 ff., p. 32; CARLIER and SAROLEA, 
Droit des Étrangers, Bruxelles, 2016, pp. 75-78. 
11
 HURWITZ, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, Oxford, 2009, p. 204; 
CHETAIL, cit. supra note 10, pp. 27-72. 
12
 HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 5, pp. 160-170; Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights 
(OHCHR), CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, 1986. 
13
 E.g.: ‘Convention-refugees’, to whom the strict definition of Article 1(A) of the 1951 Refugee Status 
Convention applies, have, to the same level as nationals, civil status guarantees (Art. 12), access to work 
(Art. 23), travel documents (Art. 24) or social aid (Art. 28); HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, pp. 173-222. 
14
 E.g.: access to an asylum procedure, recognized by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States, Case Judgement of 13 March 1997; 
see: HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, p. 211. Or admission to the territory, see: HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 5, 
p. 301. 
15
 This chapter is not intended to enumerate all the different (categories of) rights that together make 
up ‘refugee protection’, nor to specify which legal category of ‘refugee’ (see supra note 1) is entitled to 
which rights under which subfield of international law, then to analyse which State might be responsible 
to ensure each right, etc. This chapter only wants to map some legal mechanisms for the distribution of 
State responsibility, then to evaluate what their potential might be for States’ refugee protection responsi-
bilities.      
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tection’. When respected and protected by the State, refugee protection can be qual-
ified as ‘effective’.16   
3. – Territorial Jurisdiction and Externalisation  
International refugee law determines protection status and rights. However, in-
ternational refugee law did not establish a specific inter-state mechanism to deter-
mine which state is responsible to uphold which share of global refugee protection 
(let alone how to hold it accountable).17 Such a legal mechanism with binding allo-
cation criteria could be instrumental to deal with the question of distribution of ref-
ugee protection obligations, and the actual refugees themselves, between States and 
avoid unjustifiable imbalances and inequalities. 
There is a clear distinction between two types of State responsibility distribution 
mechanisms. I have opted to call responsibility ‘allocation’, the legal mechanisms 
for sharing and distributing responsibilities between States on an a priori basis of 
binding criteria.  The other type I call responsibility ‘attribution’, to refer more gen-
erally to the judicial a posteriori correcting mechanisms for establishing responsibil-
ity for violations of individuals’ rights by applying legal criteria to connect law vio-
lations with a specific State.18 Attribution is restorative, allocation rather preventive.19 
The prime instrument of international refugee law, the 1951 Refugee Status Con-
vention, does not provide a specific allocation criterion for state responsibility, and 
initiatives taken under United Nations (‘UN’) auspices or at regional level to estab-
lish a (re)distribution mechanism have so far failed to deliver,20 notwithstanding the 
 
16
 HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, pp. 52-56 and 214. 
17
 WALL, “A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee Responsibility 
Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2017, p. 201 ff., 
p. 203; HATHAWAY and NEVE, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Col-
lectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1997, p. 115 ff., p. 141; 
TENDAYI ACHIUME, “Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect Refugees”, Minnesota Law 
Review, 2015, p. 687 ff., pp. 690-691; MCADAM and DOWD, cit. supra not 4, p. 865. 
18
 While the terminological distinction is my own, I find inspiration for the conceptual difference in 
CHRISTENSON, “The Doctrine of Attribution in State Responsibility”, in RICHARD (ed.), International Law 
of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 1983, p. 321 ff. 
19
 The distinction is not necessarily clear cut: a practice of inter-state allocation can find its legal basis 
in an a posteriori dispute over violation of rights, initiated by an individual (e.g. the non-discretionary 
application of the sovereignty clause in the Dublin II-regulation found its origin in the European Court of 
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) MSS-case). 
20
 See supra note 4. 
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repeated recognition of the need for binding engagements.21  This flaw exacerbates 
‘overburdening’ of certain countries, mostly in developing regions of origin, while 
others stay unaffected and can basically keep their borders closed to refugees.22  
To fill this hiatus in international refugee law, we thus have to fall back to general 
international law. More exactly, I decided to look at international case-law for solu-
tions, one of jurisprudence’s raisons d’être precisely being the attribution of respon-
sibility.  
In the absence of binding inter-state allocation criteria in refugee law, refugees 
generally have to undertake individual judicial action to stand up for their protection 
rights. Since no specific international court has the competence at supranational level 
to deal with claims against States for violations of the international refugee law itself, 
individuals generally bring them before international or regional human right courts 
or committees and relate to violations of parallel human rights provisions.  To attrib-
ute responsibility for the violation of an individual’s human rights to a specific State, 
human rights treaties determine the State’s exercise of jurisdiction as the defining 
criterion.23 Classic sovereignty doctrine establishes jurisdiction on a territorial basis: 
the primary State responsible for securing someone’s human rights is the territorial 
State on which he or she is present.24 International and European jurisprudence, how-
ever, have gradually applied a broader interpretation of State jurisdiction by ac-
knowledging its exercise beyond its territory, because of the negative consequences 
of a purely territorial interpretation of jurisdiction.    
A good illustration of such negative effects are the EU ‘externalisation’ policies.25  
‘Externalisation’ is the term broadly used for the amalgam of policy measures, 
practices and actions, legal provisions and political agreements in migration policies 
employed by national governments and supranational organisations, such as the EU, 
 
21
 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1, para 68, and Annex 1 
(Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework), para 1; WALL, cit. supra note 17 pp. 210-214. 
22
 For figures, see supra note 2. 
23
 Article 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 2 Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and Article 1 ECHR. 
24
 CHETAIL, cit. supra note. 10, pp. 27-28; CARLIER and SAROLEA, cit. supra note 10, pp. 63-64; In 
refugee law this same idea – discretionary jurisdiction of the territorial state to grant asylum – is expressed 
in the concept of ‘territorial asylum’ (UNGA, 1967, Resolution 2312, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 
art. 3). 
25
 Also called ‘politics of non-entrée’. See: GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, “Non-Re-
foulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2015, p. 235 
ff., p. 241. 
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intended to avoid migrants coming under their jurisdiction in order to circumvent 
responsibility for refugee protection and regional and national judicial scrutiny – ba-
sically the outsourcing of border management to third States, by exporting it under 
their territorial jurisdiction.26 Generally the term is used for EU’s external policies:27 
carriers sanctions, strengthened external border controls in the Mediterranean, the 
deal with Turkey to keep refugees from onward movement,28 agreements with Libya 
or Niger to intercept and return migrants, etc.29 But also mutual deterrence policies 
between EU Member States themselves, although less commonly labelled as such, 
are good examples of ‘externalisation’: the strict application of Dublin III-regulation, 
reluctance to fully implement the relocation mechanisms, the reintroduction of inter-
nal border controls.  
Externalisation causes burden-shifting, unequal distribution of refugees and pro-
tection responsibility, and a globally shrinking protection space for those in need of 
and entitled to international protection. 30 When refugees are constrained to countries 
of first asylum in the Global South, away from the common EU protection regime, 
their access to effective protection is endangered, and international (and European) 
refugee and human rights standards are more likely to be infringed. Implementing 
policies that physically prevent migrants from entering the EU or a specific member 
 
26
 RODIER, “Analysis of the External Dimension of the European Union's Asylum and Immigration 
Policies - Summary and Recommendations for the European Parliament”, European Parliament, 
DT\619330EN.doc (2006), p. 8; GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, pp. 244 and 
249.  For a distinction between the external dimension and externalisation based on the effectiveness of 
control by the externalising State or need for implementation by the third State, see MC NAMARA, “Member 
State Responsibility for Migration Control within Third States – Externalisation Revisited”, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 2013, p. 319 ff., pp. 326-328.  
27
 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway distinguish between a first generation of ‘non-entrée’ measures 
(visa controls, carrier sanctions, creation of ‘international zones’ and deterrence on the high seas), and 
seven forms of second generation cooperation-based policies. See GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, 
cit. supra note 25, pp. 244-256. 
28
 European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, available at: <www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement> (“Turkey will take any necessary 
measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU”). 
29
 For examples and references of externalisation measures, see i.a.: GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and TAN, 
“The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy”, Journal on Migra-
tion and Human Security, 2017, p. 28 ff. 
30
 I use the term ‘protection space’ to refer to the global complex composed of different territories, 
policies and practices that, separately or taken together, guarantee refugee protection in conformity with 
international (and regional) law. When such protection is accessible for refugees, it can be called ‘effec-
tive’. 
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State immobilises refugees in substandard legal and material conditions,31 including 
within the EU itself.32  Strict EU external border policies have also made irregular 
border-crossings more difficult and deadly, leading to increased reliance on smug-
gling networks.33 Externalisation further causes spill-over effects in many transit 
countries with already restricted refugee protection regimes, as it does not incentiv-
izes them to fully implement the international refugee and human rights law them-
selves. Rather refugee hosting countries start copying externalisation practices, and 
might back down from existing non-refoulement guarantees or make them condi-
tional upon stronger responsibility-sharing commitments by countries in the Global 
North.34  
Could States that undertake externalisations practices and policies be held re-
sponsible for violations of international refugee or human rights law outside their 
own territory? Before focussing on alternatives to the jurisdiction criterion, I will 
first analyse under which conditions jurisdiction can be engaged extraterritorially.   
4. – First Mechanism: Attribution on the Basis of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction 
States have been held responsible for practices outside of their territorial borders 
that affected persons who were considered to fall under their jurisdiction.  This Sec-
tion first analyses the scope and interpretation given to extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
European and international case-law. Than it will assess the potential of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction for responsibility allocation to States for acts that affect refugee 
rights beyond its borders and executed by others than its own agents. 
 
31
 Such as collective detention camps, lack of asylum processing and reception, legal uncertainty and 
precarious protection status, limited to no access to work, education, integration opportunities or material 
support. 
32
 E.g. reception conditions on the Greek islands. See: Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights 
of the Council of Europe Dunja Mijatović following her Visit to Greece from 25 to 29 June 2018, available 
at: <www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/greece-should-safeguard-social-rights-for-all-and-improve-the-
reception-and-integration-of-migrants>. 
33
 For data on deaths at sea and human smuggling, see International Organisation for Migration’s da-
tabase, available at <missingmigrants.iom.int/> and <migrationdataportal.org/themes/smuggling-mi-
grants>; COSTELLO, cit. supra note 4, p. 5. 
34
 HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, pp. 165-176; CHIMNI “Aid, Relief, and Containment: The First Asylum 
Country and Beyond”, International Migration, 2002, p. 75 ff., pp. 83-84; GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Access 
to Asylum, Aarhus, 2009, pp. 265-266. 
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4.1. – European Case-law: Control, Authority, Effect 
In the context of EU Member States’ migration policies, regional courts have 
played a central role in interpreting the scope of State jurisdiction, and thus setting 
out the extent of States’ responsibility for human rights and refugee protection. To 
determine States’ extraterritorial jurisdiction, the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) in particular has developed extensive case-law on the application of Ar-
ticle 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’): “The High Con-
tracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in Section I of this Convention.” 
Although, in the 2001 Banković case, the Court declared sovereign territorial ju-
risdiction to be the general rule, accepting non-territorial based jurisdiction “only in 
exceptional cases” demanding special justification,35 it had already adopted in the 
1997 Loizidou case that “under its established case-law the concept of jurisdiction 
under Article 1 […] is not restricted to the national territory […] the responsibility 
of Contracting States can be involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which 
produce effects outside their own territory.”36  
The Court established extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases in which the State had 
an overall control over a part of the territory beyond its borders as a consequence of 
military action, but also when State authorities have control over the person affected. 
The Court explicits in its 2005 Öcalan and Issa judgements, that a State can exercise 
jurisdiction over persons outside of its territory, whenever that State has authority or 
effective control over them, even temporarily or de facto.37  In Al-Skeini, the Court 
clarifies: “What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control 
over the person in question.”38  
The Court specifies that “[i]n each case, the question whether exceptional cir-
cumstances exist which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was 
exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the 
 
35
 European Court of Human Rights, Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, Application No. 
52207/99, Decision (Grand Chamber) of 12 December 2001, para. 67. 
36
 Id., Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 153818/89 Judgment (merits) of 18 December 1996, para. 
52. 
37
 Id., Issa v. Turkey, Application No. 31821/96, Judgment of 16 November 2005, para. 74; Id., Öcalan 
v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 12 May 2005, para. 91. 
38
 Id., Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, Judgment (Grand Cham-
ber) of 7 July 2011, para. 136. 
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particular facts.”39 Certain activities of EU State’s agents outside their national terri-
tory (under EU’s externalisation policy), constitute an effective control or power 
over a person extraterritorially, and thus allocate responsibility with that State.40  
The Court also explicitly applied this line of reasoning in specific migration sit-
uations at and beyond State borders, where refugee rights such as the prohibition of 
refoulement or the right to seek asylum were at stake. The Court finds that a state 
exercises jurisdiction in international zones at airports,41 at sea ports,42 on airplanes it 
refuses to land and at checkpoints outside its territory.43 Most notoriously, in the Hirsi 
Jamaa case, concerning the interception of migrants on the high seas, the Court es-
tablishes that State action “the effect of which is to prevent non-nationals from reach-
ing the borders of the State or even to push them back to another State”, constitutes 
an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.44  To attribute State responsibility for sit-
uations aboard ships, the findings in the Hirsi judgement were based on the fact that 
ship and crew were de facto as well as de iure under the control of the (Italian) State, 
since it sailed under its flag.45 In its earlier Medvedyev judgement, it also assumed 
(French) jurisdiction on the basis of mere de facto control of the crew, superseding 
the flag state criterion.46  
At yet, doctrine generally identifies two models for attributing extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in European case-law, both based on effective control. First, a spatial 
model, based on the exercise by a State, through its agents, of overall control or 
authority over (a part of) a territory beyond its own borders. Second, a personal 
model based on effective control and physical power over the alleged victims.47 Both 
 
39
 Ibid., para. 132. 
40
 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, p. 263. 
41
 European Court of Human Rights, Amuur v. France, Application No. 19776/92, Judgment of 25 
June 1996. 
42
 Id., Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, Judgment of 21 October 
2014. 
43
 Id., East African Asians (British protected persons) v. the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 
4715/70, 4783/71 and 4827/71, Judgment of 6 March 1978. 
44
 Id., Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 23 
February 2012, paras. 78 and 180. 
45
 Ibid., paras. 70-75. 
46
 Id., Medvedyev and Others v. France, Application No. 3394/03, Judgment of 29 March 2010, para. 
66-67 
47
 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway distinguish a third model whereby extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
established on the basis of exercising ‘public powers’ abroad, namely when, as identified in Al-Skeini, “in 
accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting State carry out executive 
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models concern acts exercised extraterritorially by organs or agents of the external-
ising State.  
4.2. – International Law and Decisions: Control, Relationship, Effect 
UN human rights bodies also have elaborated extraterritorial jurisdiction criteria 
for international law.  
The Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) clarifies the scope of the obligation un-
der Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’) to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant” in its General Com-
ment No. 31. It ascertains State jurisdiction “to anyone within the power or effective 
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party 
[…], regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
obtained”.48  
The HRC developed a consistent practice since the 1981 Lopez Burgos case, in 
which it finds the Covenant applicable and the State responsible for the actions of its 
agents “on the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Gov-
ernment of that State or in opposition to it”.49  Extraterritorial jurisdiction for human 
right violations does not vaporise on account of complicity of the territorial State.   
 
or judicial functions on the territory of another State” (para. 135). See: GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and 
HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, pp. 266-272. I tend to see in it rather a variation of the other two ‘control’-
models. The existence of an agreement or other legal basis or not, does not appear, to me, to be in itself the 
constitutive element for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Rather it is an element of proof to indicate that control, 
power or authority might have been exercised extraterritorially. From the existence and content of such an 
agreement one might infer the personal or territorial control State agents were entitled to exercise on the 
territory of the third State, but not that they have effectively done so, nor that it is a necessary condition to 
do so. The two additional conditions identified by the authors in order for this proposed model to apply – 
in particular “the breach of human rights resulting from the exercise of public powers must be attributable 
to the extraterritorially acting state, rather than to the territorial state” –, has the same effect as sorting it as 
a variation of the other models. Their conclusion seems to support my suggestion: “Where there is an 
agreement to deploy liaison officers or provide other forms of support that in substance result in the exer-
cise of effective control by the sponsoring state, jurisdiction—and hence liability—is established.” (empha-
sis added) 
48
 United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
(2004), para. 10. 
49
 Id., Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 
88 (1984), para. 12.3 
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In the same case, the Committee also determines that jurisdiction (under the Op-
tional Protocol) does not refer “to the place where the violation occurred, but rather 
to the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a violation of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred.”50 The relevance 
of the ‘State-individual relationship in relation to the violation’ leaves room for ac-
cepting State jurisdiction even beyond violations committed directly by it agents 
abroad – e.g. for human rights violations of refugees in a transit country due to poli-
cies exactly intended to have a cross-border impact on that population. 
In its 2003 concluding observations on Israel, the HRC further clarified the rela-
tion between the conduct of the State and the violation, regardless of the range of 
control: "the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the 
Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party's authorities or agents in those 
territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall 
within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public inter-
national law" [sic].51  
The Committee Against Torture (‘CAT’), in its General Comment on Article 2 of 
the Convention against Torture, determines that “the concept of ‘any territory under 
its jurisdiction’ […] must be applied to protect any person, citizen or non-citizen with-
out discrimination subject to the de jure or de facto control of the State party”.52 In its 
2008 Marine I decision, on the interception of migrants at sea by Spanish State agents 
and their continuous detention in Mauritania, the CAT accepted that a State’s jurisdic-
tion applied “to any territory in which it exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or 
in part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with international law.”53  
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has endorsed the position of the UN 
bodies. In its 2004 advisory opinion Construction of a Wall, the Court refers to the 
“constant practice of the Human Rights Committee” since the Lopez Burgos case 
and its concluding observations on Israel, as well as to the original inspiration of the 
ICCPR drafters in 1955:  
 
50
 Ibid., para. 12.2. 
51
 Id., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C0/78/1SR (2003), para. 11. 
52
 United Nations Committee Against Torture (UNCAT), General Comment No. 2, Implementation of 
Article 2 by States parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008), para. 7. 
53
 Id., J.H.A. v. Spain, Judgments, Decision of 10 November 2008, para. 8.1.  
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“The travaux préparatoires of the Covenant confirm the Committee's interpretation of 
Article 2 of that instrument. These show that, in adopting the wording chosen, the drafters 
of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they 
exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory.”54 
In conclusion, also international law reflects in judicial and quasi-judicial deci-
sions the two models for establishing jurisdiction that was identified within the EC-
tHR case-law: the spatial, based on territorial control, and the personal, based on 
control over the individual. It further adds some extra qualifying elements: the irrel-
evance of the complicity or agreement of the territorial state, and the relevance of 
the state-individual relation for establishing the rights violation.    
4.3. – Potential of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Refugee Protection: 
Impact, Instructions, Assistance  
The two control-based models for identifying extraterritorial jurisdiction (spatial 
and personal) do not suffice, however, to attribute responsibility for more indirect 
externalisation practices – let alone for an equitable allocation of responsibility for 
refugee protection in general, independent from a State’s involvement in externali-
sation or not. What about violations that are not exercised by agents of the external-
ising State, but implemented in and by third countries themselves? It feels legally 
logical that, irrespective of the question whether or not spatial or personal extraterri-
torial jurisdiction can be established, a State should respect and ensure human rights 
to the extent that it reasonably can: jurisdiction would thus be established by the 
State’s obligation of due diligence.55 
Doctrine seems to be identifying a third way of establishing extraterritorial juris-
diction.56  In a 2018 draft for a new General Comment on the right to life, the HRC 
includes under persons over whom a state exercises power or effective control, those 
“located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose right to life 
 
54
 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 109-110.  
55
 MILANOVIC, The Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties : law, principles, and policy, 
Oxford, 2011, p. 209-210. 
56
 MOGSTER, “Towards Universality: Activities Impacting the Enjoyment of the Right to Life and the 
Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR”, EJILtalk, 27 November 2018, available at < 
www.ejiltalk.org/towards-universality-activities-impacting-the-enjoyment-of-the-right-to-life-and-the-ex-
traterritorial-application-of-the-iccpr>;  GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, p. 268. 
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is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably 
foreseeable manner.”57 Even though the HRC considers it as a form of exercise of 
power or control by the State, ‘direct and reasonably foreseeable impact’ clearly adds 
a new layer to the already accepted criteria to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction.   
The new model made explicit here reflects the range of control that State juris-
diction can entail, beside, or on top of, the forms of control acknowledged under the 
spatial and personal models.  What is new, and relevant for evaluating external mi-
gration policies, is the shift in focus from the link of the responsible State with the 
victim (effective control under the personal model) to the link with (acts of) the per-
petrator (the impact model). This shift overcomes the distinction between violations 
committed by State agents beyond their State’s borders, and those committed by non-
agents or third State officials acting under (another) State’s direction or control.  
This broadening application of the extraterritorial jurisdiction, beyond the State’s 
control as envisaged by the established models, is also made explicit in the Draft 
articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, of the Interna-
tional Law Commission (‘ILC’). Article 8 reads: “The conduct of a person or group 
of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person 
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.” 58   
Attribution of responsibility for giving instructions to persons that are not agents 
of the instructing State goes beyond the classical attribution to State agents. In its 
Commentary to the Draft Articles, the ILC points to the importance of “the existence 
of a real link between the person or group performing the act and the State machin-
ery.”59 In order to qualify this ‘link’ more precisely, the ILC refers to the ICJ judge-
ment in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua), where State responsibility 
 
57
 UNHRC, (Advance unedited version) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018), para. 
63 (emphasis added). 
58
 ILC, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), Art. 8 (emphasis added).  The Articles have repeatedly been commended and their importance 
acknowledged by the UN General Assembly. An overview of those Resolutions is available at: <le-
gal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_6.shtml>.  
59
 ILC, “Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commen-
taries”, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 31 ff., Art. 8, Com-
mentary (1). 
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was attributed for the employment of auxiliaries:60  
“Each case will depend on its own facts, in particular those concerning the relationship 
between the instructions given or the direction or control exercised and the specific conduct 
complained of. […] the instructions, direction or control must relate to the conduct which is 
said to have amounted to an internationally wrongful act.” 61  
While discarding responsibility attribution for conduct of persons that clearly 
goes beyond lawful instructions of the State, the ILC however accepts responsibility 
in case “particular instructions may have been ignored”.62 The ICJ in its 2005 Armed 
Activities (DRC v. Uganda) judgement also considered it irrelevant whether auxilia-
ries (UDFP soldiers) “acted contrary to instructions given or exceeded their author-
ity” “for their attribution of their conduct” on the territory of their own State (Congo) 
to an external State (Uganda).63  
Also the HRC further qualifies the extraterritorial impact on third State perpetra-
tors of human rights violations, referring in its draft General Comment No. 36 to 
Article 16 of the ILC Draft Articles, by reminding States that they also have “obli-
gations under international law not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other 
States and non-State actors that violate the right to life”.64   
From this perspective, it can be concluded that the impact-model could find a 
potential application as an attribution mechanism for refugee protection responsibil-
ity. Refugee rights violations conducted on the territory of a third State, but instructed 
or directed by a ‘sponsoring State’ or under the direct and foreseeable impact of its 
policies intended at externalising its refugee protection responsibilities, can be at-
tributed to that instructing State which thus bears responsibility for it.65 In this re-
spect, an interesting judgement to watch out for is the M.N. v. Belgium case pending 
before the ECtHR Grand Chamber.66 The Court might need to interpret the scope of 
 
60
 International Court of Justice, Nicaragua v. United States of America (Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua), Judgement (merits) of 27 June 1986, para. 86 (emphasis added). 
61
 See supra note 58, Art. 8, Commentary (7) (emphasis added). 
62
 Ibid., Art. 8, Commentary (8). 
63
 International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168 ff., para. 214. 
64
 See supra note 57. 
65
 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note. 25, p. 268. 
66
 European Court Of Human Rights, M.N. and Others v. Belgium, Application no. 3599/18; ECtHR, 
“Grand Chamber to examine case concerning consular authorities’ refusal to grant humanitarian visas re-
quested by Syrian nationals”, 26 November 2018, ECHR 402 (2018), available at: <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-
press?i=003-5127469-6327387>.  
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the impact-model when it will have to judge if the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a 
the State (Belgium) is engaged by refusing a visa to a refugee in a country of first 
asylum (Lebanon), and if by consequence it could be held responsible for eventual 
violations of the refugee’s fundamental rights in that third country. 
The scope of application of the HRC impact-model seems so far limited to right 
to life violations – and the threshold as well as qualification (‘direct and reasonably 
foreseeable’) will need further interpretation. Still, refugee lives are endangered and 
deprived due to the border controls and detention and refoulement practices in coun-
tries of transit or first asylum. Even in situations where agents of an EU Member 
State have not been directly engaged, one could soundly argue that its externalisation 
policies and cooperation with the territorial State have a direct and foreseeable im-
pact on refugees’ right to life, irrespective of the exact degree of control.   
4.4. – Beyond Jurisdiction: Alternative Allocation Mechanisms in 
International (Case) Law 
The jurisprudence referred to so far is mainly case-law attributing responsibility 
(a posteriori) to a State for violations of international law, by determining if the vi-
olation happened under its jurisdiction, be it territorial or extraterritorial. Jurisdiction 
simply attaches legal consequences to acts or omissions of a State on an objective 
basis (control, impact). This approach, however, does not suffice to structurally al-
locate (a priori) responsibility among States for global refugee protection in an eq-
uitable manner.  
Since States hardly allocate on a voluntary basis, a responsibility criterion is 
sought for that establishes a positive obligation on States to guarantee quality and 
availability of international protection also for refugees who find themselves beyond 
their jurisdiction.67   
Can international jurisprudence teach us something about structural inter-state 
responsibility allocation beyond their respective jurisdictions? The answer to that 
question might find in global refugee protection one of its most useful practical ap-
plications. I will map some of the lines of reasoning in international case-law, and 
tentatively hint at their potential for a more equal and fair distribution of responsi-
 
67
 For the definition of ‘quality of protection’, I refer to the use of the term by Gammeltoft-Hansen: 
“the certainty, scope and level of rights afforded to refugees”. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, cit. supra note 34, 
p. 62-63. 
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bilities for refugee protection.  First, I enquire into the obvious legal basis in inter-
national law for responsibility-sharing, the principles of international cooperation 
and solidarity (Section 5). Then, I evaluate a concept from international humanitarian 
law, the Responsibility to Protect-doctrine (Section 6). 
5. – Second Mechanism:  Allocation on the Basis of the Principles of 
Cooperation and Solidarity  
After first explaining what the central concepts of solidarity, cooperation and re-
sponsibility-sharing mean under general international law, this Section explores 
whether and how those principles have been operationalised in international refugee 
law and in international human rights law, to conclude with a glimpse at a regional 
implementation, in the EU migration policy. 
5.1. – International Law Concepts 
Solidarity, cooperation, burden- and responsibility-sharing are confusingly used 
almost as synonyms in refugee studies.68  This chapter does not intend to settle the 
issue, but approaches it with pragmatism. The following working definitions are 
based on doctrine and legal sources commonly referred to in the field of international 
refugee law, but demand a pragmatic use due to unavoidable overlap and incoher-
ence. 
International cooperation is an overarching objective of the UN, entailing the le-
gal duty for States to take joint and separate action in areas where there are shared 
interests and mutual benefits.69 The UN Charter mentions it as one of the UN’s prin-
cipal purposes “in solving international problems of […] humanitarian character, and 
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights”.70 The principle itself does 
not specify the specific contribution due by States to comply with this duty, nor its 
form or content.  
The UN General Assembly, in its Millennium Declaration, further considers 
“certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-
first century”, i.a.: “Solidarity. Global challenges must be managed in a way that 
distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity 
 
68
 INDER, cit. supra note 7, p. 528. 
69
 TÜRK and GARLICK, cit. supra note 3, p.658-660. 
70
 Art. 1(3) UN Charter. 
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and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those 
who benefit most.”, and: “Shared responsibility. Responsibility for managing world-
wide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and 
security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised 
multilaterally. […]”71 
Solidarity is a fundamental value that acknowledges a shared interest in the need 
for support between States in order to lighten the unequal distribution of burdens and 
costs that are necessary to satisfactorily implement humanitarian principles.72 It is a 
political principle that is value driven (equity, fairness), has legal quality, and is con-
text-sensitive for its implementation. 73  While the duty of cooperation is not defined 
by its outcome, solidarity is, in demanding an equitable, fairer sharing of burdens – 
still that does not yet make it sufficiently precise to substantiate specific legal obli-
gation for States.74  
Burden- and/or responsibility-sharing reflect a more concrete goal for interna-
tional cooperation, and an intended outcome of solidarity,75 namely the distribution 
of costs and benefits between States.76 In refugee policy it includes engagements for 
an equitable distribution of the consequences of refugee hosting and protection. The 
term ‘burden’ could cover all kinds of specific commitments and efforts a certain 
obligation entails for a State. It is widely understood to refer to the rather negative 
aspect of ‘costs’ of refugee protection for a State. Hence the use of the more neutral 
term ‘responsibility-sharing’, which also refers to a broader set of inter-state assis-
tance measures, such as resettlement of refugees or assistance in migration manage-
ment, besides simple cost-sharing.77  
 
71
 United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/A/55/2, 18 September 2000, para. 6. 
72
 TURK and GARLICK, cit. supra note 3,  pp. 661-663.  
73
 KOTZUR, “Solidarity as a Legal Concept”, in GRIMMEL and MY GIANG (eds.), Solidarity in the Eu-
ropean Union, Hamburg, 2017, p. 36 ff., pp. 39-40. 
74
 MORENO-LAX, “Solidarity’s reach: Meaning, dimensions and implications for EU (external) asylum 
policy”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2017, p. 740 ff., pp. 743 and 749. For an 
extended analysis of the concept of solidarity in refugee and EU law, see: WAGNER et. al. , cit. supra note 
2. 
75
 MORENO-LAX, cit. supra note 74, p. 749. 
76
 BETTS, COSTELLO, ZAUN, “A Fair Share: Refugees and Responsibility-Sharing”, Delmi-report 
Stockholm, 2017, pp. 19-22. 
77
 TURK and GARLICK, cit. supra note 3, pp.  663-665; HATHAWAY and NEVE, cit. supra note 17, p. 
201-209.  
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The principles of international cooperation and solidarity are key to dealing with 
transnational issues under international law and enshrined in numerous soft-law doc-
uments, including Resolutions of the General Assembly.78 The instruments are not 
operationalised in directly enforceable responsibility-distributing mechanisms or 
sufficiently specific provisions: burden-sharing commitments tend to be limited to 
voluntary contributions or ad hoc solutions, and they lack State practice to be con-
sidered international customary law. International solidarity and cooperation, and re-
sponsibility-sharing solutions are consequently fraught with collective-action and 
free-rider problems.79 
5.2. – Responsibility-sharing in International Refugee Law 
Also more specifically in international refugee law itself, references to the duty 
to cooperate, inspired by the principle of solidarity, and engagements to share bur-
dens and responsibilities are made repeatedly, though also in soft-law instruments 
that lack enforceable operationalisation. 
The Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Status Convention endorses cooperation and 
burden-sharing:  
“Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain coun-
tries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized 
the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-
operation,”  
The objective of the Convention itself, finding a ‘satisfactory solution’ for the 
global issue of refugee protection, is directly attached to the States’ duty to cooper-
ate. From the Travaux Préparatoires to the Convention, it becomes clear that with 
“the principle of burden-sharing […] not only international cooperation in the field 
of protection but also in the field of assistance, help for States on which the refugee 
problem places too heavy a burden was meant”.80 The Final Act of the Conference 
 
78
 E.g. Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986), Annex, Arts. 3 and 
6; Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, UN Doc. A/RES/59/193 (2004), para. 4 
(f). 
79
 WALL, cit. supra note 17, p. 207-209; TENDAYI ACHIUME, cit. supra note 17, p. 703; see supra note 
6. 
80
 UNHCR, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, p. 32. 
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adopting the Convention additionally recommends “that these refugees may find asy-
lum and the possibility of resettlement”.81 However, neither the Convention nor the 
interpretative texts, tell how burden-sharing should exactly come about or go that far 
as to establish a concrete responsibility allocation mechanism. 
Interestingly, Article 38 of the Convention appoints the ICJ as the forum litis to 
settle inter-state disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion, in case they cannot be settled by other means. A dispute between States about 
who should guarantee certain rights under the Convention in a situation of overbur-
dening – refering to the Preamble’s explicit call for cooperative solutions –, could 
thus theoretically be brought before the ICJ under this provision. In essence this con-
stitutes a question of responsibility-sharing among States.82  There is no precedent of 
the ICJ case-law on the application of the 1951 Convention.83 However, an advisory 
opinion of the ICJ could give an authoritative interpretation of the restrictions on 
States’ discretion in border and migration control imposed by minimum standards 
for Convention refugees. This would essentially entail a practical implementation of 
burden-sharing obligations between States. Ideally the ICJ would formulate global 
responsibility allocation criteria, in case of overburdening, or even more structurally. 
Numerous UN texts further recall the cooperation and responsibility-sharing 
principles explicitly in the context of refugee protection, such as the General Assem-
bly’s Declaration on Territorial Asylum, the World Summit Outcome or the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development.84 
The most concrete operationalisation of cooperation and responsibility-sharing  
in international refugee law is the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), which includes to “assume the functions of […] seeking 
 
81
 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and State-
less Persons, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1 (1951), para. IV(D). 
82
 SKORDAS, “The Missing Link in Migration Governance: An Advisory Opinion by the International 
Court of Justice”, 2018, EJILtalk, available at: <www.ejiltalk.org/the-missing-link-in-migration-govern-
ance-an-advisory-opinion-by-the-international-court-of-justice/>. 
83
 In the 1951 Haya de la Torre case, the ICJ did call on state parties to “find a practical and satisfactory 
solution by seeking guidance from considerations of courtesy and good neighbourliness” (Colombia v. 
Peru (Haya de la Torre Case), Judgment of 13 June 1951, last para. before dictum). This case concerned a 
dispute on consular asylum between the State of origin and the asylum granting State, however.  
84
 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, UN Doc. A/RES/2312 (XXII) (1967), Art. 2; World Summit 
Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (2005), para. 133; Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable De-
velopment A/RES/70/1 (2015), para. 29. 
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permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting governments”, to “en-
gage in such additional activities, including repatriation and resettlement, as the Gen-
eral Assembly may determine”, and to “administer any funds” and “distribute them 
among the private and, as appropriate, public agencies which he seems best qualified 
to administer such assistance”.85 Treaty States have the legal obligation to cooperate 
with UNHCR “in the exercise of its functions” on the basis of Article 35 of the 1951 
Convention, and are called for voluntary financial contributions to the agency.86 Nev-
ertheless States’ effective contributions for structural or emergency responsibility-
sharing remain voluntary and funding is increasingly earmarked for internal migra-
tion policy preferences rather than in order to share responsibilities more equitably.87 
And even though the UNHCR Executive Committee (‘EXCOM’) has called numer-
ous times for better cooperation and more responsibility-sharing,88 a legally binding 
mechanism did not come about. 
UNHCR’s 2003 Agenda for Protection,89 established the ‘Convention Plus’-ap-
proach to “focus on those issues and activities that would benefit from multilateral 
commitment and cooperation”, and one of the goals of its Programme of Action was 
“sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to re-
ceive and protect refugees”. It was endorsed by the General Assembly,90 but has also 
failed to bring about binding agreements.91  
Finally, the 2016 New York Declaration of the General Assembly, and the 2018 
Global Compact on Refugees (‘GCR’) are the most recent global initiatives “to pro-
vide a basis for predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing among 
 
85
 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees, UN Doc. 
A/RES/428(V) (1950), Annex, paras. 1, 9 and 10. 
86
 Ibid., para. 20. 
87
 BETTS, cit. supra note 6, pp. 288-292. In 2018, only 11% of UNHCR budget was funded by unear-
marked contributions (while 43% was not funded at all). See: UNHCR, Global Funding Overview, 31 
December 2018,  available at: <reporting.unhcr.org/financial#tabs-financial-contributions>.  
88
 E.g.: EXCOM, Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx No. 22 (XXXII) 
(1981); International Solidarity and Refugee Protection No. 52 (XXXIX) (1988); Conclusion on Interna-
tional Protection No. 89 (LI) (2000); Conclusion of the Executive Committee on international cooperation 
from a protection and solutions perspective No. 112 (LXVII) (2016). 
89
 UNHCR, Agenda for Protection, UN Doc. A/AC.96/965/Add.1 (2002). Third edition, October 2003, 
available at: <www.refworld.org/docid/4714a1bf2.html>. 
90
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Doc. RES/57/187 (2002), para. 
9. 
91
 UNHCR, Progress Report: Convention Plus, UN Doc. FORUM/2005/6 (2005), paras. 10, 11, 13 and 
17, available at <www.unhcr.org/convention-plus.html>. 
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all United Nations Member States”.92 The first text is a “political declaration” States 
commit to implement,93 the second is explicitly “non-political in nature” and “not 
legally binding”; 94 together they establish a Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (‘CRRF’). 
Both texts have added a lot to the conceptualisation and some institutionalisation 
of the responsibility-sharing issue. Nevertheless, they have not yet led to more con-
crete binding commitments by States neither. 
Set up “to operationalize the principles of burden- and responsibility-sharing”, to 
“ease pressures on host countries” and “expand access to third country solutions”,95 
the GCR subscribes to an approach of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities 
(and respective capabilities)’ (‘CBDR(RC)’):96  
“To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable 
sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, 
while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources 
among States.”97 
This idea is reflected in the mechanism for responsibility-sharing that is estab-
lished. The CRRF is conceptualized “for each situation involving large movements 
of refugees”,98 and operationalised under the GCR by the creation of two fora for 
cooperation: the quadrennial Global Refugee Forum where States will be called to 
“to announce concrete pledges and contributions towards the objectives of the global 
compact”;99 and context-specific Support Platforms, which host countries could ac-
tivate in case they lack the response capacity to deal with large-scale, complex or 
protracted refugee situations.100  
 
92
 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II Global Compact on Refugees 
(GCR), UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II) (2018), para. 3. 
93
 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1 (2016), para. 1 and Annex, 
para. 17. 
94
 GCR, paras. 4 and 5. 
95
 Ibid., paras. 5 and 7. 
96
 DOWD and MCADAM, “International Cooperation And Responsibility Sharing To Combat Climate 
Change: Lessons For International Refugee Law”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2017, p. 180 
ff., pp. 197-198; HATHAWAY and NEVE, cit. supra note 17, pp. 201-209. 
97
 New York Declaration, para. 68; GCR, para. 1. 
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 Ibid., Annex, para. 2. 
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 GCR, para. 17-18. 
100
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Both the New York Declaration and the GCR give a very holistic overview of 
“tools to operationalise burden- and responsibility-sharing”,101 including, besides the 
more traditional support through financing or resettlement, assistance for humanitar-
ian relief, supporting host communities, tackling root causes of forced displacement, 
ensuring sustainable return, and offering complementary pathways for humanitarian 
admission.102 
While the Compact and the Framework might potentially evolve into the large-
scale structural responsibility allocation mechanism this chapter tries to identify, 
they so far remain of a very non-committal nature. Responsibility-sharing advance-
ments continue to depend entirely on voluntary contributions and on the activation 
of an emergency mechanism by hosting States that might not have an interest in 
doing so – because the label ‘refugee’ crisis also entails a broad range of protection 
obligations under international law. 
5.3. – Responsibility-sharing in Human Rights Law 
In the search for mechanisms of responsibility allocation, it is useful to check if 
principles of international cooperation and solidarity are better implemented and en-
forceable in other branches of international law than refugee law.  State obligations 
under international human rights law also include a duty to cooperate.  
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) requires States to “take steps, individually and through interna-
tional assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full real-
ization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”. 
The General Assembly repeated the State obligation more generally in relation to all 
human rights:  “Every state has the duty to promote through joint and separate action 
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
accordance with the Charter”.103  
Are these general provisions implemented in any more precise manner in human 
rights law? And did courts impose specific obligations onto States under their duty 
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 Ibid., para. 30-48. 
102
 New York Declaration, Annex, paras. 6, 8, 9, 12 and 14. 
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 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly relations and Cooperation 
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to cooperate in the protection of human rights?  This Section first looks at the coop-
eration obligation in relation to the most absolute human rights, and then at a partic-
ular implementation in case-law imposing States to cooperate on a human rights ba-
sis.  
5.3.1. Erga Omnes Obligation of Cooperation to Protect Peremptory Norms 
While the responsibility-sharing measures implementing the cooperation and sol-
idarity principles are fundamentally of a soft-law nature, the principles themselves 
are in some instances endorsed as absolute and legally binding.  
As relevant case-law establishing State responsibility for refugee or human rights 
protection directly on the principle of cooperation is quasi non-existent, a 2018 Ad-
visory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the right of asylum 
as a human right, is noteworthy.  It firmly concludes on the erga omnes binding and 
customary character of the inter-state duty to cooperate in the observance of human 
rights:  
“la Corte recuerda que el deber de cooperación entre Estados en la promoción y obser-
vancia de los derechos humanos, es una norma de carácter erga omnes, por cuanto debe ser 
cumplida por todos los Estados, y de carácter vinculante en el derecho internacional. En 
efecto, el deber de cooperación constituye una norma consuetudinaria de derecho internacio-
nal, cristalizada en el artículo 4.2 de la Resolución 2625 […]” 104 
Also the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts identify a legally binding State obligation to cooperate when it comes to the 
protection of some absolute human rights. Articles 40 and 41 identify the duty to 
cooperate in ending any “gross or systematic failure” of “obligations arising under a 
peremptory norm of general international law”. The ILC Commentary specifies what 
such a norm entails:  
“In accordance with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a peremptory norm of 
 
104
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The institution of asylum, and its recognition as a human 
right under the Inter-American System of Protection (interpretation and scope of Articles 5, 22(7) and 
22(8) in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion of 30 
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general international law is one which is: accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can 
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter.”105  
The ILC identifies some human rights as peremptory norms: “the prohibitions 
against slavery and the slave trade, genocide, and racial discrimination and apart-
heid”, and “the prohibition against torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture”.106 
Cooperation under international law thus not only entails State obligations of 
burden-sharing out of solidarity with other States, but also one of protection out of 
solidarity with persons suffering serious and systematic human rights violations, 
such as racial discrimination and torture. No matter how vague this provision still is 
on its practical implementation, there is no way around the existence of the obligation 
on the State itself.  
When refugees suffer systematic violation of their most fundamental rights in a 
transit or hosting State, then other States have a shared, but erga omnes legal obliga-
tion to ensure those refugee rights. Besides extraterritorial jurisdiction-based respon-
sibilities, under international law States also have a responsibility to help improving 
refugee situations beyond their borders that amount to torture or racial discrimina-
tion.107   
5.3.2. Global Climate Policy and Human Rights  
A legal reasoning on how to make the general duty to cooperate more operational 
might be found in case-law dealing with other collective action problems which are 
taken before courts on the basis of human rights violations. Climate change is such 
a collective problem, whose solution would produce mutual benefits and yet can only 
be attained by a form of burden-sharing.   
In 2018 the Netherlands The Hague Appeal Court judged the responsibility of 
the Dutch State in dealing with climate change, and determined what exactly was the 
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 See supra note 59, Art. 40, Commentary (2). 
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 Ibid., Commentary (4). 
107
 E.g. the systematic detention of Sub-Saharan refugees in Libya. See for an assessment of their 
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Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya”, 20 December 2018, available at: 
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State’s share of the global burden it should take up.108 Crucial parts of the judge’s 
reasoning could be relevant for dealing with refugee protection responsibility also: 
First, the Court accepts that the State’s responsibility for a recognised collective 
problem – the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions – is not a legal obligation with 
a direct effect flowing from international commitments.109 However, the fact that it 
concerns a global issue that can only be solved through cooperation, does not, the 
Court says, “release the State from its obligation to take measures in its territory, 
within its capabilities, which in concert with the efforts of other states provide pro-
tection”.110 In other words, the duty of cooperation to tackle a transnational issue en-
tails an obligation on States to act individually. Also, the Court continues, the multi-
lateral nature of the commitment to deal with the collective problem, demands effec-
tive remedies in order to avoid a free-rider problem, and thus enforceable judicial 
decisions.111 
Furthermore, the rights to life and to private and family life impose a duty of care 
onto the State “to take concrete actions to prevent future violations”.112 Since it is 
evident from scientific proof, that there is “a real threat of dangerous climate change, 
resulting in serious risk”, the State has “a duty to protect against this real threat”,113 
which includes preventive action.114  Previous acknowledgement by the Dutch State 
of the necessity to act in combination with scientific arguments, according to the 
Court, impose an obligation on the State to a specific minimum action – a reduction 
of 25% by 2020. Not undertaking that minimum action would be a violation of the 
duty of care under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR.115  
To draw the parallel with refugee protection is attractive – despite obvious dif-
ferences, such as the scale of the mutual benefits and shared interests in dealing with 
the collective problem (all vs. some States), the protected group (world population, 
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including nationals on the State’s territory vs. non-nationals and third States).116 Po-
tentially applicable is the argument that the duty to cooperate in order to tackle col-
lective problems that might lead to human rights violations, entails a duty of care for 
the individual State, even when it has not taken up any specific international com-
mitment. And that this duty of care includes structural preventive action in the form 
of burden-sharing that can be concretised in a legally enforceable outcome. 
Also relevant for a global refugee protection policy, is that international climate 
policy has begun to assess the specific shares of burden or responsibility of individ-
ual States on an objective scientific basis. This asymmetric allocation mechanism is 
referred to as the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’-approach (‘CBDR’),117 
and is also being explored in refugee protection policies, e.g. by calculating national 
contributions to ad hoc or potential (re)distributions measures on more objective cri-
teria, such as GDP, population size, unemployment rate or number of asylum appli-
cations.118 
5.4. – Solidarity in a Regional Context: EU Migration Law 
To effectively address collective problems, the principles of international coop-
eration and solidarity need a more precise transposition that is legally enforceable. 
In the absence of a genuine global community, it is therefore useful to turn to more 
legally integrated regional frameworks such as the EU in order to assess what role 
these principles could play in refugee protection.119 
At EU level the principles of solidarity and cooperation are enshrined in primary 
law, but have also been transposed into some mechanisms for operational burden-
sharing and responsibility allocation of the EU’s migration policy, in its internal as 
well as external dimension. 
The ‘principle of sincere cooperation’ to “assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaties”, as established under Article 4(3) of the EU Treaty 
(‘TEU’), and the foundational value of solidarity in Article 2 TEU, are fundamental 
to the EU communitarian order.120 They form a constitutional paradigm of the EU, 
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“both a prerequisite for and a means of integration”, combining the altruistic value 
of redistribution, with an effective self-interest due to its judicial enforceability.121 
The Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) has recognised this fundamental value of solidarity 
for the EU order: “[…] failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States 
by the fact of their adherence to the Community strikes at the fundamental basis of 
the Community legal order.”122 
In as far as the principle of solidarity has been operationalised into the EU inter-
nal and external refugee protection policy, however, solidarity seems to function 
merely as a correction mechanism, not as a fundamental allocation criterion among 
Member States.123 Even when enforceable, the responsibility-sharing mechanisms 
exist to deal with crisis or overburdening, not as the structural framework to bring 
about an equal and fair distribution of refugee protection responsibility. 
However particular this implementation might be to the specific functioning of 
the EU, it is still useful to enquire what legal allocation criteria are applied for estab-
lishing responsibility beyond the individual Member State or common external bor-
ders, and whether they have been evaluated in case-law. This Section will first look 
at the internal, and then at the external dimension of the EU migration law and policy. 
5.4.1. Internal Dimension 
The EU’s internal migration policy set out to develop a Common European Asy-
lum System (‘CEAS’), whose, according to Article 80 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the EU (‘TFEU’) “[…] implementation shall be governed by the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, be-
tween the Member States.” “Whenever necessary, the Union acts […] shall contain 
appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.” Since Article 78(3) TFEU 
specifies the need for provisional measures in case of an emergency, the general 
provision in Article 80 should be understood as an obligation to also adopt more 
structural measures.   
The principle of fair responsibility-sharing in Article 80 qualifies the support de-
manded by the principle of solidarity: “up to the point where each Member State 
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contributes their fair share”.124 This obligation of result can be understood to include 
structural measures (“whenever necessary”) in order to prevent overburdening of a 
Member State in the first place and to avoid further structural imbalances.125 How-
ever, such a preventive structural mechanism for responsibility allocation is not in 
place in the EU. 
Following the 2015 EU so-called refugee crisis, the EU Council adopted provi-
sional measures in the form of its relocation and hot spot approach. The Council 
evaluated the situation as an emergency situation that demanded solidarity in appli-
cation of Article 78(3) TFEU, rather than a deficiency of the structural obligation of 
prevention.126 Two Council Decisions established a temporary emergency relocation 
scheme which allocated responsibility for the admission of fixed quota of asylum-
seekers with individual Member States even though some of them opposed it.127   
The Court of Justice had to evaluate the legal nature of these emergency measures 
in its judgments C-643/15 and C-647/15 of 6 September 2017, since Hungary and 
Slovakia argued that the decision did not have a solid legal basis. The Court, how-
ever, accepted that such mechanism could legally be adopted under Article 78(3) 
TFEU by a non-legislative act of the EU Council with a qualitative majority, even 
against the will of certain Member States.   
Under EU-law a legally binding mechanism was thus established to allocate re-
sponsibility to a State, not on the basis of its jurisdiction, but explicitly on the basis 
of the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing,128 and imposed by a regional polit-
ical organ, against the sovereign will of a State. This solidarity-based binding allo-
cation mechanism provides, to some extent, for a more equitable distribution of re-
sponsibilities for refugee protection among States, be it limited to the specific re-
gional emergency context of the EU. In reality, however, the mechanism has not 
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delivered the anticipated results,129 nor is it simply expandable to the external dimen-
sion of the EU migration policy for enforceable burden-sharing with overburdened 
refugee hosting countries outside the EU.  
The Dublin system is also a responsibility allocation mechanism under the 
CEAS, and one of a structural nature.130 The allocation is not based on criteria of 
internal solidarity however, but essentially on criteria of jurisdiction. Responsibility 
for the protection of a refugee is basically allocated to the Member State under whose 
territorial jurisdiction they enter the Union (Articles 12-14), or whose extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would be engaged in case their human rights are violated in other Mem-
ber States (Articles 3, 8-11, and 16).131 The discretionary clauses simply reaffirm na-
tional sovereignty of Member States to assume responsibility “on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds” (or not).132 The exception clause in Article 3(2), intended to 
prevent risks of inhumane and degrading treatment, was given a binding character in 
the 2013 Recast of the Regulation exactly in order to implement the case-law from 
the ECtHR (MSS case) and CJEU (NS case) that attributed responsibility to a Mem-
ber State on the basis of its extraterritorial jurisdiction for human right violations in 
other Member States –133 and for not using its discretionary power (under the 2003 
predecessor Dublin II Regulation) to apply the clause,.134 Even though the Dublin 
Regulation establishes a structural and a priori responsibility allocation, it does so 
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along the general criteria for establishing (extra-)territorial jurisdiction, and not in 
order to share responsibilities equitably.135    
The Dublin III Regulation also establishes a solidarity-based Early Warning and 
Prepareness Mechanism.136 Together with other implementing measures under the 
CEAS, such as the Asylum Intervention Pools coordinated by the European Asylum 
Support Office (‘EASO’) “to support Member States subject to particular pressure 
on their asylum and reception systems”,137 or the internal funding mechanisms,138 
these are tools of burden-sharing through capacity building or financial support, ra-
ther than responsibility allocation mechanisms themselves. The redistributive value 
of these measures is furthermore very limited: Member States invoking their support 
are ultimately held to the full implementation of the CEAS, contributions are volun-
tary and the funding does not primarily target asymmetric overburdening.139 These 
different instruments are not examples of structural responsibility-sharing. 
It is clear that as far as the EU’s migration policy has implemented responsibility 
allocation mechanisms in the CEAS, these are either based on emergency-driven ad 
hoc solidarity – the temporary relocation measures – or on jurisdiction criteria with-
out any structural responsibility-sharing rationale – the Dublin system.  
5.4.2. External Dimension 
As to its general external policy “characterised by close and peaceful relations 
based on cooperation” (Article 8 TEU), the EU engages “to advance in the wider 
world […], the principles of equality and solidarity”, to “build partnerships with third 
countries”, “promote multilateral solutions to common problems”, and “work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to […] pro-
mote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good 
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global governance”, as stipulated in Article 21 TEU. 
Article 78(2) TFEU adds an external dimension to the CEAS, consisting of “part-
nership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of 
people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection”. Cooperation here 
is a means to control migration, rather than to share protection responsibility with 
refugee hosting countries on the basis of solidarity.  
In the EU Commission’s 2008 Political Plan on Asylum and 2011 overarching 
framework of EU external migration policy, the Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (‘GAMM’), responsibility-sharing, solidarity and international cooperation 
with non-EU countries in the neighbourhood are explicitly mentioned as policy prior-
ities.140 In the first place such cooperation is meant to “enable these countries to offer 
a higher standard of international protection for asylum-seekers and displaced people 
who remain in the region of origin of conflicts or persecution” through Regional Pro-
tection Programmes, focussing on capacity-building and development. It also adds an 
“enhanced resettlement component […] as a sign of international solidarity and a key 
instrument for pursuing orderly access to durable solutions in the EU”.141  
These political declarations on resettlement and supporting protection in coun-
tries of transit and first asylum, are repeated in combination with fluctuating practical 
commitments in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration,142 its Progress Reports,143 
and other instruments such as the Partnership Framework with third countries,144 the 
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Facility for Refugees in Turkey,145 the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa,146 or the 
proposed Union Resettlement Framework.147 However genuine their burden-sharing 
potential, up until now the EU external solidarity tools are without exception depend-
ing on voluntary commitments of Member States and do not establish any legally 
binding responsibility allocation mechanism. They clearly do not form a legal basis 
for third States to claim an equitable sharing of responsibility for refugee protection 
from EU Member States.148 No cases have been brought before the Court of Justice 
by a third State claiming solidarity-based responsibility-sharing under the EU’s ex-
ternal migration policy.  
On two occasions EU Courts got the opportunity to evaluate claims by individu-
als in search for international protection in the EU. The judgements could have at-
tributed responsibility for refugee protection to a Member State, on the basis of cri-
teria other than jurisdiction, or might have brought in considerations of solidarity and 
cooperation in the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Unfortunately the 
Courts did not consider the merits of the cases, nor the potential legal relevance of 
the principle of solidarity in cooperation agreements with third countries or in the 
assessments of visa applications by refugees in third countries.  
The first case related to the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal, and could 
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have led to the assessment of whether a third country should be considered ‘safe’ 
and what consequences this entails for Member States’ responsibility for admitting 
refugees entering the Union from such a country. It had the potential of establishing 
criteria for allocating responsibility to a Member State, that are based on the effec-
tiveness of the protection in a third country that the EU has established far-reaching 
migration cooperation with.149 The first instance General Court, in its judgements of 
28 February 2017, however, dismissed the claim because it lacked the competence 
to judge the international agreement it considered the EU as an institution not to be 
part of.150 The CJEU dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible.151  
The other case, X and X v. Belgium, before the Grand Chamber of the CJEU 
concerned the refusal to a refugee in a third country (Lebanon) of a humanitarian 
visa aimed at applying for asylum in an EU Member State.152 The Court could have 
evaluated whether the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the addressed State extends to 
its visa posts in third countries that cannot guarantee to refugees some of the most 
fundamental human rights. In relation to refugees in countries of first asylum that are 
overburdened, such case-law might add solidarity and equitable burden-sharing con-
siderations to the assessment of jurisdiction as a form of control over or impact on 
the human rights of refugees beyond their borders – a hybrid, stripped version of the 
solidarity principle, restricted to emergency situations. The Court, however, judged 
it to be a visa application for a long-stay, which does not fall under the EU Visa 
Code, and over which, by consequence, it has no competence.153  It will be interesting 
to see how the Strasbourg court, who has now been called to judge on the humani-
tarian visa matter, will judge the extent of the State’s responsibility and whether it 
will include solidarity considerations in situations of inhumane treatment of refugees 
in overburdened countries of first asylum.154  
The EU’s external migration policy has not produced any binding criteria to al-
locate responsibility for refugees outside the EU. All in all, in the name of solidarity, 
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the EU seems to have shifted rather than shared burdens under its externalisation 
policies, without accepting any legal responsibility for it.   
5.5. – The Potential of Cooperation and Solidarity for Refugee Protection 
International law concepts as solidarity and cooperation offer a good principled 
basis to break the deadlock in global refugee policy on a more equitable distribution 
of State responsibility for refugee protection. The principles, however, have hardly 
been implemented into sufficiently precise legal provisions, and have only led to few 
legal commitments of responsibility-sharing; frameworks for cooperation and some 
emergency mechanisms, but not binding structural obligations or a priori criteria. 
Nevertheless, the principles show some potential for a more specified application 
on refugee protection distribution.  
When considering refugee protection as a collective problem – whose solution 
entails shared interests and mutual benefits – parallels could be drawn with global 
climate policy. States might then be held responsible on the basis of their duty to 
cooperate for the collective goal if they want to avoid human rights responsibility. 
Also the erga omnes obligation to cooperate in ending serious violations of peremp-
tory human right norms, and the competence of the International Court of Justice to 
judge inter-states disputes on the application of the Refugee Status Convention offer 
tentative legal avenues for a more equitable allocation of responsibilities for refugee 
protection between refugee hosting and other States. 
At the regional level of the EU the potential of cooperation and solidarity seems 
more promising in terms of legally binding engagements.  The temporary relocation 
measures allocate a legally binding ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ 
(‘CBDR’) to all Member States for the admission of refugees – as is the case with 
the EU proposals on the Dublin reform and the resettlement scheme.155   
So far, however, it does not look like the underlying fundamental values are able 
to outweigh the considerations driving EU and Member States’ policies of external-
isation. The political priority of the external migration policy is not the equitable 
distribution of responsibilities with refugee hosting countries, but migration and bor-
der control. And whatever the rhetorical shift to more structural solidarity beyond 
crisis management in the Commission’s legislative proposals, individual Member 
States are reluctant to follow. The same is true at the internal dimension where short-
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term national interests seem to take precedence over structural solidarity, however 
fundamental for the communitarian order.   
All in all, the existing legal frameworks to enhance responsibility-sharing are ad 
hoc solutions, limited to emergency situations of overburdening or based on volun-
tary contributions to capacity-building and financial support measures. Hence the 
reluctant position of courts, on the one hand confirming the legally binding nature of 
the principles of solidarity and cooperation, on the other hand barely capable of en-
forcing State responsibility on that basis in concrete situations, where States have not 
yet gone beyond making purely principled commitments. 
6. – Third Mechanism: Allocation on the Basis of the Responsibility to 
Protect  
A last interesting frame for allocating State responsibility beyond the jurisdiction 
criteria, this chapter wants to explore, is the so called ‘Responsibility to Protect’-
doctrine (RtoP).  While its exact content and application are unclear and far from 
agreed upon in opinio juris,156 the scope of the doctrine, as it has developed in the 
last two decades, is so far limited to international humanitarian law with regard to 
the so called atrocity crimes. At best its legally binding nature can be argued to rest 
on “complementary customary law developments”.157 Applying it to refugee protec-
tion is a hypothesis so far hardly explored in legal doctrine, but might have some 
potential for the question of responsibility allocation.158  
This Section will first outline the core of the doctrine with a reference to interna-
tional case-law, before assessing its potential for global refugee protection.  
6.1. – The RtoP-doctrine in International Law  
Established under UN auspices, the central element of RtoP is that States have a 
responsibility to protect populations at risk of atrocity crimes, on their territory, but 
also beyond their borders.  The most authoritative basis for RtoP is the 2005 World 
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Summit Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly,159 which outlines the 
scope of the doctrine in two provisions (and three pillars): the general RtoP-obliga-
tion is to protect populations, whether national citizens or not, against genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, including through preventive 
measures. The prime bearer of that responsibility is the territorial State (1st pillar). 
But there is also a complementary responsibility of the international community to 
assist territorial States with their prime obligation (2nd pillar),160 and to undertake 
collective action in case the territorial State manifestly fails to fulfil its obligation 
(3rd pillar).161  
RtoP had an innovative jurisprudential application, relevant for its potential as a 
state responsibility allocation mechanism under international law. The International 
Court of Justice, in its Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia v. Serbia) 
judgment,162 refined criteria for attributing responsibility onto a so called ‘bystander 
State’ for not having fulfilled its RtoP-duty to (help) prevent genocide. The Court 
accepted the bystander State (Serbia) not to have committed, nor to have been com-
plicit in the act of genocide (in Srebrenica), but it found that State in casu nonetheless 
responsible for having failed to prevent it (in violation of Article 1 of the Genocide 
Convention).163   
The Court qualifies a State’s legal duty to prevent genocide beyond its borders 
as a due diligence obligation:164 “to employ all means reasonably available”.165 This 
is an obligation of conduct, so the State’s responsibility will be incurred when it 
“manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its 
power” –166 even though this State can only be held responsible if and once the pro-
hibited act (genocide) would ultimately be committed.167 
So, can every State be held responsible for failing the due diligence-test when a 
genocide happens somewhere in the world? To a certain extent it could, but here the 
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Court is innovatory, as it introduces a new criterion for allocating State responsibil-
ity. The Court does not attribute responsibility to all States in an undifferentiated 
way, nor to the international community as a whole, but proceeds to an in concreto 
assessment. The judgement specifies criteria to define exactly which bystander State 
bears (extraterritorial) responsibility, and to what extent:    
“[…] In this area the notion of “due diligence”, which calls for an assessment in concreto, 
is of critical importance. Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has 
duly discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to 
another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, 
or already committing, genocide.”168 
The Court clarifies that a State’s capacity to influence the acts of (potential) per-
petrators beyond its borders, itself depends on multiple factors, such as the geograph-
ical distance from the events, political or other links with the actors, or limitations 
by international law.   
The obligation to take preventive measures exists once a State with such influ-
encing capacity can reasonably be expected to be aware of the existence of a serious 
risk: 
“In fact, a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the 
instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious 
risk that genocide will be committed. From that moment onwards, if the State has available 
to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or 
reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to 
make such use of these means as the circumstances permit.”169 
While in principle the duty to prevent genocide rests on all States, the scope of 
each State’s responsibility to prevent it (and protect persons against it) is not deter-
mined by its territorial or extraterritorial jurisdiction, but by its reasonably knowl-
edgeable capacity to influence. What then the obligation on such bystander States to 
employ all means reasonably available exactly entails, depends on each State’s ca-
pacities in that concrete situation. 
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6.2. – The Potential of the RtoP-Doctrine for Refugee Protection 
Could taking up responsibility for the protection of refugees who find themselves 
in States of first asylum or transit be a legal obligation for bystander States under 
their R2P-duty?  
In general, the implementation of the RtoP-doctrine by the international commu-
nity has shifted from forcible intervention (3rd pillar) to more non-coercive and pro-
active measures (under the 2nd and 3rd pillars) in order to prevent atrocities from 
happening.170 In a 2009 Report, the UN Secretary-General hints at capacity-building 
and other forms of assistance in refugee protection for States to fulfil their obliga-
tions under any of the pillars of RtoP,171 and explicitly includes refugee protection in 
the ‘way forward’ for RtoP:  
“[The United Nations and its range of agencies, funds and programmes] could do that 
[the elimination of man-made scourges] much more effectively if goals relating to the re-
sponsibility to protect, including the protection of refugees and the internally displaced, were 
mainstreamed among their priorities, whether in the areas of human rights, humanitarian 
affairs, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, political affairs or development.”172 
Before focussing on the content of the State’s obligation under RtoP, however, it 
is essential to clarify what it adds as a mechanism for responsibility allocation to 
States, in comparison with other mechanisms. Advantages of RtoP are that its criteria 
are not based on jurisdiction and extend beyond territorial borders. Moreover, it is 
not in the first place directed at sanctioning individual cases of endured violations of 
international law (attribution), but rather has a more preventive objective of promot-
ing State responses to protection failures (allocation).173 Another asset is that the cus-
tomary obligation the ICJ identified allocates a CBDR to States: a qualified obliga-
tion to take preventive measures,174 based on an a priori criterion to determine the 
degree of responsibility of respective States, namely their capacity to influence.175    
 
170
 HAKIMI, “Distributing the Responsibility to Protect” in NOLLKAEMPER and JACOBS (eds.), Distri-
bution of responsibilities in International Law, Cambridge, 2015, p. 265 ff., p. 266; GLANVILLE, cit. supra 
note 157, pp. 11-14 
171
 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. A/63/677, paras. 17, 29, 30, 35. 
172
 Ibid., para. 68. 
173
 MALEY, “Humanitarian law, refugee protection and the Responsibility to Protect”, in THAKUR and 
MALEY (eds.), Theorising the responsibility to protect, Cambridge, 2015, p. 249 ff., p.253.  
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 HAKIMI, cit. supra note 170, pp. 270-271. 
175
 GLANVILLE, cit. supra note 157, pp. 18-19. 
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If the RtoP reasoning could be applied on global refugee protection, then the State 
who has the means to prevent the violation of refugee’s fundamental rights on the 
territory of another State, and can be expected to know about it, has an obligation to 
do all it reasonably can in order to prevent (or stop) it. 
Potential limitations for applying RtoP as a mechanism to allocate responsibility 
for refugee protection, however, concern the nature of the rights it seeks to ensure, 
as well as the scope and quality of the preventive or protection measures it demands 
of bystander States.  In order to determine the relevance of the doctrine for refugee 
protection, two questions need an answer. Firstly, could the obligation at stake go 
beyond the prevention of genocide and also include prevention of violations of ref-
ugees’ fundamental rights on the territory of another State? And secondly, could the 
obligation to employ all means reasonably available include an obligation on States 
to share responsibility for refugee protection with hosting States? 
As to the first question, on the nature of the protected rights, RtoP is strictly lim-
ited to prevention of and protection against the four atrocity crimes.176 Moreover, the 
ICJ explicitly limits its assessment to the obligation to prevent genocide, excluding 
the direct application of the Genocide judgement to other obligations to prevent acts 
prohibited by international law.177  
Though not directly applicable to violations of refugee rights under international 
law, nothing excludes per se a broader application of the responsibility criteria in 
other fields of international law.  The Court itself acknowledges the existence of 
other positive obligations “under peremptory norms or […] obligations which pro-
tect essential humanitarian values, and which might be owed erga omnes”.178 Refer-
ence can be made here once more to the provisions in Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility, which identify peremptory norms whose violation 
States are held to end collectively, including the prohibition of racial discrimination, 
torture, and non-refoulement (see supra Section 4.3) – with this distinction that ‘end-
ing’ a rights violation presupposes its commission, and might thus preclude certain 
preventive action,179 though not all protective measures.  
But even without this extended interpretation of rights (violations) RtoP might 
apply to, the doctrine could offer a useful alternative to the limits of State jurisdiction 
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and the weak enforceability of international solidarity, in its application for refugees 
fleeing genocide or other atrocity crimes.  Refugees leaving their country to escape 
such persecution or violence could be entitled to protection under the RtoP, in order 
exactly to prevent genocide or stop atrocity crimes from being committed by the 
State of origin. The RtoP then first lies with their hosting State that should  guarantee 
their non-refoulement and protection under the 1951 Refugee Status Convention or 
general human rights law (1st pillar).180 Subsequently, when that State fails to do so 
due to unwillingness or incapacity, the RtoP-obligation falls on bystander States and 
obliges them to assist the hosting State (2nd pillar) or employ other means of collec-
tive action (3rd pillar).181 
As to the second question then, assuming RtoP in general could include State 
obligations to stop or prevent violations of certain refugees rights beyond its borders, 
what specific protection measures might such an extended interpretation of the in-
ternational law then include? Do assistance (2nd  pillar) and non-coercive collective 
action (3rd pillar) measures imposed by RtoP include specific actions by States be-
yond their territory, for specific categories of refugees or in specific situations?  
The Secretary-General’s 2009 Report clarifies that, while the scope of RtoP is 
limited and should not be extended to cover “other calamities”, “the response ought 
to be deep, employing the wide array of prevention and protection instruments”. The 
international community’s obligations to “encourage and help” refugee hosting 
States, and to apply “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means” 
could surely include measures of (common but differentiated) responsibility-sharing 
for refugee protection, such as resettlement, capacity-building or financial support.182  
A last suggestion for the potential application of RtoP for refugee protection even 
goes further in its answer to both questions concerning the nature of the protected 
rights and of the protective measures. Forced displacement of the civilian population 
is, in the context of armed conflict and under certain conditions, a crime under inter-
national criminal law,183 as well as a violation of customary international humanitarian 
 
180
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law,184 but it can also be considered a constituting element of atrocity crimes, a tactic 
or instrument of war,185 or a crime against humanity in itself.186 The RtoP-obligation to 
stop atrocity crimes from happening would then include the protection of a population 
that already is or is at risk of being forcibly displaced. The responsibility of bystander 
States in such a situation would thus include preventive measures that go beyond and 
precede strict refugee protection. As such, RtoP-obligations towards forcibly displaced 
populations in general, including internally displaced persons or persons threatened to 
be displaced – potential refugees in spe – might be the international law incentive to 
take effective measures to fight root causes of forced migration.187 
To sum up the findings on the RtoP potential for global refugee protection, there 
are two interesting, but rather antagonistic conclusions to draw. One, the R2P-mecha-
nism to allocate responsibility to States is very attractive to deal with the current prob-
lem of unequitable distribution of refugee protection responsibilities among States, 
since it establishes an a priori CBDR-criterion beyond States’ jurisdiction. And two, 
even though theoretically applicable to responsibility-sharing in refugee protection, 
the doctrine does only protect against certain violations of refugees’ fundamental 
rights, and it does not necessarily require of States that they take protective measures 
in third States to such an extent that as a minimum the standards of international refu-
gee law are guaranteed.  In other words, the bystander States’ duty to prevent atrocity 
crimes – including (secondary) forced displacement for that matter – does not entail 
an obligation to ensure all the rights under the Refugee Status Convention. However, 
it can be argued that, under R2P, States have the duty to help other States, or even 
force them to, respect the non-refoulement of refugees on their territory. 
7. – Conclusion 
Global refugee policy is in need of a legal framework that could distribute re-
sponsibility for refugee protection among States in an equitable manner and guaran-
tee effective protection for refugees. This issue being subject to persistent political 
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inhibition, is why this article has focussed on the potential of international case-law 
and theoretical arguments for international law.   
At first, it might seem effective for an individual refugee to litigate against a State 
for it to take responsibility for the violations of her or his rights (e.g. the ECtHR Hirsi 
case). However this jurisprudential avenue has important limitations. Although 
structural allocation criteria can find their origin in individual cases before regional 
human rights courts (e.g. the ECtHR MSS case), such case-law attributes responsi-
bility only a posteriori, once fundamental refugee rights have already been violated. 
Besides, attribution of responsibility to a State traditionally only happens when such 
violations happen under its jurisdiction, and prevailing migration policies are pre-
cisely designed to keep refugees out of the State’s jurisdiction. As a consequence, 
such externalisation policies cause overburdening of countries of first asylum. 
In this chapter, I searched for alternative mechanisms to address these limitations 
and deliver a more equitable distribution of responsibility among States. And while 
international case-law has, up to now, not produced a decisive legally binding crite-
rion to allocate State responsibility on an a priori basis, I have showed it did come 
up with some legal avenues with the potential to help breaking through the legal 
deadlock.  
Firstly, in situations where fundamental human rights of refugees are violated in 
hosting States, some solace might already be found in novel legal interpretations of 
the existing attribution on the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Other States could 
be forced to accept their responsibility for refugee protection beyond their borders 
on the basis of the direct and reasonably foreseeable impact their policies have on 
the endangerment and violation of refugees right to life, even in the hands of non-
state or third State perpetrators.   
Secondly, the principles of solidarity and cooperation seem to be the most obvi-
ous candidates for equitable responsibility distribution, because they establish a pri-
ori criteria on the basis of fundamental values in inter-State relations. However, 
much of this remains theory, and little to no case-law directly applies those principles 
and States’ commitment to burden-sharing as legally binding criteria. At the mo-
ment, the principles are unenforceable because they lack implementation into precise 
legal commitments that go beyond the purely voluntary in emergency situations.  
Nonetheless, qualifying global refugee protection as a collective problem might im-
pose obligations on States to cooperate by taking preventive measures to safeguard 
human rights.  
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Thirdly, in cases where persons have or might be forcibly displaced due to very 
serious breaches of international humanitarian law or where refugees suffer viola-
tions of peremptory norms such as the non-refoulement principle, the Responsibility 
to Protect-doctrine and ICJ-jurisprudence could be used to allocate responsibility to 
States. All States have the duty to protect victims, prevent atrocity crimes, and stop 
violations of peremptory norms even beyond their own borders through assistance 
or even intervention in refugee hosting States. States even have a differentiated qual-
ified obligation to do all they reasonably can to prevent or end atrocities, which might 
include taking refugee protection measures, simply because they have the capacity 
to influence their fate. 
Each of these mechanisms has its own legal restrictions: some related to the lim-
itation in rights they protect in comparison with the totality of refugee protection 
rights – only right to life, prohibition of genocide or atrocity crimes, or peremptory 
norms –, others linked to the lack of enforceability of State measures – responsibility-
sharing such as resettlement is purely based on voluntary commitments. Combined 
however, the legally binding core of the different criteria this article has assessed – 
jurisdiction-as-impact, cooperation obligations in solving collective problems and 
obligations to prevent or stop atrocities beyond borders – could already help estab-
lishing legal responsibility of States in situations of overburdening of refugee hosting 
States that lead to serious rights violations for refugees. Even when limited to emer-
gency situations, this might have some redistributive effect. 
Still, this does not equal the sought for structural, a priori allocation mechanism 
that should guarantee an equitable distribution of responsibilities among States and 
an effective protection to refugees, just yet. This article however also showed some 
contours of how such a, more legally robust, mechanism might take form in the fu-
ture. As to the nature of rights to be protected by States with cooperative and pre-
ventive measures, international law already offers better avenues for protection when 
it concerns absolute human rights: example could be taken from the right to life basis 
in the climate case, peremptory human rights norms such as non-refoulement from 
the ILC Draft Articles, or prohibition of atrocity crimes under the RtoP-doctrine – 
and as to the specific rights guaranteed by the Refugee Status Convention, the ICJ 
could be a potential forum litis for determining respective responsibilities of Con-
tracting States. As to the scope of the measures responsible States should take, a 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’-approach (CBDR) seems have the most 
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potential in creating at least some willingness with States to commit themselves: in-
spiration could come from the – although limited – EU relocation programme, the 
capacity-to-influence-criterion from the Genocide case, or the scientifically based 
calculation of a State’s contribution to fighting climate change.  
My conclusion, for now, is that there are several promising legal avenues to be 
found in international law, but that a game-changer to legally enforce an equitable 
inter-State distribution of responsibilities for an effective refugee protection in a 
structural manner and on a global scale is lacking. As mentioned before, this article 
only had the intention to map some of the legal landscape covered by international 
case-law. More legal and practical scrutiny of these, and other, arguments is defi-
nitely needed in order to assess their legal coherence and judicial resilience. 
The urgency of the issue of equitable distribution, in a time where States inten-
tionally try to circumvent their responsibility by externalising it to other States, might 
eventually lead to serious disputes between States. Notwithstanding the valued prag-
matism of law-making, it is not to be excluded that regional or international courts 
will have to rule upon this issue one day. Refugee hosting States that are not able to 
live up to their international refugee protection obligations, due to limited capacities 
and overburdening, could grow tired of continuously demanding more solidarity and 
responsibility-sharing from other States on the policy level and take it to the courts. 
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1. – Introduction 
L’Avocat général Mengozzi terminait des conclusions devenues célèbres dans la 
récente affaire de la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne (‘CJUE’) sur la question 
des visas humanitaires, surgie dans le contexte du conflit syrien, par ces mots, 
« permettez-moi de rappeler à votre attention combien le monde entier, en particulier 
chez nous, en Europe, s’est indigné et profondément ému de voir, il y a deux ans, le corps 
sans vie du petit Alan, échoué sur une plage, après que sa famille avait tenté, à l’aide de 
passeurs et d’une embarcation de fortune surchargée de réfugiés syriens, de rallier, par la 
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Turquie, l’île grecque de Kos. Sur les quatre membres de sa famille, seul son père a réchappé 
du naufrage. Il est louable et salutaire de s’indigner. Dans la présente affaire, la Cour a ce-
pendant l’occasion d’aller plus loin, comme je l’y invite, en consacrant la voie légale d’accès 
à la protection internationale […]. Que l’on ne se méprenne pas : ce n’est pas parce que 
l’émotion le dicte, mais parce que le droit de l’Union le commande »1. 
À l’appel de l’Avocat général pour aller vers un dépassement des limites de l’état 
du droit international et européen pour une protection effective des migrants, la Cour 
a répondu en refusant l’existence d’une compétence de l’Union et donc de la juridic-
tion qui en administre le droit. Elle a ainsi plongé dans le silence l’appel à l’indigna-
tion de son Avocat général. 
Face à ce qui a été considéré comme l’une des plus importantes « crises migra-
toires » de tous les temps, il convient de questionner le rôle joué par le droit interna-
tional dans ce contexte. Le cas particulier des réfugiés en mer représente un exemple 
emblématique où le droit international est confronté à ses limites et paradoxes. 
Ainsi, étudier le discours des juridictions internationales ayant eu à connaître de ce 
type d’affaires est particulièrement intéressant : conçoivent-elles le droit international 
comme un élément de solution de cette « crise » ou le façonnent-elles comme un ins-
trument qui participe des failles structurelles qui contribuent à alimenter cette crise ?  
Dans une tribune publiée récemment, le philosophe Étienne Balibar affirme que 
cette situation « appelle une refonte du droit international, orientée vers la reconnais-
sance de l’hospitalité comme ‘droit fondamental’ imposant ses obligations aux États, 
dont la portée soit au moins égale à celle des grandes proclamations de l’après-
guerre »2. Cette affirmation repose sur l’idée selon laquelle le droit international au-
rait un rôle fondamental à jouer dans la transformation de masses de migrants en 
refugiés sans refuge, et que le discours du droit international devrait être modifié 
pour justement éviter qu’il contribue à légitimer ces opérations. 
Une telle étude du discours des juridictions internationales se développe à partir 
d’un triple prisme. L’encadrement juridique de la situation des réfugiés en mer est 
confronté à plusieurs facteurs de complexité. Le premier est d’ordre systémique : 
répondre à ce phénomène implique de questionner plusieurs branches du droit inter-
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février 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:93, para. 175. 
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 BALIBAR, “Pour un droit international de l’hospitalité”, Le Monde, 16 juillet 2018, accessible sur 
<https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/08/16/etienne-balibar-pour-un-droit-international-de-l-hospi-
talite_5342881_3232.html>.  
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national à la fois, ce qui montre bien le fonctionnement compartimenté du droit in-
ternational fragmenté (1.1). Le deuxième est d’ordre pratique : les réfugiés en mer 
sont confrontés à une difficulté d’accès à la justice, ce qui inclut à plus forte raison 
l’accès aux juridictions internationales, élément à prendre en compte dans une telle 
étude (1.2). Enfin, le discours des juridictions internationales doit être analysé sous 
un prisme théorique, qui déterminera notre approche. La réflexion philosophique et 
éthique sur le phénomène des migrants en mer montre bien que le discours politique 
à ce sujet est polarisé entre deux pôles: un pôle communautariste mettant l’accent 
sur la protection des intérêts collectifs de la communauté d’accueil, correspondant 
au discours souverainiste, et un pôle individualiste, correspondant à la lecture du rôle 
fondamental des droits individuels des migrants à l’encontre des États (1.3). Montrer 
comment ces oscillations irriguent le discours des juridictions internationales est le 
but précis de cet article. 
1.1. – Un problème lié à la fragmentation du droit international 
Le régime juridique applicable aux migrants en mer constitue un exemple topique 
de ce que l’on a pu qualifier de fragmentation du droit international. Depuis quelques 
décennies, le droit international est présenté comme fragmenté : de l’un aux frag-
ments, l’idée fondamentale est une perte d’unité de cet instrument de régulation so-
ciale qui aurait éclaté en une pluralité d’espaces normatifs spécialisés, avec des am-
bitions particulières3 : « the new disorder is not the anarchical society of atomized 
states and inadequate cooperation, but the heterarchical proliferation of disparate 
international and regional regimes, institutionism and jurisdictions »4. 
Penser la situation des migrants en mer en droit international implique de recourir 
à au moins trois branches distinctes du droit international fragmenté : le droit de la 
mer, le droit des réfugiés et les droits de l’homme. Or les migrants sont pris dans le 
morcellement des régimes juridiques applicables à leur situation et dans les angles 
morts résultant des défauts de communication entre les différentes sphères norma-
tives. Si la relation entre droits de l’homme et droit des réfugiés n’est pas en soi 
 
3
 KOSKENNIEMI, MARTINEAU, “La fragmentation du droit international”, in DAVID-MENARD, Chaos, 
Paris, 2013, pp. 51-74, p. 52. 
4
 KANWAR, “International Emergency Governance: Fragments of a Driverless System”, Critical Sense: 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Political Theory, 2004, p. 41 ss., p. 44. 
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problématique (les deux étant unies par une communauté généalogique et idéolo-
gique5), celle qui unit le droit de la mer et les droits des individus l’est assurément.  
Trois positions doctrinales différentes peuvent être identifiées concernant les rap-
ports entre droits de la mer et droits des individus. Certains auteurs estiment que les 
obligations prévues par le droit de la mer et celles prévues par le droit international 
des droits de l’homme sont si différentes que le champ d’application ratione mate-
riae des deux corpus normatifs en ferait presque deux cercles qui ne trouvent pas 
d’intersection6. Inversement, en infléchissant l’idée de parallélisme, il a pu être sou-
ligné que les deux espaces normatifs sont en interaction constante7. D’autres auteurs, 
comme Bernard H. Oxman, ont souligné que la Convention de Montego Bay a été 
conçue précisément pour poursuivre certains intérêts collectifs que pourraient être 
associés aux droits de l’homme8. Ainsi, au-delà de la simple interaction systémique, 
la Convention aurait été pensée pour poursuivre des buts tout à fait en ligne avec la 
vision des droits de l’homme, et c’est en raison de cette alliance philosophique, cette 
 
5
 CANÇADO TRINDADE, PEYTRIGNET, RUIZ DE SANTIAGO, Las tres vertientes de la protección 
internacional de los derechos de la persona humana : Derechos Humanos, Derecho Humanitario, 
Derecho de los Refugiados, Mexico, 2003, p. 3 ss. 
6
 PAPASTAVRIDIS, “Is there a right to be rescued at sea? A skeptical view”, Questions of International 
Law, Zoom-in 4, 2014, p. 20. 
7
 PAPANICOLOPULU, “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, in ATTARD, FITZMAURICE, MARTÍNEZ 
GUTIÉRREZ, The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: The Law of the Sea, Oxford, 
2014, p. 509 ss., pp. 531-532:  
“interaction between human rights and the law of the sea is developing along three main lines. In 
the first place, human rights law and labour law instruments provide the standards for the treatment of 
individuals at sea, that are taken into account in developing law of the sea rules, for example the SUA 
Convention, or in adjudicating disputes. Even in cases where law of the sea instruments do not mention 
or do not refer to human rights, these need to be taken into account when determining the rights and 
duties of States with respect to individuals at sea. Second, the law of the sea, in allocating power and 
jurisdiction among States, provides the structural background for determining the State or States that 
have the duty to ensure that such human rights are effectively enjoyed by individuals. The identifica-
tion of multiple States having jurisdiction as a means to address non-compliance by some States—
notably, flag States—is compatible with human rights law and may best help promote the full enjoy-
ment of human rights. Finally, the law of the sea has started considering in detail how maritime activ-
ities may impact on human rights and how the marine environment may impose practical constraints 
on their enjoyment. This has triggered the development of legal instruments that aim at ensuring that 
human rights are enjoyed by individuals involved in maritime operations and has informed adjudica-
tion of disputes by a wide range of tribunals. Thus, human rights are a vector for further development 
of the law of the sea, along the jurisdictional framework set out in the UNCLOS”. 
8
 OXMAN, “Human rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Columbia Jour-
nal of Transnational Law, 1998, p. 399 ss. 
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communauté de buts que les deux branches ne doivent être lues comme antagonistes.  
Une première question théorique est donc celle de savoir comment les juridic-
tions internationales articulent ces différents champs normatifs dans le domaine des 
réfugiés en mer. S’agit-il d’un discours juridictionnel d’interprétation harmonieuse 
ou de la construction de conflits axio-téléologiques ?  
1.2. – Un problème d’accès à la justice 
Quand on étudie les décisions juridictionnelles ayant adressé les questions rela-
tives à la migration en mer, il faut garder à l’esprit la grande difficulté à laquelle les 
migrants font face quand ils souhaitent avoir accès à la justice, nationale ou interna-
tionale. Comme la pratique des États consiste souvent à refouler en mer, sans étude 
individuelle de leurs demandes, le fait d’empêcher l’accès à une procédure juridic-
tionnelle est le problème même dont le droit international vient se saisir.  Sans comp-
ter, par ailleurs, les difficultés matérielles auxquelles font face des migrants ayant 
connu de telles persécutions et crises. 
Dans l’affaire Hirsi Jamaa, le Gouvernement italien avait plaidé que « les cir-
constances de l’espèce, dès lors qu’elles se sont déroulées à bord de navires, ne per-
mettaient pas de garantir aux requérants le droit d’accès à une instance nationale »9. 
L’argument semble relever de la naïveté, puisque l’article 16 de la Convention de 
Genève prévoit l’obligation pour tout État partie de « libre et facile accès devant les 
tribunaux ». L’idée centrale est que « without access to authorities safeguarding the 
substantive rights granted to refugees, there would be no way to ensure that these 
rights are provided not only on paper, but also in practice »10. Si l’on pense à l’accès 
aux juridictions civiles, on sait que les chefs de compétences en droit international 
privé national reposent sur des critères (nationalité, domicile, résidence habituelle) 
qui peuvent être extrêmement difficiles à caractériser pour un réfugié. Ces chefs de 
compétence présupposent, en effet, un degré significatif d’intégration de la personne 
dans le contexte économique et social de l’État du for.  
Par rapport à la justice internationale, les difficultés pratiques concernant l’accès 
aux juridictions sont reflétées dans l’article 8 du projet d’articles de la Commission 
du droit international (‘CDI’) sur la protection diplomatique. Consciente du fait que 
 
9
 Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Hirsi Jamaa et autres c. Italie, requête n. 27765/09, arrêt 
du 23 février 2012, para 191. 
10
 ELBERLING, “Article 16 – Droit d’ester en justice”, in ZIMMERMANN, MACHTS, DÖRSCHNER, The 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol - A Commentary, Oxford, 2011, 
p. 931 ss., p. 933. 
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l’État de nationalité ne va pas être enclin à exercer sa protection diplomatique à rai-
son des persécutions politiques qui accablent le réfugié, la Commission cherche à 
trouver des liens de rattachement alternatifs, permettant à l’État où celui-ci a établi 
sa « résidence légale et habituelle » de le faire. Cette disposition n’est soutenue par 
aucune pratique étatique et relève pour l’heure de la lex ferenda11. Mais au surplus, 
comme on l’a rappelé, ces critères de rattachement se révèlent de faible intérêt pour 
le cas des réfugiés qui peuvent avoir besoin d’une protection de la part de l’État 
d’accueil avant même d’obtenir une résidence légale et habituelle sur le territoire12. 
Cela va à l’encontre de l’esprit de la disposition dont, comme noté par la CDI, « l’ob-
jectif est de permettre aux États d’exercer leur protection diplomatique à l’égard de 
toute personne qu’ils considèrent et traitent comme un réfugié »13. 
Le contentieux devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (‘Cour EDH’) 
a également montré à quel point l’accès à une juridiction internationale est difficile 
d’accès pour les réfugiés en mer. Les avocats des migrants dans l’affaire Hussun 
(première grande affaire sur la question, antérieure à Hirsi) affirment que « selon les 
informations fournies par les représentants des requérants le 16 juillet 2006, ces der-
niers ont perdu tout contact avec les requérants et ne disposent "même pas d'un nu-
méro de téléphone" où pouvoir les joindre »14. Dans Hussun, par ailleurs, la Cour a 
déclaré irrecevables une grande partie des requêtes, à raison de l’irrégularité des pro-
curations conférant mandat aux avocats15. De plus, les avocats des migrants éprou-
vent de grandes difficultés à défendre les migrants détenus car en situation irrégulière 
de sorte que, dans l’affaire Hirsi, la recevabilité de la requête a été rendue possible 
par la seule action d’intermédiation de l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés 
(‘HCR’)16. 
 
11
 Queen’s Bench (Royaume-Uni), Al Rawi & Others, R (on the Application of) v. Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs and Another [2006] EWHC (Admin), §63. 
12
 ZIEGLER, “Protecting Recognized Geneva Convention Refugees outside their States of Asylum”, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2013, p. 260. 
13
 Commission de droit international, Projet d’articles sur la protection diplomatique et commentaires 
y relatifs, 2006, UN Doc. A/61/10, p. 51. 
14
 Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Hussun et autres c. Italie, requêtes n. 10171/05, 10601/05, 
11593/05 et 17165/05, arrêt du 19 janvier 2010, para 28. 
15
 Ibid., para 43-44. 
16
 DEMBOUR, “Interception-at-sea : Illegal as currently practiced – Hirsi and Others v Italy”, Stras-
bourg Observers, 1er mars 2012, accessible sur <https://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/01/interception-
at-sea-illegal-as-currently-practiced-hirsi-and-others-v-italy/>.  
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1.3. – Un problème philosophique 
Tout comme dans le cas du droit international, la réflexion sur les réfugiés en 
philosophie politique oscille entre deux pôles discursifs opposés, que l’on peut sché-
matiser comme étant représentés par l’approche individualiste et l’approche commu-
nautariste de la migration17. 
L’approche communautariste est représentée par la position de Michael Walzer 
qui, au nom d’une « communitarian self-determination », défendait une discrétion 
quasi pleine et entière des membres d’une communauté politique de décider qui ad-
mettre et qui exclure en son sein, au nom d’un intérêt supérieur de cette communauté. 
L’idée des communautaristes est que l’État est comme un club ou une famille, ayant 
avant tout des obligations à l’égard de sa propre société18. Cette vision correspond 
aux revendications souverainistes de certains juristes. 
De manière assez emblématique, le philosophe qui a porté cette logique à son ex-
trême, Garrett Hardin, utilise les demandeurs d’aide en mer pour expliquer les fonde-
ments de son éthique de l’immigration, connue sous le nom d’« éthique du bateau de 
sauvetage »19. En simplifiant, selon Hardin, on peut concevoir un État développé au-
quel on demande d’accueillir les migrants par analogie à un bateau de sauvetage qui a 
un nombre de places limité. Le bateau coulera si on prend plus de passagers que ce 
que rend possible sa capacité. Ainsi, la seule réponse éthique acceptable consiste à 
refuser plus de personnes. Cette métaphore est intéressante à garder à l’esprit comme 
prisme d’analyse d’un certain nombre de revendications juridiques allant précisément 
dans ce sens. Le secours en mer a toujours été considéré comme un cas limite, permet-
tant de penser les paradoxes de la réflexion philosophique et éthique.  
L’approche individualiste est illustrée par l’optique opposée de Jospeh Carens 
qui, au nom d’un « orthodox individualism », défend la centralité de la liberté de 
mouvement. Les droits des migrants sont fondés sur des valeurs démocratiques fon-
damentales d’égalité et de liberté qui demandent une politique d’open borders20. 
Cette vision correspond aux principales positions des juristes analysant la question 
essentiellement du point de vue des droits de l’homme. 
 
17
 YPI, “Justice in Migration”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2008, p. 391 ss..  
18
 WALZER, Spheres of Justice, New York, 1983, pp. 47-59. 
19
 HARDIN, “Lifeboat Ethics : the Case against Helping the Poor”, Psychology Today, 1974, accessible 
sur <https://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_lifeboat_ethics_case_against_helping_poor.html>.  
20
 CARENS, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders”, Review of Politics, 1987, vol. 49, 
pp. 251-273. 
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L’analyse individualiste est généralement inspirée des travaux de John Rawls, 
selon lequel, par une synthèse extrême, derrière un voile d’ignorance nous sommes 
tous potentiellement des réfugiés. Être né dans un pays développé n’est pas un critère 
qui puisse permettre une telle discrimination sociale : les réfugiés sont des personnes 
ordinaires dans une situation exceptionnelle21. Ce type de logique est menée à son 
extrême par les utilitaristes radicaux comme Peter Singer, pour qui sur ces prémisses 
il est moralement inacceptable de ne pas appeler à une large redistribution des res-
sources et que les États devraient donc accepter des migrants jusqu’à ce qu’on ne 
parvienne pas à égaliser les niveaux de condition de vie22.  
On peut également identifier une position intermédiaire, essayant de trouver un 
compromis entre les revendications individualistes et communautaristes. Une pre-
mière voie de médiation est constituée par l’approche de vulnérabilité. Comme le 
constate Matthew Gibney, les individus ont des obligations morales « générales » (à 
l’égard de l’humanité) et « spéciales » (à l’égard de communautés proches, comme 
la famille). Si normalement on a tendance à faire prévaloir les obligations spéciales, 
le principe d’humanité devrait mener à renforcer les obligations que nous avons à 
l’égard des personnes plus vulnérables, surtout quand le coût social d’une telle dé-
marche est relativement faible23. Une autre approche est celle défendue par Seyla 
Benhabib24 et Thomas Pogge25, selon qui on ne pourrait plus penser en termes de 
communautés nationales à l’ère des interconnections transnationales : l’existence 
d’une société globale fait que nous sommes complices dans la souffrance des autres 
et que cette souffrance a un impact sur nos propres politiques nationales.  
Il a également été souligné que l’approche individualiste tout comme l’approche 
communautariste convergent, le plus souvent en réalité, lorsqu’il s’agit du cas des 
réfugiés politiques. Les auteurs s’accordent à affirmer que, dans les cas de persécu-
tions donnant lieu à la qualité de réfugié, les liens avec la communauté politique 
d’origine ont été à ce point sectionnés que les autres communautés politiques ne sau-
raient refuser d’accueillir en leur sein ces individus26. Telle est en justement la raison 
 
21
 RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, New York, 1974, p. 173. 
22
 SINGER, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, 1993, p. 28 ss. 
23
 GIBNEY, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees, 
Cambridge, 2004, pp. 5 ss. 
24
 BENHABIB, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Cambridge, 2004, p. 17 ss. 
25
 POGGE, “Migration and Poverty”, in BADER (ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion, Houndmills, 
1997, pp. 12-27. 
26
 YPI, “Justice in Migration”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2008, p. 391 ss., p. 397.  
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même de l’émergence du droit international des réfugiés. La pertinence de la distinc-
tion ne subsiste que pour les « migrants économiques », une communauté politique 
pouvant opter pour l’accueil ou le rejet de l’errant selon un bilan coûts-avantages 
opéré en son sein. 
Dans ce chapitre, nous allons analyser le discours des juridictions internationales 
par rapport aux migrants en mer à l’aune de ces différentes postures philosophiques. 
Il sera souligné que le discours du droit international fragmenté oscille entre diffé-
rents pôles, selon l’objectif poursuivi par le locuteur. Déconstruire ces discours nous 
permettra donc de mettre à nu l’articulation des logiques en jeu dans la jurisprudence 
internationale, par rapport à une question qui met à l’épreuve les contours du droit 
international tout autant que ceux de la philosophie politique. Dans cette optique, il 
sera question d’analyser le discours des juridictions internationales portant sur le pi-
lier du droit des réfugiés, le principe de non-refoulement (2), ainsi que sur l’impact 
des droits de l’homme (3). Enfin, il s’agira d’analyser leurs silences concernant le 
secours en droit de la mer (4). 
2. – Les discours juridictionnels sur l’applicabilité du principe de non-
refoulement 
La première branche du droit international qu’il convient d’interroger est le droit 
international des réfugiés, afin de comprendre comment joue le statut protecteur par-
ticulier reconnu à l’individu persécuté qui fuit son pays d’origine en empruntant des 
voies marines. D’un point de vue philosophique, il a été reconnu que « the underlying 
ethos of the refugee regime is a reciprocal commitment to the principle of non refou-
lement »27. En effet, en interdisant aux États d’expulser ou de refouler « un réfugié 
sur les frontières des territoires où sa vie ou sa liberté serait menacée en raison de sa 
race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un certain groupe social 
ou de ses opinions politiques »28, le non-refoulement symbolise au mieux le centre 
névralgique du statut protecteur du réfugié. 
Le discours des internationalistes à cet égard oscille entre deux pôles, selon que 
 
27
 BETTS, “The Normative Terrain of the Global Refugee Regime”, Ethics and International Affairs, 7 
octobre 2015, accessible sur <https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2015/the-normative-terrain-
of-the-global-refugee-regime/>.  
28
 Convention relative au statut des réfugiés, signée à Genève le 28 juillet 1951, entrée en vigueur le 
22 avril 1954, R.T.N.U., vol. 189, n°2545, article 33 (1). 
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l’on voit dans le droit international un instrument de progrès ou une partie du pro-
blème29. Pour certains, la réponse à la crise migratoire réside dans la nécessité pour 
les États de donner application pleinement à leurs obligations internationales en ma-
tière de droits de l’homme et des réfugiés et ce de la manière la plus englobante 
possible (y compris de manière extraterritoriale). À ce discours d’expansion s’op-
pose une logique de minimisation de ceux qui considèrent que le régime juridique 
en l’état est fortement questionnable et ne peut fonctionner.  
La pratique des États suit également ce fonctionnement binaire. Dans un premier 
moment, les États particulièrement intéressés ont eu tendance à délimiter le champ 
d’application du principe de non-refoulement afin de limiter le périmètre de sa force 
obligatoire. En adoptant une perspective chronologique, les pratiques ont porté sur 
deux grands débats : (1) le recoupement de zones du territoire où le principe n’opère 
pas et (2) le refus de son applicabilité extraterritoriale. En revanche, les juridictions 
internationales sont progressivement venues sanctionner ces comportements en ap-
pelant à une application plus large de ces obligations. 
2.1. – Le rejet du découpage territorial de zones de non-droit 
Un certain nombre d’États avaient recoupé, au sein de leur territoire, des zones 
qui au sens du droit interne devaient relever d’un régime d’extra-territorialité. Ainsi, 
ces parties du territoire étaient considérées comme exemptes de l’applicabilité du 
principe de non-refoulement. Ce type de régime juridique était ouvertement contesté 
par le HCR, qui réaffirmait que l’obligation de non-refoulement « n’est pas soumise 
à des restrictions territoriales ; elle s’applique en tout endroit où l’Etat en question 
exerce sa juridiction » 30. 
La pratique de l’Australie et de la France sont emblématiques à cet égard31. Par 
 
29
 WILDE, “’Let them down’: Rescuing migrants at sea and the non-refoulement obligation as a case 
study of international law’s relationship to ‘crisis’: Part I”, EJIL:Talk!, 25 février 2017, accessible sur 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/let-them-drown-rescuing-migrants-at-sea-and-the-non-refoulement-obligation-
as-a-case-study-of-international-laws-relationship-to-crisis-part-i/>.  
30
 Comité des droits de l’homme, Avis consultatif sur l’application extra-territoriale des obligations 
de non-refoulement en vertu de la Convention de 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés et de son Protocole 
de 1967, 16 janvier 2007, A/AC96/951, §9 et §12. 
31
 Pour une analyse historique du droit international des réfugiés en mer et des grandes affaires ayant 
structuré son évolution, voy. MANN, Humanity at sea: maritime migration and the foundations of interna-
tional law, Cambridge, 2016. 
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un Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone), en 200132 l’Australie a 
défini certaines îles situées dans sa mer territoriale comme étant en dehors de la « mi-
gration zone » au sens de sa loi sur la migration de 1954, qui est également l’instru-
ment de transposition permettant l’application en droit interne de la Convention de 
Genève de 1951. Ce faisant il est empêché au migrant d’instituer une instance devant 
les juridictions nationales afin de contester la légalité de sa détention, son refoule-
ment vers un État tiers ou la qualification de son statut juridique33. Cet amendement 
est une réponse à l’épisode du navire Tampa, ayant transporté 433 demandeurs 
d’asile dans les eaux australiennes34. 
Le Comité des droits de l’homme a eu l’occasion de critiquer ce régime, notam-
ment dans une affaire concernant les migrants en mer. Dans ses communications 
dans l’affaire Shams et autres c. Australie, le Comité a constaté une violation de 
l’article 9 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques (‘PIDCP’) du 
fait de détentions allant au-delà de périodes justifiables par l’État et de l’impossibilité 
d’accès à un contrôle juridictionnel de leur détention35. Néanmoins, le Comité se ré-
jouit des modifications du cadre législatif interne intervenues depuis 2003, allant 
progressivement dans le sens de ses recommandations. 
De manière similaire, la législation française avait prévu le découpage de zones 
d’extra-territorialité au sein de ses ports et aéroports, afin de se soustraire à certaines 
obligations internationales. La Cour EDH, dans l’affaire Amuur c. France, a ouver-
tement critiqué cette approche et affirmé que « même si les requérants ne se trou-
vaient pas en France au sens de l’ordonnance du 2 novembre 1945, leur maintien 
dans la zone internationale de l’aéroport de Paris-Orly les faisait relever du droit 
français. En dépit de sa dénomination, ladite zone ne bénéficie pas du statut d’extra-
territorialité » 36. Ainsi, « le système juridique français en vigueur à l’époque et tel 
qu’il a été appliqué dans la présente affaire n’a pas garanti de manière suffisante le 
droit des requérants à leur liberté » 37. On peut en déduire que, selon la Cour, le non-
 
32
 Australia, Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provision) 
Act 2001, No. 127/2001. 
33
 GOODWIN-GILL, MACADAM, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford, 2007, p. 256. 
34
 CROCK, “In the wake of the Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in the 
Management of Refugee Flows”, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 2003, pp. 49-95. 
35
 Comité des droits de l’homme, Saed Shams et autres c. Australie, communications n. 1255, 1256, 
1259, 1260, 1266, 1268, 1270, 1288/2004 du 11 septembre 2007, para. 7.2 et 7.3. 
36
 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Amuur c. France, requête n.19776/92, arrêt du 25 juin 
1996, para. 52. 
37
 Ibid., §54. 
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refoulement s’appliquait sur l’ensemble du territoire et que tout acte unilatéral con-
traire aurait été inopérant. 
2.2. – La condamnation de la non-applicabilité extraterritoriale du principe 
Dans une première phase, la pratique (notamment juridictionnelle) des États par-
ticulièrement intéressés est allée dans le sens d’un refus catégorique de l’applicabilité 
du principe de non-refoulement au-delà de la juridiction étatique. Telle a été la posi-
tion soutenue par la Cour suprême américaine dans l’affaire Sale c. Haitians de 
199338, suivie par l’Australie, le Royaume-Uni, la France et le Canada39. Les organi-
sations internationales spécialisées puis les juridictions internationales ont fortement 
critiqué cette position et mené à l’émergence du principe inverse. 
La Cour suprême avait en effet considéré que l’article 33 de la Convention de 
Genève n’était pas applicable à la situation des Haïtiens interceptés, puisque ceux-ci 
ne se trouvaient pas sur le territoire des États-Unis et que la norme n’était donc pas 
applicable dans le cas d’une personne refoulée vers le territoire d’origine à partir de 
la haute mer.  
Une telle lecture repose sur la vision territoriale du principe de non-refoulement, 
qu’une partie de la doctrine fait découler de l’interprétation du texte et de l’économie 
générale de la Convention de Genève40. Comme le souligne la Cour suprême, le terme 
« retour » inséré à l’article 33 sous-entend un acte de défense et d’exclusion à la 
frontière même de l’État41. Cela est confirmé à la lecture du paragraphe 2 de l’article, 
visant directement les personnes qui se situent déjà sur le territoire de l’État. Il a 
également été souligné que, lors des travaux préparatoires, les délégations suisse et 
néerlandaise avaient soutenu que l’obligation de ne pas refouler n’incluait pas une 
obligation d’admettre la personne dans le pays dans lequel elle souhaite se rendre42 : 
la rédaction vague du texte serait le résultat de ces divergences politiques. Partant, il 
 
38
 Cour suprême des États-Unis, Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
et al. v. Haitian Centers Council, INC., et al, 509 U.S. 155 (1993), n. 92-344, 21 juin 1993. 
39
 Voy. notamment Cour fédérale d’Australie, Ruddock c. Vadarlis, jugement du 18 septembre 2001, 
[2001, FCA 1329], §126; Chambre des Lords (comité judiciaire), Regina c. Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport and Another, 9 décembre 2004. 
40
 HATHAWAY, Rights of refugee under international law, Cambridge, 2005, p. 339. 
41
 Cour suprême des États-Unis, Sale, Ac Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, et al. V. Haitian Centers Council, INC., et al, cit., §182. 
42
 Rapport du Comité spécial pour les réfugiés et les apatrides, Deuxième session, Genève, Suisse, 25 
août 1950, E/AC.32/8; E/1850. 
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est souvent souligné que le non-refoulement ne peut être interprété de manière à fon-
der un droit à l’asile territorial, idée qui a été clairement rejetée par les rédacteurs de 
la Convention et qui n’est point admise en droit international coutumier43. 
De manière similaire, la Chambre des Lords a jugé dans l’affaire de Prague Air-
port que le principe de non-refoulement n’avait pas été violé par les autorités britan-
niques qui contrôlaient les passagers sur le territoire de la République tchèque44. La 
pratique de l’Allemagne ainsi que celle de l’Australie vont dans le même sens45. 
Cette lecture de la disposition est clairement inspirée d’une vision générale du 
droit international des réfugiés comme fondé sur le pouvoir souverain de l’État d’ad-
mettre ou non des étrangers sur son territoire, considéré comme étant le contenu fon-
damental du droit international coutumier. Si la Convention de Genève de 1951 as-
sure une protection pour les personnes qui ont fui leur pays, elle n’empêche pas les 
États de mener des actions en dehors de leurs frontières pour réguler les flux de mi-
grants souhaitant demander asile sur leur territoire : cette clef de lecture fournie par 
l’opinion de Lord Hope aide à comprendre la jurisprudence britannique sur ce point46. 
Ce sont surtout les juridictions internationales qui vont rejeter ce type de raison-
nement. La Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme refuse la conformité 
au droit international des droits de l’homme de la position de la Cour suprême amé-
ricaine dans l’affaire Sale et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme cautionne la 
même idée d’extraterritorialité dans l’affaire Hirsi Jamaa47. 
Cette position inverse part aussi de présupposés idéologiques diamétralement op-
posés. Il s’agit d’une lecture du droit international des réfugiés comme étant une 
discipline visant à protéger les droits individuels des migrants et posant ainsi autant 
de limites substantielles à la souveraineté des États. Comme l’a reconnu le HCR, une 
telle application extraterritoriale s’imposerait en raison de l’objet et du but mêmes 
 
43
 CHETAIL, “Le principe de non-refoulement et le statut de réfugié en droit international”, in CHETAIL, 
FLAUSS (éd.), La Convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés 50 ans après : 
bilan et perspectives, Bruxelles, 2001, p. 17. 
44
 Chambre des Lords (comité judiciaire), Regina c. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and Ano-
ther, 9 décembre 2004. 
45
 FISCHER-LESCANO, LÖHR, TOHIDIPUR, “Border Controls at Sea: Requirements under International 
Human Rights and Refugee Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2009, p. 282. 
46
 Chambre des Lords (comité judiciaire), Regina c. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and An-
other, op. cit., opinion du Lord Hope. 
47
 Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Hirsi Jamaa et autres c. Italie, cit. supra note 9, para. 
179-180. 
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de la Convention de Genève de 195148, dont la téléologie serait de conférer une pro-
tection effective aux réfugiés contre des violations des leurs droits49. Cette interpré-
tation téléologique entre d’ailleurs dans la veine de l’application extraterritoriale des 
droits de l’homme50.  
La Commission interaméricaine affirme ouvertement ne pas pouvoir rejoindre le 
raisonnement de la Haute juridiction américaine sur ce point et adhère à la vision du 
HCR (qui était intervenu en tant qu’amicus curiae devant la Cour suprême), défen-
dant que l’article 33 ne souffre aucune limitation géographique51. Ainsi, elle constate 
qu’en rapatriant en Haïti les demandeurs d’asile haïtiens sans vérifier leur qualité de 
réfugiés, les États-Unis avaient violé l’article XXVII de la Convention interaméri-
caine, prévoyant un droit à demander et recevoir l’asile dans un territoire étranger, 
conformément aux lois de l’État d’accueil et aux traités internationaux52.  
La Cour EDH affirme clairement que c’est une lecture téléologique de la Con-
vention qui l’amène à dépasser la vision souverainiste sus-énoncée :  
« Les considérations ci-dessus ne remettent pas en cause le droit dont disposent les États 
d’établir souverainement leurs politiques d’immigration. Il importe toutefois de souligner 
que les difficultés dans la gestion des flux migratoires ne peuvent justifier le recours, de la 
part des États, à des pratiques qui seraient incompatibles avec leurs obligations convention-
nelles. La Cour réaffirme à cet égard que l’interprétation des normes conventionnelles doit 
se faire au regard du principe de la bonne foi et de l’objet et du but du traité ainsi que de la 
règle de l’effet utile » 53. 
On voit donc qu’une logique communautariste peut impliquer une territorialisa-
tion des obligations internationales à l’égard des réfugiés. Au contraire, une logique 
individualiste voit celles-ci comme dépourvues de limites territoriales, dans l’idée 
selon laquelle c’est le migrant qui est personnellement titulaire de certains droits, qui 
ne sont pas ancrés dans l’assiette territoriale de la souveraineté étatique.  
 
48
 Comité des droits de l’homme, Avis consultatif , cit. supra note 30, para. 29. 
49
 CARLIER, “Droit d’asile et des réfugiés : de la protection aux droits”, Recueil des Cours de l’Acadé-
mie de La Haye de droit international, vol. 332, 2008, pp. 108-109. 
50
 O’BRIEN, “Refugees on the High Seas: International Refugee Law Solutions to a Law of the Sea 
Problem”, Goettingen Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 729. 
51
 Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. 
United States, affaire 10.675, Report No. 51/96, arrêt du 13 mars 1997, para 157. 
52
 Ibid., para 163. 
53
 Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Hirsi Jamaa et autres c. Italie, cit. supra note 9 para. 179. 
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3. – Les discours juridictionnels sur l’impact des droits de l’homme 
Le discours des droits de l’homme par rapport aux migrants en mer peut être lu à 
la lumière d’un parallélisme avec le tiraillement montré par la philosophie politique 
entre communautarisme et individualisme : entre droit souverain de l’État de gérer 
efficacement ses politiques migratoires et droits individuels des migrants. La pre-
mière branche du chiasme est illustrée par l’opinion du juge russe Dedov de la Cour 
EDH dans l’affaire Khlaifia : situant le fondement intellectuel du régime juridique 
des migrants en mer dans la « présomption du droit souverain de tout État de contrô-
ler ses frontières », celui-ci parvient à affirmer qu’on ne saurait lire le droit interna-
tional des droits de l’homme comme plaçant une « charge excessive sur les autori-
tés » étatiques « dans une situation de crise migratoire, où des milliers de migrants 
illégaux arrivaient en même temps sur les côtes »54. 
Le pivot de la seconde branche de ce tiraillement consiste dans l’exigence d’exa-
men individuel de la demande. Le droit international des réfugiés postule déjà, de 
manière abstraite, l’obligation pour les autorités étatiques compétentes de procéder 
à l’examen individuel de la demande de reconnaissance de la qualité de réfugié, afin 
d’éviter le renvoi d’une personne vers un pays où sa vie ou sa liberté serait menacée55. 
Le droit international des droits de l’homme est venu donner des contours plus nets 
à cette idée en postulant une « prise en compte réelle et différenciée de la situation 
de chacune des personnes concernées »56. Cette prise en compte de la situation indi-
viduelle du migrant se traduit notamment en deux points distincts : l’importance des 
garanties procédurales reconnues (3.1) et de la considération de la vulnérabilité de 
l’individu (3.2). 
3.1. – Les garanties procédurales au cœur du régime de protection 
L’idée d’exigence d’examen individuel de la situation du demandeur d’asile 
donne une coloration fortement procédurale aux droits qui lui sont garantis par la 
 
54
 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Khlaifia et autres c. Italie, requête n. 16483/12, arrêt 
(Grande Chambre) du 15 décembre 2016, opinion partiellement dissidente du juge Dedov. 
55
 GIUFFRÉ, “Access to Asylum at Sea? Non-refoulement and a Comprehensive Approach to Extrater-
ritorial Human Rights Obligations”, in MORENO LAX, PAPASTAVRIDIS (eds), Boat Refugees and Migrants 
at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights, Boston, 2016, pp. 
248-279, p. 256. 
56
 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Khlaifia et autres c. Italie, requête n. 16483/12, arrêt du 1er 
septembre 2015, para. 157. 
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Convention de sauvegarde. Elle est placée au cœur de la qualification même d’ex-
pulsion collective, prohibée par l’article 4 du Protocole 4 à la Convention. Déjà dans 
son arrêt Čonka ayant défini pour la première fois l’expulsion collective, la Cour 
affirme que celle-ci consiste en « toute mesure contraignant des étrangers, en tant 
que groupe, à quitter un pays, sauf dans les cas où une telle mesure est prise à l'issue 
et sur la base d'un examen raisonnable et objectif de la situation particulière de cha-
cun des étrangers qui forment le groupe »57. C’est l’opportunité fournie par les auto-
rités à l’individu de mettre en avant des arguments à l’encontre de son expulsion sur 
une base individuelle qui permet d’éviter la qualification. Finalement, les garanties 
procédurales issues du droit des réfugiés deviennent un élément constitutif de l’exis-
tence d’une violation du droit international des droits de l’homme.  
Le caractère automatique et dépourvu de toute étude individuelle de l’expulsion 
(et donc l’absence de garanties procédurales suffisantes) constitue le critère central 
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour à l’égard des migrants en mer. Sur cette base, la 
Cour a pu condamner l’interception en haute mer méditerranée des navires portant 
des migrants dès lors qu’ils sont refoulés systématiquement et de manière générale 
vers la Libye (Hirsi Jamaa)58, la pratique des autorités italiennes de renvoyer auto-
matiquement vers la Grèce les étrangers arrivant à ses ports de cet endroit (Sharifi)59, 
de même que cette même posture des autorités espagnoles à l’égard des migrants 
provenant du Maroc et rentrant à Melilla (ND et NT)60. Le Comité exécutif du Pro-
gramme du Haut Commissaire (‘EXCOM)61 insiste sur « la nécessité d’admettre les 
réfugiés sur le territoire des États, impliquant le non-rejet aux frontières, en l’ab-
sence de procédures justes et efficaces de détermination de statut et des besoins de 
 
57
 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Čonka c. Belgique, requête n. 51564/99, arrêt du 5 février 
2002, para 59. 
58
 HERVIEU, “Interception et refoulement des migrants en haute mer : la Méditerranée n’est pas une 
zone de non droit(s) (CEDH, G.C. 23 février 2012, Hirsi Jamaa et autres c. Italie) – Appréhension conven-
tionnelle inédite de la pratique d’interception et de refoulement des groupes de réfugiés en mer”, Combats 
pour les droits de l’homme, 29 février 2012, accessible sur <http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.le-
monde.fr/2012/02/29/interception-et-refoulement-des-migrants-en-haute-mer-la-mediterranee-nest-pas-
une-zone-de-non-droits-cedh-g-c-23-fevrier-2012-hirsi-jamaa-et-autres-c-italie/>.  
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 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Sharifi et autres c. Italie et Grèce, requête n. 16643/09, 
arrêt du 21 octobre 2014. 
60
 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, N.D. et N.T. c. Espagne, requêtes n. 8675/15 et 8697/15, 
arrêt du 3 octobre 2017. 
61
 Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 
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protection »62. En conséquence, il est soutenu par la doctrine qu’un droit à l’asile 
provisoire devrait être accordé au moins pour permettre une étude de la situation 
individuelle63, sans lequel la reconnaissance de la qualité de réfugié serait dépourvue 
de tout effet utile64. 
3.2. – Les conditions de traitement : l’approche de vulnérabilité  
Dans l’affaire M.S.S. c. Belgique et Grèce, la Cour EDH a développé ce que l’on 
peut appeler une approche de vulnérabilité65 à l’égard des migrants. La Cour affirme 
qu’elle « accorde un poids important au statut du requérant qui est demandeur d’asile 
et appartient de ce fait à un groupe de la population particulièrement défavorisé et 
vulnérable qui a besoin d’une protection spéciale », ce qui dérive d’un « consensus 
à l’échelle internationale et européenne, comme cela ressort de la Convention de 
Genève, du mandat et des activités du HCR ainsi que des normes figurant dans la 
directive Accueil de l’Union européenne »66. Un tel état de vulnérabilité sert à la Cour 
pour déterminer l’existence de la violation de l’article 3 de la Convention : les con-
ditions de détention auprès de l’aéroport d’Athènes atteignent le seuil de traitements 
inhumains et dégradants dans le cas du demandeur d’asile, quand bien même sa durée 
eût été brève, compte tenu du fait que « la détresse du requérant a été accentuée par 
la vulnérabilité inhérente à sa qualité de demandeur d’asile »67. Comme le souligne 
le juge Rozakis dans son opinion concurrente, une telle approche de vulnérabilité est 
mue par une lecture de la Convention à la lumière des autres obligations de l’État 
issues du droit international des réfugiés et du droit de l’Union. 
Néanmoins, dans le contexte spécifique de l’humanité en mer, la Cour a pu nuan-
cer cette approche de vulnérabilité dans son affaire Khlaifia c. Italie. En argumentant 
a contrario par rapport à son arrêt M.S.S., la Cour refuse de constater de violation de 
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 H.C.R., Conclusion sur la sauvegarde de l'asile Nº 82 (XLVIII), 17 octobre 1997, A/52/12/Add.1, 
§d (iii).  
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 GIUFFRÉ, “Access to Asylum at Sea? Non-refoulement and a Comprehensive Approach to Extrater-
ritorial Human Rights Obligations in PAPASTAVRIDIS, MORENO-LAX, Boat Refugees and Migrants at Sea: 
A Comprehensive Approach, Boston, 2016, pp. 248-279. 
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 Sur la notion de vulnérabilité, BURGORGUE-LARSEN (ed.), La vulnérabilité saisie par les juges en 
Europe, Paris, 2014. 
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 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, M.S.S. c. Belgique et Grèce, requête n. 30696/09, arrêt du 
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l’article 3 car « les intéressés, qui n’étaient pas demandeurs d’asile, n’avaient pas la 
vulnérabilité spécifique inhérente à cette qualité et qu’ils n’ont pas allégué avoir vécu 
des expériences traumatisantes dans leur pays d’origine […]. De plus, ils n’apparte-
naient ni à la catégorie des personnes âgées ni à celle des mineurs » 68. La position 
est contestable. La Cour semble faire preuve d’un formalisme (en exigeant l’exis-
tence d’une demande d’asile formulée pour conclure à la vulnérabilité) qui s’accorde 
mal avec l’idée selon laquelle le statut de réfugié est déclaratoire et non pas consti-
tutif. Si la condition de réfugié est intrinsèque à l’individu ayant subi certaines per-
sécutions, peu importe qu’il ait diligenté la procédure qui aboutit à sa reconnaissance 
aux fins du constat de la violation de ses droits, dès lors que sa vulnérabilité est ac-
quise avant même l’introduction de la demande. En revanche, l’arrêt Khlaifia cons-
titue une avancée en ce qui concerne le rappel des conditions de « régularité » de la 
détention des migrants, au sens de l’article 5 de la Convention, en rappelant l’impor-
tance de garantir une sécurité juridique suffisante et en imposant de la clarté dans le 
droit interne concernant les modalités de la détention69. 
Il est soutenu en doctrine que l’approche de vulnérabilité devrait même être prise 
davantage au sérieux et que le droit international des droits de l’homme viendrait 
renforcer les exigences de protection de certaines catégories de migrants particuliè-
rement vulnérables. Tel serait notamment le cas des enfants, dont la vulnérabilité en 
tant que mineurs en développement devrait se rajouter à leur situation de migrants70. 
Cette approche de vulnérabilité renvoie à la théorie philosophique de ceux qui, 
comme Matthew Gibney, voient dans le principe d’humanité un levier qui permet de 
renforcer les obligations que nous avons à l’égard des personnes plus vulnérables. 
Cette voie intermédiaire entre approche communautariste et individualiste montre 
que les droits de l’homme peuvent être employés comme une manière de nuancer les 
deux extrêmes et consolider les exigences procédurales. 
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4. – Le silence juridictionnel sur l’étendue de l’obligation de secours en 
mer 
L’article 98 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer prévoit une 
obligation de prêter assistance qui constitue le pivot du régime de sauvetage en mer 
en droit international public71. Cette disposition est un terrain d’analyse privilégié 
pour étudier les divergences rhétoriques entre perspective communautariste et indi-
vidualiste. D’abord il est discutable de savoir si celle-ci peut être lue comme un droit 
individuel ou une simple obligation interétatique (4.1). De plus, face à une pratique 
clairsemée, les divergences concernant plusieurs éléments structurant son fonction-
nement peuvent être compris au vu de ce tiraillement (4.2). 
4.1. – Un droit individuel au secours en mer ? 
Le débat sur la titularité des droits découlant de l’article 98 correspond au tirail-
lement du droit international et oscille entre une dimension individuelle (le droit au 
secours en mer) et une dimension communautaire (la simple obligation incombant 
sur certains États côtiers et limitée à certaines conditions). 
Selon Seline Trevisanut, le droit international des droits de l’homme (notamment 
le droit à la vie) insuffle dans le droit de la mer une logique différente, pouvant cons-
tituer un cadre juridique structurant un véritable droit individuel au secours en mer : 
« the duty to render assistance can be considered to be the operational obligation 
deriving from the application of the human right to life at sea »72.  
Le point de départ intellectuel d’un tel raisonnement est un dictum de l’arrêt 
Medvedyev :  
« la spécificité du contexte maritime, invoquée par le Gouvernement en l’espèce, ne sau-
rait aboutir à la consécration d’un espace de non-droit au sein duquel les équipages ne relè-
veraient d’aucun régime juridique susceptible de leur accorder la jouissance des droits et 
garanties prévus par la Convention et que les Etats se sont engagés à fournir aux personnes 
placées sous leur juridiction »73.  
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 GUILFOYLE, “Article 98”, in PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Mu-
nich, 2017, pp. 725-730. 
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 TREVISANUT, “Is there a right to be rescued at sea? A constructive view”, Questions of International 
Law, Zoom-in 4, 2014, pp. 3-15, p. 8. 
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La Cour y affirme clairement que le droit de la mer ne peut être interprété comme 
étant un bouclier permettant aux États de revenir sur les obligations en matière de 
droits de l’homme. Du moment où la juridiction de l’État côtier peut être établie à 
l’égard de l’humanité en mer, comme l’a montré de manière éclatante l’affaire Hirsi, 
le droit à la vie inscrit à l’article 2 de la Convention – tel qu’interprété par la Cour 
dans l’affaire Osman 74– impose une obligation positive de tout mettre en œuvre pour 
protéger la vie des individus se trouvant sous sa juridiction ou son contrôle. 
Cette logique ne s’inscrit pas en antinomie avec la jurisprudence du Tribunal inter-
national du droit de la mer (‘TIDM’) qui a clairement affirmé que, bien que la Con-
vention de Montego Bay ne constitue pas un instrument de protection des droits de 
l’homme, on peut lire en filigrane dans cet instrument une certaine logique pro ho-
mine75. Ainsi, le TIDM a développé toute une jurisprudence sur les « considérations 
d’humanité » qui pourrait lui permettre d’accueillir la logique précitée en son sein76.  
En revanche, Efthymios Papastavridis se montre sceptique en ce qui concerne 
l’existence d’un tel droit individuel77. Son argument principal repose sur l’idée selon 
laquelle les obligations conventionnelles du droit de la mer (issues de la Convention 
de Montego Bay, des conventions SAR et SOLAS ainsi que des instruments de 
l’OMI) consistent seulement en une répartition des compétences parmi les États cô-
tiers et en une organisation de différentes obligations de coordination. Il s’agirait au 
surplus de simples obligations de moyens et non pas de résultats, consistant au plus 
en des obligations de diligence due78. Ainsi, même si le droit à la vie devrait pouvoir 
être employé afin de permettre de faire évoluer le droit international dans le sens 
d’un droit individuel au secours en mer, il s’agirait pour l’heure d’une analyse de 
lege ferenda et non de lege lata. 
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La décision de la CJUE dans l’affaire Intertanko alimente ce type de discours. La 
Cour y affirme que « la convention de Montego Bay ne met pas en place des règles 
destinées à s’appliquer directement et immédiatement aux particuliers et à conférer 
à ces derniers des droits ou des libertés susceptibles d’être invoqués à l’encontre des 
États, indépendamment de l’attitude de l’État du pavillon du navire »79. En observant 
la nature interétatique de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, la 
Cour affirme que celle-ci n’a pas pour vocation de créer des droits directement pour 
les individus. La position de l’Avocat général Kokott sur ce point semblait, en re-
vanche, plus nuancée. Elle refusait la position du Conseil selon laquelle la Conven-
tion réglait des problèmes purement interétatiques et fonctionnait dans une pure lo-
gique de réciprocité, car celle-ci se veut en réalité une « constitution des océans », 
visant à créer un ordre juridique objectif pour les mers et océans80. On retrouve alors 
ce contraste entre logique communautariste et individualiste qui irrigue le traitement 
que le droit international réserve aux questions de réfugiés en mer.  
4.2. – Les contours incertains de l’obligation de secours en mer 
Comme on l’a dit, le régime juridique du fonctionnement de l’obligation de prêter 
assistance demeure peu clair, en raison notamment d’importantes divergences dans 
la pratique des États. Plusieurs éléments structurant ce fonctionnement font donc 
l’objet d’oscillations importantes entre une perspective individualiste et une perspec-
tive communautariste. 
Le premier élément qu’il est intéressant d’observer sous ce prisme est la notion 
de « détresse », délimitant le champ d’application temporelle de l’obligation : celle-
ci débute avec le surgir d’une situation de détresse et se termine lorsqu’elle disparaît. 
Or, donner un contenu à cette idée de « menace d’un danger grave et imminent pour 
la vie humaine » est loin d’être anodin81 et l’indétermination du droit international 
est particulièrement bien illustrée par l’utilisation à géométrie variable de ce concept. 
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chambre) du 3 juin 2008, affaire C-308/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, para. 64. 
80
 Ibid, conclusions de l’AG Juliane Kokott du 20 novembre 2007, para. 53-55. 
81
 KOMP, “The Duty to Assist Persons in Distress: An Alternative Source of Protection against the 
Return of Migrants and Asylum Seekers to the High Seas?”, in PAPASTAVRIDIS, MORENO-LAX, Boat Ref-
ugees and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach, Boston, 2016, p. 230. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 Edoardo Stoppioni 
 
 
Une première approche de définition est de nature très restrictive. La pratique de 
Malte et de l’Irlande82 consiste par exemple à considérer que la détresse n’est quali-
fiée qu’à partir du moment où le navire était sur le point de couler83. Une partie de la 
doctrine adhère à cette vision, en transposant la lecture restrictive de l’article 24 des 
articles de la CDI de 200184. En revanche, l’ancien contentieux avait déjà fourni des 
éléments de raisonnement pour aller au-delà d’une telle optique restrictive. Tel est le 
cas notamment de la sentence Kate A Hoff de 1923 d’une commission mixte :  
« While recognizing the general principle of immunity of vessels in distress, domestic 
courts and international courts have frequently given consideration to the question as to the 
degree of necessity prompting vessels to seek refuge. It has been said that the necessity must 
be urgent. It seems possible to formulate certain reasonably concrete criteria applicable and 
controlling in the instant case. Assuredly a ship floundering in distress, resulting either from 
the weather or from other causes affecting management of the vessel, need not be in such a 
condition that it is dashed helplessly on the shore or against rocks before a claim of distress 
can properly be invoked in its behalf. The fact that it may be able to come into port under its 
own power can obviously not be cited as conclusive evidence that the plea is unjustifiable. 
If a captain delayed seeking refuge until his ship was wrecked, obviously he would not be 
using his best judgment with a view to the preservation of the ship, the cargo and the lives 
of people on board. Clearly an important consideration may be the determination of the ques-
tion whether there is any evidence in a given case of a fraudulent attempt to circumvent local 
laws. And even in the absence of any such attempt, it can probably be correctly said that a 
mere matter of convenience in making repairs or in avoiding a measure of difficulty in nav-
igation can not justify a disregard of local laws »85. 
Les commissaires incitent à écarter deux extrêmes : la détresse d’un navire ne 
saurait s’analyser comme la situation d’ultime nécessité où le navire est sur le point 
de sombrer, ni comme la simple situation d’invocation prétextueuse, finalisée à con-
tourner les exigences du droit local. Cette position intermédiaire est confortée par la 
pratique de l’UE dans le cadre des actions de son agence FRONTEX. D’après cette 
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dernière, l’assistance doit être apportée dès lors qu’il y a incertitude, alerte ou dé-
tresse du navire ou des personnes à son bord86.  
Une seconde question concerne le périmètre substantiel de l’obligation de l’ar-
ticle 98. Est-ce que celle-ci s’étend jusqu’à imposer aux États une obligation de dé-
barquement sur leur propre territoire ou l’obligation s’estompe-t-elle dès lors qu’on 
a mis fin à la situation de détresse ? 
La lecture individualiste consiste à dire que l’obligation de l’article 98 doit se lire, 
dans une idée d’interprétation systémique, à la lumière du droit international des réfu-
giés et des droits de l’homme. Comme ces derniers corpus normatifs prévoient une 
obligation d’analyser individuellement la situation des demandeurs d’asile, le secours 
en mer se traduit nécessairement dans l’obligation de l’État côtier de donner accès à 
son territoire et de prévoir des procédures de vérification du statut des migrants87. 
La lecture plus restrictive et ancrée dans une lecture particulièrement respec-
tueuse de la souveraineté de l’État côtier va dans le second sens. La disposition en 
question ne garantit pas explicitement l’accès à un territoire ni à une procédure de 
demande d’asile88. Même son interprétation à la lumière du droit international des 
réfugiés ne saurait permettre d’obtenir un tel résultat : au sens de la Convention de 
Genève de 1951, les États sont uniquement liés par une obligation de ne pas renvoyer 
les migrants dans le pays d’origine qu’ils ont fui. Il n’existe aucune obligation pesant 
sur l’État côtier de débarquer les migrants sur le territoire conformément au principe 
de non-refoulement89. La Convention ne fait en effet pas état d’un devoir d’accorder 
l’asile qui lierait les États parties90. Telle est la lecture de la disposition que fait la 
pratique des États comme l’Italie, le Canada, les États-Unis et l’Australie91. 
 
86
 Règlement n ° 656/2014 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 15 mai 2014 établissant des règles 
pour la surveillance des frontières maritimes extérieures dans le cadre de la coopération opérationnelle 
coordonnée par l’Agence européenne pour la gestion de la coopération opérationnelle aux frontières ex-
térieures des États membres de l’Union européenne, 15 mai 2014, JO L 189, article 9 2. (a). 
87
 CARLIER, cit. supra note 49, p. 43 et p. 175; TREVISANUT, “The principle of Non-Refoulement at 
Sea”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nation Law, 2018, p. 213. 
88
 O’BRIEN, “Refugees on the High Seas : International Refugee Law Solutions to a Law of the Sea 
Problem”, Gottingen Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 730; BROUWER, KUMIN, “Interception and 
Asylum : When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide”, Revue Canadienne sur les réfugiés, 2003, 
p. 15. 
89
 LAUTERPACHT, BETHLEHEM, The Scope and Context of the Principle of Non-Refoulement (Opinion), 
H.C.R., 2001. 
90
 Ibid., §76. 
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 MORENO-LAX, “The Legallity of the “Safe Third Country” Notion Contested: Insights from the Law 
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Ces deux tendances se reflètent dans l’interprétation de tous les éléments de pra-
tique ayant tenté de densifier le contenu normatif de l’article 98, et notamment l’idée 
selon laquelle il impliquerait une obligation de mettre fin à la détresse en ramenant 
les personnes en « lieu sûr ». En effet, en réaction à l’affaire du Tampa92, un groupe 
de travail rassemblant plusieurs organisations internationales, dont l’Organisation 
maritime internationale (‘OMI’), l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés 
(‘HCR’), le Comité des droits de l’homme, et l’Organisation mondiale pour les mi-
grants (‘OIM’)93, a permis l’adoption des amendements aux Conventions ‘SAR’ 
(Search and Rescue) et ‘SOLAS’ (Safety of Life at Sea) en 2004, introduisant ainsi 
en droit positif l’obligation de débarquement des personnes secourues en lieu sûr94. 
Le lieu sûr a été défini par des directives de l’OMI95, comme un lieu dans lequel la 
vie des naufragés n’est plus menacée et dans lequel on peut subvenir à leurs besoins 
fondamentaux96. 
La posture communautariste a donné lieu à une pratique qui fait une équation 
entre la notion de « lieu sûr » et celle de « État tiers sûr ». Tout ce que le droit inter-
national demanderait, dans cette logique, serait de ne pas renvoyer les migrants vers 
leur pays d’origine, alors que l’État pourrait se satisfaire de refuser l’accès à son 
territoire en s’assurant de refouler vers un pays sûr. Dans la mesure où un tel méca-
nisme entraînerait des renvois automatiques des individus sans examen de leur de-
mande d’asile97, cette pratique de renvoi systématique est certainement contraire à 
l’optique individualiste, soutenue par certaines juridictions nationales98 et internatio-
nales99. En refusant d’examiner leur demande d’asile, une telle pratique revient à 
 
of Treaties”, in GOODWIN-GILL, WECKEL, Migration and Refugee Protection in the 21st Century: Legal 
Aspects, Académie de droit international de La Haye, 2015, p. 671. 
92
 Cour fédérale d’Australie, Ruddock v Vadarlis, jugement du 18 septembre 2001, [2001, FCA 1329]. 
93
 RATCOVICH, “The Concept of ‘Place of Safety’: Yet Another Self-Contained Maritime Rule or a 
Sustainable Solution to the Ever-Controversial Question of Where to Disembark Migrants Rescued at 
Sea?”, Australian Yearbook of International Law, 2015, p. 9. 
94
 Convention SOLAS telle qu’amendée, Annexe, Chap. 5, Règle 33 (1-1) ; Convention SAR telle 
qu’amendée, Annexe, Chap. 3, 3.1.9. 
95
 VAN HOOYDONK, “Développements récents en matière de lieux de refuge pour navires en détresse 
(2004-2006)”, Droit maritime français, 2016, p. 662-682.  
96
 O.M.I., Directives sur le traitement des personnes secourues en mer, résolution du Comité de la 
Sécurité Maritime 167 (78), 20 mai 2004, 6.12. 
97
 FERNANDEZ, VIEL, “Le concept de ‘pays tiers sûr’ en droit d’asile”, A.J.D.A., 2018, p. 322. 
98
 Conseil d’État, 1ème et 9ème sous-sections réunies, arrêt du 23 juillet 2010, Lebon, n°336034. 
99
 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Ilias et Ahmed c. Hongrie, requête n. 47287/15, arrêt du 14 
mars 2017. 
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violer le droit des migrants à une protection effective et notamment à bafouer les 
obligations découlant du statut de réfugié de certains migrants100.  
Les évènements récents concernant la pratique italienne à l’égard des migrants en 
mer, notamment dans l’affaire Sea Watch 3, ont mené à des positions divergentes101. Le 
ministère de l’intérieur soutenait la licéité internationale du refus italien de débarque-
ment en reproduisant l’argumentaire communautariste analysé ci-dessus. Cette position 
est en revanche rejetée par une lettre publiée par 21 professeurs de droit international qui 
rappellent que, s’il est indéniable que chaque État exerce un droit souverain de contrôle 
de ses propres ports, l’obligation internationale de secours en mer lui impose de porter 
secours au navire. Comment peut-il alors porter assistance à un navire chargé de mi-
grants sans accepter un débarquement, ne serait-ce que temporaire ? C’est en ce sens que 
devrait être lu l’article 3.1.9 de la Convention SAR, obligeant les États à coopérer pour 
permettre le débarquement en lieu sûr, en substituant cette obligation à celle du com-
mandant102.  On voit bien que le dualisme des logiques, individualiste et communauta-
riste, reste un prisme valable d’analyse de l’évolution de la pratique des États. Il reste à 
espérer que les juridictions internationales viendront clarifier ces questions, en contri-
buant encore une fois à rétablir une approche de vulnérabilité et de respect des droits 
procéduraux des migrants dans un contexte où l’on a tendance à cacher derrière la posi-
tion communautariste la haine de l’autre.  
 
100
 FISCHER-LESCANO, LÖHR, TOHIDIPUR, op. cit., p. 37. 
101
 Pour une lecture des différentes positions, GRADONI et PASQUET, “Lisistrata a Lampedusa: una 
riflessione sul caso Sea Watch 3”, SIDI Blog, 6 juillet 2019, accessible sur <http://www.sidi-
blog.org/2019/07/06/lisistrata-a-lampedusa-una-riflessione-sul-caso-sea-watch-3/>. 
102
 Lettre de 21 professeurs de droit international en réponse à l’Avocat  Busco, du 3 juillet 2019 
(signée par Enzo Cannizzaro, Pasquale De Sena, Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Nerina Boschiero, Andrea 
Cannone, Gabriella Carella, Marina Castellaneta, Giuseppe Cataldi, Carlo Focarelli, Pietro Gargiulo, 
Edoardo Greppi, Paola Ivaldi, Paolo Palchetti, Marco Pedrazzi, Laura Pineschi, Fausto Pocar, Lorenzo 
Schiano di Pepe, Tullio Scovazzi, Massimo Starita, Antonello Tancredi, Ugo Villani):  
“non vi è dubbio che nei porti ciascuno Stato eserciti la propria sovranità, ma nel rispetto del 
diritto internazionale. Per quanto poi tale diritto non imponga un obbligo di accoglienza, esso di certo 
impone un obbligo di assistere le persone in difficoltà in mare. Allora, come può uno Stato “prestare 
assistenza” a una nave carica di naufraghi che si presenti di fronte al proprio porto, se non consentendo 
uno sbarco, sia pure temporaneo? Si noti che l’art. 3.1.9. della Convenzione SAR, emendata nel 2004, 
obbliga gli Stati a cooperare per consentire lo sbarco delle persone in pericolo in un porto sicuro, 
sollevando il comandante della nave dal proprio obbligo di assistenza”, 
 accessible sur <https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_luglio_03/chi-viene-soccorso-mare-naufrago-ha-
diritto-essere-sbarcato-un-luogo-sicuro-9ac444c4-9daa-11e9-9326-
3d0a58e59695.shtml?fbclid=IwAR0UifO2xqEIDs_Fv_yJSFa-
jkM2mRuo_fzBKapSS0HLVLm26rwpu7YMEnGM&refresh_ce-cp>. 
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5. – Conclusion 
Cet excursus au travers du discours des juridictions internationales ayant été con-
frontées aux questions de migrants en mer montre que le droit international contem-
porain fonctionne à partir d’une dialectique argumentative qui rappelle les oscillations 
philosophiques entre une logique communautariste et une logique individualiste. 
Dans une optique plus individualiste, les juridictions internationales sont venues 
invalider la pratique étatique ayant tenté de cantonner le champ d’application des 
obligations découlant du droit international des réfugiés à la situation des migrants 
en mer. Elles ont également employé le droit international des droits de l’homme 
pour façonner des garanties procédurales permettant une prise en compte réelle du 
statut de réfugié et donné corps à une certaine approche de vulnérabilité. 
Dans une tendance plutôt communautariste, les juridictions internationales n’ont 
pas encore lu le droit international de la mer comme une branche irriguée de droits 
individuels au nombre desquels on pourrait compter le droit au secours en mer. Cette 
fragmentation du droit international constitue encore une limite à ce que l’on pourrait 
appeler une sanction juridictionnelle du droit international de l’hospitalité, telle que 
proposée par Étienne Balibar : « il s’agit d’empêcher que, sous couvert de hiérarchi-
ser ces causes, la politique des Etats transforme l’exode en un processus d’élimina-
tion. Les migrants en proie à l’errance et ceux qui leur viennent en aide doivent avoir 
le droit avec eux, dans leurs efforts pour y résister » 103. Le droit international frag-
menté peut, en effet, être vu comme une segmentation fonctionnelle du panorama 
international, évoluant en des régimes qui hiérarchisent les causes et valeurs, faisant 
primer celui pour lequel ils ont été constitués sur tous les autres.  
Comme le rappelle le Groupe d’étude de la CDI sur la fragmentation « considérer 
[l]es institutions [internationales] comme isolées les unes des autres et ne prêtant 
attention qu’à leurs propres objectifs et préférences revient à faire du droit un simple 
instrument destiné à réaliser les objectifs d’un régime […]. Sans le principe d’inté-
gration systémique, il serait impossible d’exprimer et de conserver le sens du bien 
commun de l’humanité, lequel ne se réduit pas au bien d’une institution ou d’un 
régime particulier »104. Le principe d’intégration systémique, inscrit à l’article 
 
103
 BALIBAR, cit. supra note 2.  
104 Fragmentation du droit international : difficultés découlant de la diversification et de l’expansion 
du droit international. Rapport du Groupe d’étude de la Commission du droit international établi sous sa 
forme définitive par Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 avril 2006, § 480. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Les réfugiés en mer devant les juridictions internationales … 117 
 
 
31(3)(c) de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, peut constituer un point 
de départ utile pour faire évoluer le régime juridique des réfugiés en mer vers le 
paradigme de l’hospitalité. Telle est notamment l’approche de la Cour européenne 
des droits de l’homme, notamment dans l’affaire Hirsi Jamaa105. Défragmenter notre 
vision du droit international à l’aune du principe d’intégration systémique permet de 
considérer la communauté d’objectifs entre droit de la mer et droit de l’homme, plu-
tôt que leurs divergences, comme le font certains106 et comme l’énonce le TIDM dans 
son discours de promotion des « considérations d’humanité ». Cela permet de pren-
dre conscience du fait que la rencontre entre réfugiés en mer et autorités étatiques 
implique une exigence réelle de répondre à un appel à l’aide. 
Comme l’affirme Itamar Mann, l’exemple des réfugiés en mer nous encourage à 
dépasser les oppositions binaires sur lesquelles s’est construit le droit international 
libéral. Il incite à dépasser le tiraillement entre droit naturel et droit positif concernant 
le fondement juridique des droits de l’homme. Les droits des migrants seraient fondés 
sur cet « asymmetric encounter between a powerful party and a disempowered party, 
in which the terms of the relationship have not yet been determined »107. Cette rencontre 
est prise dans les mailles du discours juridictionnel dual décrit: si l’on dépasse vision 
territoriale et communautariste permettant à une société de hisser des murs, « [w]hen 
the court realizes the human rights encounter in its own positive jurisprudence, 
executive agencies push against it to eliminate the encounter » 108. C’est donc 
également sur le discours politique qu’il faut travailler. On est confronté aujourd’hui à 
la montée de discours de haine ou d’abandon, qui sont banalisés et normalisés dans 
leur violence. Nier l’existence de ces situations de rencontre oblige les migrants à 
exposer leurs vies à de plus gros dangers, pour fuir la persécution. Ainsi donc, penser 
la situation juridique des réfugiés en mer en termes de rencontre est une urgence pour 
repenser non seulement le discours des juridictions internationales mais également les 
initiatives politiques à l’égard de ceux à qui l’on ne doit jamais cesser de reconnaître 
ce qu’Hannah Arendt appelait un « droit à avoir des droits ».  
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 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Hirsi Jamaa et autres c. Italie, cit. supra note 9, para 171. 
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 OXMAN, “Human rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 1998, p. 399 ss. 
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 MANN, Humanity at sea: maritime migration and the foundations of international law, Cambridge, 
2016, p. 235 
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1. – Introduction 
In recent years the European Union (‘EU’) has been dealing with an increasing 
migratory pressure on its external borders. Migratory flows towards Europe, in par-
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ticular, have been intensified from 2010 onwards, especially due to significant inter-
national events such as the ‘Arab Spring’ or the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, 
reaching the peak in 2015, when an estimated one million migrants reached the ter-
ritory of the EU across the Mediterranean.1  
EU Member States have reacted to the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in different 
ways. Many have adopted a strict approach in terms of migration control, based on 
strengthened security checks and increased border surveillance. Frontline EU Mem-
ber States, in particular, have often resorted to practices aimed at offshoring migra-
tion controls, such as interception of migrants on the high seas, push-back operations 
and pre-emptive and extraterritorial surveillance activities. Moreover, some Member 
States, as Italy and Spain, have concluded specific bilateral agreements with African 
countries with a view to curbing migratory flows, preventing departure of migrants 
and facilitating repatriation.  
This chapter argues that this process of ‘securitisation’ and restrictive border 
management has produced a direct impact on migrants’ human rights and that a proof 
of that may be found in the increasing case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘ECtHR’) concerning the collective expulsion of aliens, prohibited under Ar-
ticle 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’). 
Indeed, the growing engagement of the Court with such violation of the Convention 
may be regarded as a direct consequence of the border practices adopted by EU 
Member States in response to the increasing migratory pressure. 
Such parallelism is confirmed by the chronological and geographical characteri-
sation of the case law of the ECtHR. In fact, while over the years Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 had been sparingly invoked before the Court of Strasbourg, with only a limited 
number of cases, from 2010 onwards the litigation concerning collective expulsion 
of aliens has been growing considerably, becoming matter of attention for the judges, 
who have been called to assess the compatibility with the Convention of European 
migration control and border policies. Geographically, the vast majority of European 
frontline States have been brought before the Court in Strasbourg for potential vio-
lations of the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, including Mediterranean 
countries (Italy, Spain, France, Greece) and islands (Malta and Cyprus), as well as 
countries with land borders (e.g. Poland, Slovakia, Croatia and Hungary). 
Starting from the observation that the issue of the expulsion of aliens exemplifies 
 
1
 For detailed data and statistics on migratory flows and arrivals in the EU during 2015, see FRONTEX, 
Annual Risk Analysis for 2016, Frontex 2499/2016 (2016), available online.  
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emblematically the classical tension between State sovereignty and migration (Sec-
tion 2), the chapter first points out how, in general, the case law of the ECtHR has 
played a decisive role in strengthening the protection of aliens against expulsion, 
especially through the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR in connection with the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement (Subsections 2.1. and 2.2.). 
The focus is then specifically put on the prohibition of collective expulsions (Sec-
tion 3), explaining how the ECtHR has extensively interpreted and clarified its main 
features, including the personal and territorial scope of application, the notion of ex-
pulsion and its collective character (Subsections 3.1. – 3.4.). With regard to this latter 
aspect, in particular, this chapter specifically analyses the criteria developed by the 
Court to determine whether or not an expulsion may be considered as collective for 
the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, namely, the size of the group of aliens 
concerned, the circumstances surrounding the adoption and the implementation of 
the expulsion orders and the discriminatory character of the expulsion (Sub-subsec-
tions 3.4.1. – 3.4.3.). 
By way of conclusion (Section 4), the chapter points out how the ECtHR has 
actively contributed to clarify crucial aspects of the prohibition of collective expul-
sion of aliens and how, through an extensive and dynamic interpretative approach, it 
has significantly expanded the protection of migrants’ rights on the one hand and 
limited States’ sovereign prerogatives on the other. 
2. – The Expulsion of Aliens as the Paradigm of the Tension between 
State Sovereignty and Migration 
The expulsion of an alien is an emblematic manifestation of the State sovereign 
right to control the entry and the stay in its territory and represents a paradigm of the 
classic tension between sovereignty and protection of human rights in the field of 
migration. The migrant, indeed, as the definition in and of itself suggests, is a person 
who migrates, moving from a country to another.2 This capacity of movement, how-
ever, is guaranteed in one direction but not in the other: while the right to leave any 
 
2
 At the international level there is not a universally accepted legal definition of ‘migrant’. According 
to the International Organization for Migration (‘IOM’), the term “migrant” entails an “umbrella term”, 
comprehensively covering all the various cases of persons who move away from their usual place of resi-
dence on the basis of a decision freely taken for reasons of personal convenience. In this sense, thus, the 
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country freely is recognised in several legal instruments at the international, regional 
and national level,3 there is not a corresponding specular right to cross the borders 
and entry in a given State. In other words, there is a right to emigrate (leave a country) 
but non a right to immigrate (enter in a country).  
The State, in fact, enjoys the sovereign right to control the entry and the stay of 
aliens on its territory, having the prerogative to conduct checks at the borders, refuse 
the entry and expel aliens. This is the traditional view of ‘classic’ international law, 
according to which the right of a State to decide on aliens’ admission in or expulsion 
from its national territory represents a logical and natural consequence of its 
sovereignty.4 This assumption has been confirmed by the jurisprudence, including 
the ECtHR, which on several occasions has reiterated that States have and maintain 
the “undeniable right” to control aliens’ entry into their territory.5 
 
term encompasses people and family members moving away, whether within a country or across an inter-
national border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. See IOM, Glossary on migration, 
International Migration Law n. 43 (2019), available online. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (‘UNHCR’) for its part, in light of its specific mandate, keeps a clear distinction between the 
terms “migrant” and “refugee”, considering the first one as fundamentally implying a voluntary process of 
mobility. See UNHCR, Emergency Handbook, 4th ed., UNHCR, 2015; Id., Refugee or migrant?, UNHCR, 
March 2016. A legal definition may be found in the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (‘ICRMW’), which, however, specifically 
refers to the term “migrant worker”, thus identifying and defining a particular category of migrants (ac-
cording to Article 2(1), ICRMW, the migrant worker is “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has 
been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”). 
3
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 13), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Art. 12), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (Art. 8). Similarly, the right to leave a country is guaranteed in the main human 
rights texts adopted at regional level, such as the American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 22(2)), the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art. 12(2)) and the ECHR (Art. 2, Protocol No. 4). The 
right to leave a country is also guaranteed at the national level, being often included in the Constitution as, 
for example, in the case of Italy (Art. 16(2)). 
4
 See for example INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Règles internationales sur l’admission et l’ex-
pulsion des étrangers, session de Gèneve, 1892, in which it was affirmed: “[…] pour chaque Etat, le droit 
d'admettre ou de ne pas admettre des étrangers sur son territoire, ou de ne les y admettre que conditionnel-
lement, ou de les en expulser, est une conséquence logique et nécessaire de sa souveraineté et de son 
indépendance”.  
5
 European Court of Human Rights (Chamber), Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, 
Judgment of 1st September 2015, para. 119. In the same sense see also Id., Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkan-
dali v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, Judgment of 28 May 1985; Id., 
Amuur v. France, Application No. 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June 1996; Id., Mahdid and Haddar v. Aus-
tria, Application No. 74762/01, Judgment of 8 December 2005; Id., Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 
Application No. 30471/08, Judgment of 22 September 2009.  
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State sovereign prerogatives as regards migration control are not called into ques-
tion. However, the traditional vision has been somehow overturned, as States are 
now subjected to obligations towards migrants and aliens, which arise from interna-
tional human rights law. As acknowledged by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (‘UN’) “[…] when exercising their sovereign right to enact and implement 
migratory and border security measures, States have the duty to comply with their 
obligations under international law, including international human rights law, in or-
der to ensure full respect for the human rights of migrants”.6 In other terms, therefore, 
if the sovereignty allows the controls, the sovereignty itself is, in its turn, controlled.7  
This assumption has been further confirmed in the UN framework with specific 
regard to the expulsion of aliens. In particular, as the relevant legal framework con-
cerning expulsions is particularly diversified and multiform, the International Law 
Commission decided to launch a process of codification aiming at a comprehensive, 
organic and uniform regulation of the expulsion of aliens. As a result, in 2006 a 
Memorandum by the Secretariat on Expulsion of Aliens was released, providing a 
deep analysis of the topic and its legal implications.8 In so doing, it clearly recognises 
that “every State has the right to expel aliens” but, at same time, it also clarifies that 
“this right is subject to general limitations as well as specific substantive and proce-
dural requirements”.9  
The codification process led to the realisation of the Draft Articles on the Expul-
sion of Aliens, adopted in 2014 by the International Law Commission and submitted 
to the UN General Assembly.10 The Draft articles are built on the fundamental prem-
ise of the right of expulsion enjoyed by States, which, however, is not absolute as it 
has to be exercised in accordance with applicable rules of international law and, in 
particular, those relating to the protection of human rights (Article 3).  
This outcome has been reached also by the ECtHR, which, through its case law, 
has elaborated the limitations and conditions that States encounter in their right to 
 
6
 General Assembly, Resolution on Protection of Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/62/156 of 18 December 
2007, para. 8. See also Human Rights Council, Resolution on the Human Rights of Migrants, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/18/21 of 30 September 2011, para. 4. 
7
 CARLIER and SAROLEA, Droits des étrangers, Bruxelles, 2016, p. 75. 
8
 International Law Commission, Memorandum by the Secretariat, Expulsion of Aliens, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/565 of 10 July 2006. 
9
 Ibid., p. 1. 
10
 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with Commentaries, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/69/10, 2014.  
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expel aliens, whether individually or collectively, in this way giving a decisive con-
tribution to enhance the protection of migrants against States’ migration control and 
border practices. 
2.1. – The Extended Protection against Expulsion through the Dynamic 
Interpretation of the ECHR: the Prohibition of Torture and the Principle of 
non-refoulement 
The ECtHR, although aligning itself with the traditional principle of international 
law of States’ sovereign prerogatives as regards migration control, has clarified that 
Member States of the Council of Europe have to ensure that their migration and bor-
der policies are consistent with the obligations arising from the ECHR. On such 
premise and following a pragmatic and protection-oriented approach, the Court of 
Strasbourg has progressively developed and strengthened a system of protection of 
migrants’ human rights through a flexible, extensive and ‘dynamic’ interpretation of 
the Convention.  
This result is particularly remarkable if one considers that the ECHR does not 
provide for an explicit and articulated system of protection of aliens and migrants. 
The Court, thus, has conducted its interpretative work by extrapolating principles 
relating to the protection of migrants from some very specific provisions of the Con-
vention. As for the protection against expulsion, in particular, the interpretative pro-
cess of the ECtHR has been carried out taking into consideration the right to life 
(Article 2),11 the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 
3), the right to a fair trial (Article 6),12 the right to respect for private and family life 
(Article 8)13 and the right to an effective remedy (Article 13).  
Article 3, in particular, served as the main interpretation tool that allowed the 
Court to elaborate and develop the protection of migrants against expulsions. In ef-
fect, the extensive interpretation given to such provision possibly represents one of 
the most significant examples of the dynamic and human rights-oriented interpreta-
tive evolution of the Convention, which makes and keeps it “a living instrument” 
adapted to current challenges. 
In short, the protection against expulsions based on Article 3 ECHR (prohibition 
 
11
 See, for example, European Court of Human Rights, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, Application No. 
13284/04, Judgment of 8 November 2005. 
12
 See, for example, Id., Ahorugeze v. Sweden, Application No. 37075/09, Judgment of 27 October 2011.  
13
 See, for example, Id., Nunez v. Norway, Application No. 55597/09, Judgment of 28 June 2011. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Problematic Management of Migratory Flows in Europe … 125 
 
 
of torture) has been fundamentally developed by the ECtHR in connection with the 
principle of non-refoulement, the cornerstone of the international legal regime for 
the protection of migrants and refugees, which essentially prohibits States to expel, 
extradite or return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial 
risks for his or her personal safety or life.14  
Building on this principle, the Court, starting from the leading case Soering v. 
United Kingdom,15 has outlined an indirect protection against expulsions through the 
obligation for the State to refrain from expelling an alien towards a country in which 
he or she would be subjected to the risk of suffering treatment prohibited under Ar-
ticle 3 ECHR. In this way, even if the State in question is not the material author of 
the treatment contrary to Article 3, it nevertheless participates in such violation of 
the Convention in the case of the expulsion of an alien towards a country where there 
are concrete risks of being subjected to such treatment. Indeed the expulsion, if im-
plemented, would become a decisive step in the chain of events leading to the treat-
ment contrary to Article 3, whose violation, therefore, becomes imputable to the 
State which carried out the expulsion. 
This outcome is particularly relevant if one considers that Article 3 has an abso-
lute character and admits no derogation, according to Article 15(2) of the Conven-
tion. The Court, moreover, has affirmed that the prohibition of torture under the 
terms of Article 3 “must be regarded as one of the most fundamental provisions of 
the Convention and as enshrining core values of the democratic societies making up 
the Council of Europe”.16  
Over the years the Court of Strasbourg has then enriched the level of protection 
against expulsions, in particular by extending both the personal and the territorial 
scope of application of the safeguards guaranteed in the Convention. From the first 
point of view, for example, the ECtHR has ruled that the protection against the ex-
pulsion derived from Article 3 applies to migrants irrespective of their legal status, 
 
14
 The principle of non-refoulement is enshrined in relevant international instruments such as the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating to Status of Refugees (Art. 33), the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Art. 3), and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (Art. 19(2)).  
15
 European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgment 
of 7 July 1989.  
16
 See Ibid., para. 88; Id., M.S. v. Belgium, Application No 50012/08, Judgment of 31 January 2012, 
para. 122. 
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thus covering also those who are in an irregular situation17. Similarly, Article 3 has 
been applied to expulsion cases involving a potential danger to national security, 
preventing States to expel aliens allegedly involved in terrorist activities and regard-
less of their illicit and dangerous conduct.18 For the Court, ultimately, the absolute 
character of the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment prevails 
over considerations concerning the victim’s conduct or legal status. 
From the point of view of the territorial scope of application, the protection 
against expulsions has been extended in light of Article 1 ECHR, which lays down 
the fundamental obligation for States Parties “to secure to everyone within their ju-
risdiction” the respect of the human rights protected in the Convention. The exercise 
of jurisdiction, therefore, is a necessary condition for a State to be possibly held re-
sponsible for acts or omissions giving rise to a violation of the ECHR.19  
Accordingly, the ECtHR has considered that, in order to engage the responsibility 
of the State, it is necessary and sufficient that an individual finds himself subjected, 
de jure and de facto, to the control and authority of the State. Consequently, although 
the notion of jurisdiction has to be considered as essentially territorial, in some ex-
ceptional circumstances and for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR, the State’s conduct 
performed, or producing effects, outside the national territory may indeed constitute 
an exercise of jurisdiction. 
It is intuitive that the potential extra-territorial scope of application of the Con-
 
17
 Id., Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 15576/89, Judgment of 20 March 1991. See 
also Id., Hilal v. United Kingdom, Application No. 45276/99, Judgment of 6 March 2001. 
18
 Id., Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 15 No-
vember 1996. The Court affirmed to be “well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern 
times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these circumstances, the 
Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespec-
tive of the victim’s conduct” (para. 79). See also, Id., Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/06, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber) of 28 February 2008. 
19
 On the subject of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention and its extraterritorial scope of 
application, see, among others, GAJA, “Art. 1 Obbligo di rispettare i diritti dell’uomo”, in BARTOLE, 
CONFORTI, RAIMONDI (eds.), Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e 
delle libertà fondamentali, Padova, 2001, p. 23 ff; DE SENA, La nozione di giurisdizione statale nei trattati 
sui diritti dell’uomo, Torino, 2002; MERON, “Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties”, American Jour-
nal of International Law, 1995 , pp. 78-82; KING, “The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of 
States”, Human Rights Law Review, 2009, p. 689 ff; MILLER, “Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A 
Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention”, European Jour-
nal of International Law, 2009, p. 1223 ff. 
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vention is particularly relevant in the field of migration control and border manage-
ment, where States have increasingly resorted to practises aimed at offshoring con-
trol operations and intercepting and pushing-back migrants before their arrival in the 
national territory.20 An emblematic example in this sense is the leading case Hirsi 
Jamaa and Others v. Italy,21 concerning the interception of migrants on the high seas 
and their following transfer to Libya by Italian authorities. The Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR unanimously held that the applicants were within the jurisdiction of the 
Italian State, observing that the events took place on board Italian vessels flying It-
aly’s flag, the crew of which was entirely composed of Italian military personnel, 
with the consequence that the migrants concerned were under the de jure and de facto 
control of Italy.22 
2.2. – Further Extensions of Migrants’ Protection under Article 3 ECHR: 
the Indirect Refoulement and the ‘Dublin Cases’ 
Another example of the extension of aliens’ protection against expulsion is the 
approach developed by the ECtHR with regard to the so-called indirect or “chain 
refoulement”:23 a State may be held responsible under Article 3 ECHR not only if it 
directly expels an individual towards a country in which he/she will be concretely 
subjected to the risk of torture or inhuman treatment (direct refoulement), but also in 
cases of removal to an intermediate country, which, in turn, could expel him/her to 
a third country where the person concerned would face the risk of treatment contrary 
to Article 3 (indirect or chain refoulement). 
In such cases, the responsibility of the State remains intact, as it has an obligation 
to ensure that the intermediate country offers sufficient guarantees in terms of com-
pliance with Article 3 of the Convention. According to the ECtHR, moreover, this 
obligation to carry out proper assessments as to avoid indirect refoulement is even 
 
20
 On the topic of offshore migration and border controls, see GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Access to Asy-
lum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control, Cambridge, 2011; MORENO-
LAX, Accessing Asylum in Europe. Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugees Rights under EU Law, 
Oxford, 2017; DEN HEIJER, “Europe beyond its Borders: Refugee and Human Rights Protection in Extra-
territorial Immigration Control”, in RYAN and MITSILEGAS (eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration Control. 
Legal Challenges, Leiden, 2010, p. 168 ff. 
21
 European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, 
Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 23 February 2012. 
22
 Ibid., paras. 76-82. 
23
 CARLIER and SAROLEA, cit. supra note 7, pp. 84-85. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 Francesco Luigi Gatta 
 
 
more relevant where the intermediate country is not a State Party to the Convention, 
as it happens especially in cases of bilateral agreements between European and Af-
rican States on migration matters.24 
As a further development of the protection against expulsions, the Court has clar-
ified that Article 3 ECHR and the protection against refoulement also apply between 
Member States of the EU. This principle has been affirmed in a number of ‘Dublin 
cases’, involving transfers of asylum seekers between EU Member States according 
to the EU ‘Dublin system’ setting down the criteria and the mechanisms for the al-
location of competence for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in the EU.25  
The Dublin system is built on the presumption that all EU Member States respect 
fundamental rights, are safe countries and are able to provide asylum seekers with 
proper conditions of reception, protection and treatment, in line with international 
and EU human rights standards. The Court of Strasbourg has essentially rebutted this 
presumption, clarifying that EU rules governing the “Dublin transfers” between EU 
Member States cannot be applied automatically and mechanically, that is to say, 
without previously conducting a proper assessment of the reception conditions of the 
receiving Member State, which may not be compatible with Article 3 ECHR. 
The Court, sitting as Grand Chamber, reached this conclusion in the case M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece,26 concerning the Dublin transfer of an Afghan asylum seeker 
from Belgium to Greece, in accordance with EU law. The ECtHR acknowledged the 
“major structural deficiencies” of the Greek asylum system, amounting to treatment 
contrary to Article 3 and concluded that this situation was well known or was easily 
 
24
 See European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa case, cit. supra note 21, para. 147. 
25
 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or 
a stateless person (recast). 
26
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, Judg-
ment (Grand Chamber) of 21 January 2011. For analyses and comments on the case, see CARLIER and 
SAROLEA, “Le droit d’asile dans l’Union européenne controlé par la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme. À propos de l’arret M.S.S. c. Belgique et Grèce”, Journal des Tribunaux, 2011, p. 357 ff.; MAIANI 
and NERAUDAU, “L’arret M.S.S. c. Grèce et Belgique de la Cour EDH du 21 janvier 2011. De la détermi-
nation de l’Etat responsible selon Dublin à la responsabilité des Etats membre en matière de protection des 
droits fondamentaux, Revue du droit des étrangers, 2011, p. 7 ff. The approach of the ECtHR in M.S.S. 
was later followed also by the Court of Luxembourg: see, joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., 
Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.  
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and freely ascertainable by the Belgian authorities, which, by returning the applicant 
to Greece in application of the Dublin Regulation, knowingly exposed him to treat-
ment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. 
In the following case Tarakhel v. Switzerland,27 concerning the transfer of an Af-
ghan family from Switzerland to Italy, the Court, once again as Grand Chamber, 
ruled that, even in the absence of systemic and structural problems of a national asy-
lum system (as in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece), EU Member States have an obli-
gation, before executing a Dublin transfer, to verify, in concreto, the potential spe-
cific risks for the aliens concerned of being subjected to conditions contrary to Arti-
cle 3 in the Member State of destination.28 
3. – The Prohibition of Collective Expulsion of Aliens 
While the individual expulsion of an alien is permitted, although in compliance 
with certain substantive and procedural guarantees, States, on the contrary, encounter 
an absolute prohibition to expel aliens collectively. The UN Memorandum on Ex-
pulsion of Aliens confirms this, highlighting that, while a State has and maintains 
the right to expel an alien individually, the collective expulsion of a group of aliens 
“is contrary to the very notion of the human rights of individuals and is therefore 
prohibited”.29 Collective expulsions, in this sense, may be viewed as an abuse of the 
right to expel an alien and represent an aggravated form of violation of human rights. 
Collective expulsions, indeed, are firmly and widely prohibited at international 
level. In Europe, within the Council of Europe, collective expulsion of aliens is pro-
hibited under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, which, adopted in 1963, be-
came the first international legal text to explicitly address and prohibit collective 
expulsions of aliens.30 Collective expulsion is explicitly prohibited also in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Article 19).  
 
27
 European Court of Human Rights, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application No. 29217/12, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber) of 4 November 2014. 
28
 Ibid. According to the Court, “it follows that, were the applicants to be returned to Italy without the 
Swiss authorities having first obtained individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applica-
tions would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be 
kept together, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention” (para. 122). 
29
 International Law Commission, Memorandum, cit. supra note 8, p. 2. 
30
 In the framework of the Council of Europe, another legal instrument which indirectly confirms the 
prohibition of collective expulsion is the European Convention on Establishment, signed in Paris on 13 
December 1955, whose Protocol, Section III, letter c), establishes that “The right of expulsion may be 
exercised only in individual cases”. 
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At other regional levels, similar prohibitions may be found in the American Con-
vention on Human Rights (Article 22(9)), in the Arab Charter on Human Rights (Ar-
ticle 26(2)) and in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 12(5), 
which refers to “mass expulsion of non-nationals”). At global level, the prohibition 
of collective expulsion is provided for in the International Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, with re-
gard to those specific categories of migrants (Article 22). The UN Draft Articles on 
the Expulsion of Aliens, adopted in 2014 by the International Law Commission, ex-
pressly establishes that “the collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited” (Article 9).  
Other international instruments, although not legally binding, address the prohi-
bition of collective expulsion of aliens. The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration, for example, affirms the States’ commitment to upholding 
the prohibition of collective expulsion in the context of search and rescue operations 
in the seas and the enforcement of return policies (Objectives 8 and 21).31 Similar 
considerations may be drawn also from the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees 
and Migrants.32 
The mentioned provisions share a common rationale, which consists, essentially, 
in prohibiting the collective character of the expulsion so as to avoid that removals 
from a certain State take place without a proper examination of the individual and 
specific situation of the persons concerned. The core purpose, therefore, is to prevent 
States from removing aliens as group, without examining their personal circum-
stances and, consequently, without enabling them to put forward their arguments 
against the expulsion measure.33 So conceived, the prohibition of collective expul-
sion of aliens has an absolute character, which seems to be considered as a general 
principle of international law recognised by civilized nations.34 
 
31
 General Assembly, Resolution on Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN 
Doc. A/RES/73/195 of 11 January 2019. 
32
 General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1 of 19 
September 2016, Annex I, para. 5. 
33
 European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa case, cit. supra note 21, para. 177. 
34
 International Law Commission, Third Report on the Expulsion of Aliens by Mr. Maurice Kamto, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/581 of 19 April 2007, para. 115. The report, however, as well as the 
2014 UN Draft Articles on the expulsion of aliens, makes a distinction between collective expulsions of 
aliens in time of peace and war: while in the first case collective expulsion is prohibited in a general and 
absolute manner, in the latter case, possibly, it might be considered admissible under certain circumstances. 
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However, while the aim and the character of the prohibition of collective expul-
sion seem to be clear, its concrete features and scope of application have been in 
need of clarification. Indeed, despite the wide and explicit recognition of the prohi-
bition of collective expulsion in international and regional legal instruments, there is 
not an unequivocal and uniform definition of its notion. This may be partially ex-
plained considering, on the one hand, that the relevant legal provisions contained in 
international instruments are drafted in a rather generic and concise manner, and, on 
the other, that the case law on collective expulsion so far has been still relatively 
modest.35 
In this context, the Court of Strasbourg, once again, has been playing a decisive 
role in outlining the scope of application and the main features of the prohibition of 
collective expulsion of aliens.36 Even if the violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 
ECHR was actually declared only in few cases and only in specific and exceptional 
circumstances,37 the interpretation given by the ECtHR has been extremely meaning-
ful, being mainly characterised by an extensive and teleological approach, similar to 
the one used for Article 3 ECHR.38 This wide interpretation of the Convention has 
led to the result of enhancing the level of protection of migrants and limiting the 
prerogatives of States, particularly with regard to the aspects addressed in the fol-
lowing paragraphs. 
3.1. – Personal Scope of Application 
Unlike other provisions of the Convention, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 generically 
refers to “aliens”, without specifying anything as regards the situation or the legal 
 
35
 On this topic, see CARLIER and LEBOEUF, “The Prohibition of Collective Expulsion as an Individu-
alisation Requirement”, in CORNELISSE, DE BRUYCKER and MORARU (eds.), Law and Judicial Dialogue in 
the Implementation of the Return Directive, Oxford, forthcoming. The Court of Justice, for its part, to date 
has never been asked to interpret Art. 19(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
36
 The contribution of the ECtHR to the definition of the notion of collective expulsion is expressly 
acknowledged in the 2014 UN Draft Articles on the expulsion of aliens, see International Law Commission, 
Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, cit. supra note 10, commentary to Article 9. 
37
 At the time of writing the ECtHR has found a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion of 
aliens in seven cases. 
38
 The importance of the case law of the ECtHR relating to the prohibition of collective expulsion of 
aliens is also proved by the frequent involvement of the Grand Chamber and the intervention in the case as 
third party of relevant international actors, such as the UNHCR, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Amnesty International (as, for example, in Hirsi Jamaa, Sharifi and N.D. and N.T.).  
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status of the persons concerned.39 The provision, however, must be interpreted in an 
extensive manner, being applicable to a plurality of individuals.  
First of all, with regard to the nationality, in particular, whereas Article 3(1) of 
Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR prohibits collective expulsions of nationals, Article 4 of 
the same Protocol must be interpreted as comprising also stateless persons, as con-
firmed by the Explanatory report to Protocol No. 440 and by the Court itself.41  
As to the legal status and the situation of the individuals involved in the collective 
expulsion, the Court has clarified that the notion of “aliens” applies not only to those 
lawfully residing within the territory of a State, but also to irregular migrants trying 
to cross borders and enter it. In other words, thus, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 applies 
to those who find themselves subjected to the removal measure as a group, regardless 
of their actual legal characterisation in terms of status or nationality, which are irrel-
evant for the purpose of the protection against the collective expulsion. 
Accordingly, in the cases of alleged collective expulsions brought before it, the 
ECtHR has applied Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to a variety of individuals, including 
both asylum seekers (Sultani v. France)42 and migrants who did not apply for asylum 
(Georgia v. Russia I),43 as well as persons having a specific nationality (Shioshvili 
and Others v. Russia)44 or belonging to a particular ethnic group (Conka v. Bel-
gium).45  
For the Court, ultimately, the protection against collective expulsion applies to 
“aliens” to be intended in a broad meaning, embracing not only those nationals law-
fully resident on the territory but also “all those who have no actual right to nation-
ality in a State, whether they are merely passing through a country or reside or are 
domiciled in it, whether they are refugees or entered the country on their own initia-
tive, or whether they are stateless or possess another nationality”.46 
 
39
 Art. 2(1) of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR guarantees the freedom of movement to persons who are 
“lawfully within the territory of a State”. Art. 1(1) of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR establishes procedural 
safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens “lawfully resident in the territory of a State”. 
40
 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already 
included in the Convention and in the first Protocol thereto, para. 32. 
41
 European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa case, cit. supra note 21, para. 174. 
42
 Id., Sultani v. France, Application No. 45223/03, Judgment of 20 September 2007. 
43
 Id., Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 3 July 2014. 
44
 Id., Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, Application No. 19356/07, Judgment of 20 December 2016. 
45
 European Court of Human Rights, Conka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, Judgment of 5 
February 2002. 
46
 Id., Hirsi Jamaa case, cit. supra note 21, para. 174. 
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3.2. – Territorial Applicability and Jurisdiction 
If the personal scope of application of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 does not pose 
particular problems of interpretation – as the provision covers individuals irrespec-
tive of their legal situation – the territorial applicability of the prohibition of collec-
tive expulsion of aliens has raised more complex issues. These, in particular, have 
emerged recently: while, in the past, the ECtHR’s case law on Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 used to be relatively moderate, it has gained momentum since 2010, as litiga-
tion before the Court of Strasbourg increased in parallel with the growing migratory 
pressure in the Mediterranean and the consequent responses put in place by EU 
Member States. 
As European States started to engage in practices of border control and migration 
management such as ‘push-back’ operations or interception of migrants on the high 
seas, the Court found itself in the position of dealing with new challenges. Until that 
moment, indeed, the vast majority of cases concerning Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 
had involved aliens who were already on the national territory of the State concerned, 
therefore, no question of territorial applicability arose.47 But the changes occurred in 
the pattern of migratory flows and the consequent reactions by States led the Court 
to consider whether Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 applied also to cases in which the 
relevant events took place outside the national territory of a State. 
The turning point was represented by the Hirsi Jamaa case, concerning push-
back operations on the high seas and subsequent transfers of migrants to Libya by 
the Italian Coast Guard. As clarified above,48 in its judgment of 2012, the Court con-
cluded for the extraterritorial application of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, basing its 
interpretation on the concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR. What is particu-
larly significant in the Court’s reasoning, revealing a pragmatic and human rights-
oriented approach, is the establishment of the link between the prohibition of collec-
tive expulsion and the border control practices put in place by States.  
The ECtHR, indeed, drawing the picture of the evolving European migratory sce-
nario, acknowledges that “migratory flows in Europe have continued to intensify, 
with increasing use being made of the sea” and that “the interception of migrants on 
 
47
 See, for example, European Commission of Human Rights, K.G. v. Germany, Application No. 7704/76, 
Decision of admissibility of 11 March 1977; European Court of Human Rights, Andric v. Sweden, Application 
No. 45917/99, Decision of admissibility of 23 February 1999; Id., Conka case, cit. supra note 45. 
48
 Supra Subsection 2.1. 
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the high seas and their removal to countries of transit or origin are now means of 
migratory control in so far as they constitute tools for States to combat irregular mi-
gration”.49 Building on such premise and in the light of the core purpose of the pro-
hibition of collective expulsion of aliens, the Court observes that  
“if Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 were to apply only to collective expulsions from the na-
tional territory of the States Parties to the Convention, a significant component of contem-
porary migratory patterns would not fall within the ambit of that provision […] the conse-
quence of that would be that migrants having taken to the sea, often risking their lives, and 
not having managed to reach the borders of a State, would not be entitled to an examination 
of their personal circumstances before being expelled, unlike those travelling by land”.50 
With regard to the State’s exercise of jurisdiction on the high seas, the Court 
further affirms that “the special nature of the maritime environment cannot justify an 
area outside the law”,51 thus, coming to the conclusion that  
“the removal of aliens carried out in the context of interception on the high seas by the 
authorities of a State in the exercise of their sovereign authority, the effect of which is to 
prevent migrants from reaching the borders of the State or even to push them back to another 
State, constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction […] which engages the responsibility of the State 
in question under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4”.52 
The Court followed the same approach in the case Sharifi and Others v. Italy and 
Greece, concerning the deportation to Greece of migrants who had clandestinely 
boarded vessels for Italy.53 The ECtHR condemned the immediate refoulement of the 
migrants arrived from Greece to the Italian port of Ancona, establishing the applica-
bility of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to cases of refusal to allow entry to the national 
territory to persons arriving illegally. The Court, thus, did not consider relevant to 
ascertain whether the migrants were expelled before or after physically reaching the 
Italian territory. In other terms, for the Court, the prohibition of collective expulsion 
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is potentially applicable also when aliens have not concretely “touched” the national 
territory of the State.54 
The extraterritorial applicability of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and the concept of 
State jurisdiction in migration control matters were addressed again in the case N.D. 
and N.T. v. Spain.55 The case concerned the immediate and allegedly collective ex-
pulsion of migrants intercepted in the attempt of crossing the Spanish-Moroccan bor-
der in Melilla, a Spanish enclave situated on the North-African Coast. As explained 
by the Spanish government in its defence, the mentioned border crossing is made up 
of a total of three enclosures: two external barriers and a third, final, internal fence. 
According to the government, given the fact that the applicants did not succeed in 
climbing and passing through all the three protective structures, and, therefore, they 
had not physically entered the Spanish territory, the events had occurred outside the 
jurisdiction of Spain.  
The Court did not agree with such argumentation and, following its previous ap-
proach, considered as irrelevant and unnecessary to determine exactly whether the 
Spanish-Moroccan border crossing of Melilla was actually located in Spain or not. 
Rather, the ECtHR, recalling its judgment in Hirsi Jamaa, pointed out that what mat-
ters for the applicability of the Convention is the circumstance that control is exer-
cised, de jure and de facto, by the State over the individuals concerned. For the Court, 
thus, in the N.D. and N.T. case, as the migrants were brought down from the barriers, 
arrested and then expelled by the Spanish Guardia Civil, there is no doubt that the 
events fell within the jurisdiction of Spain for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.56  
Accordingly, the Court unanimously declared that Spain violated Article 4 of Pro-
tocol No. 4 to the Convention, alone and in conjunction with Article 13. Following the 
judgment in N.D. and N.T., the Spanish Government requested the case to be referred 
to the Grand Chamber, before which, at the time of writing, it is still pending.57 
3.3. – The Notion of Expulsion 
The ECtHR, following a pragmatic approach, interprets the notion of ‘expulsion’ 
in an extensive way. In particular, decisive attention is given to the effects of the 
removal of the alien concerned, rather than to the concrete modalities in which it is 
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carried out or the formal definition of the expulsion measure established according 
to the domestic legislation of the States. For the Court, indeed, also taking into con-
sideration the travaux préparatoires of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, “the word ‘ex-
pulsion’ should be interpreted in the generic meaning, in current use (to drive away 
from a place)”.58 
Accordingly, the ECtHR has considered as falling within the scope of application 
of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 not only acts entailing an expulsion in the strict mean-
ing (“ex-pellere”, from Latin, “to drive out”), that is to say, actions implying first the 
entry of the individual on the national territory and then his subsequent removal by 
the State, but also actions and practices taking place without the aliens having nec-
essarily already reached and entered the territory of the State.  
This approach was followed in Hirsi Jamaa, where the Italian government argued 
the necessity, when considering the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, to 
stick to the ordinary and strict meaning of the term “expulsion”, according to which, 
in order for a State to expel someone, the person concerned must be already present 
on its national territory, having previously entered it. In the specific case, Italy 
claimed that, given that migrants had been intercepted on the high seas and then 
removed to Libya, they had actually not entered the Italian territory: a circumstance 
which constituted a “logical obstacle” to the applicability of Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4.59 The Court rejected this argumentation, choosing a wide interpretation of the 
concept of expulsion, which encompasses push-back operations, interception on the 
high seas and other similar practices aimed at preventing migrants from disembark-
ing on the national territory.  
For the Court, moreover, is not relevant how the removal measure concretely 
takes place. It has considered, for example, as falling within the scope of applicability 
of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 both expulsions carried out via sea by vessels (Hirsi 
Jamaa and Sharifi) and deportations via air through joint “collective flights” (Sultani 
v. France and Ghulami v. France)60. 
Finally, for the Court the formal legal classification specifically given to a re-
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moval measure by the domestic legislation of a State is not relevant either. For ex-
ample, in the case Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (Grand Chamber)61  – concerning the 
detention of migrants in a reception centre on the island of Lampedusa, their transfer 
on ships moored in the harbour of Palermo and their subsequent removal to Tunisia 
– the Italian government argued that, according to the relevant domestic law, the 
procedure in question was technically defined as “refusal of entry with removal” and 
not as “expulsion”. The ECtHR, refusing a too formalistic approach, maintained its 
extensive interpretation of the notion of expulsion, to be intended as “a formal act or 
conduct attributable to a State, by which an alien is compelled to leave the territory 
of that State”.62 
3.4. – The Collective Character of the Expulsion 
The feature that specifically and typically characterises the prohibition estab-
lished under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR is the collective character of 
the expulsion. This element is to be understood as the lack of a reasonable and ob-
jective examination of the particular situation of each individual concerned. 
This individualisation requirement – the lack of which makes the expulsion “col-
lective” and thus prohibited – can be deduced from the well-established case law of 
both the European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) and the ECtHR, which 
define a collective expulsion as “any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave 
a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and 
objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group”.63 
By reading this definition, it follows that, basically, a collective expulsion entails 
two essential aspects, that is to say, on the one hand, the circumstance that the indi-
vidual in question is expelled together with other persons, as a group, and, on the 
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other, the fact that his/her specific situation was not individually and properly exam-
ined by the national authorities.64 That being said, however, when and how, exactly, 
an expulsion of aliens becomes ‘collective’?  
To answer this question, the Court over the years has identified a number of cri-
teria, which, on the basis of a case-by-case approach, may serve as indicators reveal-
ing the collective character of an expulsion. These elements, if taken alone, are not 
sufficient per se to automatically lead to declare a violation of Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4, rather, they serve as parameters that are carefully taken in consideration by 
the Court itself to possibly establish the collective character of an expulsion in the 
specific case. These are, in particular, the size of the group of aliens involved, the 
circumstances in which the expulsion measure takes places and its discriminatory 
character. 
3.4.1. The Size of the Group of Aliens 
By considering the case law of the ECtHR it seems possible to argue that the 
question of the collective character of an expulsion is more of a qualitative rather 
than quantitative nature.65 An expulsion, indeed, is not simply and automatically con-
siderable as collective just because it involves a plurality of individuals, who are 
removed simultaneously, in a group. That being said, nevertheless, it is also true that 
the involvement of a certain number of persons is inherently necessary in order for 
an expulsion to be collective.  
As to the group of aliens subjected to the expulsion, however, neither the inter-
national legal texts nor the case law give precise indications as to the minimum quan-
tity of individuals that should be involved. Rather, the quantitative element of the 
size of the group of aliens constitutes the characteristic that distinguishes collective 
expulsions from mass expulsions. The UN Memorandum on the Expulsion of Aliens 
of the International Law Commission confirms this assumption, by affirming that 
“the mass expulsion of aliens is generally considered to involve a large number of 
persons”66 and that “the quantitative character of the expulsion of a large number of 
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aliens appears to be the essential element of the notion of mass expulsion as opposed 
to collective expulsion”.67 
Beyond the difference between mass and collective expulsion, still, there is no 
clear guidance as regards the size of the group of aliens concerned in a collective 
expulsion, which, anyhow, by its inherent nature, needs to involve a plurality of per-
sons. The case law of the ECtHR does not provide clear answers on that point. In 
Conka v. Belgium, for example, the Court, in dealing with a case of expulsion of 
some Slovakian Roma families amounting to around 70 people, qualified such group 
of aliens as a “large number of persons of the same origin”;68 whereas, in the case 
Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia, concerning the expulsion of Georgian nationals 
from Russia in 2006, the Court upheld the complaints of some of the 19 applicants 
and declared a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.69  
The applicability of this provision was established also with smaller numbers of 
applicants: in Shioshvili, regarding again the issue of collective expulsion of Geor-
gian nationals from Russia, the Court considered Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 appli-
cable, being satisfied with a family consisting of a woman and her four children.70 In 
N.D. and N.T. v. Spain (currently pending before the Grand Chamber) the ECtHR 
unanimously found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 with regard to only two 
applicants, while in Khlaifia (Chamber judgment), it applied the provision to three 
applicants.71  
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3.4.2. The Circumstances Surrounding the Adoption and the Implementation 
of the Expulsion Order 
The ECtHR examines the potential collective character of the expulsion with re-
gard to two different moments: the adoption of the decision to expel and its subse-
quent implementation. The Court, in particular, seems to lend particular weight to 
the first aspect as, if the State conducts a serious and objective examination of the 
individual position of each alien concerned, the following collective implementation 
of the individual decisions of expulsion does not constitute per se a violation of Ar-
ticle 4 of Protocol No. 4.72  
At the same time, however, when dealing with cases of alleged collective expul-
sions, the Court analyses and keeps in consideration also the circumstances surround-
ing the implementation of the expulsion measure. For the ECtHR, indeed, the fact 
that an individualised examination has been carried out as regards the single partic-
ular case of each applicant does not mean that “the background to the execution of 
the expulsion orders plays no further role in determining whether there has been 
compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4”.73 
In this framework, a first element that the ECtHR keeps in particular considera-
tion when assessing whether an individualised examination has been effectively car-
ried out is the motivation of the expulsion order. For the Court, however, the circum-
stance that multiple decisions were issued in similar terms or with a stereotyped mo-
tivation is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a violation of Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4. Indeed, “the fact that a number of aliens are subject to similar decisions does 
not in itself lead to the conclusion that there is a collective expulsion if each person 
concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his expulsion to 
the competent authorities on an individual basis”.74  
Following this approach, in M.A. v. Cyprus, despite the fact that expulsion orders 
were issued with letters drafted in identical and formulaic terms, the Court found no 
violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion, confirming that “what is im-
portant is that every case was looked at individually and decided on its own particular 
facts”.75 In other cases, however, the motivation of the expulsion order has been taken 
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into particular account as a possible indicator of the collective character of the ex-
pulsion. In Conka, for example, the stereotyped motivation of the expulsion orders 
has been considered as a relevant circumstance giving rise to a suspicion of a collec-
tive expulsion, although this type of motivation is not prohibited per se and does not 
suffice, if taken alone, to establish a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.76   
Among other relevant circumstances that may potentially reveal the collective 
character of an expulsion, the Court has considered the political context in which the 
expulsions have taken place. The rulings concerning the expulsion of Georgian na-
tionals from Russia carried out during 2006 and 2007 in the wake of the political 
tensions between the two countries represent an emblematic example in this sense, 
clearly revealing an organised strategy of collective expulsion of a given category of 
aliens.77 Also, in Conka, the Court has considered the acts and declarations of the 
Belgian authorities as indicators of the existence of “a general system intended to 
deal with groups of individuals collectively”.78 
The number of aliens expelled is a further circumstance, which, although insuf-
ficient to establish a collective expulsion alone, is considered by the Court as an 
element that may reveal the existence of a general policy aimed at collectively ex-
pelling a given group of individuals. Once again, the cases concerning Russia and 
Georgian nationals are particularly significant, as they involved coordinated admin-
istrative practices of arrest, detention and following expulsion of numerous groups 
of aliens, according to specific circulars and instructions issued by Russian authori-
ties for this purpose.  
The procedures carried out with regard to the expulsion may also play a relevant 
role. The Court does not intend to impose strict procedural requirements on States, 
as it essentially requires them to guarantee objective individualised examinations of 
the aliens’ situation, but with a certain flexibility as how to do so. From the case law 
on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, however, it can be deduced that the ECtHR requires 
some minimal procedural guarantees such as, at least, the identification of the aliens 
concerned.  
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Indeed, while in M.A. v. Cyrpus the violation of the prohibition of the collective 
expulsion was excluded on the grounds that national authorities had carried out iden-
tity checks in respect of each person, in Hirsi Jamaa and Sharifi the lack of identifi-
cation of the aliens weighed heavily in the reasoning of the judges, leading to the 
condemnation of automatic and immediate refoulement practices without prior iden-
tification of the migrants. Similar emphasis on the lack of identification may be also 
found in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain.79 
The requirement of identifying aliens, however, is not intended as an absolute 
obligation for the States, as the Court has excluded the violation of Article 4 of Pro-
tocol No. 4 where the lack of the identification and individualised examination was 
attributable to the culpable conduct of the aliens concerned.80 In Dritsas v. Italy, for 
example, a group of Greek nationals, who were on their way to attend the G8 Summit 
in Italy, were expelled without being previously identified.81 The Court declared the 
application inadmissible, observing that the applicants had refused to cooperate and 
show their identity documents to the Italian police. Ultimately, thus, as for the iden-
tification of aliens, States have an obligation of means, not results.82 
A procedural approach was also followed in Khlaifia. While the Chamber estab-
lished a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion on the grounds that appli-
cants were sent back to Tunisia through a simplified fast track procedure without being 
heard,83 the Grand Chamber overruled the decision, clarifying that Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 does not guarantee the right to an individual interview in all circumstances and 
the requirement of this provision may be satisfied where each alien has a genuine and 
effective possibility of submitting arguments against the expulsion and when those 
arguments are examined in an appropriate manner by national authorities.84 
3.4.3. The Discriminatory Character of the Expulsion 
The ECHR and the ECtHR do not require the collective expulsion to have a dis-
criminatory character. Thus, the homogeneity of the group of aliens expelled, in terms 
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of characteristics such as nationality or ethnic origin, does not entail a constitutive el-
ement of the prohibition established under the terms of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. 
Other international instruments follow the same approach, prohibiting the collective 
expulsion in general terms, without requiring the discrimination of the persons in-
volved in the expulsion. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights represents 
an exception though, as, under Article 12(5), it explicitly prohibits “mass expulsion” 
to be intended as one “aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups”. 
That being said, however, even if it does not represent a necessary legal require-
ment for the purpose of the prohibition of collective expulsion, the element of the 
discrimination of aliens is not without importance in the context of the expulsion of 
aliens, whether individually or collectively carried out. The discriminatory character 
of a removal measure, indeed, may unveil the unlawfulness of an expulsion, which, 
otherwise, would be admissible. This is confirmed by the UN Memorandum on the 
expulsion of aliens, according to which “the expulsion of aliens contrary to the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination may constitute a violation of international law”.85  
More specifically, according to the Memorandum, the discriminatory character 
of an expulsion is relevant in three respects. First, an individual expulsion of an alien, 
which, in abstracto, represents an admissible and legitimate measure by the State, 
would turn into an unlawful act if based solely on grounds such as race, religion or 
any other criteria covered by the principle of non-discrimination. Second, with re-
gard to the implementation of an expulsion measure, the principle of non-discrimi-
nation would prohibit failure to comply with the substantive and procedural guaran-
tees prescribed for a lawful expulsion. The State, thus, when exercising its right to 
expulsion, is under the obligation to respect the rights of the aliens subject to expul-
sion without discrimination of any kind. This obligation covers the decision to expel, 
the procedures relating to the adoption of the expulsion measure and those relating 
to its subsequent implementation.86 Finally, the Memorandum highlights how the 
principle of non-discrimination may be “of particular relevance to the prohibition of 
collective expulsions”,87 as it may unveil the collective character of the expulsion, in 
this way revealing its unlawfulness. 
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This same logic is also used and applied in the framework of the ECHR. Indeed, 
the possible discriminatory character of the removal measure, although unnecessary 
for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol no. 4, is taken into account by the ECtHR 
as a relevant additional circumstance, which may somehow reinforce the suspicion 
about the existence of a collective expulsion in a given case.  
This approach, in particular, has been followed by the Court with regard to factors 
as the ethnic origin and the nationality of aliens involved in an expulsion. As for the 
first element, for example, in Conka, the ECtHR, when assessing the relevant facts 
of the case, took well note of the fact that practices as arrest, detention and subse-
quent expulsion were conducted with specific regard to Roma people, concluding 
that “in view of the large number of persons of the same origin who suffered the 
same fate as the applicants (…) the procedure followed does not enable to eliminate 
all doubt that the expulsion might have been collective”.88  
On the other hand, the cases concerning Russia and the collective expulsion of 
Georgian nationals represent a vivid example of the nationality as factor of discrim-
ination, with a multiplicity of individuals specifically and systematically targeted as 
a particular identified group of aliens to be expelled. In this regard, it is worth men-
tioning that in all these cases (Georgia v. Russia (I), Berdzenishvili and Shioshvili) 
the applicants specifically invoked a violation of Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of 
discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol no. 4. The Court, for 
its part, acknowledged the discriminatory character of the expulsions, but, having 
already found a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, consid-
ered unnecessary to examine also the violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction 
with Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 of the Convention. 
Within the Council of Europe, the discriminatory character of a collective expul-
sion has been addressed also by the European Committee of Social Rights with re-
gard to a case of expulsion from France of Roma people of Bulgarian and Romanian 
origin following the dismantling of the camp sites where they were living.89 In its 
decision, the Committee, also recalling the judgment of the ECtHR in Conka, high-
lighted how, statistically, the vast majority of administrative decisions requiring in-
dividuals to leave the French territory issued during the period under consideration 
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were principally directed against Roma, in this way revealing the existence of a dis-
criminatory expulsion policy specifically targeting those individuals. As a conse-
quence, the Committee concluded for the incompatibility with the Charter of the ex-
pulsion measures issued by the French authorities against Roma people, given that 
“they were not founded on an examination of their personal circumstances, did not 
respect the proportionality principle and were discriminatory in nature since they 
targeted the Roma community.90 
4. – Concluding Remarks 
While the ECtHR’s engagement with the prohibition of collective expulsion of 
aliens has remained modest during the decades, the recent intense migratory pressure 
against European borders has paved the way for the development of a new line of 
case law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR. Border practices and migration 
control operations put in place by EU Member States have indeed raised a number 
of significant issues in terms of respect of migrants’ fundamental rights. 
While Frontline EU Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain, have al-
ready been – or currently are91 – involved in cases of collective expulsions due to 
their border control practices aimed at tackling maritime migratory flows, the case 
law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is destined to increase with a number of pending 
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cases involving potential human rights violations occurred at land borders of eastern 
European States, such as Slovakia,92 Poland,93 Croatia94 and Hungary.95  
This scenario offers a further confirmation of the potential repercussions on mi-
grants’ rights of States’ border policies. In this sense, the Court of Strasbourg has 
acknowledged the serious difficulties faced by national authorities in dealing with 
increasing migratory flows, emphasising that “States which form the external bor-
ders of the European Union are currently experiencing considerable difficulties in 
coping with the increasing influx of migrants and asylum-seekers”, and that it “does 
not underestimate the burden and pressure this situation places on the States con-
cerned”.96 As for the migration across the Mediterranean, moreover, the Court af-
firmed to be “particularly aware of the difficulties related to the phenomenon of mi-
gration by sea, involving for States additional complications in controlling the bor-
ders in Southern Europe”.97  
Having said that, however, the Court, while reiterating, in general terms, the 
States’ sovereign and legitimate right to control borders, at the same time affirms the 
necessity for national authorities to carry out migration control measures in full com-
pliance with the Convention, even in cases of intense migratory pressure and when 
national asylum systems are under strain. In striking a balance between EU Member 
States’ interest to control migratory flows and the respect of human rights, the Court 
firmly states the need to ensure an essential level of protection of aliens against ex-
pulsion and refoulement practices, which sounds particularly relevant in times char-
acterised by restrictive and aggressive policies towards migrants. 
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ment on 11 May 2018, concerning the removal to Serbia of 14 Afghan nationals. 
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 Id., H.K. v. Hungary, Application No.18531/17; Khurram v. Hungary, Application No. 12625/17, 
both communicated to the Hungarian Government on 13 November 2017 and concerning the expulsion of 
aliens to Serbia. 
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 Id., M.S.S. case, cit. supra note 26, para 223. 
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 Id., Hirsi Jamaa case, cit. supra note 21, para 122. 
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1. – Introduction 
Since the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (‘USSR’), the Rus-
sian Federation (‘RF’) has been the leading destination for those migrating from for-
mer Soviet republics (‘FSU’), as well as for the numerous people in search of shelter 
fleeing war, authoritarian regimes and persecution in neighbouring or former allied 
States. Nowadays, according to the United Nations Department of Economic and So-
cial Affairs (‘UN/DESA’), Russia ranked fourth globally as a host country for inter-
national migrants.1 During the last decade, migrants (including voluntary migrants, 
asylum seekers, refugees, and international displaced persons) came to almost 8% of 
 
1
 See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA), Population Division 
International Migration Report 2017, ST/ESA/SER.A/404 (2017), p. 6. 
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the overall Russian population. In 2017, this amounted to some 11.6 million people.2  
While the migration flow toward Russia seems considerable (and indeed it was), 
in the last decade the RF has been one of the few states in which the migration flow 
has declined by -2% per annum.3 This data includes the period from 2014-2016 when 
a wave of refugees arrived due to the Ukrainian war.4 Part of this decreasing trend 
reflects the fact that since 1993 the RF has adopted restrictive migration policies and 
practices that hinder voluntary migrants, refugees and asylum seekers coming from 
States other than the FSU.5 Nowadays, migration flows are characterised by mixed 
movements of individuals migrating from the country of origin for several reasons. 
Alongside economic migrants, there are different categories of vulnerable individu-
als that flee their home countries for genuine fear of persecution and seek shelter and 
international protection, i.e., refugees, asylum seekers, refugee alike person, stateless 
and refugees sur place. 
Voluntary and forced migrants often follow similar migratory routes and use the 
same modes of transport and networks. Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish 
between the different categories to apply the appropriate legal framework in each 
case. Unfortunately, in Russia, domestic courts frequently consider the migration 
picture in its entirety, adopting a ‘case file logic’6 and applying the normative defi-
nition of refugee very strictly to cases of involuntary or forced migration. The effects 
of these policies and practices fall on the vulnerable asylum seekers, who are often 
most affected by expulsion, deportation and extradition measures.  
 
2
 See Federal State Statistics Service (Rossast), The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, Moscow, 11 
September 2017, available at: <http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2017/demo17.pdf>. These data refer only 
to officially registered migrants. According to Abashin and Cress, this figure does not include 11 million 
migrants who de facto live in Russia permanently, but do not apply for a residence permit or citizenship. 
See, ABASHIN, “Migration Policies in Russia: Laws and Debates”, in HEUSALA and AITAMURTO (eds.), 
Migrant Workers in Russia: Global Challenges of the Shadow Economy in Societal Transformation, New 
York, 2017, p. 16; SCHENK, Why Control Immigration? Strategic Uses of Migration Management in Rus-
sia, Toronto, 2018, p. 1. Moreover, even if until the 2018 a decreasing trend has been stable, from January 
to April 2019 migration growth almost doubled - up to 98,000 people by the same period of 2018. The 
number of arrivals in the country grew by 20% to almost 220,000 people.  
3 See UN/DESA, cit. supra note 1, p. 7. 
4See UNHCR, 2016 Year-End report, 28 June 2017, available at: <http://reporting.un-
hcr.org/sites/default/files/pdfsummaries/GR2016-RussianFederation-eng.pdf>. 
5 See SILVESTRI and TCHERNISHOVA, The Legal Framework Regulating Asylum in the Russian Feder-
ation, International Journal of Refugee Law, 1998, p.184 ff., pp. 184-188. 
6
 See KURKCHIYAN and KUBAL, A Sociology of Justice in Russia, Cambridge, 2018, p. 93 ff. 
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Most of the expulsion cases relate to lesser administrative offences, such as not 
having a resident permit (propiska) or working without the required permit. These 
cases typically involve individuals from Central Asia, Syria, Ukraine and Afghani-
stan, who in a first time have moved temporarily to Russia to work (with or without 
a permit), making business and sending remittances to their families at home, while 
in a second time ask for asylum given the changed situation in their countries and in 
order not to be returned in a context of war or widespread violence and mass human 
rights violations. 
Most extradition cases are related to individuals coming from Uzbekistan, Tajik-
istan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan,7 who have temporarily moved to 
Russia to escape from religious or political persecution.8 In the majority of cases, the 
person had suffered intimidation by authorities at home for being too close too reli-
gious groups9 or for alleged membership in extremist movements and/or political 
opposition groups. Usually, they move to Russia when their countries issued arrest 
warrants and extradition requests. However, once they have become internationally 
wanted persons, on Russian soil, the national authorities can legally keep them in 
custody and extradite them to their homelands, where many face the risk of torture 
and other ill-treatment as part of vulnerable groups.  
Moreover, since 2010, alongside regular extradition measures, cases of illegal 
transfer, abduction, kidnapping and extraordinary rendition have been recorded.  
With the new constitutional order of 1993, Russia has begun a path of internal 
regulation of migration issues. Moreover, in 1992 the Russian Federation joined the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent New York 
 
7
 See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, Transnational Injustices: National Security Transfers 
and International Law, Geneva, 2017, available at: <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Eu-
rope-Transnational-Injustices-Publications-Reports-Thematic-reports-2017-ENG.pdf>; AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, “Fast-Track to Torture: Abductions and Forcible Returns from Russia to Uzbekistan”, 21 
April 2016, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/574d453f4.html>; ID., “Asylum-seeker returned 
from Russia to Uzbekistan in blatant violation of international law”, EUR 62/4488/2016 (19 July 2016), 
available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/57baf9be4.html>; HUG, Shelter from the Storm: the Asylum, 
Refuge and Extradition Situation Facing Activists from the Former Soviet Union in the Cis and Europe, 28 
April 2014, available at: <https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1630.pdf>. 
8 See YORMIRZOEV, “Migration, Remittances and Economic Growth: an Empirical Study in the Case 
of Former Soviet Republics”, in Вестник Пермского Университета Серия «экономика», Perm, 2016, 
pp. 86-94. 
9
 See European Court of Human Rights, Abdulkhakov v. Russia, Application No. 14743/11, Judgment 
of 2 October 2012; Id, Azimov v. Russia, Application No. 67474/11, Judgment of 18 April 2013; Id, Erma-
kov v. Russia, Application No. 43165/10, Judgment of 7 November 2013; Id, Gaforov v. Russia, Applica-
tion No. 25404/09, Judgment of 21 October 2010. 
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Protocol and become a member of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’) in 1998.  
Over the past years, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has dis-
cerned about the respect of refugees and asylum seekers rights in Russian Federation, 
often condemning the state for the violation of Art. 3 ECHR. In relation to the 
administrative expulsion, the Court has repeatedly asked to the state to amend its 
Administrative Procedural Code in order to include a suspensive automatic 
mechanisms for those who are in the proceeding of the asylum temporary status 
determination, as well as to review the Code of Administrative Offences and the 
Criminal Procedural Code in order to guarantee the certainty on the maximum period 
of detention pending the expulsion procedure.  
Furthermore, in recent years the Court has often condemned the RF for extradi-
tions and ‘undercover’ transfers of Uzbek, Tajik, Kazak and Kirgiz asylum seekers 
in disregard of the interim measures (Rule 39 of its Rules of the Court), recognising 
Russia’s failure to fulfil its positive obligations entailed a violation of Art. 3 ECHR. 
Between 2010 and 2015 such provisional measures have often been indicated by the 
Court, not only to protect applicants from extradition and deportation but also to 
place the state under a positive obligation to establish appropriate mechanisms to 
prevent kidnapping or ‘extraordinary renditions’.10 Given the high number of re-
peated cases, the Council of Europe (‘CoE’) gathered a set of cases together under 
the label Garabayev Group, all of which concern different extradition-related viola-
tions (Arts. 3, 5, 13 and 34 ECHR). Nowadays, this group includes more than 82 
cases brought in front at the ECtHR between 2007 and 2018, including several pend-
ing cases that will be decided shortly.11  
Given the scope of the topic, this research aims at providing an introduction to 
the situation of refugee and asylum seekers in Russia. Drawing on both qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies, it analyses the extent to which the Russian Refugee 
Law and the practice of domestic courts are consistent with the principle of non-
refoulement and Art. 3 ECHR. This chapter proceeds in three parts. Firstly, it pre-
sents the general legal background of international and regional refugee law, detail-
ing the legal frameworks which bind the Russian Federation. Secondly, it details the 
 
10
 European Court of Human Rights, Savraddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, Application No. 71386/10, Judg-
ment of 25 April 2013. 
11
 All the cases included in the Garabayev Group are available at: 
<https://rm.coe.int/090000168091ed13>. 
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Russian Refugee law and its shortcomings. The focus here is on the policies and 
practices related to administrative expulsion and extradition measures, shedding light 
on those cases of abduction and extraordinary rendition analysing the ECtHR juris-
prudence and the decisions of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE). It concludes 
with a discussion on the future development and the concrete actions that the RF has 
promised to implement in the next months.  
2. – The principle of non-refoulement: the International and Regional 
Framework 
The right to regulate migration and to return or transfer migrants to their origin 
countries or third territories is a core dimension of state sovereignty. However, this 
right is not absolute: states are bound by international and regional instruments that 
regulate refugees’ rights and guarantee that their return must be exercised within 
limits established by domestic and international law, especially by the so-called prin-
ciple of non-refoulement. 
At the international level, the legal framework is provided by the 1951 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees (the ‘1951 Refugee Convention’)12 and its 
subsequent 1967 New York Protocol.13 According to Art. 1(a) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, 
“refugee is anyone who is owing to a well-founded fear of persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him-
self of the protection of that country”. 
The 1951 Refugee Convention lists refugees’ substantive and procedural rights, 
as well as States’ legal obligations. Refugee status is entirely factual and does not 
depend on national legal recognition. Only in exceptional cases related to the com-
mission of non-political severe international or national crimes or the possession of 
specific protection, the refugee status will not apply (Art. 1(d)). 
 
12
 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Na-
tions, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137 ff. 
13
 UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, United Na-
tions, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267 ff. 
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The core of the 1951 Convention is the principle of non-refoulement (Art. 33), 
which prohibits the host State from any act to return, expel, extradite, deport or trans-
fer a person to another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
person would be in danger of being subjected to violations of his/her fundamental 
rights (i.e. right to life, right to freedom and security, torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment, etc.).  
This guarantee applies to refugees or asylum seekers, regardless of whether the 
host State has formally recognised their status. The only admissible exceptions are 
when a refugee constitutes a danger to the security of the country in which the person 
is, or if she or he has been convicted of a particularly serious crime (Art. 33(2)). 
At the regional level, the ECHR actually must be considered as the most effective 
instrument for the protection of asylum seekers rights in Europe and all Member 
States of the CoE. Even if the Convention contains no provisions explicitly dedicated 
to the rights of asylum seekers or migrants, most of the rights listed therein deal cover 
asylum issues. Moreover, since 1989 an extensive jurisprudence of the ECtHR has 
broadened the scope of Art. 3 ECHR in order to guarantee effective respect for ref-
ugees’ rights and the principle of non-refoulement.  
Art. 1 ECHR details the duty of Member States of the Council of Europe, includ-
ing the RF, to protect and secure everyone’s fundamental human rights within their 
jurisdictions – including foreigners, refugees, and asylum seekers. While the ECHR 
does not expressly include the principle of non-refoulement, the ECtHR has repeat-
edly recognised such a principle as inherent in the general terms to the right to life 
(Art. 2) – and especially to the prohibition of torture (Art. 3). Since the Soering case14 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Art. 3 has established that any form of removal (ex-
tradition, expulsion or deportation) to another State can give rise to an issue under 
Art. 3 ECHR if there are substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned 
if returned in his/her country of origin or a third state, faces a real risk of being sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.15 
 
14
 European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judg-
ment of July 1989. 
15
 European Court of Human Rights, Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 15576/89, 
A/201, Judgment of 20 March 1991; Id., Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, Application No. 13163/87, Judg-
ment of 30 October 1991. 
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Such a principle was consolidated in Chalal v. UK 16, which confirmed that the 
conduct of the applicant cannot be taken into material consideration in order to evalu-
ate the compliance of the extradition or expulsion order with the absolute prohibition 
of torture or degrading and inhuman treatment.17 The Court stated that even if the ap-
plicants had committed atrocities against other people, they cannot be deprived of the 
protection guaranteed by Art. 3 ECHR due to its absolute character and “the fact that 
it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies” (para. 98).  
In order to guarantee the overall protection of refugees’ rights, the Convention 
encompasses other provisions that are of great value in cases concerning expulsion 
and extradition. These include the right to life (Art. 2), the right to liberty and security 
(Art. 5), the right to a fair trial (Art. 2), the right to respect for private and family life 
(Art. 8), the right to an effective remedy (Art. 13), and individual applications ( Art. 
34). The Court has scope to assess these either in conjunction with Art. 3 ECHR or 
severally. Although an in-depth analysis of these provisions is beyond the compe-
tence of this chapter, in the next paragraphs, we will briefly discuss the content of 
these Articles – and the guarantees they provide – since almost all cases related to 
extradition and expulsion against Russia include a range of violations, especially of 
Arts 5 and 6 ECHR. 
The ECHR bestows not only substantive rights but also grants procedural safe-
guards, such as the right of an effective remedy (Art. 13). Concerning non-re-
foulement, a range of remedies can be accessed, including the right to challenge the 
return or transfer before a national court or an independent and impartial authority; 
the possibility to appeal a first-instance negative decision on one’s refugee status; 
and the obligation of the national authorities to provide independent and rigorous 
scrutiny of a complaint relating to Art. 3 EHCR and the automatic suspensive effect 
in respect of the impugned measure.  
Moreover, in order to protect the applicant’s life from imminent risk of torture, 
ill-treatment or danger to life, the Court – following a motion by the party concerned 
– can indicate to the state any interim measures which it considers in the interest of 
 
16
 European Court of Human Rights, Chahal v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judg-
ment of 15 November 1996. 
17
 The Court has followed the same approach in several similar cases related to Russia such as Shama-
yev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, Application No. 36378/02, Judgment of 12 October 2005; Klein v. 
Russia, Application No. 24268/08, Judgment of 1 April 2010; Khaydarov v. Russia, Application No. 
21055/09, Judgment of 20 May 2010 (not final); Khodzhayev v. Russia, Application No. 52466/08, Judg-
ment of 12 May 2010. 
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the applicant. The interim measure is an instrument through which the court seeks to 
preserve the status quo of the applicant while his or her case is pending. 
Over the years, this instrument has become an essential preventive tool, particu-
larly for cases of non-refoulement. Although the ECHR does not directly regulate 
the interim measures, such instruments are disciplined under Rule 39 of the Rules of 
Court. The non-compulsory nature of the decision taken by the court on the interim 
measures was sanctioned in the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey in 2005. 
In a fundamental passage, the Court has ensured that the provisional measures are 
mandatory, and  
“play a vital role in avoiding irreversible situations that would prevent the Court from 
properly examining the application and, where appropriate, securing to the applicant the 
practical and effective benefit of the Convention rights asserted. Accordingly, in these con-
ditions, a failure by a respondent State to comply with interim measures will undermine the 
effectiveness of the right of individual application guaranteed by Article 34 and the State’s 
formal undertaking in Article 1 to protect the rights and freedoms set forth in the Conven-
tion.”18  
The Court emphasised the essential role of the provisional measures as guarantees 
of the right of individual application (Art. 34) and as a fundamental tool to protect the 
applicant from irreparable harm following his/her extradition/expulsion to the home 
state, where the subject is at risk of torture, mistreatment or deprivation of life. 
After this decision, the number of requests for interim measures among the CoE 
Member States swelled.19 However, the Court maintained a restrictive approach, lim-
iting the share of provisional measures granted and reaffirming that the instrument 
 
18
 European Court of Human Rights, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Applications Nos. 46827/99 
and 46951/99, Judgment of 4 February 2005, para. 125. 
19
 The number of interim measures issued has dramatically increased from 2005 to 2014. In 2005 the 
decisions on interim measures were 459 (51 requests granted, and 408 requests refused). In 2010, the num-
ber of decisions rose to 3,680, recording an increase of 53% compared with the previous year. Among these 
requests 1,440 had been granted, 1,823 dismissed, and the remainder fell outside the scope of Rule 39 of 
the Rules of Court but required an urgent examination. In 2015 the overall number of decisions on interim 
measures decreased to 1,458 (161 granted, 630 dismissed, the remainder out of the scope) and more than 
39% of the requests granted were linked to the war in Ukraine. Over 2016-2018, on a total of 5,495 requests, 
only 389 interim measures were granted while 2,122 had been refused and 2,984 considered as outside the 
scope of the Convention. ECtHR database on Analysis Statistics of 2006, 2010, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 
available at: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports&c>.  
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is designated only for “truly exceptional cases”20 – i.e. when “the applicants face a 
genuine threat to life and limb, with the ensuing real risk of grave, irreversible harm 
in breach of the core provisions of the Convention.”21.  
2.1. - Extending the Boundaries of the Risk Assessment Test 
Over time, the ECtHR has not only evoked the principle of non-refoulement but 
also broadened its subjective scope. In recent cases, the Court has extended the cri-
teria for determining refugee status going beyond the criteria of the individual risk 
and taking in consideration the general risks caused by the presence of widespread 
violence, conflict as well as grave and systematic human rights violations in the 
origin country. This enlargement is also the result of numerous cases against Russia. 
In its leading cases – Sufi and Elmi v. UK (2010), and more recently in L.M. and 
others v. Russia22 and S.K. v. Russia23 – the Strasbourg Court stated that “exposing 
an individual to a situation of general violence of exceptional intensity may be suf-
ficient to conclude that the person will face ill-treatment simply on account of his or 
her presence in the area in question”.24 That is particularly relevant for places affected 
by generalised or indiscriminate violence, like a State involved in international or 
internal armed conflict or territories where “a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights” is observed. 
This legal stance was recalled in L.M. and Others v. Russia, handed down in 
October 2015 and concerning the removal of two Syrians and a stateless Palestinian 
to Syria. The Court was asked for the first time to evaluate the risk of danger to life 
or ill-treatment in the context of the ongoing conflict in Syria. The Court condemned 
Russia and cited the UNHCR report that recommends the host State not to carry out 
returns to Syria,25 as well as the UN documentation, which reports a “massive viola-
tion of human rights and humanitarian law by all parties” and describes the situation 
 
20
 European Court of Human Rights, Kasyamakhunov v. Russia, Application No. 296041/12, Judgment 
of 14 November 2013, para. 181. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 See, European Court of Human Rights, L.M. and Others v. Russia, Applications nos. 40081/14, 
40088/14 and 40127/14, Judgment of 15 October 2015 
23
 See, European Court of Human Rights, S.K. v. Russia, Application No. 52722/15, Judgment of 14 
February 2017. 
24
 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, “Asylum, CourtTalks/DisCours”, 2016, avail-
able at: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/COURTalks_Asyl_Talk_ENG.PDF>. 
25
 UNHCR, “Syrian Refugees in Europe: What Europe Can Do to Ensure Protection and Solidarity”, 
11 July 2014 , available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b69f574.html>. 
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as a “humanitarian crisis”. The Court consolidated and recalled its position in a fol-
low-up case, S.K. v. Russia, stating the prohibition against returning individuals to 
Syria because such an extreme case of widespread violence was recognised in the 
country and especially in Aleppo (para. 61 of the Judgment of 2017). 
While assessing violations of the Art. 3, the ECtHR also condemned the transfer 
of asylum seekers when doing so might risk a flagrant breach of the right to liberty 
and security (Art. 5) or the right to fair trial (Art. 6 ) of the Convention on the desti-
nation country. These provisions might come into play if the destination country al-
lows arbitrary detention of a suspect, incommunicado detention or unlawful convic-
tion rising from flagrantly unfair trials, as well as a trial in absentia without the pos-
sibility to obtain a retrial.  
Furthermore, in several cases, the Court has extended the risk test, recognising 
as an appropriate yardstick in assessing violations of Art. 3 whether applicants be-
long to certain vulnerable groups. On this point, the Court made clear that individuals 
- accused of involvement in the activities of Islamic organisations considered ex-
tremist and banned in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (in particular, suspected members 
of the international pan-Islamist political organization Hizb al-Tahir) or accused of 
possession and dissemination of literature of a religiously extremist nature - be-
longed to a group systematically exposed to the practice of ill-treatment in these 
countries.26 Indeed, the charges of religious (or political) extremism borrow its se-
 
26
 See among others, K.I. v. Russia, Application No. 58182/14, Judgment of 07 November 2017; Kha-
midkariyev v. Russia, Application No. 42332/14, Judgment of 26 January 2017; Mukhitdinov v. Russia, 
Application No. 20999/14, Judgment of 21 May 2015; Khalikov v. Russia, Application No. 66373.13, 
Judgment of 26 February 2015; Eshonkulov v. Russia, Application No. 68900/13, Judgment of 15 January 
2015; Mamazhonov v. Russia, Application No. 17239/13, Judgment of 23 October 2014; Rakhimov v. Rus-
sia, Application No. 50552/13, Judgment of 10 July 2014; Egamberdiyev v. Russia, Application No. 
34742/13, Judgment of 26 June 2014; Akram Karimov v. Russia, Application No. 62892/12, Judgment of 
28 May 2014; Nizamov and Others v. Russia, Applications No. 22636/13, 24034/13 and 24334/13, Judg-
ment of 07 May 2014; Ismailov v. Russia, Application No. 20110/13, Judgment of 17 April 2014; Azimov 
v. Russia, Application No. 67474/11, Judgment of 18 April 2013; Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, Appli-
cation No. 31890/11, Judgment of 03 October 2013; Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, Application No. 
71386/10, Judgment of 25 April 2013; Sidikovy v. Russia, Application No. 73455/11, Judgment of 20 June 
2013; Zokhidov v. Russia, Application No. 67286/10, Judgment of 05 February 2013; Ermakov v. Russia, 
Application No. 43165/10, Judgment of 07 November 2013; Kasymakhunov v. Russia, Application No. 
29604/12, Judgment of 14 November 2013; Rustamov v. Russia, Application No. 11209/10, Judgment of 
03 July 2012; Umirov v. Russia, Application No. 17455/11, Judgment of 18 September 2012; Abdulkhakov 
v. Russia, Application No. 14743/11, Judgment of 02 October 2012; Yakubov v. Russia, Application 
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mantics from the anti-terrorism law and have to be contextualized with the authori-
tarian nature of the Central Asian regimes. Any form of political opposition and ac-
tivism is often considered as terrorist attempts to overthrow the constitutional order. 
In this respect, since 2008 the Court has found violations of the principle of non-
refoulement in a high number of complaints concerning extraditions and expulsions 
to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan.27 
Hence, the Court described the practice of ill-treatment and torture on those ac-
cused of religious or political crimes in Uzbekistan as ‘systematic and indiscrimi-
nate’ and stated that there is no evidence demonstrating any fundamental improve-
ment in that area over the years.  
Recently in Allanzarova v. Russia, the Court further extended the risk test, consid-
ering detention per se to imply the possibility of risk of torture and ill-treatment in 
certain countries, such as Tajikistan. Indeed, such mistreatment has been documented 
by several NGOs and IGOs, which have denounced the harsh condition of detentions 
as well as the lack of access of independent inspectors to detention facilities. 
According to the Court in such cases, applicants do not have to show the exist-
ence of further special distinguishing features to find a violation of Art. 3 ECHR, 
whereby the burden shifted to the Russian authorities to “dispel any doubts”28 about 
 
No.7265/10, Judgment of 08 November 2011; Ergashev v. Russia, Application No. 12106/09, Judgment 
of 20 Dicember 2011; Gaforov v. Russia, Application No. 25404/09, Judgment of 21 October 2010, Is-
kandarov v. Russia, Application No. 17185/05, Judgment of 23 September 2010; Khaidarov v. Russia, 
Application No. 21055/09, Judgment of 20 May 2010; Khodjaev v. Russia, Application No. 52466/08, 
Judgment of 12 May 2010. 
27
 As examples for deportations to Uzbekistan see, among others, Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, Ap-
plication No. 2947/06, Judgment of 24 February 2008; Yakubov case, cit. supra note 24; Abdulkhakov case, 
cit. supra note 9; Ermakov case, cit. supra note 9; Mamazhonov case, cit. supra note 24; Nazarov v. Russia, 
Application No. 74759/13, Judgment of 11 Dicember 2014; Khalikov case, cit. supra note 24. For depor-
tations to Tajikistan see, among others, Gaforov case, cit. supra note 9; Azimov case, cit. supra note 9. 
Deportations to Turkmenistan: Garabayev v. Russia, Application No. 38411/02, Judgment of 07 July 2007; 
Ryabikin v. Russia, Application No. 8320/04, Judgment of 19 June 2008; Kolsnik v. Russia, Application 
No. 26876/08, Judgment of 10 June 2010. Deportation to Kyrgyzstan: Saliyev v. Russia, Application No. 
39093/13, Judgment of 17 April 2014; Kadirzhanov and Mamashev v. Russia, Applications No. 42351/13 
and 47823/13, Judgment of 17 July 2014; Mamadeliyev v. Russia, Application No. 5614/13, Judgment of 
24 July 2014; Khamrakulov v. Russia, Application No. 68894/13, Judgment of 16 April 2015; Abdullayev 
v. Russia, Application No. 8474/14, Judgment of 1 October 2015; Turgunov v. Russia, Application No. 
15590/14, Judgment of 22 October 2015; Tadzhibayev v. Russia, Application No. 17724/14, Judgment of 
01 December 2015; R. v. Russia, Application No. 11916/15, Judgment of 26 January 2016. 
28
 European Court of Human Rights, Muminov v. Russia, Application No. 42502/06, Judgment of 11 
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possible ill-treatment of the applicant, which they often were unable to do.29  
The ECtHR has dealt with numerous claims against the unlawful expulsion and 
extradition of asylum seekers and refugees from Russia during the last decade. Con-
cerning violations of the principle of non-refoulement, since 2007 Russia has re-
ceived the highest number of citations among Member states of the Council of Eu-
rope (46 times), mostly concerning extraditions.30 The Strasbourg Court has more 
than once used this opportunity to assess the Russian Refugee Law and its imple-
mentation, finding several critical weaknesses and shortcomings.  
3. – The Russian Law on Refugees 
In Russia, issues of migration are regulated by federal legislation.31 Major princi-
ples establishing political asylum, refugee and temporary asylum policies are defined 
respectively by the national Constitution, and by legislative acts regulating the reg-
istration and entry of foreign nationals and stateless persons into the country and 
granting them refugee status or providing temporary asylum.32 
In 1993, the RF ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 New York 
Protocol, agreeing to follow and implement international principles and standards 
that Russian authorities had not yet been familiar with. In the same year, the RF 
adopted three legislative acts to address the issue of migration: (1) Art. 63 of the 
Constitution33, which regulates political asylum; (2) the Law on Forced Migration,34 
which addresses citizens of the FSU who moved to Russia for economic reasons after 
the USSR collapsed and; (3) the Federal Law on Refugees,35 which deals with indi-
viduals from the ‘far abroad’ – i.e., anyone arriving from States other than the FSU. 
 
29
 DE WECK, Non-refoulement Under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Un Conven-
tion against Torture: The Assessment of Individual Complaints by the European Court of Human Rights 
Under Article 3 ECHR and the United Nations Committee against Torture Under Article 3 Cat, Leiden, 
2017. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Library of Congress, “Refugee Law and Policy: Russian Federation”, 21 June 2016 , available at: 
<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/russianfederation.php>. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 The Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted on the 12 December 1993 and entered into 
force on the 25 December 1993. It is available at: <https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_docu-
ments/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/571508>. 
34
 Law of 1995 on Forced Migrants, 28 December 1995, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/3ae6b4fe8.html>. 
35
 Federal Law No. N 4528-1 of 1993 on Refugees, 19 February 1993, available at: <https://www.ref-
world.org/docid/527246344.html>. 
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The Federal Law on Refugees, as amended in 1997, represents the critical legis-
lation for the regulation of the substantive and procedural rights of refugees and tem-
porary asylum seekers. It also disciplines the process for determining the status of 
refugees. The law establishes two types of protection: refugee status and temporary 
asylum. The first corresponds to the form of international protection provided by the 
1951 Refugee Convention and seeks to safeguard anyone: 
“not a citizen of the Russian Federation who, because of a well-founded fear of becoming 
a victim of persecution by reason of race, religion, citizenship, national or social identity or 
political convention is to be found outside the country of his nationality and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of this country due to such a fear, or having lost 
his or her nationality and staying beyond the country of his or her former place of residence 
as a result of similar developments, cannot return to it and does not wish to do so because of 
such fear.”36  
Refugee status is granted for up to three years and is renewable. The administra-
tive procedure for assessing and granting status is defined inside the text of the law. 
Art. 12 of the Law on Refugees recognises a form of subsidiary protection, called 
temporary asylum for those who “do not have grounds to be recognised as refugees, 
but for humanitarian reasons cannot be expelled/deported outside the territory of the 
Russian Federation”. Temporary asylum is granted up to one year but can be subse-
quently extended yearly if the circumstances that serve as grounds for temporary 
asylum continue. 
The procedure for granting temporary asylum is regulated by Law No. 274 “On 
the Granting of Temporary Asylum in the Territory of the Russian Federation” of 9 
April 2001.37 In reality the legislation limits the humanitarian reasons to cases where 
the asylum seeker is severely ill or incapacitated, and largely ignores external cir-
cumstances, such as a state of civil war, post-war devastation, or a brutal regime, 
linked with torture and summary executions, on the territory of the State from which 
the applicant has arrived.38 
 
36
 Art. 1 of the Federal Law on Refugess 
37
 Resolution No. 274 of 2001 “On the Granting of Temporary Asylum in the Territory of the Russian 
Federation”, 9 April 2001, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ed7378b4.html>. 
38
 IONTSEV and IVAKHNYUK, “Migrant Integration Models in Modern Russia”, CARIM-East Research 
Report, 13.2013. 
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Although definition of refugee enshrined in the Federal Law on Refugee is almost 
identical to that of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has several deficiencies concern-
ing its substance and, in its enforcement, which contradict Russia’s international ob-
ligations. In the first place, the act disregards the principle of non-refoulement and 
protection against forced return to a country where a person fears persecution, dep-
rivation of life, torture or inhuman and degrading treatments.39 Indeed, although the 
law expressly provides a prohibition against refoulement for refugee and for those 
who apply for refugee status (Art. 10), it does not provide the same guarantee for 
those who are applying for temporary asylum (who make up the majority of appli-
cants). Indeed, the above-mentioned law in Art. 12 guarantees that only a “person 
who has been granted temporary asylum cannot be returned against his or her will to 
the country of his or her nationality (his former home).”  
This shortcoming is exacerbated by the provisions of Art. 5 which list several 
grounds on which administrative officers may elect not to assess a person’s applica-
tion on its merit. The Art. 5(1) allows an applicant’s status to be refused if there are 
criminal proceedings against him or her for any crime committed on Russian soil, 
including administrative offences i.e., the lack of registration or the lack of working 
permit. In Paragraph 6 is provided that an applicant’s status must be refused if the 
individual is found to have departed illegally from his or her country of origin. Fur-
thermore, in Paragraph 5 established that an applicant’s status must be refused if the 
individual arrived from a so-called ‘safe country’. These paragraphs indirectly hinder 
the correct application of principle of non-refoulement. These restrictions especially 
impact non-Ukrainian applicants 
In addition to these normative shortcomings, in practice, the law is often incor-
rectly enforced by the officials of the Federal Migration Service (nowadays by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs’ officials).40 The access to the procedure is often made 
harder by administrative constraints and obstacles (i.e. long waiting periods for the 
application to be processed, long queues, corruption, threats from administrators, 
language difficulties, insufficient information), which lead to the potential for chaos 
 
39
 LÉTOURNEAU-TREMBLAY, “Expulsion of Refugees from Russia to Syria Would Violate International 
Obligations”, PlurisCourt Blog, 8 January 2016, available at: <http:www.reflaw.org.expulsion-of-refu-
gees-from-russia-to-syria-would-violate-international-obligations>. 
40
 On 5 of April 2016, the Federal Migration Service was disbanded, and its duties and tasks passed in 
the hand of the Main Directorate for Migration Affairs of the Russian Federation which is part of the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs, 
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and misunderstanding for asylum seekers.41 Frequently, persons who have applied to 
be registered as refugees/temporary asylum have to wait for several months before 
their applications are considered. These persons, living without documents that 
demonstrate their right to remain in Russia or with an expired visa, are often stopped 
by the police on the streets, taken in custody and not infrequently end up being ar-
rested for administrative offences, such as lacking registration documents or a work 
permit and then expelled.  
4. – Expulsion and Extradition in Russia 
After the dissolution of USSR, a massive number of people from the former So-
viet Republics or the satellite countries moved to in Russia, in order to return to their 
motherland, to search for better economic conditions, or to flee from new political 
regimes or conflict. Since 1998 (first available data) the number of refugees in Russia 
has rapidly declined – from 235,065 to 598 at the beginning of 2018.42 This decrease 
was allowed thanks to the creation of the temporary asylum status, but also to the 
limitative migration policies adopted by the state.  
However, in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, the number of applications for 
refugee and mainly temporary asylum status grew dramatically.43 From 2012-2014, 
the 98% of those with temporary asylum in Russia is Ukrainian (123,400 people at 
the beginning of 2018).  
Despite this, the refugee’s crisis in Russia is also tied to the presence of asylum 
seekers from conflict areas such as Syria (1,302 people at the beginning of 2017), 
Afghanistan (400 people), or Central Asian countries where fundamental human 
rights are grossly and constantly violated like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Kazakhstan.44  
While from one side, the Russian government provides simplified measures 
aimed at quickly regularizing the status of the Ukrainian citizens and guarantee their 
 
41
 BURTINA, KOROSTELEVA and SIMONOV, Russia as a Country of Asylum, 2015, p. 312 ff., available 
at: <https:refugee.ru.wp-content.uploads.2016.06.doklad_ENG.pdf>. 
42
 ЩЕРБАКОВАМиграция в России, предварительные итоги 2017 года, Демоскоп Weekly, No. 
763-764, 2018, available at: <http:www.demoscope.ru.weekly.2018.0763.barometer763.pdf>. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
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integration into local communities,45 other vulnerable groups such as Syrians or Uz-
bekistanis have faced several obstacles that have hampered their access to the asylum 
procedure and public services and made it challenging to regularize their status.46 
These nationalities often experience administrative obstacles, including initiation of 
expulsion procedures instead of registering asylum claims, long waiting periods and 
refusal to issue identity cards and documents confirming their legal stay in Russia.47 
Among these asylum seekers, denial of international or subsidiary protection is wide-
spread, as are cases of expulsion and extradition. For this reason, I will focus on these 
groups, leaving the analysis of Ukrainian refugees to a separate study. 
As regards expulsion, administrative offences, especially offences against the 
Code of Administrative Offences (‘CAO’),48 are the most common immigration law 
cases in Russia. Such offences generally consist in failing to secure a valid residence 
registration, the Soviet propiska, (Art. 18.8 CAO), working without a valid work 
permit (Art. 18.10 CAO) or violating an immigration rule (Art. 18.11 CAO).  
According to these provisions, once a migrant is found without the required doc-
uments (registration, visa, identity document or working permit) the Court can con-
sider them liable for breaching migration regulations and sanction them – a mone-
tary penalty and expulsion to his or her country of origin can be imposed. While 
administrative deportations were a discretionary measure for all regional courts until 
2013, following amendment No. 207-FZ of 23.07.2013 in Moscow, Moscow Oblast, 
St Petersburg, and Leningrad Oblast, expulsion now follow automatically, and the 
removal order is included in the ‘minimum’ sentence.49 
As a result of this new amendment, the number of administrative immigration 
cases has increased enormously, doubling the immigration proceedings in front of 
 
45
 Regulation No. 690 of July 22, 2014, on the “Granting of Temporary Asylum for Citizens of Ukraine 
in the Territory of the Russian Federation through Simplified Procedure”, available at: < http://govern-
ment.ru/media/files/41d4f3a5c06af7f5f50e.pdf>.  
46See BURTINA, KOROSTELEVA and SIMONOV, cit. supra note 39; MATUSEVICH, Russia’s Catch – 22 
Asylum System, 29 January 2018, available at: <https:www.newsdeeply.com.refugees.commu-
nity.2018.01.29.russias-catch-22-asylum-system>. 
47
 UNHCR, 2017 Year-End report, 25 July 2018, available at: < https: http:reporting.un-
hcr.org.node.2551>, 
48
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation, No. 195-fz, 30 december 2001, availa-
ble at: <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/rus_e/WTACCRUS48A5_LEG_27.pdf>. 
49
 KUBAL, “In Search of Justice”, in KURKCHIYA and KUBAL (eds.), cit. supra note 6, pp. 92-117, p. 
97. 
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the courts and pressuring judges to resolve these cases quickly and unequivocally.50 
Thus, in the majority of cases, judges are compelled to adopt a case file logic in 
taking decisions.51 Such a logic, regrettably, precludes adopting a holistic view of an 
individual case and instead it is entirely based on case file information which often 
resulted from an inaccurate or in bad faith investigation. The evidence contained in 
the case file – protocols from immigration and workplace raids, reports by immigra-
tion law enforcement agencies, affidavits signed by migrant defendants – is privi-
leged at the cost of human interaction in the courtroom or examining the witnesses. 
Such maniacal attention to literal formalism allowing judges to save time, however, 
hinders an in-depth analysis of how the evidence has been acquired.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that migrants are often arrested during proceed-
ings in applying for the refugee or temporary asylum status. According to Kubal, 
“[c]ase file logic is particularly challenging to understand and reconcile with the princi-
ples of proportionality, justice, and equity if one approaches immigration law cases from a 
human rights’ perspective. The arguably harsh penalty – deportation – mean[s] disrupted 
livelihoods, severed family ties and, on many occasions, a contribution to a growing undoc-
umented migrant population in Moscow”.52  
In only a few cases judges apply humanitarian logic, thereby not strictly follow-
ing the case file, but focusing more on the attenuating circumstances derived from 
international human rights obligations. A humanitarian logic has been primarily ex-
tended to asylum-seekers in Russia who cannot be returned to their home countries. 
As we have seen above, the long delay in the proceeding for obtaining refugee or 
asylum status implies that migrants often remain without valid documents for a long 
time. This has deleterious consequences, not only hindering the individual’s social 
integration but also limited his or her access to the formal labour market, therefore 
his or her economic rights.53 These limits mean asylum seeker – who most support 
 
50
 According to KUBAL, cit. supra note 47 “The record year thus far was 2014, with 255,235 Art. 18 
CAO cases. This translates into over 250,000 foreigners brought to trial, with potential expulsion orders 
issued against their names.”  
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 During the proceedings for the determination of status (either waiting for a decision or appealing a 
refusal of refugee status) many asylum-seekers work. Until recently, this practice was not regulated by the 
Russian authority and usually such behavior was not sanctioned. However, following legislative change 
No. 127-FZ of 5 May 2014, the access to the labor market has been explicitly forbidden in this Federal 
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themselves somehow – are often brought in front of the courts for working without 
a valid work permit. 
At the procedural level a judgment on the merits in respect of an administrative-
offence charge is enforceable after it has acquired legal force (Art. 31.2 CAO). More-
over, the Code provides that first-instance and appeal judgments which have become 
final can be challenged by way of review (Art. 30.12 CAO). However, a judge shall 
suspend the judgment enforcement if the prosecutor or another public official has 
lodged a request for review of judgment ex Art. 30.12 CAO, or in other situations 
prescribed by the CAO (Art. 31.6 CAO). No suspension is possible if a defendant is 
seeking the review.54 
The Article on Administrative Deportation from the Russian Federation of a For-
eign Citizen or of a Stateless Person (Art. 3.10 CAO) provides that a judge is em-
powered to require detention of a foreigner in a special detention facility to enforce 
the penalty of forcible removal. 
As regards extradition, at the regional level the RF is a party to several extradition 
agreements aimed at fostering inter-state cooperation in criminal justice. At the Eu-
ropean level, the RF is part of the European Convention on Extradition55 adopted 
within the framework of the Council of Europe. There have also been many extradi-
tion agreements signed between the RF and the Central Asian countries. The main 
regional extradition treaty among CIS countries remains the CIS Convention on Le-
gal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters 1993, as 
 
Law ‘On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation.’ As a result, asylum seekers that 
work without a permit or patent was charged ex Art.18.10 CAO.  
54
 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 5 “On Certain Issues Arising in Courts in 
Applying the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses”, 24 March 2005, para 37, avail-
able at <http://base.garant.ru/12139487/#ixzz68rWnbpYQ>. 
55
 Federal law № 190-FZ ‘About European Extradition Convention Ratification, October 25, 1999, 
available at: <http:pravo.gov.ru.proxy.ips.%3Fdoc_itself%3D%26%26nd%3D102062477%26-
%26page%3D1%26rdk%3D0#I0>; and Federal Law ‘About Ratification of the European Convention on 
Extradition, Additional Protocol and the Second Additional Protocol’, 1 October 1999, available at: 
<https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/russia/2942006/on-the-ratification-of-the-european-con-
vention-on-extradition%252c-additional-protocol-and-second-additional-protocol-thereto.html>; Su-
preme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 11 “On the practice of the courts to consider issues 
related to the extradition of persons for criminal prosecution or execution of sentences, as well as the trans-
fer of persons to serve sentences", 14 June 2012, available at: <http://base.gar-
ant.ru/70190924/#ixzz68rY4xjPs>. 
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amended by the Protocol to that Convention of 28 March 1997 (the Minsk Conven-
tion). The Minsk Convention does not include specific safeguards to forbid re-
foulement of individuals at risk of torture or ill-treatment, or the imposition of the 
death penalty once returned in their country of origin.56 The RF is also member of 
the CIS Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and 
Criminal Matters 2002 (the ‘Chisinau Convention’) which provides a more extensive 
list of grounds for a refusal to extradite a person, among which are fear of persecution 
on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, political opinion, nationality, and gender.  
At the national level, the rules governing extradition are highly fragmented. They 
are contained in different legal instruments: the Russian Constitution, the Criminal 
Code of Russia,57 the Russian Criminal Procedure Code (‘CCPr’), several interna-
tional bilateral agreements, as well as international and regional conventions, and 
federal laws that implement the treaties. The multiplicity of the sources makes it 
highly demanding to see the whole picture and apply the law in controversial and 
ordinary cases.58 This problem of fragmentation is exacerbated by the fact that the 
Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulates the case of “Refusal in the 
Extradition of a Person”, does not expressly provide for the prohibition of extradition 
due to the risk of torture or other cruel treatment (Art. 464).  
However, as was underlined in June 2012 by the Plenum of the Supreme Court – 
which provides the guidelines for domestic courts when dealing with extradition 
cases – the grounds to deny extradition requests are provided for not only in the CCPr 
but also in other pieces of legislation and international agreements. Indeed, the Ple-
num reaffirmed that the domestic courts must comply with the provisions of the In-
ternational Covenant of Political and Civil Rights, the UN Convention Against Tor-
ture and the ECHR preventing extradition if there is a risk of torture. Furthermore, it 
established that the courts in assessing the alleged risk of the applicant in the country 
of origin are to take into account relevant information from different sources, such 
as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international bodies (it is worth remarking that 
 
56
 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, cit. supra note 7, p. 32. 
57
 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, No. 63- FZ, 13 June 1996, available at: <https://www.leg-
islationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/7/Russian%20Federation/show>; Criminal 
Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, December 18, 2001, available at: <http: 
www.wipo.int.edocs.lexdocs.laws.en.ru.ru065en.pdf>. 
58
 SHAIBAKOVA and TALAN, “The Extradition Legislation in the Russian Federation and Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis”, Helix, vol. 8(1), pp. 2227 ff., p 2227, available at: <http: helix.dnares.in.wp-con-
tent.uploads.2017.12.2227-2230.864.pdf>. 
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NGOs are not mentioned). These principles have also been reaffirmed in 2013 by the 
Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 21.59 
5. – Strasbourg Criticism to the Russian Federal Law on Refugees and 
its Implementation 
At domestic level, compliance with the provisions enshrined in the ECHR is en-
sured by Articles 15 (4) and 17 of the Russian Constitution, as well as by the Russian 
Constitutional Court in 2007 60 and by the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court in 200361 
and 2013.62 The requirement for Russia to respect ECHR provisions was not chal-
lenged by a recent Constitution Court ruling on 14 July 2015, even though it issued 
an ambiguous decision regarding the compulsory execution of ECtHR judgments 
and the legal supremacy of domestic law.63  
Despite this, the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly ruled against Russia for the vi-
olation of refugees and asylum seekers’ rights. The Court, since 2008, has issued 
more than 100 judgments about asylum seekers whom the Russian Federation in-
tended to deport from the country. Most decisions relating to the administrative ex-
pulsions or extraditions of individuals belonging to vulnerable groups such as mem-
ber of banned Islamic groups or political opposition in Central Asia, as well as per-
sons coming from conflict countries and states where there are systematic, serious 
and widespread violations of human rights. In almost all of these judgments, the 
 
59
 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 21, “Application of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and its Protocols”, 27 June 
2013, available at: < http://base.garant.ru/70404388/>. Contra, Constitutional Court of the Russian Federa-
tion, No. 21-П, Judgment of 14 July 2015; Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, No. 12-П.2016, 
Judgment of 19 April 2016 (Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia); as well as Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation, No. 1-П.2017, Judgment of 19 January 2017 (OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia)  
60
 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 2-П.2007, Judgment of 5 February 2007. 
61
 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 5 “On the application by courts of general 
jurisdiction of universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties 
of the Russian Federation”, 10 October 2003, available at: <http://base.gar-
ant.ru/12132854/#ixzz68raV17AT>. 
62
 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No.21 “On the application by the courts of 
legislation governing the grounds and procedure for exemption from criminal liability”, 27 June 2013, 
available at: <http://base.garant.ru/70404388/#ixzz68rbQJRlq>.  
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92; KOVLER, “European Convention on Human Rights in Russia”, L’Europe en Formation, vol. 374, 2014, 
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Court found violations of Arts 2, 3, 5, 8 or 13 of the Convention. The threats of 
probable ill-treatment towards the applicants arise in connection with administrative 
expulsion procedure64 or with extradition procedure.65  
In almost every case, the Court found that the arguments of one or another appli-
cant were not properly examined by the domestic authorities, which resulted in a 
violation of positive obligations under Art. 3 of the Convention or a violation of Art. 
13 of the Convention. In numerous cases, the Court found that Art. 3 had effectively 
been breached as the applicants had been removed and transferred from Russian ter-
ritory despite the risks of ill-treatment in breach of the interim measures hindering 
the applicants’ right of individual petition (Art. 34). These cases will be discussed in 
detail in the following paragraph.  
Furthermore, at the procedural level, the Court has often highlighted the ineffec-
tiveness of the remedies offered by the Russian authorities in conjunction with Art. 
3 – in particular, for the absence of an automatic suspensive effect66 and independent 
and rigorous scrutiny.67 Recently, in I.U. v. Russia,68 the Strasbourg judges con-
demned the Russian authorities for “simplistic rejection – without reference to 
evidentiary material – of the applicant’s claims as hypothetical and lacking specific 
indications as to the level of risk, together with the comment that the situation in a 
requesting state might change over time”.69 Indeed, according to the interest 
 
64
 The CoE Commette of Minister has grouped all these cases in the so-called Kim group. The list is 
available at: <https://rm.coe.int/090000168089e16d> 
65
 Supra note 11. 
66
 See, European Court of Human Rights, S.K. v. Russia, Application No. 52722/15, Judgment of 14 
February 2017. Currently, there are two communicated cases on deportation pending in front of the Court. 
S.S. v. Russia, Application No. 2236/16 and O.O v. Russia, Application No. 36321/16. These cases are 
aimed at assessing the compliance of the amended Code of Administrative Procedure in force since 2015 
under Art. 3 of the ECHR. In particular the court will evaluate if the recent reform in the procedure and 
time limits for challenging a deportation order provides an effective domestic remedy as well as whether 
lodging an appeal against a deportation order might have automatic suspensive effect, so that the applicant 
may obtain an ‘independent and rigorous scrutiny’ of his complaint of a risk of ill-treatment in the event 
of the return.  
67
 European Court of Human Rights, Allanazarova v. Russia, Application No. 46721/15, Judgment of 
14 February 2017. 
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 European Court of Human Rights, I.U. v. Russia. Application No. 48917/15, Judgment of 10 January 
2017. 
69
 See European Court of Human Rights, I.U. case, cit. supra note 68, para. 31. Also, TRENINA and 
ZHARINOV, “From Russia to torture: Lack of or deficient remedies against prohibited treatment in extradi-
tion and other types of removal proceedings”, The Foreign Policy Center, 4 December 2017, available at: 
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protected by Art. 3 ECHR, “the effectiveness of the remedy for Article 13 requires 
imperatively that the complaint is subject to scrutiny by a national authority”.70  
In order to provide an adequate solution to the automatic suspension the RF in 
the recent Action Plan 2019 stated:  
“This in particular, the issue is addressed of the need to enshrine provisions in the legis-
lation providing for the automatic suspension of the enforcement of judgments on extradi-
tion, deportation or administrative expulsion of a person who applied for temporary asylum 
or refugee status until a judgment on such an application is delivered, and if such a judgment 
is appealed against – until a final judgment on the relevant appeal is delivered. Within the 
frames of addressing this issue, the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation is con-
sidering the possibility of including the relevant standards in the draft Federal Law “On 
Granting Asylum in the Russian Federation.” The drafting of this law is laid down in the 
draft plan of measures (from now on – the “draft plan”) for implementation of the Concept 
of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for 2019-2025 (approved by Decree 
of the President of Russia no. 622 of 31 October 2018). According to the draft plan, the 
deadline for preparing the draft Federal Law “On Granting Asylum in the Russian Federa-
tion” is the first half of 2020.”71 
Moreover, the European Court has faced off several cases concerning the violation 
of the right to liberty and security of asylum seekers temporary detained in expulsion 
center, the court has repeatedly found the violation of Art. 5(1) ECHR often related to 
a range of factors such as the absence of clear legal provisions establishing the proce-
dure for ordering and extending detention with a view to extradition and time-limits 
for such detention; detention beyond the time-limits allowed by domestic law; poor 
 
<https://fpc.org.uk/russia-torture-lack-deficient-remedies-prohibited-treatment-extradition-types-re-
moval-proceedings/>. 
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were to be extradited to the requesting countries and of a violation of Art. 13 as the domestic courts failed 
to scrutinize the applicants’ rigorously”, in Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (DH), 1280th Meet-
ing, 7-10 March 2017 (DH), CM/Notes/1280/H46-23, 10 March 2017, available at: < https://rm.coe.int/na-
tive/09000016806e43fb>. 
71
 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (DH), 1340th meeting, CM/Notes/1340/H46-18rev, 14 
March 2019, available at: <https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid= 
09000016809332f1>; Russian Federation, Action Plan - Communication from the Russian Federation con-
cerning the case Garabayev case, DH-DD(2019)166 (12 February 2019), available at: 
<https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=090000168092dd4a> 
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detention conditions; as well as unreported and arbitrary arrest. In Sultanov v. Russia,72 
the Court stated “the provisions of Russian law governing detention of persons with a 
view to extradition were neither precise nor foreseeable in their application and fell 
short of the “quality of law” standard required under the Convention”.  
Just as numerous are cases related to violations of Art. 5(4) ECHR concerning 
the right to judicial supervision (remedy) during a person’s detention to allow that 
person to obtain speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention. The 
1280th Human Rights meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies of the CoE emphasized: 
“failure by the courts to address the applicants’ arguments concerning the lawfulness 
of detention when examining their appeals; and lengthy consideration of such ap-
peals when a review did take place (usually upon a prosecutor’s request to extend 
the detention)”.73 Concerning the right to fair trial in a leading case, Ismoilov and 
Others v. Russia, the Court admonished the failure of Russian authorities to respect 
the presumption of innocence in their decision to extradite the applicants – 12 Uz-
bekistani and 1 Tajikistani – to their homelands. In this case, the applicants were 
subject to an extradition request for having financed and taken part in a bloody pro-
test in Andijan. The Russian prosecutor ordered the extradition of the applicants after 
noting that they had committed acts of terrorism and having received diplomatic as-
surances that the applicants, once returned to Uzbekistan, would not be tortured, mis-
treated or deprived of life. 
Despite all these pitfalls, it is worth noting that over the years the RF has made 
several efforts to address the problems indicated by the Court, by amending internal 
law and improving the practice of the domestic courts and migration services.74 
 
72
 European Court of Human Rights, Sultanov v. Russia, Application No. 15303/09, Judgment of 4 
November 2010. 
73
 See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (DH), 1280th Meeting, cit. supra note 70.  
74
 Over the years, the RF has adopted several reforms in order to adequately and solve the issue related 
to the violation of Art. 5 ECHR: briefly, Constitutional Court’s decisions of 2006 and 2007 that declared 
the incompatibility of Art. 466(1) of the CCrP with Art. 22 Russian Constitution and Art. 14(3) ICCPR, 
concerning the excessive or arbitrary detention, unlimited in time and without appropriate review in all 
cases, including extradition proceedings; the Supreme Court’s Plenum Ruling No. 22 of 2009, clarifying 
the application of the custodial measure of restraint to persons apprehended with a view to extradition; and 
the Supreme Court’s Plenum Ruling no. 41 of 2013, clarifying in general the application of the custodial 
measure of restraint, the Supreme Court’s Plenum Ruling No. 11 of 2012 which, considerably reaffirmed 
the mandatory value of the obligations deriving from the ECHR in the Russian legal order and removed 
any uncertainty in the legal framework. Unfortunately, the guidelines embodied in this decision often crash 
with the daily practice of the FMS/Internal Minister officers’ activities and are not followed by the district 
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6. – Bypassing the Interim Measures: Abductions and Irregular Trans-
fers in Russia 
The high number of claims filed against Russia for the violation of Art. 3 ECHR 
as a consequence of possible administrative expulsion and extradition has implied a 
corresponding increase in the request for interim measures.75 Between 2012 and 
2018, Russia – together with the United Kingdom and Turkey – were the primary 
state against which the Court requested interim measures about cases of expulsion 
and extradition.76 However, despite the obligatory nature of interim measures, on 
several occasions Russia has directly or indirectly violated these provisions, espe-
cially in extradition cases.77 Since 2007, the court has condemned Russia in 82 cases 
concerning asylum seekers extradition or expulsion to States where they would face 
a real risk of torture and ill-treatment in violation of Art. 3 ECHR, and in breach of 
an interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of its Rules of Procedure, 
prohibiting the removal of the applicant. These cases have been grouped by the CoE 
 
and regional courts. In addition, on 29 December 2016, draft amendments to the part of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure concerning extradition procedure were submitted by the government for consideration to 
the Duma. The amendments provide, inter alia, that a person subject to an extradition request is entitled to 
the same procedural rights as other suspects and accused in relation to all proceedings concerning the 
measure of restraint. Unfortunately, the amendment is still pending in front of the Duma. See European 
Court of Human Rights, Oshlakov v. Russia, Application No. 56662/09, Judgment of 3 July 2014. 
75
 The general restrictive approach seen in paragraph 2, mismatches with the statistics relative to Rus-
sia. Indeed, the Court has plentifully granted interim measures against Russian in expulsion and extradition 
cases. Indeed, the percentage of the requests accepted has increasingly grown over the past years. 
76
 During 2008 and 2009 the Court granted 7 and 9 interim measures while refused 31 and 30 requests 
per year. An increasing number of requests have been processed and obtain a positive result in the following 
years: in 2010, 17 requests have been granted and 46 refused, in 2011, 18 requests have been accepted and 
48 refused, while in 2012 only 5 requests have been granted and 50 have been rejected. In the following 
years the gulf between requests granted and refused highly diminished: in 2013, 21 accepted and 37 re-
fused, in 2014, 27 accepted and 45 refused, in 2015, 28 granted and 47 refused, in 2016, 42 granted and 28 
refused and finally in 2017, 31 granted and 67 refused. In 2018, of 237 requests for interim measures 
submitted against Russia, only 48 were accepted, and all correspond to cases related to expulsion and ex-
tradition in violation of Art. 3 ECHR. The information has been given by the Publication Service of the 
ECHR and are in the availability of the authors if requested. 
77
 The Court found the violation of Art. 34 ECHR for the non-observance of interim measures in the 
following cases: Shamayev and Others case, cit. supra note 17; Kamaliyevy v. Russia, Application No. 
52812/07, Judgment of 03 June 2010; Abdulkhakov case, cit. supra note 9; Zokhidov case, cit. supra note 
24; Ermakov case, cit. supra note 9; Kasymakhunov case, cit. supra note 24; Mamazhonov case, cit. supra 
note 24; Mukhitdinov case, cit. supra note 24. 
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Committee of Minister creating the so-called Garabayev Group.78 Among these 
cases several incidents of disappearance/abduction and illegal transfer of applicants 
has worried the Court. Indeed, in the face of the possible ECtHR condemnation, 
Russia has often reacted by laying down various escamotage: such as turn a “blind 
eye” on illegal transfer, abduction, kidnapping and extraordinary rendition. Espe-
cially in recent years, alongside the extradition process and administrative expulsion, 
there have been numerous cases involving the disappearance of applicants from Rus-
sian territory.  
Starting with Iskandarov v. Russia, 17 cases of abductions, kidnapping and ex-
traordinary renditions of vulnerable individuals have followed.79 Most of these cases 
concern individuals coming from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. All of 
them were persecuted in their countries for membership in an illegal religious organ-
isation or were charged with alleged terrorist activities or crimes that could be qual-
ified as against national security. Often, those individuals have been previously ar-
rested in Russia with a view of extradition and then released. Once, out from the 
Russian control, individuals have disappeared and have usually reappeared in the 
hand of the governmental authority of the origin country. Time and again, these in-
cidents involved individuals that had already been granted the protection of the 
Court’s interim measures.  
Different resolutions and decisions issued by the CoE Committee of Ministers 
have shed light on this particular problem. The 1280th Human Rights meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies of the CoE noted:  
“In six of these cases (Iskandarov, Abdulkhakov, Savriddin Dzhurayev, Nizomkhon 
Dzhurayev, Ermakov, Kasymakhunov), the Court found that the applicants could not have 
been abducted, disappeared or forcibly transferred from Russian territory without the 
knowledge and passive or active involvement of the Russian authorities. Furthermore, in four 
cases (Savriddin Dzhurayev, Ermakov, Kasymakhunov, and Mamazhonov) the Court found 
that the authorities had breached article 3 by failing to protect the applicants from exposure 
 
78
 See supra note 11. 
79
 Kamaliyevy case, cit. supra note 77; Muminov case, cit. supra note 26; Isakov Abdulazhon v. Russia, 
Application No. 14049/08, Judgment of 08 July 2010; Iskandarov case, cit. supra note 24; Yakubov case, 
cit. supra note 24; Abdulkhakov case, cit. supra note 9; Zokhidov case, cit. supra note 24; Azimov case, cit. 
supra note 9; Savriddin Dzhurayev case, cit. supra note 24; Nizomkhon Dzhurayev case, cit. supra note 24; 
Ermakov case, cit. supra note 9; Kasymakhunov case, cit. supra note 24; Latipov v. Russia, Application No. 
77658/11, Judgment of 12 December 2013; Mamazhonov case, cit. supra note 24; Mukhitdinov case, cit. 
supra note 24; O.O. v. Russia, Application No. 36321/16, Judgment 21 August 2019. 
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to the risk of torture and ill-treatment and also by omitting to hold an effective investigation 
into the disappearance/abduction incidents. 
Further, in seven of these cases (Abdulkhakov, Savriddin Dzhurayev, Zokhidov, Nizom-
khon Dzhurayev, Ermakov, Kasymakhunov, Mamazhonov), the Court considered that, by 
failing to comply with the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 which prohibited the 
applicants’ removal from Russian territory, the authorities had hindered the applicants’ right 
of individual petition in violation of article 34.”80 
However, this note is not exhaustive: other cases have been brought in front of 
the Court claiming that abductions, disappearances and forcible transfers have oc-
curred.81  
In all these cases, even if the Russian Federation did not take an active part in the 
illegal transfer, the Court found that RF authorities have violated Art. 3 ECHR by 
failing to protect the applicants from exposure to the risk of torture and ill-treatment 
and also by omitting to hold an effective investigation concerning those cases of 
alleged disappearance and abduction – notably in breach of the interim measures 
indicated by the Court. In Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, the Court emphasised: 
“that any laxity on the binding legal effects of interim measures would be incon-
sistent with the fundamental importance of the right to individual petition and more, 
 
80
 See supra note 70. 
81
 See European Court of Human Rights, Azimov case, cit. supra note 9; Isakov Abdulazhon case, cit. 
supra note 79; Yakubov case, cit. supra note 24. Moreover, Amnesty International reported a case of torture 
and unfair trial in Uzbekistan of an extradite refugee from Russia. Mirsobir Khamidkariev, an Uzbek citi-
zen, asked international protection in Russia while was extraditing towards his home country that had is-
sued an absentia trial against him, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Uzbekistan: Fear Of Unfair Trial For 
Extradited Refugee: Mirsobir Khamidkariev”, EUR 62/008/2014, 6 November 2014, available at: 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR62/008/2014/en/>. These cases were struck out from the 
Court's list due to lack of applicants’ interest. In particular, Russia has announced in its 2019 Action Plan 
that investigations carried out showed that applicants currently present in their countries of origin have 
returned voluntarily. The applicants affirm this circumstance in written testimonies. Such declaration cast 
the light on a corollary problem that has often invested the Court when dealing with cases of unlawful 
removal, abduction, illegal transfer, or kidnapping: the lack of effective investigation (Ermakov case, cit. 
supra note 9 ). As the Committee of Minister affirmed, an effective investigation which must be pursuant 
even when the case have been struck out from the list (Yakubov case, cit. supra note 24) as well as when 
the abduction happened after the final judgments (Isakov Abdulazhon case, cit. supra note 79, Azimov case, 
cit. supra note 9). In the merits, the Ministers’ Deputies of the Council of Europe affirmed: “It should be 
reiterated once again in this context that, due to the applicants’ vulnerable situation, statements made by 
them through the authorities of the requesting States do not obviate the need for effective investigations 
capable of establishing a convincing account of the events, with due regard for the Court’s findings”, see 
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (DH), 1280th Meeting, cit. supra note 70. 
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in general, undermine the authority and the effectiveness of the convention as a con-
stitutional instrument of European public order.”82  
In the same decision, the court also found the violation of Art. 46 ECHR for the 
non-observance of the interim measures and recalled that “the repeated abductions 
of individuals and their ensuing transfer to the countries of destination by deliberate 
circumvention of due process – notably in breach of the interim measures indicated 
by the Court – amount to a flagrant disregard for the rule of law and suggest that 
certain State authorities have developed a practice in breach of their obligations un-
der Russian law and the Convention.83 Such a situation has the most serious implica-
tions for the Russian domestic legal order, the effectiveness of the Convention sys-
tem and the authority of the Court.”84 In this context, the Court recalled Art. 46, not-
ing that “the State’s obligations under the judgment require the resolution of [that] 
recurrent problem without delay” (para. 259) and that the “decisive general 
measures” to be taken “should include improving domestic remedies in extradition 
and expulsion cases, ensuring the lawfulness of any State action in this area, effective 
protection of potential victims in line with the interim measures indicated by the 
Court and effective investigation into every breach of such measures or similar un-
lawful acts”(para. 258). 
The Court has recognised that the State is not responsible for these violations 
only in the presence of an objective impediment that prevented the state from com-
plying with the obligation. More than once, Russia has justified non-compliance by 
relying on the prior request for diplomatic assurances to ensure respect for the right 
to life and the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment in the state of transfer. 
Nevertheless, in numerous cases, the Court has reaffirmed that national legislation 
or agreements with the receiving state – such as diplomatic assurances obtained after 
the court indication of the interim measures as well as reasons of state security – are 
not considered objective impediments. Recently, this in Usmanov v. Russia,85 the 
Court revealed that “the domestic courts’ unquestioning reliance on the assurances 
 
82
 European Court of Human Rights, Savriddin Dzhurayev case, cit. supra note 24, para. 213. 
83
 KLASFELD, “Rendition Of Alleged Islamist Will Cost Russia”, Courthouse New Service, 30 April 
2013, available at: <https:www.courthousenews.com.rendition-of-alleged-islamist-will-cost-russia>. 
84
 Ibid. 
85
 European Court of Human Rights, Usmanov v. Russia, Application No. 48917/15, pending, para. 
31. 
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of the Uzbek authorities, despite their formulation in standard terms, appear[ed] ten-
uous given that similar assurances ha[d] consistently been considered unsatisfactory 
by the Court in the past.”86  
In order to curb these illegal transfers and execute the jurisprudence of the Court 
and the recommendations of the CoE Committee of Ministers, the Plenum of the 
Russian Supreme Court in 2012 noted “when cooperating internationally in the 
sphere of criminal justice, the Russian Federation is required to observe the human 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by its legislation, the generally recognized principles 
and rules of international law, as well as international treaties of the Russian Feder-
ation”.87 The Plenum also drew “the attention of [the domestic] courts to the fact that 
conditions and grounds for refusing extradition are established not only in the Crim-
inal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation and other laws but also international 
treaties of the Russian Federation”.88 Finally, it provided that in cases where the EC-
tHR has adopted 
“interim judicial measures prescribing that the authorities of the Russian Federation re-
frain from extraditing a person to a foreign state, this should not entail deferred consideration 
of an appeal against an extradition decision. Proceeding from the provisions of article 34 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, a person 
should not actually be handed over until the European Court of Human Rights cancels the 
interim measures or a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights comes into effect 
with respect to the results of consideration of the appeal in connection with which the rele-
vant interim measures was applied.”89 
Moreover, the RF since 2012 has submitted to the CoE Committee of Ministers 
several Action Plans within the framework of the Garabayev Group. In February 
2012, the Russian authorities submitted an Action Plan (DH-DD(2012)152), accord-
ing to which the Ministry of Justice committed by the end of 2012 to finalise draft 
legislative amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, to bring its provisions on 
extradition in line with ECHR requirements. Also, on 29 December 2016, draft 
 
86The Court had consistently considered similar assurances unsatisfactory, see Abdulkhakov case, cit. 
supra note 9, paras.149-150; Tadzhibayev v. Russia, Application No. 17724/14, Judgment of 1 December 
2015, para. 46. 
87
 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 11 “On Consideration by Courts of Mat-
ters Connected with Extradition for Criminal Prosecution or Execution of a Sentence, as well as Handing 
Over to Serve a Sentence”, 14 June 2012, p. 103, available at: <http://base.garant.ru/70190924/>. 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 Ibid.  
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amendments to the part of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning extradition 
procedures were submitted by the government for consideration before the Duma. 
The amendments provide, among other things, that a person subject to an extradition 
request is entitled to the same procedural rights in all proceedings concerning the 
measure of restraint as other suspects and accused. Moreover, the draft amendments 
contain provisions prohibiting extradition in the event of a risk that the person to be 
extradited will be subjected to various forms of ill-treatment in the requesting State. 
However in the same 2016, the Committee of Ministers expressed deep concern 
about continuing abductions and forced returns from Russia to Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, where suspects or detainees are at real risk 
of torture or other ill-treatment, as we have seen above.90 It also warned about the 
lack of effective investigations into abductions and forcible returns; reliance on 
diplomatic assurances and the excessive reliance on asserted confidence in the legal 
systems of the Central Asian countries.  
In the framework of the recent 2019 Action Plan, the Russian government has un-
derscored that in 2018 there have been no forcible deportations or abductions of appli-
cants which have been granted provisional measures.91 Nevertheless, the RF has 
adopted a new escamotage: compulsory deportation of “undesirable aliens” for admin-
istrative offences. This new practice consists in the deportation of foreigners, including 
temporary asylum and refugee seekers that have been convicted for a crime under the 
Russian law or persons are accused of being members of banned Islamic groups. In 
such cases, an “exclusion order” can be immediately issued and the court can order 
their automatic and immediate deportation. Amnesty International cast light on this 
recent practice stating: “Short of resorting to complicity in the abduction of individu-
als, the Russian authorities have sought other ways to circumvent their international 
 
90
 See, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (DH), 1280th Meeting, cit. supra note 70. See, also 
TRENINA, “Extradition and expulsion of persons from Russia to countries of Central Asia”, in HUG (ed.), 
Shelter from the storm? The asylum, refuge and extradition situation facing activists from the former Soviet 
Union in the CIS and Europe, The Foreign Policy Centre, 28 April 2014, available at: <http: 
fpc.org.uk.publications.shelter-from-the-storm>. 
91
 Recently, the Court is looking at two cases related to forcible return from Russia to Tajikistan despite 
the interim measures. See K.Z v. Russia, Application No. 35960/18, and Dalerdzhon Bozorovich Buriyev 
v. Russia, Application No. 42874/18. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 Maria Sole Continiello Neri 
 
 
obligations and have used administrative means, such as deportations for administra-
tive offences, to return individuals to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.”92 Unfortunately, this 
practice emerged also in some recent decisions of the Strasbourg Court.93  
7. – Conclusion 
The shortcomings of Russia’s Refugee Law – and the broader legal framework 
around refugee rights – and the consequent violations of the principle of non-re-
foulement have been noted at length by the ECtHR. The Court has also highlighted 
recently that the expulsion and deportation of Syrian asylum seekers, as well as the 
extradition of Uzbekistani and Tajik asylum seekers, would give rise to a violation 
of Art. 3 ECHR. 
By such jurisprudence, Russian Appeals Courts have started to reverse their pre-
vious restrictive orientation, granting temporary asylum to those comes before them 
escaping from conflict areas, especially Syrian citizens. However, such openness – 
probably due to the so-called ‘Strasbourg effect’ – has been limited by the definitive 
closure of the Federal Migration Service, the centralisation of the system, the transfer 
of its functions to the Ministry of the Interior, and the adoption of Russia’s more 
restrictive migration policies. 
The tightening of migration is a product of broader policy changes at the federal 
level. In particular, from 2012 Russia has sought to reorganise its migration and bor-
der policy through to 2025 in line with its new national and regional security strat-
egy.94 This strategy has impacted all legislation and policy-making, including re-
gional arrangements such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Col-
lective Security Treaty Organization. These policy changes, have seen refugees, and 
asylum seekers caught up as collateral damage, driving a decrease in applications for 
international and subsidiary protection of about 35% in 2017.95  
 
92
 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Amnesty International’s submission to the Council of Europe Commit-
tee of Ministers: Garabayev v. Russian federation (no.38411/02) group of cases”, 23 February 2017, avail-
able at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR6258392017ENGLISH.pdf> 
93
 See Kholmurodov v. Russia, Application No. 58923/14, Judgment of 04 July 2016 and O.O. case, 
cit. supra note 79.  
94
 See, President of the Russian Federation, Executive Decree “The concept of state migration policy 
of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025”, 31 October 2018, available at: <http://le-
galacts.ru/doc/kontseptsija-gosudarstvennoi-migratsionnoi-politiki-rossiiskoi-federatsii-na/>. 
95
 See UNHCR, cit. supra note 45. 
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However, a new amendment to the Law on Refugees is in the works and is ex-
pected to be adopted shortly. It includes provisions that guarantee more protection 
to those who apply for temporary asylum and greater respect for the principle of non-
refoulement. The UNHCR has heavily promoted this reform in Russia, and it could 
be the first step to remedying the critical shortcomings of the current legal framework 
for refugees and asylum seekers in the Russian Federation. 
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1. – Introduction 
Migration is a complex phenomenon composed by multiple intervening ele-
ments, and unfolded in diverse phases across time and space. The first critical point 
in the migratory process is access to a new territory. Detention and retention at the 
border of this new territory relate to the first stage for those who are to be considered 
migrants. The lack of clear legal pathways and the externalization of border controls 
are responsible for the majority of human rights violations. According to Article 2 
of the 1997 Resolution of the Council on Uccompanied Minors, the European Union 
(‘EU’) demands to stop illegal human trafficking.1 However, the Resolution is not 
 
1
 Council Resolution of 26 June 1997 on Unaccompanied Minors Who Are Nationals of Third Coun-
tries, 18 March 1998, 97/C 221/03. Art. 2. See also, Council framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 
December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, considerandum 
(2); European Commission, “Towards an EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child - Preliminary inventory 
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binding on all Member States of the European Union and does not sufficiently pro-
tect the vulnerability of minors, as it allows and authorizes the rejection of minors 
and their repatriation if there are guarantees in the country of origin.  
As a primary consideration, child entry and residence should be taken in the 
framework of appropriate mechanisms and procedures in the child’s best interests.2 
At the border, and without any assessment of their age, minors can also be rejected, 
under the condition of family reunification in their country of origin, or may be con-
sidered simply as irregular migrants, without any age discrimination.  
This contribution takes into account the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘ECtHR’) about the refoulement3 at the border and the indiscriminate expul-
sion of minors, which is put into effect disregarding the best interests of the minor as 
provided for by Article 3 of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(‘UNCRC’), together with the provisions set by Article 24 (2) of EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. The latter applies to the entry requirements of the EU asylum acquis 
related to children. It establishes that in all actions relating to minors, public authorities 
or private institutions of EU Member States ought to “…ensure that the best interests 
of the child are a primary consideration”. Access to the territory of a Member State by 
irregular migrant minors is dealt with in Article 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (‘ECHR’), which guarantees the right to protect private and family life. 
Article 8 is often referred to in cases involving the expulsion of children who would 
otherwise have been assessed as not in need of international protection, including sub-
sidiary protection. Violations under Article 8 have been found in cases involving mi-
nors, as forced separation from close family members could have an acute impact on 
their education, social and emotional stability and identity. 
By using interpretative approaches that focus on the positive obligations inherent 
in the ECHR provisions, the ECtHR has developed a large body of case-law dealing 
with children’s rights. In this chapter, a case concerning Italy and Greece is ana-
lysed,4 on an illegal practice of refoulement along the Hellenic coast to potential asy-
 
of EU actions affecting children’s rights”, 31 July 2006, para. 2.   
2
 POBJOY, The Child in International Refugee Law, Cambridge, 2017, p. 46 ff.  
3
 Refoulement is the act of forcing a refugee or asylum seeker to return to a country or territory where 
he or she is likely to face persecution. 
4
 European Court of Human Rights, Sharifi et al. v. Italy and Greece, Application No 16643/09, Judg-
ment of 21 October 2014. 
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lum seekers from Afghanistan in 2009. The analysis will cover also a case concern-
ing Spain,5 dealing with the immediate return to Morocco of sub/Saharan migrants 
who attempted on 13 August 2014 to enter Spanish territory illegally by scaling the 
fences that surround the North African city of Melilla. 
Thus, this chapter focuses on first entry immigration and subsequent expulsion 
of minors not in accordance with the best interest of the child. It is set to compare 
two EU Mediterranean frontier countries (Spain and Italy) taking into account 
ECtHR rulings, and providing a broader perspective at similar cases in Europe. An 
examination of Spanish and Italian legal provisions and practices regarding 
rejections will be made to address the question of whether or not the policy of border 
control prevails upon that of protection to minors. 
2. – Setting the Context  
The reception and protection of unaccompanied migrant minors (‘UMM’) has 
been a subject of growing interest and debate within the European Union. In general 
terms, the protection of UMM lacks of a legal conceptualization of them as a separate 
category and, thus, of political representation. The EU legal framework regarding 
unaccompanied juvenile migration was developed in 1997 with the adoption of the 
resolution on reception, stay, and return (or asylum procedure) of minors. Yet, when 
the legal framework comes to practical developments, individual States are primarily 
responsible for the protection of children’s human rights and, consequently, the ef-
fective realization of the rights of children depends on policies enacted by the gov-
ernments of those Member States.6 This pressing issue has reached in some situations 
the level of social emergency.  
In the context of the ongoing migration crisis, the number of applications for 
international protection presented by unaccompanied foreign minors has been con-
spicuous. 30,000 children, of which 12,700 were unaccompanied or separated chil-
dren, arrived in Europe in 2018.7 In 2016, there had been 63,300 migrant children, a 
 
5
 Id., N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Applications Nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, Judgment of 3 October 2017. 
6
 ALAKBAROVA, “Lack of Opportunities and Family Pressures Drive Unaccompanied Minor Migra-
tion from Albania to Italy”, The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute, 18 July 2019, p. 5 ff.   
7
 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Latest statistics and graphics on refugee and migrant 
children, 2019, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/eca/emergencies/latest-statistics-and-graphics-refu-
gee-and-migrant-children>.  
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number lower by about a third compared to 20158. However,  this figure represented 
almost five times the annual average for the 2008-2013 period of around 12,000 per 
year.9 Faced with the challenges posed by these developments, new interactions 
among actors related to migration, asylum and child protection have evolved rapidly 
at EU level, albeit in different ways.  
Given this context, on 12 April 2017 the Commission adopted the Communica-
tion on “The protection of children in migration”,10 addressing the rights and needs 
of all children on the move, which links migration, asylum and the protection of 
minors. In addition, it shifted attention from UMM and Unaccompanied and Sepa-
rated Children (‘UASC’)11 to cover children who migrate on their own and with their 
families together with a working document explaining the implementation of the ac-
tion plan on “unaccompanied migrant minors” (2010-2014).12  The Communication, 
in sum, highlighted the needs of both categories regarding accompanied and unac-
companied minors. To prepare targeted actions for the protection of migrant chil-
dren, there are numerous areas (in particular identification, reception and protection) 
on which to pay attention. First of all, there is a need to quickly identify children 
when they arrive in EU soil. This is crucial for the provision of appropriate treatment 
according to their age and conditions: all children must have immediate access to 
legal and health care, psychosocial support and to education, regardless of their status 
(in adequate facilities and in a friendly environment).  
While some encouraging improvements have taken place, it is also noticeable 
that child protection actors (public and private) have left their counterparts (the mi-
gratory system) the leading role in managing migrant and refugee children, while 
providing training, guidance, support and access to services. The migration agents 
(public and private) have, in turn, adopted concepts relating to children's rights and 
incorporated them into their practice. In this dichotomy, migration management 
agencies conduct the game, transporting the issue of migrant minors, accompanied 
or separated in the migratory narrative. The nature of the partnership is still evolving, 
 
8
 Ibid.  
9
 UNICEF, Uprooted. The Growing Crisis for Refugee and Migrant Children, New York, 2016, p. 21.   
10
 European Commission, Communications on the Protection of Children in Migration, 
COM(2017)211 final.  
11
 UNHCR/Council of Europe, Uaccompanied and Separated Asylum-Seeking and Refugee Children 
turning eighteen: what to celebrate?, Strasbourg, 2014, p. 7.  
12
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors (2010-2014). 6 May 2010, COM 213 final. 
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but a new discourse has developed which puts children’s rights at the core of migra-
tion and asylum policy and practice.  
The precise content of the principles and standards stemming from the children’s 
rights may vary at national level, depending on each Member State's legislative sys-
tem. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’) and of the ECtHR provides an exhaustive list of these principles and there-
fore defines the fundamental meaning of the child's best interests, as a common EU 
value in accordance with Article 3 of the UNCRC. 
These principles include the right to life, which implies the right to health, to be 
heard, to family life and to education; but also the ruling out of arbitrariness by ex-
ecutive powers; the right to impartial treatment and non-discrimination; the integral 
compliance of fundamental rights; and the equal and fair treatment before the law 
and the tribunals. Both the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
confirmed that those principles are not purely formal and procedural requirements. 
They are the vehicle for ensuring compliance with and respect for children’s rights 
and human rights. The best interest of the child is to be considered a legal principle 
with both formal and substantial components that are intrinsically linked to fulfil 
both democratic values and fundamental rights.  
3. – Protecting Borders across Europe  
The EU has competence to legislate in the area of migration and asylum concern-
ing both its land and sea borders. It covers a wide range of migration situations, such 
as long-term work-related migration, asylum, subsidiary protection or irregular situ-
ations. All of these situations also include the governance of migrant children.  
The main EU laws on protecting borders are:  
- the ‘Free Movement Directive’13, preamble (para. 24), Article 7, Article 
12, Article 13 and Article 28 (3) (b);  
- the ‘Return Directive’14, Article 17; 
 
13
 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 (the ‘Free Movement Directive’). 
14
 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 
(the ‘Return Directive’). 
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- the ‘Directive on Reception Conditions,15 Article 11. 
Various legal instruments regulate the migration of EU nationals in a more 
straightforward manner. Instead, the freedom of movement of third-country nation-
als is subject to more restrictions. The latter is partially regulated by EU law and 
partially regulated by national immigration laws. 
In the context of international protection procedures, children are regarded as 
“vulnerable persons” whose specific situation Member States are required to take 
into account when implementing EU law.16 This requires Member States to identify 
and accommodate any special provision that asylum-seeking children in particular 
might need when they enter the host State. Article 24 of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights applies to the entry and residence requirements of the EU asylum ac-
quis as it relates to children. It implies that in all actions relating to children, whether 
taken by public authorities or private institutions, EU Member States ensure that the 
best interests of the child are a primary consideration. These underpin the implemen-
tation of Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (the ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’).17 They also apply to 
the Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining any application for international protection lodged 
in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (the 
Dublin Regulation) as they relate to children.18 Both texts also contain specific guar-
antees for UMM, including their legal representation.  
The Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on the Schengen Borders Code requires border 
guards to check that those persons accompanying children have parental care over 
them, especially when the children are with an adult and there are doubts about the 
legitimacy of the accompanying persons. In this case, the border guard must investi-
gate further for any inconsistencies or contradictions in the information provided. If 
 
15
 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, (the ‘Reception Directive’). 
16
 See ibid. Art. 21 and Return Directive, Art. 3 (9). 
17
 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), Art. 25(6), (the ‘Dublin Regula-
tion’). 
18
 Regulation No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establish-
ing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast), Art. 6. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refoulement at the Border … 185 
 
 
children are travelling unaccompanied, border guards must ensure, by means of thor-
ough checks on travel and supporting documents, that the children are not leaving 
the territory against the wishes of the person(s) legitimate responsible for their pa-
rental care.19 However, according to the standards of the Council of Europe (CoE), 
States have the right to control the entry, residence and expulsion of foreigners. As 
a matter of consolidated international law and without prejudice to the treaty obliga-
tions, including the ECHR, it is legitimate to fully control their borders. 
Expulsion, however, takes effects for adults and for minors, despite the guaran-
tees that European and international law has put in place. The subject of rejections 
and related appeals is also regulated at supranational level. Police authorities should 
comply with the bilateral agreements stipulated with the migrants’ countries of 
origin, which however, cannot be used as justification for the derogation of the con-
stitutional or EU rules. Article 13 para. 1 of Directive 2008/115 / EC, concerning 
appeals against return decisions, provides that: 
“A third-country national concerned shall be granted effective remedies against deci-
sions related to repatriation referred to in Article 12 (1) or to request a review before a com-
petent judicial or administrative body or a competent body composed of impartial members 
offering guarantees of independence”.  
In any case, Article 13 of Regulation No. 562 of 2006 (Schengen Borders Code)20 
stipulates that ‘refoulement’ may be ordered only with a motivated provision stating 
the precise reasons for such a decision. It is to be adopted by a competent authority 
according to national legislation and is applicable immediately. Nevertheless, the 
rejected persons have the right to appeal. Appeals are settled in accordance with na-
tional legislation. Third-country nationals are also given written indications regard-
ing contact points that can provide information to the representatives entitled to act 
on behalf of third-country nationals in accordance with domestic law. However, the 
opening of the appeal procedure does not have suspensive effects on the refusal pro-
vision. Forced repatriation procedures are characterized by speed, following the 
adoption of rejection measures. Thus, the timeliness of the appeal is essential, as is 
access to legal assistance.  
 
19
 Regulation 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders Annex VII, 6 (the ‘Schengen Border 
Code’).  
20
 Ibid., Art. 13.  
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It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the immediate border rejection 
that implies a limitation of the freedom of movement (as the person physically is 
prevented to entry into the territory, although he/she remains free to circulate in the 
space outside the State territory), and all other forms of rejection, with or without a 
formal provision (in the latter instance violating Schengen Borders Regulation).21  
Further distinctions can be made regarding asylum. The regulation provides a list 
of factors to help the authorities to determine what is in the best interests of the child, 
for those seeking asylum (‘UASASC’)22. This includes the possibility of family reu-
nification of the minor as well as the well-being and social development of the child.23 
The regulation includes considerations on safety and security, in particular where 
there is a risk that the child could be a victim of trafficking in human beings; and the 
child’s own opinion and information, in accordance with his age and maturity.24 Con-
cerning asylum-seeking children whose claims have been rejected, authorities must 
apply the best interests of the child relating to the process of return of unaccompanied 
children.25 Moreover, before removing an unaccompanied child from a Member 
State, the authorities of that Member State must secure that the child is to be returned 
to a member of his/her family, a nominated guardian or to adequate reception facili-
ties in the State of return.26 
4. – The Border Blackout 
Although the ECHR does not refer to the principle of the best interests for the 
child, and despite it had preceded the UNCRC by over thirty years, the ECtHR has 
produced a long series of interpretations where the best principle is a ‘hidden’ pro-
tagonist.27 Thus, in the parental child abduction case of Neulinger and Ahuruk v Swit-
zerland, the Court held that there is a broad consensus in support of the idea that in 
all decisions concerning children, their best interest must be paramount.28 
 
21
 In this case in violation of Article 14 of the the Schengen Border Code. 
22
 UNHCR/Council of Europe, cit. supra note 11. 
23
 SCHWEIGER, “Should states prioritize child refugees?”, Ethics &Global Politics, 2019, 12:2, p. 48 ff. 
24
 Dublin Regulation, Art. 6.  
25
 Return Directive, Art. 10 
26
 Ibid., Art. 10(2).  
27
 SMYTH, “The best Interests of the child in the Expulsion and First-Entry Jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: How Principled is the Court’s Use of the Principle?”, European  Journal of  
Migration and Law, 2019, p.70 ff. 
28
 European Court of Human Rights, Neulinger and Ahuruk v Switzerland, Application No. 41615/07, 
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In this chapter, and for the sake of comparison, the choice of the two judgments: 
N.D. y N.T. v. Spain,29 and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece30 has taken into 
account the similarities of the events, as well as the modality and commensurability 
of the Court's judgments. Both Spain and Italy had been in the not too distant past 
migrant countries themselves, but now they face complex migratory flows for which 
they are partly unprepared.31 
The Court ruled on Article 4 of Protocol 4 on collective expulsions. The afore-
mentioned Protocol, drawn up in 1963, was the first international treaty to deal with 
collective expulsion, and its purpose was to prevent States from being able to remove 
a certain number of aliens without examining their personal circumstances and with-
out allowing them to present their arguments. 
In the two cases examined, Spain and Italy were both convicted of collective ex-
pulsions that, among other things, did not allow identification and violated the child’s 
right to protection. The “devolución en caliente”,32 as well as the collective expulsions, 
violated article 6 of the UNCRC. The expulsion de facto and without identifying the 
migrants who were in the border areas prevented the identification of the UMM. 
4.1 – N.D. and N.T. v. Spain 
On 3 October 2017, the third section of the ECtHR held responsible Spain for the 
violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR (prohibition of collective expulsions 
of aliens), and for the violation of Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy)33. 
The Court noted that the applicants, N.D. and N.T., had been expelled and sent 
back to Morocco against their wishes and that the removal measures were taken in 
the absence of any prior administrative or judicial decision. At no point they were 
subjected to any identification procedure by the Spanish authorities. The Court con-
cluded that, in those circumstances, the measures were indeed collective in nature, 
 
Judgment (GC) of 6 July 2010, para.135. 
29
 Id., N.D. y N.T. v. Spain, II, cit. supra note 5. 
30
 Id., Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, cit. supra note 4.  
31
 In the case of Sharifi and Others Greece is involved too, as being another country on the southern 
border of the EU, to complement the scenario of the three main migratory routes to the ‘fortress Europe’. 
Definition used in COOPER, “Historical sociology, ‘Fortress Europe’ and the EU’s frontier politics”, Paper 
presented to the Institute of Human Sciences Fellows Colloquium, 5th November 2018 , p. 10 ff. 
32
 Summary return is the practice of expelling an irregular immigrant from the country at the time 
he/she attempts to cross the border, without any guarantee of the country's foreign legislation being applied. 
33
 European Court of Human Rights, N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, cit. supra note 5, para. 15. 
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according to the article 4 of Protocol n.4.  
The applicants were, respectively, Malian and Ivorian nationals; they were born 
in 1986 and 1985, both arrived in Morocco in March 2013 and stayed for about nine 
months in the makeshift camp on Gurugu Mountain, near the border crossing around 
Melilla34. After scaling the fence, they were immediately arrested, handcuffed and 
returned to Morocco by members of the Spanish Guardia Civil.35 At no point were 
their identities checked; neither did they have an opportunity to explain their personal 
circumstances or to receive assistance from lawyers, interpreters or medical person-
nel. They were subsequently transferred to the Nador police station, and then to Fez, 
more than 300 km away from Melilla, in the company of a group of other adult mi-
grants who had attempted to enter Melilla on the same date.  
According to the Court, there were substantial failings to respect fundamental 
rights despite the fact that Spain had been condemned in a similar case for the viola-
tion of Article 13 (entitlement to an effective remedy) in a previous judgment: A.C. 
and Others v. Spain.36 The latter judgment had already clearly ruled that the Spanish 
authorities should have suspended the procedure for removal of international protec-
tion seekers until their allegations about the risks they faced in their country of origin 
had been thoroughly examined.  
Following a request from Spain, the case of N.D. and N.T. was referred to the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. The Spanish government submitted on August 17, 
2018 new documentation,37 insisting on defending the legality of these express ex-
pulsions. The centre-right Rajoy Government presented a circular letter of a ‘re-
stricted’ nature prepared by the previous Socialist Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mi-
guel Angel Moratinos, and sent in 2009 to all ambassadors and consular offices with 
instructions in the implementation of the new asylum law. With this circular, the 
Government intended to strengthen some of the arguments included in its appeal to 
 
34
 The Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla are on the northern shores of Morocco’s Mediterranean 
coast. 
35
 Spanish National Police Guard. 
36
 European Court of Human Rights, A.C. and Others v. Spain, III, Application no. 6528/11, Judgment, 
22 April 2014, para. 88. 
37
 According to Article 43 ECHR, and within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any 
party may request exceptionally that the case be referred to the 17-Member Grand Chamber of the Court. 
European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber hearing in the case N.D. and N.T. v. Spain Cases: 
8675/15 and 8697/15, Press release ECHR 314, 26 September 2018.  
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defend the expulsion of N.D. and N.T. in August 2014.38 The hearing in Strasbourg 
took place on 26 September 2018. A final judgment is expected in the course of 2019. 
4.1.1. Spanish Legislative Framework  
The peculiarity of the Spanish southern borders is that while Spain and Morocco 
are largely separated by the Mediterranean Sea, the countries share a short land bor-
der at the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta in North Africa. Both land borders 
are ‘sealed’ with a six-metre-high fence.39 For many years, Ceuta and Melilla have 
been migrant gates of access to Europe from the African continent, the so-called 
Western Mediterranean route. A mixed flow of immigrants enters through them, 
mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa and Syria. 
The migrant population entering Spain is a heterogeneous group that includes 
asylum seekers, involuntary migrants (victims of trafficking in human beings), un-
accompanied minors and economic migrants who seek a better life for themselves 
and their families. While their reasons for leaving their land of origin may vary con-
siderably, they have all been exposed to the same harsh conditions on their itinerary 
to Spain, and have faced similar risks.  
Spain complies with the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Con-
vention on the Status of Refugees 1951, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, and in the legal instruments of European Union that make up the 
Common European Asylum System, with the Law 12/2009.40 All of them regulate 
the right to asylum and subsidiary protection and include provisions applicable to all 
applicants for international protection. In fact, the Spanish Organic Law 4/2000 – 
Articles 49.a), 51.1.b) and 53.1) – has overcome the punitive concept of the previous 
Organic Law of 1 July 1985 No. 7/85, by changing the concept of expulsion. Fur-
thermore, it requires that in the case of very serious infringements of letters a), b), 
 
38
 EL PAIS, “El Gobierno insiste en defenderlas devoluciones en caliente ante Estrasburgo”, 26 sep-
tiembre 2018, available at: <https://elpais.com/politica/2018/09/25/actualidad/1537889632_ 
746605.html>. 
39
 The greater part of the border between Beni Ansar, Morocco and Melilla, Spain is delineated by a 
security zone containing six rows of fences: three on Moroccan territory and three on Spanish territory. 
CASTAÑO and ESTRADA, “Situation report at the Spanish-Moroccan border”, in On Europe’s External 
Southern Borders, Budapest, 2018, p. 17 ff.  
40
 Ley 12/2009, de 30 de octubre, reguladora del derecho de asilo y de la protección subsidiaria. Mo-
dified by: Ley 2/2014, de 25 de marzo BOE núm. 74, de 26 de marzo.  
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c), d) and f) of Article 53, a fine shall be imposed. 41 
Likewise, and following the provisions established in Article 2 of the 1997 Res-
olution of the Council of the European Union,42 Spain ought to pursue the policy of 
combating the trafficking of human beings, with the eventual rejection at the border 
and the devolution of unaccompanied minors.43 However, Article 57.5b of the Ley 
Orgánica 4/2000, prohibits the expulsion of minors in desamparo44, including them 
in the broadest category of serious cases and in situations of vulnerability.45 
The application of the Immigration Law46 that entitles Spain to defend its borders, 
together with the Citizen Security Law,47 which replaces the Organic Law 1/1992, of 
the same name, has created a loophole for the regulation of border rejection around 
the perimeter of Ceuta and Melilla.  
Summary returns, which found regulatory accommodation in the above men-
tioned Citizen Security Law through the newly created legal figure labelled ‘border 
rejection’, refers to the act of delivering back migrants intercepted on jumping the 
border fence separating Morocco and the Spanish cities of  Ceuta and Melilla. Spain 
appealed to the Court because when there is the possibility of a legal passage, the 
Spanish State has the right and the obligation to protect the border against attempts 
to illegal passage.48 It is important to mention also the Mobility Partnership between 
the Kingdom of Morocco, the European Union and its Member States, which was 
signed in Brussels on 3 June 2013, as well as the Agreement between the government 
of the Kingdom of Spain and the government of the Kingdom of Morocco on the 
free movement of persons, transit and the readmission of foreigners entering the 
 
41
 Ley Organica 4/2000, de 11 de Enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su 
integración social (Arts 49.a), 51.1.b) y 53.1), en regulación mantenida por la reforma operada por Ley 
Orgánica 8/2000, de 22 de Diciembre (Arts 53.a), 55.1.b) y 57.1). 
42
 Cit. supra, note 1, Art. 2 
43
 Real Decreto 155/1996 de 2 febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de ejecución de la Ley 
Orgánica 7/1985, Art. 62.4.  
44
 Abandonment in Spanish.  
45
 Ley Organica 4/2000, cit. supra note 41, Art. 57.5.b.  
46
 Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 
4/2000, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, tras su reforma 
por Ley Orgánica 2/2009, Art. 11.  
47
 Ley Organica 4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de protección de la seguridad ciudadana BOE núm. 77, de 31 
de marzo.  
48
 Gran Chamber hearing on returns to Morocco of migrants who scaled the fence en Melilla, Twitter 
on 16/09/2018 by @ECHR_Press. 
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country illegally, which was signed in Madrid on 13 February 13 1992. The imple-
mentation of these agreements led to a decrease in the number of arrivals in the bor-
der fences. Moreover, a lack of coordination among competent authorities was noted 
with regard to arrivals on the Andalusian shores, while deficiencies were identified 
in the provision of information on the right to apply for protection.49 
4.2. – Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece 
On 21 October 2014, the ECtHR held Italy and Greece responsible for the col-
lective and arbitrary refoulements of Afghan, Sudanese and Eritrean migrants from 
the port of Ancona to Patras, in 2009. 
The Second Section of the Court, in the case  Sharifi et al against Italy and 
Greece, found appropriate the application concerning the rejection of summaries 
from the Adriatic ports of 35 asylum seekers (including 10 children). With this rul-
ing, the ECtHR reiterated the principle already expressed in M.S.S. against Belgium 
and Greece, namely that concerning the notion of ‘safe country’.50 
The Court  holds  that no collective expulsion can be carried out in the application 
of the Dublin Regulation, which must be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
the ECHR, following the individual examination of each person concerned. Accord-
ing to the Court, Italy and Greece had violated ECHR and, in particular:  
- Article 3 (Prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treat-
ment),  
- Article 13 (Right to an effective remedy),  
- Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (Prohibition of collective expulsions). 
The case concerned 35 applicants, 32 of Afghan origin, 2 Sudanese and one Eri-
trean, some of whom, at the time when the events occurred, were minors. They had 
tried to enter in Italy between January 2008 and February 2009. After passing 
through Greek territory, they were rejected by the border police at the ports of Bari, 
Ancona and Venice. Their rejection was motivated on the basis the bilateral agree-
ment of the Italian and Hellenic governments concluded in 1999.51 Although the ap-
plicants complained about the violation of Articles 2, 3 and 13 ECHR against Greece 
 
49
 Spanish Commission on Refugee Aid / Comisión Española de Ayuda Al Refugiado CEAR, Input to 
the EASO Annual Report 2018. 
50
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Judg-
ment 21 January 2011, para. 338.  
51
 Camera Dei Deputati, Accordo tra Italia e Grecia sulla riammissione delle persone in situazione 
irregolare , Rome, 30 April 1999.  
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and the infringement of Articles 2, 3, 13 and 34 ECHR against Italy, the Court upheld 
the violation of Articles 3 and 13 against Greece and the violation of Articles 2, 3 
and 13; plus Article 4 of Protocol 4 for Italy. In addition to the already accepted 
criterion of collective and indiscriminate expulsion, it should be noted that the Court 
held responsible Italy for the violation of Article 3 because the applicants did not 
have access to the request for international protection, also due to their age. 
The CoE Committee of Ministers (in its Deputy meeting of 12-14 of March 2019) 
rejected the requests put forward by the Italian government to close the supervision 
processes following the Khlaifia v. Italy and Sharifi v. Italy judgments.52 On 26 June 
2019, the Italian authorities provided information on the legislative measures 
adopted to reorganise Italy’s migrant reception system. In particular: (a) the Legis-
lative Decree No. 142 of 18 August 2015, which transposed into national law direc-
tives 2013/33/EU and 2013/32/EU; (b) the Legislative Decree No. 220 of 22 Decem-
ber 2017 on international protection for unaccompanied minors; and (c) a circular 
letter sent out on 29 June 2011 which expressly forbids “… repatriations without first 
examining the individual situation of the people concerned”.53 The information pro-
vided is under assessment54 as “leading repetitive”.55  This is a leading Court judg-
ment with innovative reasoning In this case systemic and structural problems have 
been found. Such a case requires the adoption of new general measures to prevent 
similar violations in the future.  
 
52
 The Committee asked Italian Authorities to provide further information, 
CM/Del/Dec(2019)1340/H46-9.  
53
 Department of Public Security, 29 June 2011.  
54
 Previously the authorities had provided information on 26 September 2017 (DH-DD(2017)1099), 
followed by an action report on 23 January 2019 (DH-DD(2019)77). On 18 January 2019, the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) submitted a communication pursuant to 
Rule 9.3 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers (DH-DD(2019)90). Two communications were also 
submitted pursuant to Rule 9.2 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers by the Associazione per gli studi 
giuridici sull’immigrazione (‘ASGI’) (DH-DD(2019)176) and The Aire Centre (DH-DD(2019)191) on 11 
and 15 February 2019 respectively. Moreover, the Italian authorities submitted additional information on 
12 March 2019, during the 1340th meeting (DH) of the Committee of Ministers (DH-DD(2019)275). See, 
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (DH), 1340th Meeting, Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece. 
Case: 16643/09 – Pending – Enhanced  Procedure - Judgment of 21 October 2014 – Final Judgment of 21 
January 2015, Leading Repetitive, 12 March 2019.  
55
 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2018, Strasbourg, 2019, p.150 ff. ‘Leading cases’: 
these are cases revealing new structural and/or systemic problems that require new general measures. Lead-
ing cases are identified by the Court directly in its judgment, or by the Committee of Ministers in the course 
of its supervision of execution. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refoulement at the Border … 193 
 
 
4.2.1. Italian Legislative Framework. 
Since its original formulation, the Legislative Decree56 286/199857 provided for 
the prohibition of the expulsion of the minor under eighteen years and unaccompa-
nied minors (except cases of expulsion for “reasons of public order or State security”, 
according to Article 13, para. 1, on prevention of acts of terrorism). However, the 
Law 47/201758 added to Article 19 the new paragraph 1-bis, according to which 
“…under no circumstances can unaccompanied foreign minors be rejected at the 
border”. It provided disciplinary certainty to a widely debated issue. Likewise, this 
Law aims at solving some practical problems regarding the reception system.59  
The reception system for unaccompanied minors in Italy, confirmed by Law 
142/2015 and more recently by Law 47/2017, specifically deals with UMM. The role 
of the Italian Ministry of Interior60 in the governance of unaccompanied minor mi-
grants has been strengthened. Previously, this role had been under the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy61, which financed reception centres. The 
Ministry of Interior continues to be responsible for the Information System on Mi-
nors and tracks their movement and location in Italy.62 Since 2017, institutional in-
terventions are described in the National Action Plan to deal with the extraordinary 
flows of non-EU citizens, families and unaccompanied migrants.63 
At the time of crossing the border, the condition of UMM is ascertained by veri-
fying the legitimacy of the adults with whom the child is accompanied. On this point, 
the new text of Article 33, c. 1, Law 184/1983,64 says that:  
 
56
 A legislative decree is a normative act having the force of law adopted by the executive power 
(Government) by express and formal mandate of the legislative power (Parliament). 
57
 Decreto Legislativo 286/1998, Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione, Art. 19, c. 2, lett.a t.u.. 
58
 Legge 7 aprile 2017,  n. 47, “Disposizioni in materia di misure di protezione dei minori stranieri non 
accompagnati”..   
59
 Ibid. As a solution to minors escaping from the first reception facilities, the permanency timing in 
these structures has been reduced from 60 days to 30 days .After this, unaccompanied minors will be allo-
cated in the centres of the SPRAR (Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers) throughout Italy.  
60
 Ministero dell’Interno.  
61
 Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali.  
62
 DEMURTAS et al., “In search of Protection: Unaccompanied Minors in Italy”, Center for Migration 
Studies of New York, 2018, p. 22 ff., available at: <https://cmsny.org/publications/2018smsc-cse-uam/>. 
63 Ministero dell’Interno, Circolare 6909, “Piano nazionale per fronteggiare il flusso periodico di cit-
tadini extracomunitari adulti, famiglie e minori stranieri in accompagnati”, 1 August 2014. 
64
 Legge 4 maggio 1983, n. 184, “Disciplina dell'adozione e dell'affidamento dei minori”.  
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“… minors who do not have an entry visa issued pursuant to article 32 of this law and 
who are not accompanied by at least one parent or relatives by the fourth degree will apply 
the provisions of art. 19, paragraph 1-bis, of the consolidated text referred to in Legislative 
Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286”.  
The provisions of Annex 7, par. 6, of the Schengen Borders Code65 stipulate that, 
in the case of accompanied minors, the border guard ought to verify the existence of 
parental responsibility towards the minor,  
“… especially, if the minor is accompanied by an adult only and there are serious reasons 
to believe that the child has been illegally removed from custody of the person or persons 
legally exercising parental authority over him. In the latter case, the border guard carries out 
further investigations, in order to identify inconsistencies or there are contradictions in the 
given information, the existence of parental responsibility is verified”.  
In the case of minors travelling alone, it is necessary to ensure, “… by means of 
thorough checks of travel documents and supporting documents, that the child does 
not leave the territory against the will of the person or persons exercising parental 
authority over him”. 
Guidance centres located in the transit areas of the border crossings are to be 
improved, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 c. 6 of the Consolidated 
Act,66  now implemented through agreements stipulated by the Minister of Interior 
with some selected institutions, although, de iure condendo, the legislative provision 
of the indispensable presence at the border crossings of a third party, guarantor of 
the right to non-refoulement and of the prohibition of refusal of minors67 would be 
much more effective. 
According to the combined provisions of Articles 14 and 19 of the Consolidated 
Act68 the child cannot be the subject of administrative measures of detention, as well 
as with regard to minor applicants for asylum, following Article 19, c. 4, of the leg-
islative decree 18 August 2015, n. 142 (which implemented the 2013/32 / EU and 
2013/33 / EU directives).69 
 
65
 Schengen Border Code.  
66
 Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n. 286, Testo Unico, cit. supra note 57, Titolo II - Disposizioni 
sull’ingresso, il soggiorno e l’allontanamento dal territorio dello Stato.  
67
 BHABHA, Child Migration & Human Rights in a Global Age, Princeton, 2016, pp. 20 ff. 
68
 Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n. 286, Testo Unico, cit. supra note 57. 
69
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Concerning the prohibition of expulsion of the UMM, subtracting this compe-
tence from the office of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy,70 Article 8, Law 
47/201771 provides that the repatriation is to be voluntary and consensual, and can 
only be adopted:  
“… where reunification with family members in the country of origin or in a third coun-
try corresponds to the child's best interests, by the competent court for minors, after hearing 
the minor and the guardian and considering the results of the family surveys in the country 
of origin or in a third country and the report of the competent social services regarding the 
situation of the minor in Italy.”72 
During 2018, the Italian government delayed or hindered access to individuals 
rescued at sea, including applicants for protection, such as unaccompanied minors.73 
5. – Analytical Findings 
A specific legal treatment aimed at immigrant minors in general and those unac-
companied minors in particular is a very important manifestation of the immigration 
policy of any State. From the analysis of the literature and case studies, the treatment 
of unaccompanied migrant minors, in Spain and Italy, exposes the vulnerability of 
multiple principles of the UNCRC. On the one hand, there is the violation of some 
principles that govern the Convention, such as the principle of non-discrimination 
(Art. 2), and the best interests of the child (Art. 3). On the other hand, there are con-
crete violations of rights such as, among others, the right to receive adequate protec-
tion, taking into account that they are outside their country of origin, in a condition 
of vulnerability.74 
The very concept of vulnerability is key in the court sentences condemning col-
lective expulsions, which is defined as “… any measure of the competent authorities 
 
Reflective of the EU Migration Regime and International Human Rights Standards”, Central and Eastern 
European Migration Review, 2017, pp. 69-102.  
70
 Direzione Generale per l'Immigrazione del Ministero del Lavoro. 
71
 Legge 7 aprile 2017,  n. 47, cit. supra note 58. 
72
 Ibid. Art. 8 
73
 MORSELLI, Testo Unico dell’Immigrazione: Commentario di legislazione, giurisprudenza, dottrina, 
Pisa, 2019.  
74
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compelling aliens as a group to leave the country, except where such a measure is 
taken after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the partic-
ular cases of each individual alien of the group”.75  
Let us remind that the principle non-refoulement in international law prevents a 
State from delivering an individual to another State in which there are serious risks 
to his life or his physical integrity. It also prohibits the surrender of a person to a 
State that could turn it over to a third State where that risk exists, according to the 
interpretation by the Court of Article 3 ECHR (Article 33 of the 1951 Convention 
on the Status of Refugees). 
According to the drafters of Protocol No. 4, the word ‘expulsion’ should be inter-
preted in the generic meaning of ‘driving way from a place’, as the Court stated in the 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy case,76 when referring to the travaux préparatoires of 
Protocol No. 4.  It follows the pattern of other sentences against Italy as when the Court 
considered that an applicant had been brought back to Tunisia against his will.77  
The circumstances of the case Sharifi and Others took place at the time of the 
great wave of landings of migrants in the island of Lampedusa in 2011, but the issues 
raised by the applicants, as well as the principles confirmed by the Grand Chamber, 
are more relevant than ever concerning the current management of the ‘migratory 
question’. Now the institutions of the European Union and the Member States face a 
pressing need to deal with the so-called ‘hotspot approach’, which Italy adopted in 
the framework of the immediate actions envisaged by the European Agenda for Mi-
gration78 and the expulsion procedures negotiated by the agreements between Italy 
and the non-European countries. Responsibility for the treatment of migrants and the 
violation of human rights can be regarded also as a responsibility of agreements be-
tween the European Union and third countries.  
The same applies to the other frontier object of this study. It is important to men-
tion the ‘Mobility Partnership’ between the Kingdom of Morocco, the European Un-
ion and its Members States,79 as well the Agreement between the government of the 
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 European Court of Human Rights, Conka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, Judgment 5 Feb-
ruary 2002, para. 59. 
76
 European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, 
Judgment (GC) of 23 February 2012, para.174.  
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 European Court of Human Rights, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, Judgment 
(GC) of 15 December 2016,  paras. 243-244. 
78
 Ministero dell’Interno, Circolare of 6 October 2015. 
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Kingdom of Spain and the government of Kingdom of Morocco, on the free move-
ment of foreigners entering the country illegally, which was signed in Madrid, on the 
13 February 1992.  
With reference to minors, the Court has repeatedly established that it is crucial to 
bear in mind that the child’s extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor that takes 
precedence over considerations relating to the status of illegal immigrant.80 Children 
have specific needs that are related in particular to their age and lack of independ-
ence, but also to their asylum-seeker status.81 The Court has insisted in the interpre-
tation that the Convention on the Rights of the Child encourages States to act appro-
priately to ensure that a child who is seeking to obtain refugee status enjoys protec-
tion and humanitarian assistance, whether the child is alone or accompanied by his 
or her parents.82 
In application of the general principle, the Court establishes that the expulsion 
must be organized following a case-by-case assessment. There ought to be proce-
dures prior an expulsion decision (as well as refoulement) against vulnerable persons 
(disabled, elderly), minors, members of single-parent families with minor children, 
or victims of serious psychological, physical or sexual violence. Expulsions must be 
conducted in such ways that are compatible with individual personal situations. No 
form of collective and indiscriminate returns could be justified by reference to the 
Dublin system.  
6. – Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed issues revolving around the best interest of the child, 
even if the status of such a general principle is notoriously problematic.83 It has been 
described as a principle of interpretation or principle of duty. The concept becomes 
even more labile in the context of migration. So the meaning is doubled, the best 
 
80
 See, inter alia, European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Bel-
gium, Application No. 13178/03; and Popov v. France, Application Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07. In doc-
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versidad Pontificia Comillas, 2012, p. 42 ff. 
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 BYRNE, “Migrant, refugee or minor? It matters for children in Europe”, Forced Migration Review, 
2017, p. 94 ff.  
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 European Court of Human Rights, Popov v. France, Application Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, Judg-
ment of 19 January 2012, para. 91.  
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 POBJOY, “The best interest of the child principle as an indipendent source of international 
protection”, Inttenational & Comparative Law Quartely, 2015,  pp. 327-363. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 Patrizia Rinaldi 
 
 
interest can mean to enter or be rejected by the country of destination. The principle 
can also be used to control immigration and can become a tool for the protection of 
the border and not for the protection of the child. Hence the defence and definition 
of vulnerability, which the Court provides in its judgments, goes through and exceeds 
the concept itself, defending the minor (or the alleged minor), in condemning collec-
tive expulsion. In the Hirsi Jamaa and others c. Italy ruling, the Court considered 
the vulnerability of migration regardless of the age of the subjects84. 
Domestic laws often circumvent vulnerability. Spain, in its recent Organic Law 
4/2015,85 has ‘legalized’ the hotspot returns. It should be noted that, against this law, 
two unconstitutionality appeals have been filed and admitted, and many national and 
international public bodies have expressed their opposition to it.86 The Citizen Secu-
rity Law should be changed to put an end to the immediate devolutions that take 
place in Ceuta and Melilla, or alternatively guarantees should be established on mi-
nors. The also called ‘hot return’ of UMM is not only an illegal act, which does not 
respect national and international laws and violates human rights, but can be re-
garded as a violent act given the abruptness with which it is carried out.  
Therefore, the Spanish Ombudsman has recommended to the Minister of Inte-
rior87 that the procedure should contemplate the need to issue an administrative res-
olution, with legal assistance, an interpreter and information about potential legal 
actions.88 All this should be accomplished in accordance with the Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court 17/2013.89 It has also recommended to the Home Office Secre-
tary, that written evidence should be incorporated in the file stating that the foreigner 
has been provided with information on international protection and that, through an 
adequate mechanism of identification and referral, international protection needs 
have been verified, that he/she is a minor or that there is a concurrence of signs that 
he may be a victim of trafficking in human beings. These recommendations have not 
yet been accepted. 
The main obstacles regarding access to the Spanish territory are faced mostly at 
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 European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, cit. supra note 81, paras. 125-
126.  
85
 Ley Organica 4/2015, cit. supra note 47.  
86
 The ‘Consejo General de la Abogacia Espanola’ (Committee against Torture and the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, in its periodical report of Spain).  
87
 Ministro del Interior (author’s translation). 
88
 Defensor del Pueblo, V y VI Informe sobre la aplicacion de la convención sobre los Derechos del 
Niño y sus Protocolos Facultativos, INDH, Madrid, 2017, pp. 40-45.  
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the Ceuta and Melilla borders and checkpoints. These physical obstacles are mainly 
due to the impossibility of asylum seekers to cross the border and exit Morocco. One 
of the ways used by migrants and asylum seekers to enter the territory is to attempt 
to climb border fences in groups. The increasing numbers of attempts to jump border 
fences occur because migrants and asylum seekers (mostly sub-Saharan nationals) 
still face huge obstacles in accessing the asylum points at the Spanish border, due to 
the severe checks of the Moroccan police at the Moroccan side of the border. There 
are several reported cases concerning refusal of entry, refoulement, collective expul-
sions and pushbacks, including incidents involving up to a thousand persons during 
2017.90 In addition, the Human Rights Committee91 has expressed its concern about 
the ‘hot expulsions’ that are taking place on the borderline of the territorial demar-
cation of Ceuta and Melilla. 
The Italian case is no different from the Spanish one, and the rejections towards 
Libya continue despite the rulings of the ECtHR. In January 2018, the ECtHR de-
clared admissible the appeals of five Sudanese citizens, who on 24 August 2016 were 
victims of a collective refoulement in Ventimiglia, near the French border. Sudanese 
migrants subject to a raid in the Ligurian town illegally locked up in a hotspot in 
Taranto, with attempted forced repatriation.92 Some of these migrants have actually 
been forced to return to Sudan, although their situation could fall into the status of 
‘international protection’.93 The ban on disembarkation in Italian ports can be con-
sidered as a form of ‘collective refoulement’, and cases of omitted sea rescue are 
starting to arrive at the Court, like that of the Sea Watch3 boat on 5 November 201794.  
Collective expulsions or refoulement do not allow the State to examine the situ-
ation of each individual or to assess the risk of serious personal damage. For this 
reason, this type of expulsion is prohibited in numerous international treaties (see 
Article 4 of Protocol 4 ECHR, and Article 19.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union). 
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Minors are of great concern for the Court according to Strasbourg jurisprudence.95 
The ECtHR has also participated in devoloping legal protection for children through 
its jurisprudence. At level of the EU, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty recog-
nises the importance of fundamental rights, including children’s rights on the EU 
agenda96. The reason given was the the particular vulnerability of minors97. In accord-
ance with Directive 2013/32/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 
26 June 2013, on common procedures for the granting or withdrawal of international 
protection, Member States should endeavour to identify applicants who need special 
procedural guarantees for reasons, among others, of their age. With the implementa-
tion of ‘systematic collective refoulements at the borders’, the rights of minors are at 
risk. Many are put again in the hands of sea and land smugglers.  
The analyses carried out in this chapter served not only to construct an evolution-
ary path through the development of the case-law, but they can also reinforce the 
ideology of non-derogable obligation under international law. Along this procedure, 
the ECtHR would clarify constitutive elements that justified the peremptory nature 
of the clause, and also identify other human rights provisions that could not be dis-
associated from its application. 
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1. – Introduction 
The emerging prominence of family migration has set out the scope of protection 
standards applicable to family life in migration contexts in recent decades. The Euro-
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pean Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion (‘CJEU’) have adopted an incidental approach to family life1 at different jurisdic-
tional levels. On the one hand, the ECtHR has extended the reach of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) and applied it to the field of immi-
gration on an eminently case-by-case basis. The Strasbourg Court has extended the 
application of Article 8 to situations of cross-border migration in expulsion and family 
reunion cases, but has broadened its scope to the legal conditions for leave to remain. 
Therefore, several circumstances have been considered, including  the real family sit-
uation, the length of their stay in the country, the behaviour of the individual con-
cerned, the degree of the grasp of the language and customs of the country from which 
they were to be expelled, as well as the seriousness of the difficulties of the parent-
child relationship separation. On the other hand, the CJEU has issued extremely so-
phisticated preliminary rulings and has begun a “quiet revolution” regarding the use 
of a broad interpretation for EU citizens, in contrast with the limited scope of Directive 
2003/86/EC concerning the family members of third-country nationals. Overall, de-
spite the multiple potentialities the EU connection has, the Court has shown a clear 
preference for a more cautious approach, curtailing its positive application to cases 
involving EU minors and third-country national parents.2 
While the rights-protective approach taken in supranational case-law has been gen-
erally significant, it does not seem to have become consolidated, due to reiterated im-
plementation gaps in national contexts. For instance, it has had an unequal impact on 
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national case-law, particularly regarding the resolution of complex cases and the pro-
tection of family life in the cases related to so-called “anchor babies” (children born to 
a non-citizen mother in a country that has birth-right citizenship, which will help the 
mother and other family members gain legal residency). In these cases, minors have 
the nationality of their country of birth and residence, but their family life has been 
altered by the expulsion of one or both of their third-country national parents who are 
illegal residents in the State of which the child is a national.3 These cases are complex 
from the point of view of the weighting of rights because the enforcement of the ex-
pulsion order may collide with other interests which are deserving of greater protec-
tion, such as the child’s best interest, reverse discrimination between dynamic and 
static EU citizens, and their right to enjoy family life and free movement.  
The shift from a sensible to a sensitive approach adopted by the Courts of Stras-
bourg and Luxembourg will be analysed below, followed by an assessment of its real 
impact on the Spanish jurisdiction.4 Spanish natives usually make mistakes when it 
comes to the use of the adjectives ‘sensitive’ and ‘sensible’. These adjectives are 
considered ‘false friends’, because their meaning is exactly the opposite in their orig-
inal language, i.e. the meaning of the word (spelt) as ‘’sensible’ in the Spanish lan-
guage is equivalent to the meaning of the English word ‘sensitive’. Following the 
thread of this paradoxical meaning, this paper seeks to explain two ways of interpret-
ing the protection of parent-child relationship in migration case-law, which have 
evolved over time in an ambiguous and interchangeable way at supranational level. 
The interpretation that relates to the sensible approach is characterised by under-
standing what other families (especially migrant families) need and being helpful 
and the interpretation that is linked to the sensitive approach is based on good judg-
ment, reasonable and practical ideas and understanding family life. These approaches 
should not be in conflict, but they are used in an exclusive and contradictory way, in 
terms of advocating either tolerance or full recognition. I aim to prove that this se-
mantic confusion has been properly resolved at the supranational level, but that it 
continues to be quietly resisted by the Spanish courts. To this end, I focus on two 
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judgments issued in similar cases in the different jurisdictions. These are the Tribu-
nal Constitucional No. 186/2013 and the application of C-165/14, Rendón Martín v 
Spain by the Tribunal Supremo in decision No. 15/2017.5  
2. – The Shift from a Sensible to a Sensitive Approach to the Situation of 
Migrant Families in Strasbourg Case-law 
There have been few attempts in Strasbourg case-law to invoke a right involving 
the unconditional obligation on the part of States Parties to allow at least the closest 
family member(s) of legally resident foreign nationals into their territory under Ar-
ticle 8 of the ECHR.6 However, there have been many attempts to restrict unjustified 
state interference with family life, such as the expulsion of family members.7 The 
case-law of the ECtHR has reiterated that there are individuals who arrive on a tem-
porary visa or illegally and then start a family, and who use this familiar situation as 
a “fait accompli” in order to secure legal residence.8 In some cases, however, the 
child’s best interests have shifted the balance decisively against the removal of a 
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parent on the basis of exceptional circumstances.9 Consequently, respect for migrant 
family life is hardly subject to the real balancing act between the general interests 
and the range of criteria that need to be taken into account when determining whether 
removal is in line with Article 8(2) ECHR. Despite this parallel development in the 
context of the child’s best interests, case-law provides a reasonable variety of rele-
vant factors that contribute to the finding of a violation. The case-law of the ECtHR, 
as outlined above, has identified numerous factors that are relevant to the admission 
of family reunion10 and many that are reflected in its jurisprudence on expulsion.11  
2.1. – A Preliminary Version of the ‘Sensible Approach’ in Case-law of 
the ECtHR 
The first time that the ECtHR faced a specific claim regarding application for 
residence from third-country family members based on Article 8 of the ECHR12 was 
in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the UK, Judgment of 28 May 
1985.13 The ruling of the Court confirmed that state immigration control may inter-
fere with family life and thus contravene Article 8 only when would be impossible 
or extremely burdensome to have a family life in another country.14 Moreover, Dem-
bour and Staiano criticized this vague criterion and moral conception of good mi-
grant families because it seemed to accept family dislocation and assume that only 
 
9
 As in several cases, the Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR, Rodrigues de Silva and 
Hoogkamer v. The Netherlands, Application No. 50435/99, Judgment of 31 January 2006; Nunez v. Nor-
way, Application No. 55597/09, Judgment of 28 June 2011, para. 84. 59; Butt v. Norway, Application No. 
47017/09, Judgment of 4 December 2012; and recently in Said Mohamed Abokar v. Sweden, Application 
No. 23207/16, Judgment of 6 June 2019: “There could be no reasonable or legitimate expectations as to 
possibilities for establishing family life in the Contracting State it was likely only to be exceptional cir-
cumstances that the removal of the non/national family member could constitute a violation of Article 8”.  
10
 NICHOLSON, cit. supra note 7, p. 30 summarized the range of criteria applied.  
11
 NICHOLSON, cit. supra note 7, p. 20 sets out a range of criteria according to Boulatif case and Jeu-
nesse judgments.  
12
 SPIJKERBOER, “Structural Instability: ‘Strasbourg case law on Children's Family Reunion”, Euro-
pean Journal of Migration, 2009, p. 271 ff.  p. 292 . 
13
 European Court of Human Rights, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom, Applica-
tion Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, Judgment of 28 May 1985, paras. 60-69. The judgment of the Court 
was unanimous.  
14
 DEMBOUR, cit. supra note, pp. 96-103. STAIANO, “Income requirements in family reunification re-
gimes”, in The human rights of migrant women in International and European law, The Hague, 2016, p. 3 
ff,, p. 20.  
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bad migrant families15  provoke separation, and they are responsible for their free 
decisions or actions.16 Although strictly speaking this case did not deal with a parent-
child relationship, its argumentation would have repercussions later in the two in-
stances of the case Biao v Denmark,17 where it was considered that the rights were 
guaranteed under Article 14 ECHR.18 Consequently, it was used to justify the objec-
tivity and reasonableness of preventive control measures and the application of une-
qual standards in order to protect the domestic labour market and ensure public order. 
A decade later, there would be two cases concerning the protection of family life 
involving parents and their children where the initial version of the ambiguous “sen-
sible approach” was adopted: Gül v Switzerland19 and the controversial case of Ahmut 
v the Netherlands.20 Although these two decisions expressly alluded to Article 8 of 
the ECHR, state interference was deemed to be justified if family life was reasonably 
feasible in the country of origin, even if this did not consider whether this was equally 
appropriate for a family unit that was made up of parents and their children.21 In both 
cases, the most important protective interest or purpose was the economic welfare of 
the host State, which failed to understand what family migrant members might need 
or find helpful. This is an extremely vague approach to reasonable judgment, and 
 
15
 LA SPINA, “Good/bad migrant families and their integration in European Union, Migraciones inter-
nacionales, 10, 2019, p. 1 ff,, pp. 2-5 
16See European Court of Human Rights, Ejimson v. Germany, Application No. 5681/12, Judgment of 
2 July 2018.  
17
 See Id., Biao v. Denmark, Application No. 38590/10, Judgment (GC) of 24 May 2016, in which the 
Court revoked the Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 25 March 2014, which dealt with the discrimination 
suffered by the applicants on grounds of ethnic origin and nationality. An analysis can be found in 
CARRERA, “The ECtHR’s judgment in Biao v. Denmark: non-discrimination among nationals and family 
reunification as converging European standards”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 
2016, p. 856 ff., p. 859; DE VRIES, “The ECtHR grand chamber's ruling in Biao v. Denmark”, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 2016, p. 467 ff., pp. 468-469. 
18
 See European Court of Human Rights, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom, cit 
supra note 13, paras 73-78. 
19
 See European Court of Human Rights, Gül v Switzerland, Application No. 23218/94, Judgment of 
19 February 1996, para. 38. The judgment was issued with seven votes in favour and two against. This case 
involved a Kurdish asylum seeker of Turkish nationality whose wife suffered an accident and was trans-
ferred to Switzerland to receive medical assistance during the resolution of this petition, leaving the two 
children in the country of origin. The applicants were subsequently denied asylum, but they ultimately were 
granted a residence permit for humanitarian reasons, and they applied for family reunion.  
20
 See European Court of Human Rights, Ahmut v Netherlands, Application No. 21702/93, Judgment 
of 28 November 1996, para. 63. 
21
 See European Court of Human Rights, Ahmut v. Netherlands, cit supra note 20. 
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therefore the granting of the entry permit can be tacitly considered as an unproven 
negative effect that justifies potentially restrictive policies against migrants.22 This 
kind of interpretation of a sensible approach is a controversial rights-protective ap-
proach, because it is only founded in tolerance logic and a wide margin of apprecia-
tion with unlimited scopes. 
2.2. – A Turning Point in the Protection of the Right to Family Life in 
Favour of Relations between Parents and Minor Children in Difficult v. 
Exceptional Circumstances 
The case-law of the ECtHR can be described as being rights-protective, since it 
has established that expelling an individual from the country where they have lived 
and where they have close relatives can seriously interfere with the right to family 
life, and above all, it can cause serious harm to minor dependents. The Strasbourg 
Court has used a different strategy at this turning point by prioritizing the child’s best 
interest and the goal of integration.  
Firstly, the role played by integration conditions in the Judgment of 21 December 
2001, Sen v. the Netherlands23 was a remarkable turning point in the shift of inter-
pretative guidelines from a sensible to a sensitive approach in ECtHR case-law. The 
Strasbourg Court ambiguously considered that there were some obstacles to return 
to the State of origin if other children had been born and raised in the host State and 
were integrated into it. The best interest of the children was proven to be the basis 
for substantiating the essence of the right to family life in the host State. This was 
merely casual, as aptly noted by Van Walsum; the problem of justifying a refusal 
was no longer presented separately from the very basis of the right,24 if such a right 
 
22
 See European Court of Human Rights, Sulejmanovic et Sultanovic, Application No. 57574/00; 
57575/00, Judgment of 8 November 2002; Id. Ejimson v. Germany, Application No. 5681/12, Judgment of 
2 July 2018.  
23
 European Court of Human Rights, Sen v. Netherlands, Application No. 31465796, Judgment of 21 
December 2001, para. 38 and 39, where the Court pointed out that there were several parallels between the 
two cases, para. 40. 
24
 VAN WALSUM, “Comment on the Sen Case. How Wide is the margin of appreciation regarding the 
admission of children for purposes of family reunification”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 
2003, p.511 ff.,  pp. 517-520. 
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existed.25 Therefore, for the first time, in those cases in which parent-children rela-
tionships were at stake, a favourable aspect was not only the presence of other rela-
tives in the host country, but the existence of a certain degree of integration of the 
other members of the family unit into the host country.26 The Court no longer re-
garded family reunification as the only means of ensuring family life in the host 
society, but based its decision on proportionality, which was deemed to be the po-
tentially most suitable and reasonable means for the migrant family as a whole.27 This 
was the first effect of a compounded sensitive and sensible approach at supranational 
level. Both approaches were considered to be interchangeable and part of a compre-
hensive continuum.  
The scenario described above was completed by new progressive case-law on the 
positive obligation of the State, since the Court granted legal residence to a migrant 
family member in subsequent judgments. The Judgment of 1 December 2005, 
Tuquabo-Tekle v. Netherlands, which has certain similarities with the Sen case, 
sought to endorse the favourable decision made by its predecessor.28 But a more de-
veloped sensitive approach was used that was more decisive and balanced in its rea-
soning. However, the Court in several cases held that there would be no violation of 
Article 8 when the children were increasingly able to fend for themselves.29 
Secondly, the defence of the child’s best interest was a keystone in subsequent 
immigration case-law, by referring to the “exceptional circumstances” already men-
tioned in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali.30 The Court introduced 
some sensitive factors to be taken into account on a case-by-case basis in the balanc-
ing act between concerning family life and immigration in analogous cases.  
 
25
 See, however, the dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, supported by Judge Rosso, in the Gül judg-
ment, para. 6, and the affirmative individual votes of Judges Thór, Vilhjálmsson and Berhardt in the Ab-
dulaziz judgment, who based their opinion on the existence of justification for the measure adopted in 
accordance with Article 8, para. 2 of the ECHR.  
26
 VAN WALSUM, cit. supra note 18, p. 518. 
27
 DESMOND, cit. supra note 1, p. 27.  
28
 See European Court of Human Rights, Tuquabo-Tekle v. The Netherlands, Application No. 
60665/00, Judgment of 1 December 2005; Id., Darren Omoregie others v. Norway, Application No. 
265/07, Judgment of 31 July 2008, in para. 57; and Id., Rodrigues da Silva et Hoogkamer v The Nether-
lands, cit. supra note 9. 
29
 The ECtHR held that, while this principle was paramount, it was not a “trump card” for minors over 
15 years of age. See Berisha v. Switzerland, Application No. 948/12, Judgment of 30 July 2013, para. 48; 
A.A. and others v. United Kingdom, Application No. 25960/13, Judgment of 31 March 2016.  
30
 VILJANEN and  HEISKANEN, “The European Court of Human rights: a guardian of minimum stand-
ards in the context of immigration”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2018, p. 174 ff., pp. 190-193.  
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The Judgment of 31 January 2006 (Rodriguez de Silva and Hoogkamer v. Nether-
lands) and the Judgment of 31 July 2008 (Darren Omoregie and others v. Norway) 
are also of interest, even though they were on the border between the negative and 
positive obligations derived from respect for family life. They both confirmed that 
Article 8 had been violated, in the absence of a fair balance between the different in-
terests at stake: the economic prosperity of the country in contrast to the interests of 
maintaining family life for a mother and a daughter, regardless of the administrative 
status of the mother. The case involving Rodrigues Da Silva was a quiet revolution 
because it was the first time that the Court, in the light of the Rome Convention, ex-
amined the refusal by the Dutch authorities to grant a residency application filed by a 
person who had had irregular migrant status throughout her stay in the Contracting 
State. The ECtHR ruled that refusing to grant the residence permit and returning the 
mother to Brazil would render a suitable relationship between the mother and daughter 
impossible; therefore, it was deemed that the government of the Netherlands had to 
allow the mother to live with her daughter for the due protection of the interests of the 
minor. This case-law construction would later be qualified by means of “anti-fraud” 
criteria to avoid unconsciously establishing a wide-ranging precedent of respect for 
family life in illegal situations that contravened migration policies and sovereignty.31 
The judgment in the case of Senigo Longue and Others v. France32 also contains 
useful guidance on the assessment of the child’s best interests in family reunification 
cases. The Court ruled that “it was necessary to institute a procedure that took into 
account the children’s welfare and that the protracted nature and accumulation of the 
difficulties encountered had not enabled the mother to assert her right to live with 
her children, whose situation ought to have been given greater consideration”. The 
same argument was used in another case, focusing on the determination of the child’s 
best interests.33 In its 2016 judgment, the ECtHR underlined the importance of en-
suring that “in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be para-
mount”. It continued: “While the best interests of the child cannot be a ‘trump card’ 
 
31
 See European Court of Human Rights, Rodrigues da Silva v. Netherlands, cit. supra note 9, para. 
43. 
32
 See Id., Senigo Longue et autres c. France, Application No. 19113/09, Judgment of 10 July 2014, 
paras. 67-69 and para. 74.  
33
 See Id., El Ghatet v. Switzerland, Application No. 56971/10, Judgment of 8 November 2016, para. 
47, “the reasoning of domestic decisions is insufficient with any real balancing of the interests in issue 
being absent (..).  
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(…) the domestic courts must place the best interests of the child at the heart of their 
considerations and attach crucial weight to it.” 
At this stage, special mention should be made of two additional judgments con-
cerned family reunification of refugees and persons with complementary/subsidiary 
protection where a sensitive approach was taken.34 The Court considered that it was 
essential for the national authorities to take account of the vulnerability of the appli-
cant when they had encountered “difficulties participating effectively in the family 
reunification procedure and especially in putting forward ‘other elements’ of proof 
of their parent-child relationship and/or the children’s ages”. 
2.3. – A Singular Regression to a Sensible Approach: Parent-Child 
Relationship in Adult Ages 
Beyond the relationship between parents and minor children, it is also worth dis-
cussing the unequal protection of the parent-child relationship in adult ages, which 
can be seen in the judgment of the case of Senchishak v. Finland.35 The ECtHR low-
ered the level of protection and consequently the impact of a sensitive approach, 
allowing the deportation of a 72-year-old woman from Finland to Russia, even 
though the applicant lived with her Finnish-born daughter in Finland. The Court held 
that the reasons given were not sufficient to grant her the right to family life under 
Article 8 of the ECHR, because in the case of adult children and parents the Court 
had stronger requirements than living together and having normal family ties, espe-
cially if the adult children and their relatives had not lived together for some time.36 
Essentially, this decision made a difference in the standards of the protection of fam-
ily reunification between parents and children in adulthood, and interpreted the word 
“family” in a way that was foreign to the cohabitation that existed in multi-genera-
tional environments. In this judgment, the Court placed undue emphasis on the de-
pendency requirement, the interpretation of which clashed with two-way health care 
 
34
 See Id., Mugenzi v. France, Application No. 52701/09, Judgment of 10 July 2014; Id., Tanda-
Muzinga v. France, Application No. 2260/10, Judgment of 10 July 2014, paras. 55 and 58. The Court 
unanimously held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.  
35
 See Id., Senchishak v. Finland, Application No. 5049/12, Judgment of 18 November 2014. For ex-
ample, the comments of ASKOLA “(No) Migrating for Family Care in Later Life: Senchishak v Finland, 
Older Parents and Family Reunification”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2016, p. 351 ff., pp. 
370-372.  
36
 This judgment is a logical continuation of Kwakye-Nti and Dufie v. The Netherlands, Application 
No. 31519/96, Judgment of 7 November 2000; Emonet and others v. Switzerland, Application No. 
39051/03, Judgment of 13 March 2008. 
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and with the care of the elderly in the home. This poses a serious risk of age discrim-
ination and exclusion of modern forms of family life from the material scope of the 
right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
3. – A Two-Speed Approach to Family Life in the Case-law of the CJEU 
As Bernieri pointed out, the CJEU deliberately placed family life in the area of 
the fundamental rights of EU citizens who actively exercise their right to free move-
ment (and their families) as a lever for people to move effectively within the Euro-
pean Union.37 Traditionally, cross-border movement had not been applied in the EU. 
However, a quiet shift from a sensible to a sensitive approach is currently being 
shaped into a two-speed system. The first level is only a restricted “dependent” cat-
egory that includes one family member of third-country nationals, and the second 
level is a “premium category” that includes one family member of the EU minor 
citizen. Although the rights of ‘dynamic’ Union citizens (those who exercise freedom 
of movement) have been considerably extended in accordance with the case-law of 
the Court, the situation is different for ‘static’Union citizens. They were still con-
demned to a certain ‘disregard’ by the respective State, a question which seems to 
be currently changing. 
3.1. – The Right to Family Life of Third-Country Nationals who are 
Relatives of EU Citizens: Supporting the ‘Sensitive Approach’ 
The first judgment by the European Court of Justice on the existence of a right to 
family life for EU citizens indirectly protected the families who wanted to reside in 
a Member State other than their State of origin.38 This was a consequence of the basic 
principle of free movement, and differentiated it from the families of EU citizens 
who had never exercised their freedom of movement.39 Similarly, there were some 
leading cases40 that considered the extension of the right to reunify families who had 
 
37
 BERNIERI, cit. supra note 3, p. 290. JIMÉNEZ BLANCO, “Movilidad transfronteriza de personas, 
vida familiar y derecho internacional privado”, Revista Electrónica de Estudios internacionales, 35, 2018, 
p. 1 ff., pp.2-5.  
38
 See Case C-249/86, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
ECR, 1989, I-01263, pp. 9, 10 and 11. 
39
 See Case C-35/82, Morson and Jhanjan v. Netherlands, Judgment of 27 October 1982, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:368, para. 18. 
40
 See Case C-466/00, Arben Kaba v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 6 March 2003, 
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“close family links to the EU” and were residents of another Member State.41 There-
fore, in all of them, the links that third-country nationals who were related to EU 
citizens had to EU countries generated a right of residence for certain family mem-
bers, which could only be restricted in exceptional cases that fulfilled strict require-
ments. However, as of 2000, the Court, despite not being totally inclined to expand 
the link to European Union law, finally started to make the choice42 to be more fa-
vourable to an “EU sensitive approach.”43 This was so significant that it resulted in 
two preliminary questions brought by the Dutch Council of State44 and in an opinion 
given by the General Advocate that considered that the sensitive approach renewed 
and reinforced the spirit of Ruiz Zambrano.45  The transition from a sensible to a 
sensitive approach has been limited on the basis of a possible connection to EU citi-
zenship or of a total exclusion of the migrant category in the strict sense. There is 
only one exception: Minor children who are EU citizens and are living with third-
country national parents, but only in “exceptional circumstances”. 
 
 
 
 
 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:127 para. 25. Vid. PEERS, “Dazed and confused: family members’ residence rights and 
the Court of Justice”, European Law Review, 2001, p. 76 ff., p 79-82. 
41
 See Case C-370/90, Singh v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 Luly 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:296, 
para. 20. 
42
 See Case C-109/01, Akrich v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2003:112, paras. 55, 56, 58, 59 and 60. 
43
 See Case C-413/99, Baumbas v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 17 September 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, paras. 71-75; Case C-459/99, Mrax v. Belgium, Judgment of 25 July 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:461, para. 53; Case C-148/02, García Avello v. Belgium, Judgment of the Court of 2 
October 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, para. 21; Case C-200/02, Chen, Judgment of the Court of19 October 
2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, para. 45; Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Belgium, Judgment of the Court 
of 8 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124; Case C-356/11 and C-357/11, Maahanmuuttovirasto, v. Finland, 
Judgment of 6 December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:776. See VAN ELSUWEGE and KOCHENOVB; “On The 
Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship and Family Reunification Rights”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, 2011, p. 443 ff., pp. 461-465. 
44
 See Case C-456/12, O. v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, and Minister voor Immi-
gratie, Integratie en Asiel, v. B, Judgment of 12 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:135; and Case C-457/12, 
S. v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v. G, 
Judgment of 12 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:136. 
45
 Case C-165/14 Rendón Marín v. State Administration, and C-304/14, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. CS, C-304/14, Opinion of Advocate General Maciej Szpunar, 4 February 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:75, point 96 and ff. 
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3.2. – The Special Protection of Family Life for EU Citizen Minor Children 
and Third-Country National Parents: the ‘Sensitive Approach’ Used in the 
Rendón case 
The uniqueness of the Rendón case, brought as a preliminary ruling before the 
CJEU, illustrates the difficulties involved in cases of family protection (concerning 
parent and child) in Spain and their possible link to the European Union. Mr Rendón 
was a Colombian citizen and had exclusive guardianship and custody of two children 
who had EU citizenship (a son who was a Spanish national and a daughter who was 
a Polish national). His application for a residence permit was rejected due to his 
criminal record. The crucial difference between the facts of the two cases is that Mr 
Rendón Marín had a Union citizen daughter who lived in a host Member State, and 
a son who lived in his home Member State. There was  a cross-border component in 
his daughter’s situation, but not in his son's, and a possible contradiction with Euro-
pean Union Law. Moreover, Article 31.4 of the Spanish Immigration Act requires 
that applications for a residence permit be automatically refused in exceptional cir-
cumstances when a third-country national has a criminal record.  
The CJEU's decision reformulated the meaning conveyed in the request for a pre-
liminary ruling made by the Tribunal Supremo (the Spanish Supreme Court) both 
within the scope of Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38, and of Article 20 TFEU. 
After the ruling of the CJEU, the Tribunal Supremo issued a decision that ordered 
not to apply the Spanish Immigration Act, given that it was in contradiction with 
European Union Law. From a strictly interpretative point of view, this case followed 
the Ruiz Zambrano decision and made it very clear that protection under Article 20 
TFEU is only applicable to a very small number of people in “very specific situa-
tions”, essentially only to minors who reside with their third-country national parents 
in their home Member State.46 However, the decision was focused on the conse-
quences of a refusal under national legislation. The Spanish Immigration Act re-
quired that those children leave the territory of the European Union and de facto 
forced family separation between them because their father had a criminal record. 
 
46
 See Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen v. United Kingdom, Judgment of the Court of 19 October 2004, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, para. 45; and Case C-86/12, Alokpa and Moudoulou v. Luxembourg, Judgment of 
10 October 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:645, para. 28. On the interest of the minor KLAASEN, RODRIGUES, “The 
Best Interests of the Child in EU Family Reunification Law: A Plea for More Guidance on the Role of 
Article 24(2) Charter”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2017, p. 191 ff., pp. 191-203.  
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The CJEU confirmed that there had been cases of EU citizen minors who had a third-
country national parent where the Court had ruled for the applicant because other-
wise EU citizen minors would have been deprived of their right to residence.47 
In the Rendón case there was clearly a right to residence, but the issue of the 
parent’s criminal record came into play; according to the literal meaning of Directive 
2004/38, the stronger the degree of integration of Union citizens and their family 
members is, the greater the degree of protection against expulsion will be. Limita-
tions under Directive 2004/38 are only for reasons of public order or public safety 
(Article 27). But this reservation must be strictly interpreted, and its scope cannot be 
unilaterally determined by Member States. Limitations must be consistent with the 
principle of proportionality and with an individual examination of each citizen's con-
duct. It is important to bear in mind that, under Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38, 
previous criminal convictions cannot in themselves constitute grounds for taking 
public policy or public security measures. In fact, the personal conduct of the indi-
vidual concerned must represent a genuine and present threat to a fundamental inter-
est of the society or of the Member State concerned.48 In the Rendón case, the mere 
existence of a criminal record had automatically triggered the refusal of the applica-
tion for residence; no examination of proportionality and no analysis of the individ-
ual's conduct or of the effect on public order or public safety had been conducted.49 
Some domestic decisions revealed a lack of balanced reasoning of  the interests in-
volved, which was contrary to the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention in the 
above mentioned cases.  
 
47
 Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Belgium, Opinion of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, 30 
September 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:560, paras. 77 and 78. 
48
 In this regard, see Case C-41/74, van Duyn v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 4 December 1974, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:133, para. 18; Case C-30/77, Bouchereau v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 October 
1977, ECLI:EU:C:1977:172, para. 33; Cases Georgios Orfanopoulos and Others (C-482/01) and Raffaele 
Oliveri (C-493/01) v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Judgment of 29 April 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:262, para. 
65; Case C-441/02, Commission v. Germany, Judgment of 27 April 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:253, para. 34; 
Case C-50/06, Commission v Netherlands, Judgment of 7 June 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:325, para. 42. 
DABROWSKA-KLOSINSKA, “The right to family reunification vs. integration conditions for third country 
nationals. The CJEU’s approach and the read not taken”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2018, 
p. 251 ff., pp. 280-285. 
49
 See Case C-33/07, Jipa v. Romania, Judgment of 10 July 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:396, paras. 23 and 
24; and Case C-145/09, Tsakouridis v. Germany, Judgment of 23 November 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:708, 
para. 48. 
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Finally, the judgment of C-133/15, H.C. Chavez-Vilchez,50 addressed the impact of 
the presence of the other parent in the country (if they are a citizen of that Member State) 
and who bore the burden of proof. In this case, the analysis focused on two different 
situations. On the one hand, the situation of Ms Chávez-Vílchez's daughter, in applica-
tion of Article 5(1) Directive 2004/38 and Article 21 TFEU, on the grounds that the 
minor was an EU citizen who had exercised the right of movement. And, on the other 
hand, the situation of the children of the other appellants, also minors, who had always 
resided with their mothers in the Member State of which they were nationals and, there-
fore, they had not exercised the right of movement under Article 20 TFEU.  
With regard to the real consolidation of the “sensitive approach”, the main con-
tribution made by this judgment was that “the primary day-to-day care of the child 
is a relevant factor, but it is not in itself a sufficient ground”. Therefore, the CJEU 
did not limit itself exclusively to the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU, but consid-
ered that protecting the child’s best interests was central to the examination of the 
consequences of depriving the child “of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen”.51 Moreover, the Grand 
Chamber concluded that it was necessary to determine in that specific case “which 
parent assumes the effective custody of the child, and whether there is an effective 
relationship of dependence between the child and the parent who is a national of a 
third country”. In addition, it added that the referring judge, “must” take into account 
“the right to family life, as recognised in Article 7 of the Charter”, which “must be 
interpreted in relation to the obligation to take into consideration the child’s best 
interests, recognised in Article 24(2) of the Charter”. 
 
 
 
50
 ESPINO GARCÍA, “La protección del Estatuto de ciudadanía de la Unión en la última jurisprudencia 
de Justicia de la Unión Europea (TJUE). A propósito de los asuntos Rendón Marín (C-165/14, Chávez 
Vilchez C-133-15) y Toufik Lounes (C-165/16)”, Revista de Derecho de la UNED, 2018, p. 733 ff, p. 740. 
See Case C-133/15, HC Chavez-Vilchez. v. Netherlands, Judgment of 10 May 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:354, 
paras. 76 and 77. DI COMITÉ, “Derecho de residencia de los progenitores nacionales de terceros estados e 
interés superior del niño “europeo”. Comentario a la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia Gran Sala de 10 de 
mayo de 2017 en el asunto Chávez-Vílchez”, Revista de Derecho comunitario europeo, 2017, p. 1041 ff. 
P. 1056-1058. 
51
 See Case C-540/03, European Parliament case v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 27 
June 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429. The subsequent judgments followed in the wake of the provisions of 
that Judgment. In this regard, the CJEU referred to Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11, O and others v. Finland, 
Judgment of 6 December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:776, para. 77.  
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4. – The Minimal Impact of a Rights-Protective Approach to Family Life 
in the Case-law of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional  
Faced with the recognition of the right to family life, the Tribunal Constitucional 
has traditionally only regarded as fundamental rights those rights recognised in Sec-
tion 1, Chapter 2, Title One of the Spanish Constitution, which are protected by an 
appeal before the Constitutional Court (Article 53 of the Spanish Constitution). The 
Tribunal Constitucional has expressly recognised that the interpretation of Article 
10.2 of the Constitution refers to the rights included in Articles 14 to 38 of the Con-
stitution. Therefore, Article 39 has not been interpreted as falling within the scope of 
Article 10.2, although this may be excessively categorical, since the Court has never 
denied that it can be extended to other rights.  
4.1. – The Shift from a Sensible to a Sensitive Approach in the Case-law 
of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional: a Regressive Paradigm  
These preliminary considerations on the scope of the interpretation of rights are 
essential to reconsider whether a sensible or a sensitive approach can be adopted in 
connection with the quality of the right to family life for migrants in Spain, and the 
extent to which that approach is narrow or broad. This would determine whether the 
exercise of this right could be restricted or limited if the right-holders are immigrants. 
This dichotomy was addressed in Judgment 236/2007 of the Tribunal Constituci-
onal, which expressly stated that family reunification, despite the ambiguity of the 
Immigration Act and its connection with Article 18 of the Constitution, strictly 
speaking is not a human right, and therefore its exercise can be limited in migration 
contexts.52 However, denying its nature as a fundamental right is certainly controver-
sial, in the light of the arguments posed by the Court itself and by the interpretative 
 
52
 See para. 10 and 11 of the Tribunal Constitucional, Judgement of 7 November 2007, No. 236/2007, 
(BOE No. 295 of 10 December, 2007), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-
ES/Resolucion/Show/6203> and its referral in Tribunal Constitucional, Judgment of 20 November 2007, 
no. 260/2007, no. 261/2007, No. 262/2007, No. 263/2007, No. 264/2007, No. 265/2007, (BOE No. 19 of 
22 January 2008). And, among others see Tribunal Constitucional, Judgement of 30 September 1985, no. 
99/1985, (BOE  No. 265 of 5 November 1985), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-
ES/Resolucion/Show/479>; Judgement of 7 July 1987, No.115/1987 (BOE Nº 180 of July 29 1987), avail-
able at: <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-T-1987-17724>; Judgement of 22 March 1993, No. 
4/1993 (BOE No. 37 of 27 April 1993), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-
ES/Resolucion/Show/2133>; Judgement of 29 March 1993, No.116/1993 (BOE No. 107 of 5 May 1993), 
available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/2245>,;Judgement of 29 July 
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clause of Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution.  
As Quiros Fons indicated, most of the legal doctrine on the matter supports the 
latter interpretation, since it considers the articulation and categorisation of family 
reunification as a fundamental right of foreign migrants to be a complex matter.53 
However, it disregards the different forms that the reconstitution or maintenance of 
the family unit can take in the context of family migration. On the one hand, in gen-
eral terms, it describes all the possible rights at stake in terms of the normal conduct 
of family life, that is, both the admission and the expulsion of the various members 
of a migrant family. As argued by Bhabha and Kofman, both dimensions cause the 
same disruption to the family unit, because for minors the separation of the family 
resulting from the expulsion of a parent can be as devastating as the refusal of family 
reunification.54  
Different categories have been established regarding the fundamental right to 
family privacy and the mandate to protect family life, in response to the legal classi-
fication of the right to family reunification.55 Under this articulation, both concepts 
 
1994, No. 242/1994 (BOE No. 197 of 18 August 1994), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-
ES/Resolucion/Show/2759> ; Judgement of 22 May 2003, No. 95/2003 (BOE No. 139 of 10 June 2003), 
available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/Resolucion/Show/4870>; Judgement of 4 April 2005, 
No. 72/2005 (BOE No. 111 of 10 May 2005), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-
ES/Resolucion/Show/5332> . 
53
 Many authors are in favour of this recognition of a “derived right” or a right that is instrumental to 
family reunification. For instance, QURIÓS FONS, La familia del extranjero. Regímenes de reagrupación e 
integración, Valencia, 2008, pp. 35-49. However, there are others who disagree with this assessment, in-
cluding GARCÍA VÁZQUEZ, El estatuto jurídico-constitucional del extranjero en España, Valencia, 2007, 
pp. 56-68. 
54
 BHABHA, ‘Children, Migration and international norms’, in ALEINJOFF and CHETAIL (eds.), Migra-
tion and International legal Norms, The Hague, 2003, p. 185 ff,, p. 223; KOFMAN. “Family migration as a 
class matter”, International Migration, 2018, p. 33 ff., p. 40. 
55
 Among others, see Tribunal Constitucional Judgement of 27 October 1998, No. 209/1998 (BOE 
No. 288 of 2 December, 1998), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-
ES/Resolucion/Show/3711>; Judgement of 1 December 1988, No. 231/1988 (BOE No. 307, of 2 December 
1988), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/1172>; Judgemnt of 17 
October 1991, No. 197/1991 (BOE, No. 274 of 15 November 1991), available at: <http://hj.tribunalcon-
stitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/1836>; Judgement of 11 April 1994, No. 99/1994 (BOE No. 117 of 
17 May, 1994), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/2616>; Judge-
ment of 9 May 1994, No. 143/1994 (BOE no. 140, 13 June, 1994), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitu-
cional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/2660; Judgement of 16 December 1996, No. 207/1996 (BOE No. 19 of 
22 January 1996), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/ca/Resolucion/Show/3259>; Judgement 
of 10 April 2000, No. 98/2000 (BOE No. 119 of 18 May 2000), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstituci-
onal.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/4082>;  and Judgement of 2 July 2001, No. 156/2001 (BOE No. 178 of 26 
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represent two profoundly different legal concepts that affect the content of the right, 
the subject of the right, and the possible limits to, and conditions of, exercise and 
protection. This preference for the optimisation mandate bypassed the fact that the 
existence of family life can be a fundamental presupposition for family intimacy, 
thus rendering the protection of the family inoperative from the viewpoint of the 
optimisation mandate.56  
The existing case-law of the Tribunal Constitucional57 does not tend to broaden 
the content of family privacy, in order to prevent any elements of family life (other 
than the strictly private ones) from falling in the scope of family reunification. In 
fact, the Tribunal Constitucional has ruled on the scope of family privacy from an 
information-based point of view, thus ensuring some immunity from outside inter-
ference. According to significant case-law decisions contained in Judgment 
119/2001 (of 24 May), Judgment 186/2000 (of 10 July), and Judgment 107/1984 of 
the Tribunal Constitucional,58 it can be concluded that a number of rights exist, in-
 
July 2001), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/4452>. 
56
 A critique of the sustainability of a constitutional doctrine that denies the extension of the right to 
family life in Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution can be found in JIMENA QUESADA, “La cuestión prej-
udicial europea ante planteamientos más que dudosos”, UNED Teoría y realidad constitucional, 39, 2017,  
p. 271 ff.,  p. 282. 
57
 Tribunal Constitucional, Judgement of 2 December 1998, No. 231/1988 (BOE No. 207 of 2 Decem-
ber, 1988), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/1172>; Judgement 
of17 October 1991, No. 197/1991 (BOE No. 274 of 15 November 1991), available at: <http://hj.tribunal-
constitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/1836>; Judgement of 5 April 2000, No. 115/2000 (BOE No. 136 
of 7 July 2000), available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/4099>, Judge-
ment of 25 November 1997, No. 201/1997 (BOE No. 312 of 30 December 1997), available at: <http://hj.tri-
bunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/3466>. 
58
 The latter is well known due to the threefold classification of fundamental rights and freedoms in 
relation to their subjects of the rights and their exercise by foreigners. See, among others, Judgments of the 
Tribunal Constitucional, Judgement of 23 November 1984,No. 107/1984 (BOE No. 265 of 23 November 
1984) on the right to life, physical and moral integrity, privacy and religious freedom, available at: 
<http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/HJ/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/SENTENCIA/1984/107>; Judgement of 
30 September 1985, No. 99/1985 (BOE No. 254 of 5 May 1985) on the right to effective judicial protection, 
available at: <http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/479>; Judgement of 22 May 2003 
No. 95/2003 (BOE No. 138 of 10 June 2003) on the instrumental right to free legal assistance, available at: 
<http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/Resolucion/Show/4870>; Judgement of 26 September 1990, No. 
144/1990, (BOE No. 254 of 23 October 1990) on the right to freedom and security, available at: 
<http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/1569> and Judgement of 29 May 2000 No. 
137/2000 (BOE No. 156 of 30 June 2000)  on the right not to be discriminated against, available at: < 
http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/es-ES/Resolucion/Show/4121>. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Protection of the Migrant Parent-Child Relationship … 219 
 
 
cluding family privacy, without any distinction based on regular or irregular migra-
tion status. The conditions for exercising these rights, just as practically any other, 
can be limited according to the proportionality to the aim sought and by providing 
sufficient grounds. On this point, the case-law of the Tribunal Constitucional is a 
long way from the latest sensitive approach applied by the case-law of the Strasbourg 
Court. The Spanish Court does not assume that the right to family life exists, as the 
ECtHR does; it imposes limits to the application of the legal grounds for expulsion 
of foreign nationals, taking into account the circumstances of the case and the weigh-
ing of the interests at stake.59  
4.2. – The Impact of Judgment 186/2013 of the Tribunal Constitucional: 
an Unexpectedly ‘Sensitive Approach’ 
There are clear differences between the case-law of the Tribunal Constitucional 
and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on this matter. The most 
eloquent instance can be found in Judgment 186/2013 of the Tribunal Constitucional,60 
which combined facts involving two supranational judgments: the Rendón case and 
the case of Rodrigues da Silva v. Netherlands. In this case, the Tribunal Constitucional 
heard an appeal for relief against the expulsion of a third-country national who was the 
mother of a Spanish minor and had been ordered to be expelled from Spain because 
she had been convicted of a crime, despite having legal residence in Spain. In addition, 
the minor’s father was in prison at the time the judgment was handed down. One of 
the most debatable arguments in the ruling of the Tribunal Constitucional ruling was 
that in this case, the administrative decision that ordered the mother to be expelled 
from Spain ( regardless of how much this might affect her Spanish minor daughter) 
did not entail any legal obligation to leave Spain.61 It also concluded that her funda-
mental right to remain in Spain under Article 19 of the Spanish Constitution would be 
 
59
 By way of example, see European Court of Human Rights, Shevanova v. Latvia, Application No. 
58822/00, Judgment of 15 June 2006; Id., Kaftailova v Latvia, Application No. 59643/00, Judgment of 22 
June 2006; Id., Bashir and others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 65028/01, Judgment of 14 June 2007; Id., 
Musa and others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 61259/00, Judgment of 11 January 2007; Id.,  Gablishvili v. 
Russia, Application No. 39428/12, Judgment of 26 June 2014. 
60
 See Judgment of the Tribunal Constitucional Judgementof 4 November 2013, cit supra note 5, legal 
ground 6 and the individual vote by Judges Adela Asua Batarrita and Fernando Valdés Dal-Ré on the 
Judgment issued in appeal for relief No. 2022-2012. 
61
 QUICIOS MOLINA, “Sentencia del Tribunal constitucional 186/2013, de 23 de noviembre de 2013. 
Límites a la aplicación del art. 57.2 LOEX: el derecho a la vida familiar de los menores”, in MARTÍNEZ 
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violated, taking into account that  the child’s best interest necessarily involved accom-
panying her mother to her country of origin, either because she had no family ties in 
Spain, or because only her mother could support her. 
In other words, in the opinion of the Tribunal Constitucional, Article 18 does not 
protect the right to family life of minors with their parents. The Court considered that 
a 7-year-old child has the capacity to decide whether she would want to stay with her 
mother or with her father in the event of a forced separation of their parents (although 
her father was in prison). However, the key aspect, according to the dissenting vote, 
was the connection between Article 19 of the Spanish Constitution and Article 39.1 of 
the Spanish Constitution. The protection of the family was extended to cohabitation of 
the minor with her mother, because in order to support her, she would be forced to 
leave Spain; and it would be constitutionally inadmissible to have such a contradiction 
between a fundamental right and the guiding principle to the extent that it would be 
impossible to satisfy both. It must also be linked to Article 39.3 on the duty of parents 
to provide assistance to their children in every way, which in this case would also 
become impossible for the mother if her daughter stayed in Spain, exercising her right 
to freely choose her place of residence while the mother was expelled. 
According to the dissenting vote and in line with a more sensitive approach, it 
was mistaken to argue that the focus on the child’s best interest necessarily involved 
leaving with her mother, either because of the lack of family ties and support in 
Spain, or because only she was able to support her daughter. This clearly showed the 
use of a “sensible” rather than a “sensitive” approach, which ignored more important 
issues. Parents must provide their children with all kinds of assistance, and not just 
maintenance. The Court’s position disregarded the affective factor and the educa-
tional task that falls on parents according to Article 154.1 of the Spanish Civil Code, 
which stipulates that they should watch over their children, have them in their com-
pany, feed them, bring them up and provide them with comprehensive education.  
Fortunately, there has been no opportunity to review and contrast the interpreta-
tion of the Tribunal Constitucional, since the appeal for relief that was dismissed in 
Judgment 186/2013 of the Tribunal Constitucional was referred to the Strasbourg 
Court. The Spanish State ultimately acquiesced to the plaintiff’s claim and recog-
nised that her rights had been violated, so the dispute was settled out of court. This 
case opened the possibility of referring cases to the supranational jurisdiction once 
 
VÁZQUEZ DE CASTRO, ESCRIBANO TORTAJADA, Comentarios a la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional en 
materia civil, Valencia, 2009, p. 151 ff., pp. 151-156. 
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the internal route had been exhausted, but the case was resolved and set aside before 
the administrative resolution by which the expulsion of the plaintiff (G.V.A) was 
issued. The execution was suspended by the interim relief obtained from the ECtHR 
under Article 34 in fine of the Convention and Article 39 of the Rules of Procedure. 
In particular, the grounds for the decision were the violation of the right to an effec-
tive remedy under Article 13 in relation to Article 8 (both of the ECHR). It was based 
on the fact that the judgments of the national jurisdiction had failed to correctly in-
terpret and apply Article 57.2 of Organic Law 4/2000, of 11 January, on Rights and 
Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain. Article 57.5.b) of said Organic Law requires taking 
into account the consequences that an expulsion would have for the applicant and 
the other members of his or her family. Suffice it to recall that a judgment is highly 
likely to be changed, given the precedent of the ECtHR judgment of 10 April 2012 
against Spain in the case of K.A.B v Spain.62 This case involved the expulsion of a 
mother which led to the father losing contact with his child when the latter was con-
sidered to be without parental care, and later fostered and adopted. 
5. – Final Remarks  
Despite current advances at supranational level, the gradual shift from a sensible 
to a sensitive approach in the case-law of the ECtHR is fully focused on recognising 
the right from a perspective of exceptionality or as a kind of privilege. This excep-
tionality not only poses limitations to the chaotic circumstantial grounds for the con-
duct of family life; it also puts at risk its national interpretation, which denies any 
rebuttable presumption of the right to family unity in migration contexts by issuing 
a reactive discourse in favour of the circumstantial exercise of the right. A logic that 
contrasts with the existence of contradictory solutions without the de facto assump-
tions differing substantially from each other, leading to a possible risk of unpredict-
ability and legal uncertainty.  
While Article 8 is essentially intended to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities, it is not limited to imposing on the State the duty 
to refrain from such interference; rather, this negative obligation tends to add positive 
obligations that are inherent to the effective respect for private and family life. In 
 
62
 Also, more recently, the priority of this right over others was highlighted in the European Court of 
Human Rights, K.A.B v. Spain, Application No. 59819/08, Judgment of 10 April 2012; and in Id., R.M.S. 
v. Spain, Application No. 28775/12, Judgment of 18 June 2014, in which the Court upheld that there had 
been a violation, as the applicant’s right to respect for her family and private life had been breached. 
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both cases, the fair balance between the concurrent interests of the individual and 
those of society as a whole must be respected, and the State must put forward specific 
reasons in light of the circumstances of the case.  
This is particularly important considering that the Member State in question (in 
this case, Spain) does not respect the doctrine established by both European Courts, 
especially in the Rendón Case and the Chavez Vilchez case. In fact, in opposition to 
the Tribunal Supremo decision, the interpretation of the Tribunal Constitucional had 
traditionally been that the Spanish Constitution does not recognise a “right to family 
life” in the same terms as the ECtHR interprets Article 8.1 ECHR and the CJUE 
outlines Article 7 of the European Chapter. This clearly shows proof a predominant 
preference for an exclusively “sensible approach” and the reluctance to apply a real 
“sensitive approach” or reasonable judgment according to family needs and vulner-
able or exceptional circumstances, as in the Rendón case, for example. Paradoxi-
cally, in the light of the individual opinion of the 2013 judgment, if the right to family 
life were taken into consideration, a “sensitive approach” could begin to be generated 
in accordance with Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution. This may result in a 
right for family members to have a relationship with each other, since family life is 
not respected if the bond between the minor and each of their parents is protected on 
a separate basis.  
Therefore, despite the acquiescence by the Tribunal Constitucional and its recog-
nition that it had misinterpreted the case-law of the ECtHR, the Tribunal Constituci-
onal urgently needs to allow and facilitate normal family life to be enjoyed, regard-
less of where it takes place or of the legal status of the minor’s parents.63 This would 
involve making a more teleological interpretation and updating the current suprana-
tional standards of both European Courts according to the key principle of the child’s 
best interest and of proportionality. There is a need to find appropriate solutions to 
accommodate the interests of family migrants and respect for family life rights, as 
well as the necessity to protect the most vulnerable individuals in a manner that is 
consistent with current social norms and human rights. 
 
 
 
63
 ROGERS, “Immigration and the European Convention on Human Rights: are new principles emerging?”, 
European Human Rights Law Review, 2003, p. 53 ff., p. 58. 
BRUNO, PALOMBINO, DI STEFANO (eds.), Migration Issues before International Courts and Tribunals, Rome, CNR 
Edizioni, 2019, ISBN 978 88 8080 367 6, pp. 223-274. 
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1. – Preliminary Remarks 
According to this volume goal to analyze the international case-law on migration 
and migrants, the chapter aims at analysing the jus migrandi – if we can name it so 
– developed in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, mainly (but not exclu-
sively) by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, also ‘the Court’, 
the ‘IACtHR’, or ‘San José judges’) in its case-law on migration issues, and to ex-
plore its contribution to the application and the development of legal rules on human 
migration.  
The pertinent corpus of decisions is not extensive, and it is somewhat recent. 
Three advisory opinions (‘OC’, from the Spanish Opinión Consultiva) are especially 
relevant, the first of which was adopted in 2003 on the legal status of undocumented 
migrants,1 the second addressed rights of migrant children (2014),2 and the third ex-
plored the right to asylum (2018). 3 Additionally, several contentious cases are perti-
nent as well, such as, for instance, the judgement in case Vélez Loor of 20104 and the 
2016 decision in the case Wong.5  
Among others, two features can be found in the IACtHR case-law. Firstly, the 
presence of landmark decisions (e.g. OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants and case 
Vélez Loor) that set and recognize relevant bases for the construction of Inter-Amer-
ican standards on the protection of migrants, which influence future decisions by 
virtue of the already affirmed standards. Secondly, the distinction between conten-
tious cases and advisory opinions in building the protection of migrants in the Inter-
American System of Human Rights has proven to be quite positive in terms of build-
ing the jus migrandi, since it is possible to explore what conduct is required even 
 
1
 IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03 of 17 September 2003 (hereinafter, OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants).  
2
 IACtHR, Rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need of international 
protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of 19 August 2014 (hereinafter, OC-21/14 on Migrant Children). 
3
 IACtHR, The institution of asylum, and its recognition as a human right under the Inter-American 
System of Protection (interpretation and scope of Articles 5, 22(7) and 22(8) in relation to Article 1(1) of 
the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-25/18 of 30 May 2018 (hereinafter, 
OC-25/18 on the Right of Asylum). 
4
 IACtHR, case of Vélez Loor v. Panama (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 
Judgment of 23 November 2010 (hereinafter, case Vélez Loor). 
5
 IACtHR, case of Wong Ho Wing v. Peru (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 
Judgment of 30 June 2015 (hereinafter, case Wong). 
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when no individual application has been filed, and due to the control of convention-
ality doctrine States must take into account and strive to follow what the Court indi-
cates. Furthermore, unlike what happens with contentious jurisdiction judgements, 
advisory opinions can offer interpretative clarifications on international obligations 
in migration contexts to all Member States of the Organization of America States 
(‘OAS’), including those which have not accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdic-
tion (e.g., the USA).6 For instance, in the very recent OC-25/18 on the Right of Asy-
lum, the Court took into account its previous judgements, starting with the leading 
case Vélez Loor, extending de facto the progressively-built protection standards to 
all the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
Moreover, it’s due underlining that with the main bodies of the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights having been so important in terms of the promotion and 
protection of human rights in the region of the Americas, and with the region having 
faced migration issues in human rights terms, it is not surprising to find, as will be 
explored in this Chapter, developments promoting an evolutionary and progressive 
protection of the rights of migrants, whether they are refugees or not. This is of the 
utmost importance, considering that there are xenophobia, abuses, lack of enjoyment 
of rights, and other problems (mentioned in international instruments, such as the 
2001 Durban Declaration)7 that many migrants have suffered throughout the world. 
Thus, in addition to addressing regional issues, the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights can set some examples that may be followed elsewhere. 
That being said, for presentation purposes, we have chosen to select some issues, 
i.e. the peculiar situation of irregular migrant workers and children, the issue of na-
tionality as an element strictly connected to the migrant status, the (fundamental) 
non-refoulement principle, the issue of asylum and refugees and, finally, mass de-
portations. In addition, we will consider the pertinent case-law in order to identify 
what the Court has said with regard to obligations of respect (to refrain from abuses) 
 
6
 See OLMOS GIUPPONI, “Assessing the evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 
protection of migrants’ rights: past, present and future”, The International Journal of Human Rights, 2017, 
p. 1482 ff. See also ROA SÁNCHEZ, “Hacia la unificación del derecho al asilo”, DPCE Online, 2018, n. 3, p. 
797 ff. and ALIVERTI, “The Promise of Human Rights? The Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion on 
the Rights of Migrant Children”, 2014, available at: <http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk>. 
7
 United Nations, World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, A/Conf.189/12, 8 September 2001. 
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and protection of migrants – even from non-State abuses, and how those duties some-
times impose limits on State action, and whether this creates some tension with sov-
ereignty-related aspects. The selected issues approach of this text permits to highlight 
sensitive elements on the rights of migrants in the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights and permits to help readers identify the standards that are applicable in certain 
situations. That being said, the IACtHR itself has also provided a document on some 
salient aspects of its own case-law on the matter.8  
Before exploring the IACtHR case-law, we also describe some relevant elements 
found in the practice of other OAS bodies, especially the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights (hereinafter, also the IACHR). They can complement the ac-
tions of the Court in a preventive manner and address recommendations based on 
both the law and humanitarian concerns, thus acting in ways that address migrants’ 
problems and needs, and are not always satisfactorily dealt with by jurisdictional 
decisions. While internal displacement may involve both nationals and foreigners, it 
is a dynamic that pertains mobility inside State borders, reason why, although it does 
involve human rights considerations, it deserves a separate analysis on how the Inter-
American System of Human Rights has treated it, as it has also been done elsewhere.9  
2. – Migration Issues before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and Other OAS Bodies 
While the pronouncements of the IACtHR garner a well-deserved attention, it 
would be a mistake to study the developments in the Inter-American System of Hu-
man Rights without looking beyond what that Court has decided. This is because one 
of the defining features of that system, when compared with others such as the one 
of the Council of Europe, is the fact that the Court is not the only main body in its 
midst, being the Commission the other one.10 Furthermore, political bodies as the 
 
8
 IACtHR, Cuadernillo de jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos n. 2: 
personas en situación de migración o refugio, 2017, available at: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr>. 
9
 See CARRILLO-SANTARELLI, “Inter-American and Colombian developments and contributions on the 
protection of persecuted internally displaced persons”, in KATSELLI PROUKAKI (ed.), Armed Conflict and 
Forcible Displacement: Individual Rights under International Law, Abingdon, Oxon-New York, 2018, p. 
139 ff. 
10
 On the Inter-American System of Human Rights see, inter alia, PASQUALUCCI, The Practice and 
Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cambridge, 2003; RODRÍGUEZ-PINZON, “Basic 
Facts of the Individual Complaint Procedure of the Inter-American Human Rights System”, in 
ALFREDSSON et al. (eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob 
Th. Möller, Leiden-Boston, 2009, p. 619 ff. 
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General Assembly and Permanent Council of the Organization of American States 
also have the power to address migration and human rights issues. Both the Com-
mission and those bodies can act in furtherance of the protection of migrants in ways 
that complement the actions of the Court. 
As to the Commission, it is important to bear in mind that it can adopt a proactive 
approach towards recent developments and issue recommendations to both origin 
and host States of migrants due to, among others, its mandate and function to pro-
mote the observance of human rights in the Americas. Indeed, Article 41 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, also the ‘ACHR’) mentions 
that the “main function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and de-
fence of human rights”. Unlike what happens in dynamics before jurisdictional bod-
ies such as the Court, there is no need of a prior application and a contentious proce-
dure for such a mandate to take place, and the Commission can study a wide array 
of legal implications that often go beyond what is specifically discussed before a 
Court in reports, press releases and other ways. Furthermore, promotion initiatives 
provide for recommendations with multiple addressees, as exemplified below. The 
Commission can thus act by virtue of different acts, such as the publishing of the-
matic or country reports in which migration matters are addressed; the adoption of 
precautionary measures in order to deal with urgent situations and call for the pre-
vention of imminent risks of irreparable harm against migrants; press releases in 
which the plight of certain migrants is highlighted and their respect or protection are 
called for; the adoption of resolutions on worrisome problems in the region concern-
ing the rights of migrants; and else. Several examples demonstrate this. 
As to the adoption of resolutions, an example is that of Resolution 2/18 on 
“Forced Migration of Venezuelans”. The Commission declared, first, that the mass 
migration of Venezuelans may be explained by two factors, namely “massive viola-
tions of human rights, as well as the serious crisis that Venezuela has been facing as 
a result of the shortage of food and medicines”.11 In the same resolution, the Com-
mission indicates that non-State actors as criminal organizations are “exploiting re-
cently arrived Venezuelan individuals in some border areas”; that some migrants 
have been facing “serious xenophobic and discriminatory practices […] in countries 
of transit and destination”, and after recalling the right “to request and receive asylum 
[…] in the Americas”; and recalled the past solidarity of Venezuelans, urging OAS 
Member States to guarantee the “recognition of refugee status”, to consider adopting 
 
11
 IACHR, Resolution 2/18, “Forced Migration of Venezuelans”, 2 March 2018.  
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“collective protection responses”, to guarantee access to those seeking “urgent hu-
manitarian needs” while respecting the non-refoulement principle, to identify per-
sons in a “situation of vulnerability”, to ensure safe migration channels, protect and 
provide “humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans within national jurisdictions”, to 
seek the rescue and protection of migrants, guarantee “access to the right to nation-
ality for stateless persons, as well as for children of Venezuelans born abroad who 
are at risk of being stateless”, to implement coordinated responses and strategies, to 
avoid criminalizing migration, to ensure access to justice, to provide remedies, to 
promote social integration, and to permit IACHR visits.12 This resolution highlights 
many of the issues surrounding migration that will be explored below in this Chapter, 
and demonstrates how promotion actions can complement jurisdictional ones in 
terms of addressing immediate crises, addressing multiple actors in the region, and 
engaging in both preventive and a reactive initiatives. 
With regard to press releases used to achieve the aforementioned goals for the 
promotion of human rights, one example is the press release of 19 February 2019, 
by means of which the “IACHR Urge[d] Honduras and Guatemala to Guarantee the 
Rights of People in the Migrant and Refugee Caravan”. The Commission expressed 
concern at reports of the use of force by police officers, undue restrictions to the right 
individuals have “to freely leave any country, including their own”, and the de facto 
criminalization of migration. Another example is the press release of 28 August 
2015, by means of which the “IACHR Expresse[d] Concern over Arbitrary Depor-
tation of Colombians from Venezuela”, addressing the “arbitrary and collective de-
portation of undocumented Colombian migrants being carried out by Venezuelan 
authorities in the border state of Táchira”, the separation of families, and also re-
minding States that they “must take every necessary step to guarantee that racial 
profiling does not occur during migration raids” and make sure that there is an “in-
dividual decision in respect of each deportation”. Another example is provided in the 
recent press release of 23 October 2018, in which the Commission expressed its con-
cern over the situation of the “Migrant Caravan from Honduras” that was going to-
wards the USA. This not only highlighted the problems faced by migrants on the 
caravan (violence, hardships, vulnerability, hostile reactions, and else), but also al-
lowed the IACHR to urge the States involved to guarantee the rights of individuals 
on the caravan, especially “the right of persons in need of international protection to 
request and receive asylum”, and to “strengthen mechanisms of shared responsibility 
 
12
 Ibid. 
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to address” their situation, in addition to the necessity of refraining from carrying out 
collective deportations, of providing humanitarian assistance, and of guaranteeing 
fair trial and due process guarantees, among others. Promotion actions, therefore, 
permit not only to ask for hard law implementation, but also to engage in prevention 
and response actions even in relation to very recent events.  
Likewise, on 7 January 2019 the Commission expressed its concern over the 
deaths of migrant children “in the custody of Immigration Authorities in the United 
States”, recalling its reports on the protection of migrants, children and the family. 
In those reports, the IACHR took notice of accusations of threats relating to the sep-
aration of relatives from children, and said that detention of persons in an irregular 
migratory situation should be “extraordinary”; that such detentions should be “the 
least restrictive” ones; that legal representation should be given to unaccompanied 
children and families at the “States’ expense”; that expedited removal proceedings 
risk breaching non-refoulement and the rights against torture; that there must be a 
separation of migrants from criminal inmates; that due process always has to be ob-
served; that children undergo separate immigration proceedings;13 that children have 
a “right not to be separated from the family”; that there are rights to not be internally 
displaced, to special protection and to education, among others;14 and that relevant 
rights and freedoms in migration contexts include freedom of movement and resi-
dence, the right to a fair trial in deportation or extradition proceedings, the right to 
the protection of families, the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, personal liberty, the right to request and receive asylum, the non-re-
foulement principle, the right to nationality and the right to property.15 
In terms of precautionary measures adopted by the Commission, one example is 
found in the Commission’s address to the USA asking it to protect rights “through 
the reunification of […] children with their biological family’s; “regular communi-
cation between the beneficiaries and their families”, and the adoption of measures to 
bring about the reunification of families when “beneficiaries [are] deported sepa-
rately from their children”.16 
 
13
 IACHR, “Refugees and Migrants in the United States: Families and Unaccompanied Children”, 
2015, pp. 42, 77, 101-111. 
14
 IACHR, “Human Rights of Migrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons, Victims of Human Trafficking 
and Internally Displaced Persons: Norms and Standards of the Inter-American Human Rights System”, 
2015, para. 235. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 IACHR, Press release “IACHR Grants Precautionary Measure to Protect Separated Migrant Chil-
dren in the United States”, 20 August 2018. 
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As to the action of political bodies in the OAS, one example is provided in Res-
olution 2929 of 5 June 2018, by means of which its General Assembly expressed its 
concern over the crisis that generated “an increasing emigration of Venezuelan citi-
zens and is having impacts on the capacity of some countries of the Hemisphere to 
meet their different needs”, issued instructions to the Permanent Council to support 
member States receiving Venezuelan “migrants and refugees”, and urged the regime 
of Nicolás Maduro “to allow the entry of humanitarian aid […] to prevent the aggra-
vation of the humanitarian and public health crisis”, also inviting OAS Member 
States to “implement measures to address the humanitarian emergency in Vene-
zuela”, among others.17 
Altogether, the Commission (and other OAS political bodies, as was just ex-
plained) can contribute to identifying necessary standards and courses of action and 
can have a potential benefit regarding the promotion of the enjoyment of the rights 
of migrants. In turn, OAS political bodies can debate problems surrounding those 
rights, including their causes, something the IACHR can do as well.  
Having explored the importance of the promotion and political initiatives of dif-
ferent OAS bodies, we will now turn to the analysis of the pronouncements of the 
IACtHR on issues surrounding the human rights of migrants. 
3. – The IACtHR Case-law on Migration: General Aspects 
Before delving into the core analysis of the selected issues, it is worth identifying 
some basic concepts regarding migrants and their protection that constantly permeate 
the Court case-law, such as standards identified in the OC-18/03 on Undocumented 
Migrants. 
Firstly, the vulnerability of migrants in the exercise of their rights. In general, the 
Court has identified some vulnerable categories – e.g. indigenous people, children, 
stateless persons, et cetera – who, due to their personal condition or specific situation 
in a given society, are particularly vulnerable and thus need more protection and 
require the adoption of special measures to ensure the protection of their human 
rights.18 As for migrants, in the OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants the San José 
judges affirmed that  
 
17
 OAS General Assembly, AG/RES. 2929 (XLVIII-O/18), “Resolution on the Situation in Vene-
zuela”, 5 June 2018. 
18
 Case Vélez Loor, cit. supra note 4, paras. 98 ff. 
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“Migrants are generally in a vulnerable situation as subjects of human rights; they are in 
an individual situation of absence or difference of power with regard to non-migrants […] 
This situation of vulnerability […] is maintained by de jure (inequalities between nationals 
and aliens in the laws) and de facto (structural inequalities) situations”.19  
As to vulnerability of migrants when compared to “non-migrants”, the Court has 
well pointed out that the  
“[S]ituation of vulnerability has an ideological dimension and occurs in a historical con-
text that is distinct for each State and is maintained by de jure (inequalities between nationals 
and aliens in the laws) and de facto (structural inequalities) situations […] Cultural preju-
dices about migrants also exist that lead to reproduction of the situation of vulnerability […] 
which make it difficult for migrants to integrate into society and lead to their human rights 
being violated with impunity […] there are difficulties [migrants] encounter because of dif-
ferences of language, custom and culture, as well as the economic and social difficulties and 
obstacles for the return to their States of origin of migrants who are non-documented or in 
an irregular situation […] the international community has recognized the need to adopt spe-
cial measures to ensure the protection of the human rights of migrants”.20 
The Court’s case-law has also stressed that specific categories of migrants suffer 
from a particular vulnerability, including, inter alia, migrants deprived of their lib-
erty, undocumented migrants or migrants in an irregular situation,21 migrant workers, 
and migrant children. With particular regard to workers, in the OC-18/03 on Undoc-
umented Migrants the Court affirmed that  
“The vulnerability of migrant workers as compared to national workers must be under-
scored. In this respect, the preamble to the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families refers to the situation of vul-
nerability in which migrant workers and members of their families frequently find them-
selves owing, among other things, to their absence from their State of origin and to the dif-
ficulties they may encounter arising from their presence in the State of employment”.22  
 
19
 OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants, cit. supra note 1, para. 112. 
20
 Ibid., paras. 112-114, 117. 
21
 Case Vélez Loor, cit. supra note 4, para. 98. 
22
 OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants, cit. supra note 1, para. 131. See WOJCIKIEWICZ ALMEIDA, 
“Le Travailleur Migrant en Situation Irrégulière: L'accès Formel et Effectif aux Droits devant les Organs 
Juridictionnels et Juridictionnels de Contrôle”, Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos, 2012, 
p. 324 ff., who refers to their “invisibilité apparente”. 
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Moreover, with specific regard to children, the Court has considered that they are 
particularly vulnerable (saying that they have a “especial situación de vulnerabi-
lidad”),23 which is even more true in the case of migrant children. 
Considering the vulnerability that migrants may find themselves in, the Court has 
adequately required that States carry out an analysis and implementation of the per-
tinent standards in light of an evolutionary interpretation and the principle of effec-
tiveness or effet utile.24 This, coupled with the principle of equality and non-discrim-
ination, implies – among others – that  
“States have an obligation not to introduce discriminatory regulations into their laws; to 
eliminate regulations of a discriminatory nature; to combat practices of this nature; and to 
establish norms and other measures recognizing and guaranteeing all persons effective equal-
ity before the law”.25 
Another general standard related to migrants deals with their right not to be dis-
criminated against and their right to equality before the law. In the OC-18/03 on 
Undocumented Migrants the Court affirmed that, at the existing stage of the devel-
opment of international law, the principle of equality before the law, equal protection 
before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens,26 binding all States and 
demanding its being guaranteed to all persons, including migrants even if their mi-
gration status is irregular. Certainly, for the IACtHR “the regular situation of a per-
son in a State is not a prerequisite for that State to respect and ensure the principle of 
 
23
 IACtHR, case of the girls Yean y Bosico v. República Dominicana (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs), Judgment of 8 September 2005 (hereinafter, case of the girls Yean and Bosico) 
and case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs), Judgment of 28 August 2014, para. 428 (hereinafter, case of expelled Dominicans 
and Haitians). See also IACtHR, case of Veliz Franco y otros v. Guatemala (Excepciones Preliminares, 
Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas), Judgment of 19 May 2014, para. 134, where the Court talked about the 
children’s vulnerabilidad consustancial. See also SIJNIENSKY, Interpretación evolutiva de la protección 
especial debida a las niñas y los niños, in PARRA VERA et al. (eds.), La lucha por los Derechos humanos 
hoy. Estudios en Homenaje a Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Valencia, 2017, p. 230 ff., and also VANNUCCINI, 
“La protezione dei minori di età nella prassi della Corte interamericana dei diritti dell’uomo”, La Comunità 
internazionale, 2013, p. 109 ff. 
24
 IACtHR, cit., supra note 8, p. 10. 
25
 Case Vélez Loor, cit. supra note 4, para. 248. 
26
 OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants, cit. supra note 1, para. 101. 
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equality and non-discrimination”.27 The Court has well added that the aforemen-
tioned principle is breached by de facto discriminatory conduct “even when it is not 
possible to prove a discriminatory intention”, insofar as “international human rights 
law not only prohibits policies and practices that are deliberately discriminatory, but 
also those whose impact could be discriminatory with regard to certain categories of 
individuals”, even in the absence of evidence of such an intention.28 
This is also true in relation to migrant workers. In the same OC-18/03 on Undoc-
umented Migrants, the Court clarified that  
“if undocumented migrants are engaged, they immediately become possessors of the la-
bor rights corresponding to workers and may not be discriminated against because of their 
irregular situation. This is very important, because one of the principal problems that occurs 
in the context of immigration is that migrant workers who lack permission to work are en-
gaged in unfavorable conditions compared to other workers”.29  
This does not mean that States may never grant a distinct treatment to docu-
mented migrants with respect to undocumented migrants, or between migrants and 
nationals, neither that it cannot be excluded that a State may sometimes take certain 
any action against migrants who do not comply with their legal system, provided that 
this differential treatment is reasonable, objective, proportionate and does not harm 
human rights.30 
A third general aspect must be highlighted. It is related to the development of 
human rights protection standards in the IACtHR case-law, also with relation to mi-
grants. In light of the special nature of human rights treaties, the Court decides cases 
and releases advisory opinion interpreting the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR) – and other OAS treaties – as living instruments and, accordingly, 
in light of the pro homine principle enshrined in Article 29 ACHR.31 Moreover, it 
 
27
 Ibid., para. 118 followed by case of the girls Yean y Bosico, cit. supra note 23, paras. 155 ff., case 
Vélez Loor, cit. supra note 4, para. 248 and also IACtHR, case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican 
Republic (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), Judgment of 24 June 2012, paras. 229 ff. (hereinafter, case 
Nadege Dorzema). 
28
 Case Nadege Dorzema, cit. supra note 27, paras. 234, 238. 
29
 OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants, cit. supra note 1, para. 136. 
30
 Ibid., para. 119. 
31
 IACtHR, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of 
the due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 October 1999 (hereinafter, OC-16/99 on Con-
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systematically made reference to the pertinent elements of general international law 
(jus cogens included, such as the aforementioned prohibition to discriminate) and to 
external sources, i.e. universal treaties (e.g., the 1989 Convention on the Rights of 
the Child), regional treaties (e.g., the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights), 
and to decisions of other international Courts and bodies (e.g., the Strasbourg Court, 
the EU Court of Justice, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights or 
UN Charter-based bodies), and of national courts from a comparative law perspec-
tive. Indeed, this interpretative method, based on the judicial dialogue among Courts 
and other human rights bodies, brings a more effective protection of human rights in 
the Inter-American System of Human Rights32 and also underscores the universality 
of the rights of migrants and the risks they face. In the remainder of our study, the 
external sources on migrants to which the IACtHR referred to will be highlighted, 
with particular regard to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol as treaties of “crucial importance”.33 
3.1. – A Focus on More Vulnerable Migrants: Irregular Migrant Workers 
and Migrant Children 
We premised that the IACtHR has taken into account the specific needs and vul-
nerability of some persons, regardless of their refugee status or whether they find 
themselves in a regular migratory situation. Specifically, the Court has referred to 
children and workers. 
Regarding children, acknowledging what the corpus juris of the protection of 
their rights says, the Court often refers to the best interests of the child principle and 
 
sular Assistance) and case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Judg-
ment of 15 September 2005, para. 106. See also RODRÍGUEZ, “Artículo 29. Normas de Interpretación”, in 
STEINER and URIBE (eds.), Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Comentario, Berlin-Bogotà, 
2014, p. 712 ff., and also FITZMAURICE, “Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties”, in SHELTON (ed.), 
International Human Rights Law, Oxford, 2013, p. 765 ss. and Canosa Usera, “Interpretación evolutiva de 
los derechos fundamentales”, in FERRER MAC-GREGOR and ZALDÍVAR LELO DE LARREA (coords.), La cien-
cia del Derecho procesal constitucional. Estudios en homenaje a Héctor Fix-Zamudio en sus cincuenta 
años como investigador del Derecho, México, 2008, pp. 59-60. 
32
 See DE PAUW, “The Inter-American Court of Human rights and the Interpretive Method of external 
referencing: regional Consensus v. Universality”, HAECK et al. (eds.), The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: theory and practice, present and future, Cambridge- Antwerp- Portland, 2015, p. 23. 
33
 IACtHR, case of the Pacheco Tineo Family v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (Preliminary Objec-
tions, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Judgment of 25 November 2013, paras. 138-139 (hereinafter, case 
Pacheco Tineo Family). 
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to the obligation States have to “ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival 
and development of the child”.34 Quoting the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
the Court has indicated that it is necessary to evaluate the following circumstances:  
“(a) [P]ersonal and public safety and other conditions, particularly of a socio-economic 
character, awaiting the child upon return including, where appropriate, a home study con-
ducted by social network organizations; (b) availability of care arrangements for that partic-
ular child; (c) views of the child expressed in exercise of her or his right to do so under article 
12 and those of the caretakers; (d) the child’s level of integration in the host country and the 
duration of absence from the home country; (e) the child’s right “to preserve his or her iden-
tity, including nationality, name and family relations” (art. 8); (f) the “desirability of conti-
nuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic back-
ground” (art. 20); and (g) in the absence of the availability of care provided by parents or 
members of the extended family, return to the country of origin should, in principle, not take 
place without advance secure and concrete arrangements of care and custodial responsibili-
ties upon return”.35 
As to children in detention or migration facilities, and in light of the right to fam-
ily unity, the Court indicated that, if they travel alone, they ought to be with other 
children, lest adults may abuse their dominant position. If they travel with relatives 
or parents, they should remain with them unless there is a risk and the best interests 
of the child dictates otherwise, as was explained in the OC-21/14 on Migrant Chil-
dren.36 For the Court:  
“[I]n the case of unaccompanied or separated children […] the children require special 
care from the persons in charge of the center and must never be lodged together with adults 
[…] In the case of children who are with their families […] the rule must be that they remain 
with their parents or those acting in their stead, avoiding the separation of the family unit 
insofar as possible […] unless the best interest of the child advises otherwise”.37  
An event in which it is not in the child’s best interest to remain with their relatives 
is that of the detention of the latter, reason why States are required to think of alter-
native measures that permit children to remain with them, albeit in non-imprison-
ment conditions. According to the Court:  
 
34
 OC-21/14 on Migrant Children, cit. supra note 2, para. 222. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid., paras. 176-179. 
37
 Ibid., para. 177.  
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“when the child’s best interest requires keeping the family together, the imperative re-
quirement not to deprive the child of liberty extends to her or his parents and obliges the 
authorities to choose alternative measures to detention for the family, which are appropriate 
to the needs of the children”.38 
Additionally, deprivation of the liberty of children should neither be used as a 
precautionary measure nor as a consequence of failing to observe migration require-
ments, considering that there may be less intrusive alternatives. In fact, as the San 
José judges affirmed:  
“States may not resort to the deprivation of liberty of children who are with their parents, 
or those who are unaccompanied or separated from their parents, as a precautionary measure 
in immigration proceedings; nor may States base this measure on failure to comply with the 
requirements to enter and to remain in a country, on the fact that the child is alone or sepa-
rated from her or his family, or on the objective of ensuring family unity”. According to the 
Court, this is because authorities should look for alternative measures that are less inimical 
to children and their families, ensuring the protection of their rights “as a priority”.39 
For the Court, also being related to the protection of family unity, whenever this 
is possible and is in the best interests of the child, the right to “seek and receive 
asylum” may entail a requirement that “international protection [is granted] when 
children qualify for this and to grant the benefit of this recognition to other members 
of the family, based on the principle of family unity”.40 Furthermore, by virtue of the 
principle of taking into account the best interests of the child, in addition to ordinary 
guarantees that are applicable “in expulsion proceedings”, when children are subject 
to them it is necessary to “maintain family unity insofar as possible”. The Court went 
on to say that:  
“Hence, any ruling of an administrative or judicial organ that must decide on family 
separation owing to the migratory status of one or both parents must take into consideration 
the particular circumstances of the specific case, thus ensuring an individual decision; it must 
seek to achieve a legitimate purpose pursuant to the Convention, and it must be suitable, 
necessary and proportionate”.41  
 
38
 Ibid., para. 158. 
39
 Ibid., para. 160. 
40
 Ibid., para. 81. 
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To achieve this, among others, States must consider “the extent of the disruption 
of the child’s daily life if the family situation changes owing to the expulsion of a 
person in charge of the child, so that these circumstances are rigorously weighed in 
light of the best interests of the child against the essential public interest that it is 
sought”.42 
The Court has identified other specific rights and forms of protecting children in 
relation to specific rights-related aspects, such as nationality, asylum or refugee sta-
tus, which are examined in the respective sections of this Chapter. That being said, 
concerning non-refoulement, the Court has highlighted, based on what has been said 
in the UN Human Rights System, that the obligation to not return is not limited to 
the identification of irreparable harm to a few rights, but rather “applies to other 
serious violations of [human rights] […] such as “the insufficient provisions of food 
or health services”, “whether […] they originate from non-State actors or such vio-
lations are directly intended or are the indirect consequence of action or inaction […] 
[r]eturn to the country of origin shall in principle only be arranged if such return is 
in the best interest of the child” so that it is prohibited “if it would lead to a ‘reason-
able risk’ that such return would result in the violation of fundamental human rights 
of the child, and in particular, if the principle of non-refoulement applies”.43 
Altogether, migrant – and other – children must be protected in ways that take into 
account their specific needs, situation and the vulnerability they may have in a given 
situation. This implies, for instance, that it is important to take measures to make sure 
that all children have registration in a State, considering that, as the Court went on to 
say, “the failure to register a child ‘can impact negatively on a child’s sense of personal 
identity and children may be denied entitlements to basic health, education and social 
welfare’”,44 which they are entitled to regardless of whether they are migrants or not, 
as indicated in the section 3.4. on ‘Asylum and refugees’ of this Chapter.  
Moreover, State agents cannot refuse to acknowledge the documents and identi-
fication provided by migrants, considering that for reasons similar to the ones just 
cited this leads to a situation of vulnerability – if children are the victims of this, the 
principle requiring taking into account their best interest would also be breached. 
Indeed, the Court has held that it is wrongful for State agents to fail:  
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“[T]o acknowledge the identity of the victims by not allowing them to identify them-
selves or not considering the documents they presented. This situation affected other rights, 
such as the right to a name, to recognition of juridical personality, and to nationality that, 
taken as a whole, impaired the right to identity. In addition, the Court considered that, in this 
case the State, by ignoring the documentation […] did not take the best interests of the child 
into consideration”.45 
In relation to migrant workers, on the other hand, the Court highlighted in the 
OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants the need to consider their vulnerability, re-
gardless of their migratory status, and the correlative requirement of protecting them 
from threats to the enjoyment of their rights due, precisely, to that vulnerability. This 
logic be found, for instance, when the Court recognizes that there is a risk of labour 
exploitation. According to the IACtHR:  
“[I]t is not admissible for a State of employment to protect its national production, in one 
or several sectors by encouraging or tolerating the employment of undocumented migrant 
workers in order to exploit them, taking advantage of their condition of vulnerability […] 
either by paying them lower wages, denying or limiting their enjoyment or exercise of one 
or more of their labor rights, or denying them the possibility of filing a complaint about the 
violation of their rights”.46 
Moreover, in the same OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants it was indicated 
that the salaries of migrant workers must be paid even when they have an irregular 
migration status, because by working for private parties or public ones they are au-
tomatically entitled to their payment, in light of applicable human rights standards, 
especially considering the horizontal effects of human rights law (Drittwirkung). Ac-
cording to them, protection of human rights is also required from the abuses of pri-
vate actors. This explains why those workers have a right to access justice, since it 
permits them to present their respective claims. An example of an implication of this 
can be found in Article 25 of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, according to 
which “[i]t shall not be lawful to derogate in private contracts of employment from 
the principle of equality of treatment”. In the words of the Court itself:  
“The vulnerability of migrant workers as compared to national workers must be under-
scored […] Labor rights necessarily arise from the circumstance of being a worker […] A 
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person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity, imme-
diately becomes a worker and, consequently, acquires the rights inherent in that condition […] 
the migratory status of a person can never be a justification for depriving him of the enjoyment 
and exercise of his human rights, including those related to employment […] the State and the 
individuals in a State are not obliged to offer employment to undocumented migrants […] 
However, if undocumented migrants are engaged, they immediately become possessors of the 
labor rights corresponding to workers […] the obligation to respect human rights between in-
dividuals should be taken into consideration […] the positive obligation of the State to ensure 
the effectiveness of the protected human rights gives rise to effects in relation to third parties 
(erga omnes) […] particularly by the Drittwirkung theory, according to which fundamental 
rights must be respected by both the public authorities and by individuals”.47  
An important aspect to be found in the former quotation, besides the recognition 
of labour rights irrespective of migration status, is the Court’s insistence on and con-
firmation of the applicability of human rights in private relations. This issue is dis-
cussed in somewhat greater detail in a later section.  
3.2. – Migration and Nationality 
The remarks of the IACtHR on the right to nationality are interesting for several 
reasons. If one examines its case-law on the matter of status civitatis in light of pro-
nouncements on the pertinent aspects of the corpus juris, including the rights of in-
dividuals, children (migrants or with migrant parents) and the problems of stateless-
ness, this is made all the more clear. 
For instance, in the case of the girls Yean and Bosico, the Court pointed out that 
the right to nationality is non-derogable.48 While this is expressed Article 27 ACHR, 
the Court has engaged in an analysis of its importance that may support the political 
decisions of the drafters of the Convention. Certainly, the Court has referred to the 
instrumentality of the right after considering that a nationality is sometimes required 
in order to enjoy certain social benefits, but also to have the possibility to request 
State protection in certain situations. Indeed, the Court has said that the 
“[I]mportance of nationality is that, as the political and legal bond that connects a 
person to a specific State, it allows the individual to acquire and exercise rights and 
obligations inherent in membership in a political community. As such, nationality is 
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a requirement for the exercise of specific rights”.49  
Furthermore, for the IACtHR, nationality grants individuals a “minimal measure 
of legal protection in international relations through the link his nationality 
establishes between him and the State in question”.50 Due to its importance, the San 
José judges considered that, while it is up to the individual State to decide who is 
entitled to their nationality, there is a current limitation on this freedom, which seeks 
to ensure the equality – in terms of protection, for instance – of individuals.51  
Accordingly, several things ensue. Firstly, there can be no discriminatory 
regulations on practices granting a nationality, considering that “States must abstain 
from producing regulations that are discriminatory or have discriminatory effects on 
certain groups of population when exercising their rights”.52 Secondly, no one can be 
deprived of their nationality arbitrarily, nor can its desired change be arbitrarily 
denied, as indicated in Article 20 ACHR. Thirdly, considering that lacking a 
nationality places individuals in a situation of vulnerability and deprives them of the 
possibility of “enjoying civil and political rights”, States have “the obligation not to 
adopt practices or laws concerning the granting of nationality, the application of 
which fosters an increase in the number of stateless persons”.53 Otherwise, according 
to the Court, States would breach the peremptory principle of equal and effective 
protection of the law and non-discrimination, which is breached not only when there 
is an intentional or “deliberate discrimination”, but also when policies, regulations 
and practices have an impact that affects persons in a discriminatory manner even 
when “it is not possible to prove [a] discriminatory intention”, as the IACtHR held 
in the case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians.54 Fourthly, State Parties to the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are obliged to abide by it, as the Court 
reminded the Dominican Republic in 2005 in the case of the girls Yean and Bosico.55  
Furthermore, it is forbidden to resort to notions that have a discriminatory impact 
on questions of who can be a national, such as certain local interpretations on the 
status of children of parents who were regarded as “foreigners in transit”, 
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considering the IACtHR opinion according to which, in order to determine who was 
a national in accordance with domestic Dominican law, “[i]t is not possible to 
consider that people are in transit when they have lived for many years in a country 
where they have developed innumerable connections of all kinds”.56 After all, “States 
have the obligation to ensure this fundamental principle to its citizens and to any 
foreigner who is on its territory, without any discrimination based on regular or ir-
regular residence, nationality, race, gender or any other cause”.57  
Additionally, the Court has indicated that the migratory status of an individual can-
not be a condition for obtaining a nationality, because such a status cannot justify the 
annulment of that nationality; that migratory status is not transmitted to children; and 
also, importantly, that “the fact that a person has been born on the territory of a State is 
the only fact that needs to be proved for the acquisition of nationality, in the case of those 
persons who would not have the right to another nationality if they did not acquire that 
of the State where they were born”.58 This is consistent with Article 20, para. 2, ACHR, 
according to which “[e]very person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose 
territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other nationality”. 
Moreover, in its decision in the case Ivcher Bronstein,59 the Court also said that the 
freedom that States have in determining who are their nationals has been limited by 
the evolution of international law; and that the right to nationality is to be protected 
both when it is “acquired by birth, naturalization or some other means established in 
the law of the respective State”, which is evidently applicable to individuals who once 
lacked the nationality of a given State, including those who migrated without the na-
tionality of the host State. While nationality can be renounced to (or changed), as the 
ACHR and the Court have indicated, it cannot be revoked arbitrarily.  
The Court found in that case, for instance, that the applicant’s nationality had 
been annulled by State authorities despite the fact that renouncement was “the only 
way of losing it, according to the Peruvian Constitution”, reason why it condemned 
the defendant State.60 The San José judges further stated that the contravention of 
legality evinces arbitrary State actions in regard to nationality when the latter is re-
voked. In the words of the Court, the victim  
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“[D]id not expressly renounce his nationality, which is the only way of losing it, accord-
ing to the Peruvian Constitution, but was deprived of it when his nationality title, without 
which he was unable to exercise his rights as a Peruvian national, was annulled. Moreover, 
the procedure used to annul the nationality title did not comply with the provisions of do-
mestic legislation […] Since this certificate was annulled in July 1997, 13 years after it had 
been granted, the State failed to comply with the provisions of its domestic legislation and 
arbitrarily deprived Mr. Ivcher of his nationality, violating Article 20(3) of the Convention 
[…] Furthermore, the authorities who annulled Mr. Ivcher’s nationality title did not have 
competence […] Mr. Ivcher Bronstein acquired Peruvian nationality through a “supreme 
resolution” of the President […] he lost his nationality as the result of a “‘directorial resolu-
tion’ of the Migration and Naturalization Directorate”, which is undoubtedly of a lower rank 
than the authority that granted the corresponding right […] and, consequently, could not 
deprive the act of a superior of its effects […] this demonstrates the arbitrary character of the 
revocation of Mr. Ivcher’s nationality, in violation of Article 20(3)”.61 
3.3. – The non-refoulement Principle 
Article XXVII of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, and Articles 22, paras. 7 and 8 ACHR, provide for the right of asylum and the 
non-refoulement principle. The former provision affirms that “[e]very person has the 
right, in case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive 
asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of each country and with 
international agreements”. In turn, Article 22 ACHR affirms in para. 7 the right of a 
person to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory if she or he risks 
persecution for political offenses or related common crimes and, as indicated in para. 
8, “[i]n no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of 
whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal 
freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social 
status, or political opinions”. In addition, Article 13 of the 1985 Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture states that “Extradition shall not be 
granted nor shall the person sought be returned when there are grounds to believe 
that his life is in danger, that he will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, or that he will be tried by special or ad hoc courts in the 
requesting State”.62 
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Unlike what has happened with some other sensitive issues (e.g., violence against 
women),63 in the Inter-American System of Human Rights no specific treaty has been 
drafted on migrants or situations of human mobility. Thus, the Court relied on the 
aforementioned provisions, and on international (general and treaty) law. In that 
sense, it is worth recalling UN treaties on human mobility to which the IACtHR has 
referred in its case-law, such as the 1951 Convention on Refugees its 1967 Protocol, 
the 1961 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness, or the 1990 International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.  
The relationship between Inter-American provisions (in particular, the ACHR) 
and other international law sources has been underlined in the case Pacheco Tineo 
Family, in which the Court expressed that  
“said Article 22(7) of the Convention indicates two criteria of an accumulative nature 
for the existence or exercise of this right: (a) ‘…in accordance with the legislation of the 
State …,’ in other words, of the State in which asylum is requested, and (b) ‘… in accordance 
with […] international conventions.’ This concept […] understood in conjunction with the 
recognition of the right to non-refoulement in Article 22(8), supports the interrelationship 
between the scope and content of these rights and international refugee law”.64  
Moreover, looking at specific situations, in its OC-21/14 on Migrant Children 
the Court added that “Non-refoulement is conceptualized as a principle that makes 
the right to seek and receive asylum effective and as an autonomous right established 
in the Convention as well as an obligation derived from the prohibition of torture and 
from other human rights norms and, in particular, the protection of the child”.65  
According to the IACtHR, apart from being provided for in several universal and 
regional treaties regarding directly or indirectly refugees,66 the non-refoulement 
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principle has been widely accepted by States. In fact, the San José judges have 
affirmed – conclusion with which we agree – that “the prohibition of refoulement 
constitutes the cornerstone of the international protection of refugees or asylees and 
of those requesting asylum […] [and] is also a customary norm of international 
law”.67 The Court has said it several other times, as in the recent OC-25/18 on the 
Right of Asylum,68 in which it also added that when a person to-be returned risks 
suffering torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the principle under 
discussion becomes absolute. Likewise, and more extensively, in the previous OC-
21/14 on Migrant Children the Court affirmed that  
“This principle seeks […] to ensure the effectiveness of the prohibition of torture in any 
circumstance and with regard to any person, without any discrimination. Since it is an 
obligation derived from the prohibition of torture, the principle of non-refoulement in this 
area is absolute and also becomes a peremptory norm of customary international law; in other 
words, of jus cogens”.69  
It is worth adding that very recently the UN Committee against Torture affirmed 
the same.70 To ensure the prohibition of expulsion de qua, the IACtHR has stressed 
that it protects refugees “regardless of their legal status or migratory situation in [a] 
State”.71  
When compared to general international refugee law, in the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights the non-refoulement principle takes on a particular 
meaning,72 as it has a more extensive field of application ratione personae. While 
Article 33, para. 1, of the 1951 Convention addresses non-refoulement in relation to 
refugees, Article, para. 8, ACHR is addressed to every alien, and thus to “any person, 
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who is not a national of the State in question or who is not considered its national by 
the State based on its laws”.73 Moreover, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees, a document adopted by a group of Latin American experts that the 
IACtHR has taken into account, affirms that, in light of the regional situation of 
human mobility,  
“[T]he definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is one 
which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 
includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or 
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed 
public order”.74  
Even if the Declaration is not a direct source of international law, the IACtHR 
took it into due account in the OC-21/14 on Migrant Children and in following 
pronouncements in terms of both the reality it recognizes and how some States have 
referred to it in their domestic law, affirming as to the former aspect that  
“[T]he obligations under the right to seek and receive asylum are operative with respect 
to those persons who meet the components of the expanded definition of the Cartagena 
Declaration, which responds not only to the dynamics of forced displacement that originated 
it, but also meets the challenges of protection derived from other displacement patterns that 
currently take place. This criterion reflects a tendency to strengthen in the region a more 
inclusive definition that must be taken into account by the States to grant refugee protection 
to persons whose need for international protection is evident”.75 
Concerning the scope of application of the non-refoulement principle, the Court 
has posited that returning aliens to a country where they risk serious human rights 
violations is prohibited not only directly, but also indirectly. In the case Pacheco 
Tineo Family the Court reminded that States also have the obligation not to return a 
person to a country from which he may be returned where he suffers this risk, i.e. the 
“indirect refoulement”.76 Moreover it also reminded about the extraterritorial 
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application of the non-refoulement principle in light of Article 1, para. 1, ACHR, 
which affirms that the States Parties undertake to respect the recognized rights and 
freedoms to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. In that sense, in the OC-21/14 
on Migrant Children the San José judges stated that  
“[…] the fact that a person is subject to the jurisdiction of the State is not the same as 
being in its territory. Consequently, the principle of non-refoulement can be invoked by any 
alien over whom the State in question is exercising authority or who is under its control, 
regardless of whether she or he is on the land, rivers, or sea or in the air space of the State”.77 
Being connected to asylum – although also applicable to non-refugees – , the 
non-refoulement principle implies that a person cannot be expelled before an 
accurate analisys of his/her application to determine the refugee status or entitlement 
to complementary protection, in accordance with due process guarantees.78 With 
regard to this aspect, the case Pacheco Tineo Family can be considered a leading 
case, even if in previous cases regarding the detention of non-citizens79 the Court 
found the violation of the victim’s the right to access to justice ex Articles 8 and 25 
ACHR in relation to Article 1, para. 1, ACHR.80 Still, in the case Pacheco Tineo 
Family, regarding the denial of the asylum request of a family with children and their 
expulsion from Bolivia to their country of origin, the Court ascertained the violation 
of the right to access to justice in relation to Article 22, para. 8, ACHR on the non-
refoulement principle. The San José judges affirmed that  
“such persons cannot be turned back at the border or expelled without an adequate and 
individualized analysis of their application. Before returning anyone, States must ensure that 
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the person who requests asylum is able to access appropriate international protection by 
means of fair and efficient asylum proceedings in the country to which they would be 
expelling him”.81  
For this reason, the deportation of the victims was incompatible not only with the 
right to seek and to receive asylum, but also with the non-refoulement principle and 
with the right to be heard with due guarantees in judicial and/or administrative 
proceedings (Article 8 and 25 ACHR) that could culminate in their expulsion. 
Similarly, in the OC-21/14 on Migrant Children the Court interpreted Article 22, 
para. 8, ACHR also in relation to other Convention provisions, access to justice 
included. The San José judges recalled that basic guarantees of due process must be 
ensured to aliens in administrative proceedings related to migratory status, and that 
their flagrant violation may result in the violation of the non-refoulement principle.82 
The Court added that even if in case of mass influx of persons individual 
determination may seem to be burdensome, States should guarantee access to 
protection from refoulement and basic humanitarian treatment, i.e. admitting asylum 
seekers within the territory, without discrimination, respecting the non-refoulement 
principles and non-rejection at borders, and granting appropriate international 
protection.83 
Another implication of the non-refoulement principle is related to extradiction 
when an individual would risk his/her life or torture or inhumane treatment in a 
receiving State. The IACtHR first ruled on that issue in the case Wong, which 
involved an international fugitive wanted by the judicial authorities of Hong Kong 
and arrested and imprisoned in Peru. China asked for his extradiction on the basis of 
an extradition treaty with Peru, but the victim objected by asserting that, if extradited, 
he could risk the death penalty. Nevertheless, considering the circumstances of the 
case, the Court concluded that, if the indivual were extradited, Peru would not violate 
his rights to life and to personal integrity (Articles 4 and 5 ACHR) or the non-
refoulement principle in relation to extradiction ex Article 13 of the 1985 Convention 
on torture. Nevertheless, the San José judges found Peru responsible for the violation 
of the victim’s judicial guarantees, protected by Article 8, para. 1, ACHR, because 
the extradition process exceeded a reasonable time while he was in detention. 
It is interesting to draw attention to what the Court affirmed with regard to the 
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relationship between the request of extradition and the States obligation to ensure the 
rights to life and to humane treatment, together with the non-refoulement principle.  
In fact, even if the ACHR does not prohibit the death penalty in absolute terms, 
since it is not forbidden for States that had it when the instrument enters into force 
for them – but only in the strict limits then existing – , the Court has affirmed that 
the relevant provisions have to be interpreted pro homine and in light of the due 
respect of specific procedural guarantees and the conditions of the States involved. 
Thus, States Parties that have abolished the death penalty cannot expel, deportate or 
extradite persons which can be reasonably sentenced to death, without requiring 
assurances or guarantees (such as affordable diplomatic ones) that the death sentence 
will not be imposed. Instead, those States that have not abolished that penalty may 
not return persons who run a real and foreseeable risk of being sentenced to death 
“unless this is for the most serious crimes for which the death penalty is currently 
imposed in the requested State Party”.84 Moreover, the latter States may not expel 
anyone who may risk that penalty for crimes that are not punished with the same 
punishment in their own jurisdiction, without requiring the necessary and sufficient 
guarantees that the death sentence will not be applied. In addition, the obligation to 
ensure the right to personal integrity, in conjunction with the non-refoulement 
principle, imposes on States the obligation not to extradite individuals risking a real, 
foreseeable and personal risk of suffering treatment contrary to the prohibition of 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments. Finally, coming back to the 
respect of judicial guarantees, States Parties cannot extradite or return individuals 
who risk suffering a flagrant denial of justice in the destination State.85  
When analyzing if there is a risk, the Court has held that it is necessary to 
“examine the conditions in the destination country which are the grounds for the 
alleged risk, and compare the information presented with the standards derived from 
the American Convention”.86 Furthermore, the concrete danger in which someone is 
must be considered. According to the Court,  
“when analyzing a possible situation of risk in the destination country, it is not sufficient 
to refer to the general situation of human rights in the respective State, but rather it is neces-
sary to demonstrate the particular circumstances of the person to be extradited that would 
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expose him to a real, foreseeable and personal risk of being subject to treatment contrary to 
the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if he is extradited, such 
as membership in a persecuted group, prior experience of torture or ill-treatment in the re-
questing State, and the type of offense for which he is sought, among other matters, depend-
ing on the specific circumstances in the destination country”.87  
As to specific risks from which protection must be given, the Court has said, for 
instance, that whenever an individual may be expelled somewhere where the 
imposition of death penalty is a possibility,  
“pursuant to the obligation to ensure the right to life, States that have abolished the death 
penalty may not expose an individual under their jurisdiction to the real and foreseeable risk 
of its application and, therefore, may not expel, by deportation or extradition, persons under 
their jurisdiction, if it can be reasonably anticipated that they may be sentenced to death, 
without requiring guarantees that the death sentence would not be carried out”.88  
The reference to guarantees is related with the opinion of the IACtHR that it is 
also necessary to examine if “diplomatic assurances” are satisfactory and trustworthy 
in a given case (“when assessing diplomatic assurances, the quality of the assurances 
and their reliability must be analyzed”).89 Hence, if someone is expelled when there 
is no risk, or if there are sufficient guarantees on protection from potential threats, 
the responsibility of a sending State would not be engaged, as flows from the Court’s 
reasoning in the case Wong.90 
It is worth mentioning that some remarks on the recent OC-25/18 on the Right of 
Asylum91 recall and capitalize previous case-law on migrant issues and international 
pratice (e.g., the decisions adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee) in order to 
answer to the petition submitted by Ecuador. The ICtHR judges were asked to 
interpret Article 22, para. 7, ACHR and Article XXVII of the American Declaration, 
to clarify if they provide for the right to seek and receive asylum accordingly with 
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the different modalities, forms and categories developed in international law,92 
diplomatic asylum included, and which international obligations derive for the 
asylum State. After an overview of various modalities of asylum (territorial asylum, 
diplomatic asylum, and Latin American practices on asylum),93 the Court reached the 
conclusion that the aforementioned provisions protect the right to seek and receive 
international protection in a foreign territory as a human right, including refugee 
status, accordingly in particular to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, and also protect territorial asylum in accordance with regional conventions 
on asylum. 
That being said, the novelty of the OC-25/18 on the Right of Asylum can be found 
in the expansion of the extraterritoriality of the non-refoulement principle with 
regard to legations. Although under general international law granting asylum is not 
considered a diplomatic or consular function, States are obliged to respect, through 
all authorities and agents – diplomatic agents included – the rights and freedoms 
recognized in the ACHR of all persons under their jurisdiction, without 
discrimination of any kind. This happens even when a person enters in a diplomatic 
mission in search of protection, because in that case the person is considered to be 
under that State’s jurisdiction. In that hypothesis, some obligations arise from the 
non-refoulement principle. Firstly, individuals cannot be returned to another country 
where they risk an irreparable harm or to any non-safe State to which the persons 
may subsequently be indirectly refouled. Secondly, States have to evaluate through 
an interview the individual risk of an asylum seeker, “giving him or her due 
opportunity to state the reasons for the refusal of refoulement”. This requires 
carrying out a preliminary assessment on such a risk and, if it is established, the 
respective person cannot be returned to the country of origin or to another country 
where the risk exists.94  
On the other side, Article 22, para. 7, ACHR and Article XXVII of the American 
Declaration do not cover diplomatic asylum.95 The San José judges remind that the 
will of States during the drafting the American Declaration and the ACHR was to 
exclude the diplomatic asylum as a protected right, maintaining its regulation in 
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accordance with the Latin American conventions on asylum, i.e. leaving it in the 
domain of State prerogatives. In other words, even if the diplomatic asylum can be 
an effective mechanism to protect individuals from harms in countries suffering a 
difficult democratic life, it is still governed by international treaties and domestic 
legislation provisions, and it is a State prerogative to grant or deny it in specific 
situations.96 Conversely, the so-called territorial asylum is not a mere State 
‘prerogative’. Furthermore, the logic that States are free to act, provided that human 
and refugee rights are not ignored, applies in relation to both sets of institutions. 
According to the Court, the subjective right of every human being to seek and be 
granted asylum oversomes the historical understanding of that institution as a “mere 
State prerogative”.97 
It is also worth commenting that the Court has said that, while in the exercise of 
its contentious jurisdiction it is normally required to examine allegations of viola-
tions that have allegedly already taken place, some flexibility must be permitted for 
it in the exercise of such jurisdiction, in order to empower the San José judges to 
analyze whether a potential expulsion from a country’s territory would breach the 
guarantees pertaining to non-refoulement. In this regard, they have said that:  
“[I]t is not normally for this Court to pronounce on the existence of potential violations 
of the Convention. However, when the presumed victim claims that, if he is expelled or, in 
this case, extradited, he would be subject to treatment contrary to his rights to life and per-
sonal integrity, it is necessary to ensure his rights and to prevent the occurrence of grave and 
irreparable harm. Since the ultimate aim of the Convention is the international protection of 
human rights, it must be permissible to analyze this type of case before the violation takes 
place […] the Court must examine the State’s responsibility conditionally [since the extra-
dition has not occurred yet], in order to determine whether or not there would be a violation 
of the rights to life and personal integrity of the presumed victim should he be extradited”.98 
3.4. – Asylum and Refugees 
The OC-25/18 on the Right of Asylum not only examined the non-refoulement 
principle, but also addressed other issues pertaining asylum and refugees, reason why 
it merits some further attention.  
It was indicated some lines above that the Court distinguishes between diplomatic 
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and territorial asylum, holding that the former is not required by the regional cus-
tomary or treaty law, whereas the latter is governed by Inter-American standards. In 
the advisory opinion, the Court examined the history of the decline of diplomatic 
asylum in Europe and the rise of the institution of extradition there, which was mark-
edly in contrast to the increasing use and importance of the doctrine in Latin Amer-
ica, “as a response to frequent crises related to the incipient independence of Latin 
American states”.99 In spite of this, in the opinion of the Court, the recognition of 
diplomatic asylum is not present in the Inter-American instruments, and has even 
been excluded by virtue of the wording of their pertinent provisions and by persistent 
objections. Accordingly, its concession is something that States are free to give or 
not in a sovereign fashion, and there are no rules of interpretation that can be used to 
consider otherwise, reason why diplomatic asylum is governed by agreements or do-
mestic legislation on the matter, and not by custom, according to the Court.100  
Conversely, as can be said on the basis of pronouncements of the Court, refer-
ences in the ACHR (Article 22, para. 7) and the 1948 American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man (Article XXVII) to a “foreign territory” indicate that the 
asylum they refer to is a territorial asylum and not a diplomatic one. This territorial 
asylum the Court refers to is, according to the OC-25/18 on the Right of Asylum, a 
protection granted by States to individuals present in their territory,101 unlike the dip-
lomatic one, where the interested individual is present in the State territory they pre-
tend to flee from or in a third State’s territory, being it required to respect the invio-
lability of diplomatic facilities where those individuals may be located.102 
As to the protection of refugees, the Court highlights the fact that in the Americas, 
due to the adoption of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and the subsequent 
enactment of corresponding domestic legislation by some States, some OAS Mem-
ber States are legally required to provide a protection that is greater than the one 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol.103 According to said Declaration, the concept of refugees encompasses, in 
addition to those protected by such Convention and Protocol, “persons who have fled 
their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by gener-
alized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human 
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rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. Accord-
ingly, some States in the American region are required to recognize, as refugees, 
persons that do not meet the conditions set forth in the universal instruments but do 
find themselves in the circumstances just described. Having said this, the Court 
deems the definition(s) of refugees as “integral, which means that each and every 
one of the requirements set forth in the applicable instruments “must be met in order 
to obtain recognition”.104 
Apart from the identification of applicable definitions and the distinction between 
categories of asylum in the Americas, the IACtHR has stressed that the granting of 
asylum cannot be used to promote or cement the impunity of serious violations, be-
cause that would be a perversion of the institution of asylum itself and would be 
contrary to standards identified in the Court case-law addressing the requirements of 
how to deal with serious violations of human rights. Furthermore, when such serious 
violations are present, States are required to observe the principle aut dedere aut 
judicare.105  
Another important consideration of the Court, referred to in the section on non-
refoulement, is how this principle – which “applies to all refugees, even if they have 
not yet been deemed refugees by authorities”106 and to some non-refugee migrants by 
virtue of the general obligations to respect and ensure the human rights of all indi-
viduals – must be observed also in an extraterritorial way. This means that when 
State agents have authority or control over individuals who may benefit from it, even 
if said agents and persons are not located within the State’s territory, as may happen 
in the high seas; and also when actions take place in border areas or in “international 
transit zones”, human rights must be respected.107 Likewise, asylum seekers cannot 
be “rejected at the border without an adequate and individualized analysis of their 
requests with due guarantees”.108 Just as happens with geographical considerations, 
this requirement is also applicable regardless of what motivates a given expulsion or 
how the sending of someone abroad takes place, even if there has been a request of 
extradition, considering that possible risks of human rights violations must be eval-
uated. Such an examination ought to lead to an expulsion refusal if a given risk is 
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real.109 
On the other hand, it must be noted that the Court has also said that even though 
States are not required, for instance, to grant asylum in a given case, individuals 
asking for it cannot be left in limbo indefinitely; and that States must take into ac-
count all of their international obligations and possibilities of acting, such as request-
ing safe passage to a third State or elsewhere making sure that the internationally-
recognized human rights of individuals will be respected.110 
In the OC-21/14 on Migrant Children, the IACtHR provided additional insights 
on the protection of refugees and those who claim a refugee status, which not only 
point towards responses to the effects of mass migration but also towards its causes. 
Additionally, it provided insights on dynamics of contemporary migration. For in-
stance, the Court noted how complex migration dynamics sometimes involve both 
migrants and refugees travelling together.111 
On the other hand, the Court considered that when facing “a mass influx of per-
sons” that makes the “individual determination of refugee status […] generally im-
practical”, if there is a “pressing need to provide protection and assistance, particu-
larly when children are involved”, States ought to refrain from returning asylum 
seekers by providing a prima facie protection to groups, without discrimination. 
Countries of origin, in turn, should try to “resolve and eliminate the causes of dis-
placement” and ensure the possibility of “voluntary repatriation”.112  
Both considerations are important, because they go beyond the immediate request 
and individual decisions that may be difficult to make in certain situations. On the 
one hand, this opinion prevents States from invoking excuses on material difficulties 
when identifying refugees, by telling them that prima facie they should protect those 
who claim to have that status by means of a group or collective temporary recogni-
tion, lest persons with it are wrongly returned to places where their rights are at risk. 
Secondly, it tells States that the causes and roots of mass migration must be ad-
dressed, which is important because it refrains from only requiring State responses 
to its effects, by telling them that they must also deal with what causes mass migra-
tion, and that both host and also origin States have responsibilities. 
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Additionally, the Court has insisted that Human Rights Law complements Refu-
gee Law, as happens for instance in regard to the possibility of expelling refugees 
out of “national security or public order considerations” under refugee law. Indeed, 
under human rights law foreigners lawfully residing in the territory of a State may 
only be expelled after a decision observing certain legal conditions has been 
reached.113 According to the Court, while refugee status first comes to mind when 
exploring issues on migration, “various sources of law”, including international hu-
manitarian law and human rights law, are also applicable.114 Moreover, applicable 
“complementary protection mechanism[s]” may be called for under some circum-
stances – with human rights law demanding that basic needs are satisfied, regardless 
of migration status.115 This logic can be found, for instance, in the Court’s judgements 
in the case Nadege Dorzema (and others cases too), in which it said that  
“[E]mergency medical care must be provided at all times for irregular migrants; accord-
ingly, the States must provide comprehensive health care taking into account the needs of 
vulnerable groups […] failure to register the entry into and exit from the health center, the 
lack of medical care for five seriously injured victims, and the failure to diagnose their con-
dition and prescribe treatment, denote omissions in the attention that should have been pro-
vided to the injured in order to respect and ensure their right to personal integrity”.116 
Furthermore, when assessing whether individuals are persecuted, and how to bet-
ter protect them and their rights, their specific circumstances and vulnerability must 
be analyzed by a State, lest ignoring their needs engages State responsibility. This 
can be seen, for instance, in the Nadege Dorzema case, in relation to which the Court 
concluded that “special protection was never provided to […], based on his condition 
as a minor, or to […], who was pregnant, situations that increased the violation of 
their physical, mental and moral integrity”.117 This requires, for instance, “taking into 
account the specific forms that child persecution may adopt”, considering “age and 
gender”; and permitting children submitting “applications for recognition of refugee 
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status in their own capacity”.118 Furthermore, children’s confidentiality must be en-
sured; the individualized treatment of their requests must be carried out by virtue of 
the positive obligations that States have;119 and deprivations of liberty that are de 
facto penalties or punitive sanctions “in the area of immigration control” are deemed 
as arbitrary and contrary to the ACHR.120 
As to proceedings on the status of refugees, the general due process and remedies 
guarantees enshrined in Articles 8 and 25 ACHR are applicable, decisions must “ex-
pressly include the reasons” for it, and appeal is to be permitted.121 In this regard, the 
Court cites the UNHCR to recall that “fair and efficient procedures for the determi-
nation of refugee status in order to ensure that refugees and other persons eligible 
for protection under international law are identified and granted protection”.122 Guar-
antees are thus instrumental to make sure that rights are recognized, that protection 
is given, and that prohibited conduct is not incurred in. Hence, they must also be 
observed in administrative and all other proceedings in which rights may be affected. 
In this sense, the Court added that  
“[O]wing to the nature of the rights that could be affected by an erroneous determination 
of the danger or an unfavorable answer, the guarantees of due process are applicable, as 
appropriate, to this type of proceeding, which is usually of an administrative character. Thus, 
any proceeding relating to the determination of the refugee status of a person entails an as-
sessment and decision on the possible risk of affecting his most basic rights, such as life, and 
personal integrity and liberty”.123 
As to the applicable and pertinent due process guarantees, the Court has said that 
they include “the necessary facilities, including the services of a competent inter-
preter, as well as, if appropriate, access to legal assistance and representation”, an 
objective examination by a proper authority and a “personal interview”; well-
founded decisions; the protection of “the applicant’s personal information and the 
application, and the principle of confidentiality”; information on how to appeal in 
case an applicant “is denied refugee status”, and a reasonable period for that person 
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to appeal; the necessity that such an appeal has “suspensive effects and must allow 
the applicant in the country until the competent authority has adopted the required 
decision […] unless it can be shown that the request is manifestly unfounded”; and 
the effective availability of “certain judicial actions or remedies” when circum-
stances call for them, such as “for example, amparo or habeas corpus, that are rapid, 
adequate and effective to question the possible violation” of rights.124 
If children are involved, proceedings must be adapted in ways that permit them 
to have real access to them and that ensure that their specific situation will be con-
sidered. In the words of the San José judges: “proceedings [must be] appropriate and 
safe for children in an environment that creates trust at all stages” – even in the event 
of denial of the recognition of refugee status, by seeking to “avoid or reduce any 
possible psychological stress or harm” – taking into account the child’s best interests, 
providing special protection and care, avoiding undue delays, and adapting “pro-
ceedings on asylum or on the determination of refugee status, in order to provide 
children with a real access to these procedures, allowing their specific situation to be 
considered”.125 Moreover, decisions on asylum applications made by children must 
be expressed in ways that are comprehensible for them and make sure that an ade-
quate representative is present and that decisions may be subject to questioning and 
appeals. For the Court,  
“the decision on the request taken by the competent authority as to whether the applicant 
is granted refugee status based on the factual and legal determinations must expressly include 
the reasons for the decision, in order to enable the applicant to exercise his right of appeal, 
if necessary. In addition, the decision must be communicated to the child in a language and 
manner appropriate to her or his age, and in the presence of the guardian, legal representative, 
and/or another support person. If refugee status is recognized, the competent authority should 
grant a document certifying this decision”.126 
Finally, it merits noting how, according to the Court, not only refugees but also 
other migrants, such as those receiving complementary protection, are entitled to 
rights such as non-devolution and others, which “should be based on the needs of the 
applicant and not on the type of international protection granted” (emphasis 
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added).127 This rights-centered approach is a most welcome one that requires consid-
ering concrete risks that individuals are facing. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that, in the case Pacheco Tineo Family, the Court 
made another important contribution in terms of indicating that, based on a proper 
interpretation of certain exclusion and negative clauses found in international refu-
gee law, whenever someone is recognized as a refugee by a State, other States must 
afford that person such recognition, i.e. they should not refuse to treat that person 
according to the guarantees refugees have under international – and domestic, we 
might add – law. In the IACtHR’s own words,  
“[O]nce a State has declared refugee status, this protects the person to whom this has 
been recognized beyond the borders of that State, so that other States that the said person 
enters must take into account this status when adopting any measure of a migratory character 
in his regard and, consequently, guarantee a duty of special care in the verification of this 
status and in the measures that it may adopt”.128 
3.5. – Mass Deportations  
Two recent decisions reveal IACtHR considerations on mass deportations, one 
of which was rendered in the case Nadege Dorzema and another in the case of ex-
pelled Dominicans and Haitians. Both cases involved the Dominican Republic, 
which according to the International Organization for Migration is not only a country 
of emigrants, but also a migration destination and a transit country, especially from 
Haiti.129 As the Court noted in its case-law on mass deportations, in the Dominican 
territory the Haitian population and individuals of Haitian descent live in conditions 
of poverty and marginality, and are discriminated against.130  
The case Nadege Dorzema, decided in 2012, dealt with the entry of 30 Haitians 
in that State, the shooting and killing of some of them by military agents, the survi-
vors’ imprisonment and their transfer to the Haitian territory in exchange for money. 
The second case, decided in 2014, concerned the arbitrary arrest and summary ex-
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pulsion of 26 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent, and the adoption of dis-
criminatory policies impeding the acquisition of the nationality for those individuals 
born in the Dominican Republic whose parents were not citizens. 
While those cases not only addressed mass deportation – insofar as the Court 
found the violation of different AHCR provisions – 131 in both judgements the Court 
interpreted Article 22, para. 9, ACHR, according to which “The collective expulsion 
of aliens is prohibited”. The “collective” nature of an expulsion was qualified in the 
case Nadege Dorzema as the return a number of aliens not founded on an objective 
analysis of the individual situation of each person, but based on arbitrariness.132 In 
other words, the “collective” nature of an expulsion is not an issue related to the 
amount of returned aliens, but to the fact that they are expelled as a “group”. 
In addition to the requirement of them being individualized, the expulsion proce-
dures of aliens must afford sufficient guarantees demonstrating that the personal cir-
cumstances of each person have been taken into account,133 i.e. according with the 
basic guarantees of fair trials and with the prohibition to discriminate, among other 
requirements.134 In that regard, in its OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants the Court 
stated that those guarantees have to be granted to all persons irrespective of their 
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migration status,135 i.e. without any discrimination.136 In fact, the Court acknowledged 
the  
“importance of legal aid in cases […] involving an alien who may not know the country’s 
legal system and who is in a particularly vulnerable situation given the deprivation of liberty, 
which means that the recipient State must take into account the particular characteristics of 
the person’s situation, so that the said person may have effective access to justice on equal 
terms”.137  
When the consequence of immigration proceedings in a State may entail the pu-
nitive (thus, arbitrary) deprivation of liberty138 – as happened in the cases Nadege 
Dorzema and of expelled Dominicans and Haitians –, due process guarantees be-
come of fundamental importance to prevent such abuse and, according to previous 
San José case-law, “free legal representation becomes an imperative for the interests 
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that “States may not resort to the deprivation of liberty of children who are with their parents, or those who 
are unaccompanied or separated from their parents, as a precautionary measure in immigration proceed-
ings; nor may States base this measure on failure to comply with the requirements to enter and to remain 
in a country, on the fact that the child is alone or separated from her or his family, or on the objective of 
ensuring family unity, because States can and should have other less harmful alternatives and, at the same 
time, protect the rights of the child integrally and as a priority” (para 160). On these aspects, see MEDINA 
QUIROGA, The American convention on human rights: crucial rights and their theory and practice, 2nd ed., 
Antwerpen, 2016 p. 230 ff. On OC-21/14, see also ALIVERTI, cit. supra note 6. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration Issues in the Inter-American System of Human Rights … 261 
 
 
of justice”.139 In the OC-16/99 on Consular Assistance (and in the following case-
law), the Court stressed the particular situation of imprisoned migrants  
“in a social and juridical milieu different from their own, and often in a language they 
do not know, [who] experience a condition of particular vulnerability, which the right to 
information on consular assistance […] seeks to remedy in such a way that the detained alien 
may enjoy a true opportunity for justice, and the benefit of the due process of law equal to 
those who do not have those disadvantages”.140 
As for the contents of minimum guarantees, in the case Nadege Dorzema the 
IACtHR – assertively relying on international law and practice – enumerated them 
as follows. Firstly, an alien has to be informed expressly and formally of the charges 
against him/her and the grounds for the expulsion or deportation, information about 
his/her rights included (e.g. the possibility of contesting the charges and of requesting 
and receiving consular assistance, legal assistance and, if needed, translation or in-
terpretation). Moreover, in case of an unfavourable decision, the foreigner is entitled 
to present the case to the competent authority and to submit it for revision. Finally, 
expulsion may only be executed after notifying the decision.141 On those grounds, the 
Court concluded that the Dominican Republic acted against migrants as a group, 
without individualizing them or giving them the differential treatment that they were 
entitled to as human beings, and failed to consider their protection needs. This rep-
resented a collective expulsion contrary to Article 22, para. 9, ACHR. 
Finally, it is important to reflect on some remarks on the relationship between the 
prohibition of collective expulsion and the development of migrant standard protec-
tion laws in light of international law and practice. It has been rightly observed that 
the IACtHR case-law on collective expulsions particularly highlights the emergence 
of common universal standards on the respect and protection of migrants.142 Cer-
tainly, in the decisions on both the cases Nadege Dorzema and of expelled Domini-
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cans and Haitians there is a strong reliance on several (universal and regional) inter-
national human rights treaties143 and on international practice, such as decisions of 
the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
In that context, the reference to the works of the International Law Commission 
deserves a special mention, as it adopted (and submitted to the UN General Assem-
bly) a draft of treaty on the expulsion of aliens in 2014.144 Article 9 of the draft, on 
the prohibition of collective expulsion, affirms that “collective expulsion” means ex-
pulsion of aliens as a group, and also that a State may expel concomitantly the mem-
bers of a group of aliens, but only following an assessment of each individual case. 
In addition, there are also Article 19, on the detention of aliens for the purposes of 
expulsion, or Article 26 on the procedural rights of foreigners subject to expulsion, 
widely recalled by the Court in the two cases analysed above.145 They are, in essence, 
juridical contents that, under a de jure condendo perspective, both reflect the inter-
national law and practice on the protection of migrants and the homologous standards 
developed by the IACtHR. 
3.6. – The Contributions of the IACtHR to the Delineation of the Duty of 
States to Protect Migrants from non-State Abuses 
In addition to the States duty to “directly” respect human rights, according to 
Inter-American standards all migrants must be protected from non-State abuses, as 
was discussed in section 3.1, when citing the Inter-American Court’s position on 
Drittwirkung and private employers. That protection is required even when migrants 
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are not present in a State’s territory in a manner that is consistent with its adminis-
trative or other applicable regulations. Due to the horizontal effects of human rights 
law, a negligent failure to do so engages State responsibility on the basis of what the 
duty to ensure with due diligence the enjoyment of human rights, found in Article 1, 
para.1, ACHR, requires States to do. Based on this, it is not only forbidden for States 
to discriminate against migrants, but they are also required to protect migrants from 
private abuses, considering that it is prohibited for States to “tolerate discriminatory 
situations that prejudice migrants”.146  
The legal requirement of providing State protection from non-State violations is 
not only a human rights demand. It is also present, among others, in Refugee Law 
itself. Indeed, the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees indicates the following:  
“Persecution is normally related to action by the authorities of a country. It may also 
emanate from sections of the population that do not respect the standards established by the 
laws of the country concerned. A case in point may be religious intolerance, amounting to 
persecution, in a country otherwise secular, but where sizeable fractions of the population do 
not respect the religious beliefs of their neighbours. Where serious discriminatory or other 
offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if 
they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, 
to offer effective protection”.147 
While the idea that migrants must be protected by States from non-State abuses 
as a matter of international law is not revolutionary and is based on basic interna-
tional human rights obligations, its acknowledgment is nonetheless crucial, consid-
ering how frequently migrants are abused by non-State parties such as human traf-
fickers or racist groups, and in contexts as those of smuggling, among others – with-
out a doubt, these conducts, and others, are contrary to the full exercise of human 
rights guarantees and fundamental freedoms,148 and are so troubling that the interna-
tional society has developed instruments against them, such as the 2000 Protocol to 
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Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Chil-
dren and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, both 
supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized adopted by the 
General Assembly in the same year. Indeed, the 2001 Durban Declaration recognizes 
that States must “establish regular monitoring of acts of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance in the public and private sectors”. Likewise, the 
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation requires action against “racial discrimination by any persons, group or organ-
ization”; and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families sets forth in Article 16 that migrant 
workers and their families are entitled to “effective protection by the State against 
violence, physical injury, threats and intimidation, whether by public officials or by 
private individuals, groups or institutions”. 
Furthermore, non-State abuses can be a cause leading to displacement and mi-
gration, and both home States must deal with them and host States protect from re-
turning individuals to places where there is no protection against serious non-State 
threats. As the Court mentioned in OC-21/14 on Migrant Children:  
“[I]n addition to the traditional reasons for seeking refuge […] it is pertinent to be aware 
of the new factors that lead individuals and, in particular children, to be forcibly displaced 
from their countries of origin, among which transnational organized crime and the violence 
associated with the actions of non-State groups stand out”.149  
In regard to migrant children, the Court has also recognized the necessity of pro-
tecting them from potential non-State and State abuses, preventing150 or responding 
to them – e.g. by investigating abuses – 151, for instance when saying that children 
should be separated from adults, because holding them in the same place creates 
conditions that “are extremely prejudicial for their development and makes them 
vulnerable before third parties who, because they are adults, may abuse of their dom-
inant situation”.152 
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3.7. – A Tension between Sovereignty and Limits on State Action in Rela-
tion to Migration Aspects? 
Different issues related to the protection of the rights of migrants unavoidably 
impinge on the freedom of States to make decisions and policy choices, for instance 
in regards to allowing certain foreigners to remain on their territory, to require the 
payment of their salaries if they have worked without having the proper permits due 
to their irregular migration status, or concerning the decision of to whom the State 
will grant its nationality, which has been traditionally regarded as falling under the 
scope of the States sovereignty. Yet, while at first glance it may seem as if there is a 
tension between sovereignty and human rights considerations, in truth there is none, 
because sovereignty empowers States to act in a legal way, and acting contrary to 
human rights is unlawful, reason why the respective acts are neither truly sovereign 
nor endorsed by international law. It must be recognized that this is so in authoritar-
ian times and when there are discourses of exclusion. 
Apart from the fact that the main bodies of the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights must take into account the States’ sovereign rights under lex lata, considering 
that regional Human Rights Law does not exist in a vacuum and must be interpreted, 
as far as possible, in harmony with other international legal developments,153 in these 
troubled, partisan and incensed times we are living in, what supervisory bodies as 
the Court and the Commission say may have political repercussions and trigger re-
actions such as withdrawals from international instruments or institutional and finan-
cial support. Therefore, one could think that such bodies walk a thin line in order to 
neither abandon the defence of human rights nor to make decisions that are seen as 
legally incorrect in light of sovereignty that may bring about the ire of certain States. 
Facing this conundrum, the stance of the IACtHR has been quite interesting and as-
sertive. This is so because the Court has adopted a legally sound position, according 
to which it is true that in migration, mobility, and nationality matters, States retain 
the power to make certain choices.  
Nevertheless, the IACtHR has well argued that in many of those aspects interna-
tional law has evolved and ended up regulating some of them in terms of setting forth 
core protections or lowest common denominators that cannot be ignored. If States 
make choices that go “below” such guarantees, contradicting them, then their inter-
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national responsibility would be engaged. In the own words of the Court, “[t]he de-
termination of who has a right to be a national continues to fall within a State’s do-
mestic jurisdiction. However, its discretional authority in this regard is gradually be-
ing restricted with the evolution of international law, to ensure a better protection of 
the individual” (emphasis added).154 Likewise, the San José judges have argued that 
there is no obligation to employ undocumented migrants, but that if they are em-
ployed then their labour rights must be respected and guaranteed, as was mentioned 
above;155 and that “[I]n the exercise of their power to establish migratory policies, it 
is licit for States to establish measures relating to the entry, residence or departure of 
migrants […] provided this is in accordance with measures to protect the human 
rights of all persons […] to comply with this requirement States may take different 
measures, such as granting or denying general work permits or permits for certain 
specific work, but they must establish mechanisms to ensure that this is done without 
discrimination”.156  
The Court has also said that while States may adopt migration policies, they must 
bear in mind the ‘best interests of the child’ principle when their decisions may limit 
their human rights. For instance, according to the San José judges  
“With regard to possible family separation for migratory reasons, the Court recalls that 
States have the authority to elaborate and execute their own immigration policies […] a 
measure of expulsion or deportation may have prejudicial effects on the life, well-being and 
development of the child, so […] his or her best interests should be an overriding consider-
ation […] the legal separation of the child from his or her family is only admissible if it is 
duly justified by the best interests of the child, if it is exceptional and, insofar as possible, 
temporary”.157  
In spite of this necessity of certain measures being exceptional, the Court added 
that – sadly, to us, in a system still attaching too much importance to State interests 
instead of those of individuals – “the child’s right to family life does not transcend 
per se the sovereign authority of the States Parties to implement their own immigra-
tion policies in conformity with human rights […] Convention on the Rights of the 
Child also refers to the possibility of family separation owing to the deportation of 
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one or both parents”.158 This State freedom, though, does not exist when States con-
travene legal frameworks, “basic procedural guarantees […] international obliga-
tions”, do not seek “a lawful purpose”, do not take any measures seeking “to facilitate 
family reunification”, or engage in discrimination, event in which separation would 
be legally wrongful159 – in other words, State freedom in the adoption and implemen-
tation of migratory policies has international legal and human rights limits. 
Likewise, in the case Vélez Loor, the Court said, with very similar words, that “in 
the exercise of their authority to set immigration policies, States may establish mech-
anisms to control the entry into and departure from their territory of individuals who 
are not nationals, provided that these are compatible with the standards of human rights 
protection established in the American Convention”, adding that “although States en-
joy a margin of discretion when determining their immigration policies, the goals of 
such policies should take into account respect for the human rights of migrants”.160 
Interestingly, the San José judges do refer to a margin. However, they do not equate it 
with the doctrine of a ‘margin of appreciation’ as it is understood in Europe. Rather, 
the Court points towards an understanding of sovereign powers as existing on the con-
dition that the international law is respected, as is described below. 
Indeed, the IACtHR position coincides with the conception according to which, 
as flows from the Permanent Court of International Justice’s decision in the case 
Wimbledon,161 sovereignty does not equate with States having an unfettered power to 
make decisions. Instead, sovereignty refers to the powers and capacities States have 
and can exercise in a manner that is compatible with international legality.162 This 
rule of law consideration underlies the train of thought of the IACtHR, and a fortiori 
provides an argument of consistency: if States demand the respect of the choices they 
can legally make, the least they can do is respect legality (and the legal developments 
on the protection of human dignity) themselves.  
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Hence, States are not, and should be no longer considered as, the only or prepon-
derant subjects of international law. States and the law are social and political con-
structs, and, as flows from what Antonio Cançado has well said, they should serve 
human beings because, in his opinion, they instrumentally exist for them: “[t]he 
State, created by the human beings themselves, and composed by them, exists for 
them […] Ultimately, all Law exists for the human being, and the law of nations is 
no exception to that, guaranteeing to the individual his rights and the respect for his 
personality”.163 Moreover, the Court has said, “[t]he goals of migratory policies 
should take into account respect for human rights”.164 
Considering the previous analysis, we conclude that an alleged tension between 
sovereignty and human rights of migrants and foreigners, no matter what some States 
suggest, and as flows from the IACtHR case-law – and other human rights bodies – 
does not truly exist in international legal terms. This is because, after all, the Court 
enforces the respect of (human rights) legality, and sovereignty presupposes the re-
spect of that legality. Otherwise, States do not have any freedom whatsoever to con-
travene that legality – based on the dignity of human beings – and choices they make 
to the contrary would be unlawful. Furthermore, States must recall that “special 
measures to ensure the protection of the human rights of […] vulnerable groups” in 
migration contexts have been adopted at the international level.165 It must also be 
noted that the Inter-American System of Human Rights does not use the doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation;166 and that even in those regional systems that use, it must 
be borne in mind that discretion has limits. 
4. – Final Remarks: Distilling the Essence of the IACtHR Case-law on 
Migrants 
The analysis of the relevant case-law on the selected issues we have explored in 
this Chapter has shown a comprehensive picture of the jus migrandi as developed by 
the IACtHR, encompassing developments ranging from the fundamental OC-18/03 
on Undocumented Migrants to the very recent OC-25/18 on the Right of Asylum, and 
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passing through the OC-21/14 on Migrant Children and contentious-jurisdiction de-
cisions. Moreover, a look “beyond the Court” has shown the IACHR’s proactive role 
in the promotion of human rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
We reported the case of Venezuelan migrants and pertinent IACHR resolutions re-
calling (all) the OAS Member States’ basic obligations, e.g. to recognize the refugee 
status and to respect the non-refoulement principle. That is a good example of how 
that OAS body can act in a preventive way, complementing, confirming, and 
strengthening the standard of protection of human rights judicially developed, even 
in relation to non-parties to the ACHR. 
Definitely, with its case-law and developments, the Court and other OAS bodies 
have contributed by providing guidelines on the responses to migration, on the pro-
tection of the human rights of migrants, and on the prevention of factors that may 
lead to a worsening or eruption of migratory crises. Interestingly, those bodies have 
also stood up to human rights abuses against migrants coming from States as differ-
ent in terms of power as the USA and Latin American States, thus disproving what 
some may believe as to the Inter-American System of Human Rights supposedly 
being only concerned with the latter and not daring to scrutinize USA violations. The 
Court and other OAS bodies have developed a case-law that, while responding to 
what happens in the region of the Americas, echoes pronouncements and the identi-
fication of issues that have been taking place elsewhere. The humane approach they 
have come up with, which is legally sound and based on principles similar to those 
of other regions, is likewise worth considering by other regional and universal human 
rights supervisory bodies – which have considered what the IACtHR has said in other 
fields already.167 
That being said, when trying to distil the very essence or main points of the ana-
lysed case-law, some fundamental points emerge.  
Firstly, migrants are vulnerable. They suffer from some unequal conditions when 
compared to nationals, and that calls for specifically considering their needs in hu-
man rights terms, beginning with an analysis of the basic rights (a) not to be discrim-
inated against and (b) to equality before the law.  
Secondly, specific demands of protection must be considered in relation to each 
migrant as well. For instance, in the OC-21/14 on Migrant Children the San José 
judges analyzed the non-refoulement principle as an autonomous right established in 
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the ACHR as well as an obligation derived from the prohibition of torture and other 
human rights provisions, also stressing that, when migrant children are involved, the 
need to interpret them in light of the children protection are entitled to.168 In the same 
OC-21/14, the IACtHR affirmed that in proceedings on the refugees status, the gen-
eral due process and remedies guarantees ex Articles 8 and 25 ACHR apply, and that 
if children are involved proceedings that are appropriate and safe for them must be 
ensured and processed in an adequate environment, avoiding any possible psycho-
logical stress or harm (e.g. in case of denial), always taking into account the best 
interests of the child principle.169 In that regard, in the OC-21/14 it was said that “In-
ternational migration is a complex phenomenon that may involve two or more States, 
including countries of origin, transit and destination, for both migrants and those 
seeking asylum or refugee status. In this context and, in particular, that of mixed 
migration flows that entail population movements of a diverse nature, the character-
istics of and the reasons for the journey that children undertake by land, sea or air, to 
countries other than those of which they are nationals or where they habitually reside, 
may bespeak both persons who require international protection and others who are 
moving in search of better opportunities for diverse reasons, which may change dur-
ing the course of the migratory process. This means that the needs and requirements 
for protection may vary widely”.170 
Thirdly, States must respect and ensure human rights provided for ACHR in ben-
efit of every person under their jurisdiction, migrants included, even in the case of 
irregular entry and/or status. In some cases, the Inter-American standards of protec-
tion take on a particular meaning. For instance, concerning International Refugee 
Law elements, the non-refoulement principle has a wider field of application, con-
sidering that the Inter-American System of Human Rights protects all aliens under 
the jurisdiction of States in the region, and not only refugees.171 This development is 
certainly welcome as it raises the level of protection of human rights in the Americas. 
From a general perspective, the same development is welcome also because it can 
influence other systems of protection of human rights. In fact, just as the IACtHR 
has adopted comparative analysis and cross-fertilization as hermeneutical tools to 
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interpret the ACHR, taking advantage of international law and international practice, 
it is also worth reminding that other Courts and bodies have also taken note of the 
Inter-American practice and case-law as an interpretative tool172 that may reflect the 
crystallization of legal standards. We think that this cross-fertilization dynamic in 
both ways represents a key element for the development of general and regional rules 
on the protection of migrants.  
Fourthly, as was argued in the Chapter, a tension between sovereignty and limits 
on State action in relation to migration aspects does not really exist, due to the fact 
that sovereign decisions must respect human rights – and other – international legal 
obligations. Since the OC-18/13 on Undocumented Migrants, the Court has built a 
set of protection standards, progressively adding new indications on migrants’ rights, 
depending on the specificities of each case and alleged violations of the ACHR. The 
result is the Inter-American jus migrandi in best part summarized in the OC-25/18 
on the Right of Asylum and made up of limitations to the States’ latitude when regu-
lating and handling migratory flows and their effects. Just to point out an example, 
we can recall the employment of undocumented migrants: there is no obligation to 
employ them (i.e., related to a sovereign decision on employment permits), but if 
they find a job, the duties to respect and guarantee their labour rights arise and bind 
the State involved both when labour takes place in private or public relations.173 
In sum, migrants are rightfully recognized as human beings, as human and with 
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as much dignity as anyone else, and thus deserving and being entitled to the recog-
nition of their equal dignity and worth, which do not depend on any factors different 
from human identity174 such as the random place of birth or origin. As the Court has 
well pointed out,  
“The safeguard of these rights for migrants has great importance based on the principle 
of the inalienable nature of such rights, which all workers possess, irrespective of their mi-
gratory status, and also the fundamental principle of human dignity […] according to which 
‘[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’”.175  
Indeed, the dignity of all migrants without discrimination must be respected by 
States – and other actors – whenever they interact with migrants. In that regard, it’s 
due to remind what the Court affirmed in the case Pacheco Tineo Family, i.e. that  
“under international law, certain limits have been developed to the application of migra-
tory policies that impose, in proceedings on the expulsion or deportation of aliens, strict ob-
servance of the guarantees of due process, judicial protection and respect for human dignity, 
whatsoever the legal situation or migratory status of the migrant”.176 
Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that several circumstances may gen-
erate migration dynamics, which are sadly too often related to risks, vulnerability 
and abuses of rights. Moreover, the recognition of the equality and non-discrimina-
tion that all human beings are entitled to – as a matter of peremptory law, no less –
177
 and the principle of legality underpin the jus migrandi, as has been well recognized 
by the IACtHR. It has well pointed out that several regimes, including human rights 
law, with their due process and other guarantees and freedoms, are applicable when 
examining the treatment of migrants. Whenever their rights may be affected, proper 
guarantees must be observed. Indeed, the San José judges have repeatedly held that 
due process must be guaranteed to everyone, regardless of their migratory status, 
because the broad scope of the intangible nature of due process applies not only ra-
tione materiae but also ratione personae without discrimination, and also that States 
have the obligation to ensure this fundamental principle to their citizens and to any 
alien who is in their territory, without any discrimination based on their regular or 
 
174
 CARRILLO-SANTARELLI, cit. supra note 148, pp. 45, 77-78. 
175
 OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants, cit. supra note 1, para. 157. 
176
 Case Pacheco Tineo Family, cit. supra note 33, para. 129. 
177
 OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants, cit. supra note 1, para. 101. 
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irregular presence, their nationality, race, gender or any other condition. That being 
said, and as was indicated previously in this Chapter, the Court has also held that, 
when considering the principle of equality and non-discrimination, it is  
“permissible for the State to grant a different treatment to documented migrants in rela-
tion to undocumented migrants, or to immigrants in relation nationals, ‘provided that this 
treatment is reasonable, objective and proportionate, and does not harm human rights’”.178 
Finally, it’s worth mentioning a further point regarding the analysed case-law. 
The consolidation of the Inter-American set of standards for the protection of mi-
grants has much to contribute to international law and practice and deserves being 
studied by other regional systems and the UN system of protection of human rights. 
The potential multidirectional cross-fertilization represents a key element for the de-
velopment and interpretation of standards on the protection of migrants, for instance 
in regard to the recognition of the principle of equality before the law and non-dis-
crimination as a jus cogens one179 or the identification of non-refoulement not only 
as treaty but also as found in customary law (even as a peremptory requirement if a 
person would torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if returned).180 Those 
standards, furthermore, generate erga omnes legal effects. Additionally, the raison 
d’être of the rights and guarantees of migrants should never be forgotten. They ought 
to provide protection for all migrants, independently of their origin and destination, 
be them a group of Haitians crossing the Dominican border in search of a better life 
or those who, escaping from poverty and/or persecution, navigate the seas to reach 
the coasts of the EU Member States or Australia. 
Inter-American practice and case-law may also be considered to declare interna-
tional law. In that regard, under a de jure condendo perspective, the reliance made 
by the IACtHR on the works of the International Law Commission, which in 2014 
adopted a draft of treaty on the expulsion of aliens,181 deserves a special mention. In 
relation to mass deportation and other aspects, it takes into account the vulnerability 
of migrants (Article 15) and addresses elements of the protection and rights of mi-
 
178
 Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians, cit. supra note 23, paras. 351, 402. 
179
 OC-18/03 on Undocumented Migrants, cit. supra note 1, para. 101. 
180
 OC-25/18 on the Right of Asylum, cit. supra note 3, para. 179. 
181
 International Law Commission. Expulsion of aliens, cit. supra note 144 The Court made references 
to the draft in the case Nadege Dorzema, in the case Pacheco Tineo Family, in the case of expelled Domin-
icans and Haitians and, finally, in OC-21/14 on Migrant Children. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
274 Luca Paladini, Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli 
 
 
grants, such as the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, and the connected obligation to not expel an alien who may 
face the risk of such treatment (Articles 17 and 24). In some cases, the International 
Law Commission mentions, in its commentaries to Articles and with interpretative 
relevance, the IACtHR case-law and the IACHR practice, which are part of the Inter-
American jus migrandi that likely had an influence on the writing of the draft and 
may also contribute to the future codification of international law,182 being this evi-
dence of the cross-fertilization we have referred to, and which more than justifies 
studying Inter-American developments and standards in different regions and levels 
of governance.  
Interestingly, in December 2017, the United Nations General Assembly took note 
of the draft, acknowledged the comments expressed by Governments in the 6th Com-
mittee (“Legal questions”), and decided to include the item “Expulsion of aliens” in 
the provisional agenda of its 75th session (2020), with a view to examining, inter alia, 
the question of the form that might be given to the articles or “any other appropriate 
action”.183 Indeed, the future adoption of the draft by the UN General Assembly 
would represent a further and important step forward the codification of a general 
more comprehensive (universal, we could affirm) jus migrandi and would have an 
Inter-American footprint. Migration dynamics take place all over the world, and hu-
man beings are their protagonists who deserve the recognition of their dignity and 
the respect of the rights flowing from it. 
 
 
 
 
182
 For instance, the International Law Commission referred to the case Berenson (IACtHR, case of 
Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru [Merits, Reparations, and Costs]) in the commentary to Article 24 “Obliga-
tion not to expel an alien to a State where he or she may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”, in order to sustain the absolute character of the prohibition de qua. 
As for the IACHR practice, in the commentary to Article 29 “Readmission to the expelling State” some 
references regard its recommendation on the prohibition of arbitrary expulsions. 
183
 United Nations, General Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/72/117, adopted on 7 December 2017 at its 
67th plenary meeting. 
BRUNO, PALOMBINO, DI STEFANO (eds.), Migration Issues before International Courts and Tribunals, Rome, CNR 
Edizioni, 2019, ISBN 978 88 8080 367 6, pp. 275-300. 
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1. – Introduction 
Despite the fact that fifty per cent of the world’s refugees are estimated to be 
women or girls,1 the protection granted to them seems to be falling short of being 
 
1
 ALLWOOD, WADIA, Refugee Women in Britain and France, Oxford, 2010, p. 2. 
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effective. Despite the continuous pronouncement of the vulnerability of female ref-
ugees and asylum seekers2 and, thus, of their being in need of special protection,3 
there is much room for improvement left. Indeed, one would find it hard to contradict 
the observation that “as being a refugee makes refugee women more vulnerable than 
other women, discrimination on grounds of sex makes them more vulnerable than 
men, including refugee men”.4 Yet, even though the jurisprudence of regional and 
international fora has to a certain extent contradicted the lack of gender perspectives 
within refugee law per se (by having been developed so as to provide refugee women 
with a more gender sensitive protection, compatible with their particular hygienic,5 
gestational6 and postpartum needs7) more innovative steps concerning the interpreta-
tion and, subsequently, the application of existing rules of refugee law are yet to be 
taken as a response to numerous frightening indications of cruelty plaguing female 
refugees and asylum seekers worldwide.8  
 
2
 Treaty practice (e.g. General Assembly of the Organization of American States, Inter-American Con-
vention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, signed on 9 June 1994, 
entered into force on 5 March 1995, Art. 10); Fora’s practice (e.g. European Court of Human Rights, RR v 
Poland, Application No. 27617/04, Judgment of 26 May 2011, para. 159; Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, “IACHR expresses concern over the situation of the ‘Migrant Caravan’ from Honduras and 
calls on the States of the region to adopt measures for their protection”, 23 October 2018, available at: 
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/225.asp>.). . 
3
 European Court of Human Rights, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, Application No. 15766/03, Judgment 
of 16 March 2010, para 148; European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application 
No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011, para 251; Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), Land-
mark resolution on Women, Peace and Security, UN Doc. S/RES/1325 (2000), fourth and tenth preambular 
paragraphs; MUIŽNIEKS, “Human rights of refugee and migrant women and girls need to be better pro-
tected”, The Commissioner's Human Rights Comments, 7 March 2016, available at: 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/human-rights-of-refugee-and-migrant-women-and-girls-
need-to-be-better-protected?desktop=true>. 
4
 JOHNSSON, “The International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of Principal Problems 
and Issues”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 1989, p. 221 ff., p. 229. 
5
 European Court of Human Rights, Aden Ahmed v. Malta, Application No. 55352/12, Judgment of 23 
July 2013, para. 92.  
6
 Id., Mahmundi and Others v. Greece, Application No. 14902/10, Judgment of 31 July 2012, para. 
70. 
7
 Id., Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, Application No. 41442/07, Judgment of 19 January 
2010, para. 64. 
8
 COSTA RIBA, “Women face daily dangers in Greek refugee camps”, Amnesty International, 5 October 
2018, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/10/women-daily-dangers-refu-
gee-camps-greece/>; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refugee women and children face 
heightened risk of sexual violence amid tensions and overcrowding at reception facilities on Greek islands”, 
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Alarming though it may seem, women apply for asylum at lower rates than men, 
even though acceptance rates of applications submitted by women are higher.9 This 
evinces an insufficiency of the accessibility of asylum seeking procedures to women, 
which profoundly calls for immediate regulation. Accordingly, sex-oriented specifi-
cation of obligations arising from provisions granting substantive rights, such as the 
right to education,10 the freedom of assembly and association,11 the right to property 
[potentially in the form of timely financial assistance throughout periods of addi-
tional needs (e.g. pregnancies)]12 and prohibition of discrimination13 remains essen-
tial, as worrying findings highlight inequalities as to their enjoyment. The enumera-
tion of the said problems in need of solution is indicative and not restrictive, as a 
complete list highlighting the worries to be confronted would be sadly going on for 
pages. The same would hold true for wishes of potential measures to be implemented. 
However, such enumerations should be seen as falling outside the scope of this pa-
per, as does a commentary on the lack of the inclusion of gender-based persecution 
as a ground of refugee status, which has been extensively analysed elsewhere.14 The 
paper at hand will not focus on advocating for a potential customary modification of 
 
The UN Refugee Agency, 9 February 2018, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/brief-
ing/2018/2/5a7d67c4b/refugee-women-children-face-heightened-risk-sexual-violence-amid-tensions. 
html>; WRIGHT, “Rohingya women and girls face renewed risks, harms in refugee camps: Oxfam Canada 
report”, The Globe and Mail, 11 September 2018, available at: <https://www.theglobe-
andmail.com/world/article-rohingya-women-and-girls-face-renewed-risks-harms-in-refugee-camps/>; 
BAKLACIOĞLU, “The Violence of Tolerated Termporality: Syrian Women Refugees on the outskirts of 
Istanbul”, in FREEDMAN et al. (eds.), A Gendered Approach to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Abingdon-New 
York, 2017, p. 42 ff, pp 42-57. 
9
 FREEDMAN, Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate, New York, 2007, p. 30. 
10
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Her Turn: It’s time to make refugee girls’ edu-
cation a priority”, The United Nations Refugee Agency, available at:  <https://www.unhcr.org/herturn/>. 
11
 BEKAJ et al., Political Participation of Refugees: Bridging the Gaps, Strömsborg, 2018, p. 49. 
12
 BULMAN, “Pregnant refugees facing unacceptable delays in maternity payments”, Independent, 17 
May 2017, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/pregnant-refugees-asylym-
seekers-maternity-payments-delays-british-red-cross-a7739366.html>. 
13
 PITTAWAY and BARTOLOMEI, “Refugees, Race, and Gender: The Multiple Discrimination against 
Refugee Women”, Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 2001, p. 21 ff, p. 24-28. 
14
 UNHCR Division of International Protection, “Gender-Related Persecution: An Analysis of Recent 
Trends”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 1997, p. 79 ff, p. 79-113; United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the con-
text of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees”, 
UN. Doc HCR/GIP/02/01, (7 May 2002); See JOHNSSON, cit. supra note 4, pp. 221-222; CASTEL, “Rape, 
Sexual Assault and Meaning of Persecution”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 1992, p. 39 ff, pp. 39-
40. 
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the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter, the ‘Refugee Con-
vention’)15 either, nor will it suggest a modification of the said Convention or de lege 
ferenda interpretations of existing rules of international refugee law in general.  
On the contrary, the purpose of the present paper is to shed light to the reasons 
why existing rules and standards of international refugee law, enshrined in interna-
tional treaties, should be seen as granting gender sensitive protection, namely pro-
tection aiming to address female refugees’ and asylum seekers’ special gender-re-
lated needs. Initially, the paper at hand will highlight that innovative jurisprudence, 
operating as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international refugee 
law, constitutes the key to the establishment of their gender sensitive application. To 
this end, the significance of jurisprudence within the system of international law will 
be highlighted and the ultimate limits of precedents’ function will be underlined. 
Furthermore, the present paper will indicate that a gender sensitive application of 
treaty rules on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ protection within decisions is not only 
feasible but also the only lege artis correct one. This conclusion will be derived from 
a thorough analysis of the rules on treaty interpretation, which essentially leads the 
interpreter to various interpretative tools supporting the said gender sensitive inter-
pretation. Finally, the significance of the abovementioned interpretative approach to 
the whole system of international refugee law and the confrontation of the adverse 
phenomenon of fragmentation will be highlighted, verifying the correctness of the 
conclusion that the establishment of the innovative, gender sensitive application of 
international rules on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ protection is essential. 
2. – Jurisprudence as the Ideal Means of Gender Sensitive Application 
of Rules and Standards of International Refugee Law 
Despite the fact that no doctrine of stare decisis runs through international law,16 it 
is beyond doubt that precedents play a significant role therein. Indeed, the inter partes 
effect of binding judicial or arbitral decisions is highlighted within most statutes of 
international courts and tribunals.17 Accordingly, Article 38 (1) of the Statute of Inter-
national Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), which has been broadly acknowledged as a provision 
 
15
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed on 28 July 1951, entered into force on 22 
April 1954, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 
16
 SHAHABUDDEEN, Precedent in the World Court, Cambridge, 1996, p. 1. 
17
 REUTER, Droit international public, Paris, 1958, p. 85. 
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reflecting the sources of international law,18 classifies judicial decisions as “subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law”,19 even though an introductory reference 
to Article 59 of the said Statute explicitly denounces their binding character. 
In line with the aforementioned, international courts and tribunals frequently rely 
on rulings of their predecessors, using previous decisions as the principal basis for 
the issuance of subsequent ones.20 As a result, this judicial and arbitral practice has 
been characterized as a “de facto system of precedent”,21 a “jurisprudence con-
stant”,22 and a “de facto form of stare decisis”.23 Thus, it seems more and more evi-
dent that, despite the unambiguousness of the subsidiary character of judicial and 
arbitral decisions as sources of law, they do play a very important role in defining 
international law.24 After all, precedents constitute the least controversial secondary 
source of law with so decisive an influence on subsequent decisions, state practice 
and, eventually, primary sources of international law, as even States, having en-
trusted the interpretation and application of primary sources of law to various fora, 
will be at least influenced by their decisions as to their subsequent law-making con-
duct. Hence, since suggestions of de lege ferenda interpretations and amendments to 
the primary sources of international refugee law are to be herein avoided, it is juris-
prudence that seems to be the key towards the establishment of an innovative appli-
cation of international refugee law provisions.  
Pursuant to this brief reference to the importance of previous decisions within 
international law generally, it is about time attention was drawn to the importance of 
an innovative gender sensitive application of refugee law provisions within decisions 
of competent international fora specifically. Such decisions will similarly constitute 
 
18
 PELLET, “Article 38” in ZIMMERMANN et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
A Commentary, Oxford, 2012, p. 677 ff., p. 735. 
19
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(d). 
20
 NORTON, “The Role of Precedent in the Development of International Investment Law”, ICSID 
Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal, 2018, p. 280 ff., p. 280; GUILLAUME, “The Use of Precedent by 
International Judges and Arbitrators”, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2011, p. 5 ff., p. 13. 
21
 KLAGER, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, Cambridge, 2011, p. 35. 
22
 BJORKLUND, “Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante: UC Davis Legal 
Studies Research Paper No 158”, Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, December 
2008, available at:  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319834>. 
23
 KAUFMANN-KOHLER, “Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?”, Arbitration International, 
2007, p. 357 ff., p. 358. 
24
 DE BRABANDERE, “Arbitral Decisions as a Source of International Investment Law”, in GAZZINI and 
DE BRABANDERE (eds.), International Investment Law. The Sources of Rights and Obligations, Leiden, 
2012, p. 245 ff., pp. 245-288. 
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subsidiary means for the determination of the rules and standards of international 
refugee law, contributing significantly to the enhancement of the refugee law sys-
tem’s effectiveness concerning gender-related needs, as international refugee law 
does not constitute an exception to the abovementioned general rule of a “de facto 
system of precedent” governing international law in general. More precisely, the por-
traiture of the traditional circular motion running through the construction of inter-
national law’s sources will – in the case of international refugee law – take the fol-
lowing particular form: the existing international rules and standards of refugee law, 
applicable to the hypothetical dispute at stake, as applied by the competent forum 
and as incorporated within its decision, will subsequently constitute a “subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law” and will be used for the purpose of the 
said determination by competent fora in subsequent similar disputes, ultimately in-
fluencing the content of these subsequent decisions. In this exact influence does the 
great importance of such innovative jurisprudence as means of gender sensitive ap-
plication of rules and standards of refugee law lie. As time passes by, the innovative 
path will turn into established case-law. 
It is beyond doubt that the formation of this path has already begun, as gender 
sensitive international fora’s decisions have already made their presence clear,25 giv-
ing a strong, undoubted gender sensitive message for the determination of interna-
tional refugee law provisions. Indicatively, the Human Rights Committee has taken 
the vulnerability of lesbian women due to laws criminalising homosexuality into se-
 
25
 European Court of Human Rights, Jabari v. Turkey, Application No. 40035/98, Judgment of 28 
October 1999; Aden Ahmed v. Malta, cit. supra note 5; Id., Mahmundi and Others v. Greece, cit. supra 
note 6; Id., Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, cit. supra note 7; Id., Emily Collins and Ashley Aka-
ziebie v. Sweden, Application No. 23944/05, Judgment of 8 March 2007; Id., N v Sweden, Application No. 
23505/09, Judgment of 20 July 2010; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Human Rights Sit-
uation of Refugee and Migrant Families and Unaccompanied Children in the United States of America”, 
OAS/Ser.L/V/II. 155, Doc. 16, 24 July 2015, p. 40, para. 76; Human Rights Committee [ICCPR], X v 
Sweden, Communication No. 1833/2008, Decision of 1 November 2011; Human Rights Committee 
[ICCPR], Jasin (on behalf of S and ors) v Denmark, Communication No. 2360/2014, Decision of 22 July 
2015; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, MEN v Denmark, Communication 
No. 35/2011, Decision of 26 July 2013; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
SO v Canada, Communication No. 49/2013, Decision of 27 October 2014; Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, A v Denmark, Communication No. 53/2013, Decision of 19 November 
2015, para. 8.4; BEYANI, “The Needs of Refugee Women: A Human-Rights Perspective”, Gender and 
Development, 1995, p. 29 ff., p. 32. 
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rious account, noting that, if a deportation to a country with such legislative provi-
sions was implemented, the risks posed to the deported lesbian woman would be so 
extreme as to breach the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’),26 and in particular the prohibition on refoulement entailed in its Article 
7.27 Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
having noted that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (‘CEDAW’)28 “complement[s] the international regime, taking into 
account the lack of explicit gender provisions in international documents for the pro-
tection of refugees and stateless persons”,29 highlighted that “[t]he positive obliga-
tions of state parties that arose from Article 2(d) of CEDAW included the protection 
of women from the ‘real, personal, and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-
based violence’ including in situations that took place outside the territory of the 
state party.30 It has moved even further to explicitly note that States parties are re-
quired also to ensure that each of five grounds enumerated in the Refugee Conven-
tion is given a gender-sensitive interpretation, as well as that a gender-sensitive ap-
proach should be applied at every stage of the asylum process.31 Accordingly, the 
Committee on the Rights of Child has underlined that the refugee definition “must 
be interpreted in an age- and gender-sensitive manner, taking into account the par-
ticular motives for, and forms and manifestations of, persecution experienced by 
children”.32 
 
26
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on 19 December 1966, entered into 
force on 23 March 1976, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 999, p. 171. 
27
 Human Rights Committee [ICCPR], MI v Sweden, Communication No. 2149/2012, Decision of 25 
July 2013, paras. 7.2, 7.5, 8. 
28
 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, adopted on 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981, United Nations Treaty 
Series, Vol. 1249, p. 13. 
29
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, A v Denmark, supra note 25, para. 
8.4 
30
 Ibid., para. 8.6. 
31
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General recommendation No. 32 
on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women, UN 
Doc CEDAW/C/GC/32 (2014), para. 25; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
MEN v Denmark, supra note 25, para. 9. 
32
 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of Unaccompanied 
and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, UN Doc CRC/GC/2005/6 (2005), para. 27; Com-
mittee on the Rights of Child, K.Y.M. v. Denmark, Communication No. 3/2016, para. 11.3. 
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Taking such rulings into account, the innovative character of similar gender sen-
sitive decisions might not seem to be so innovative after all. However, until the spe-
cific jurisprudential pronouncement of the correctness and the necessity of gender 
sensitive interpretative specification of obligations stemming from international ref-
ugee law and the establishment of the gender sensitive application of international 
refugee law provisions within decisions as settled case-law, such jurisprudential in-
dications should be at least seen as bright examples to be more frequently used by 
fora on subsequent occasions; as innovative subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of international refugee law. 
Even though following the gender perspectives enshrined within such innovative 
decisions will not be mandatory for subsequent fora, the latter will probably need to 
justify their decision to not follow a gender sensitive application of the rules of in-
ternational refugee law, since the real question to be addressed will not be whether a 
State is held to decisions reached by fora in previous cases, but ‘whether, in this case, 
there is cause not to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases’.33 At any 
rate, even if such an obligation of justification of the choice to depart from earlier 
rulings could not be seen as being imposed on fora, then at least the non-gender 
sensitive application of the rules of international refugee law followed by them 
would undoubtedly have to be the outcome of the applicable law’s interpretation. 
Instantly, a question arises: Could such an interpretative outcome be extracted from 
existing rules of international refugee law? Or, in other words, is the abovementioned 
gender sensitive interpretation the lege artis correct one?  
The second question arising (particularly when one observes the circular motion 
described above) is whether this suggested gender sensitive application might even-
tually lead to a modification of the applicable international treaty, altering also the 
obligations imposed on States. However, what should be underlined is that such “ju-
risprudential modifications” contradict the function of precedents within the con-
struction of international law. Jurisprudence does not constitute as a “source” strictly 
speaking.34 Hence, it cannot lead to the creation of new rules of law.35 Conversely, 
the role precedents play concerning the rules of international law is a determinative 
 
33
 International Court of Justice, Cameroon v. Nigeria (Land and Maritime Boundary), Judgment of 
11 June 1998, para. 2. 
34
 See PELLET, cit. supra note 18, 735. 
35
 PELLET, “Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law?”, in Gaetano Morelli Lectures Se-
ries, Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law?, Rome, 2018, p. 7 ff., p. 33.  
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one.36 Evidently, a limit is posed on fora’s decisions, according to which the latter 
cannot create new rules of law; they can only contribute to the determination of ex-
isting ones instead. They are tools that fora are invited to use for the purpose of in-
vestigating the three sources of international law enumerated in Article 38 subparas. 
1a-1c of the ICJ’s Statute.37 They cannot lead to the emergence of new obligations; 
they may only determine the scope of the existing rules38 and, thus, the scope of the 
obligations enshrined therein. 
However, when the determination of the rule of law ends, its interpretation be-
gins. And as the determination cannot lead to the creation of a new rule,39 it could be 
within the amendment or the interpretation of the treaty that such an alteration could 
occur.40 Nevertheless, the circumstances under which such an amendment might take 
place, are regulated by the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties41 (‘VCLT’) on treaties’ amendment (if such provisions do not exist within the 
treaty to be modified per se).42 As the emergence of established case-law is not pro-
vided for as a means of treaty modification by VCLT or by any other treaty, falling 
under the scope of “international refugee law”, the answer to the second question 
arisen above is a negative one. After all, even the ones that do accept that authentic 
interpretation, whereby all parties themselves – or through special mechanisms43 to 
which they have entrusted the power of authentic interpretation – agree on (or at least 
accept) the interpretation of treaty terms by means, which are extrinsic to the treaty,44 
is of a higher interpretative quality,45 will undoubtedly agree that such a point of view 
does not change the said negative answer, as authentic interpretation lies – again – 
in the hands of the Contracting States – or of the special mechanisms, to which the 
power of authentic interpretation has been entrusted – and not on the ones of the 
fora’s members, the latter being limited to interpreting and applying the applicable 
law at the dispute, at least in cases that they do not adjudicate ex aequo et bono. 
 
36
 See PELLET, cit. supra note 18, 783. 
37
 Ibid, p. 784. 
38
 See PELLET, cit. supra note 30, p. 33. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 VILLIGER, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Leiden, 2009, p. 
429.  
41
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed on May 23, 1969, entered into force on January 
27, 1980, UN Treaty Series Vol. 1155, 331. 
42
 VCLT Arts. 39-41. 
43
 See for example; Free Trade Commission of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
44
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p. 429.  
45
 JENNINGS, WATTS, Oppenheim’s International Law: Peace, 9th Edition, Harlow, 1996, para. 630. 
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Pursuant to the analysis stated above, the question of whether a modification 
might occur through a gender sensitive application of refugee law provisions seems 
to be a question of no substance. The same does not hold true for the first question 
though, namely the question of whether a gender sensitive interpretative outcome 
could be lege artis extracted from existing rules of international refugee law, since 
if the answer to this question is affirmative, then the gender sensitive interpretation 
of the applicable rules of international law (as determined through case-law) will be 
the only correct one, as if all interpretative tools lead to such an interpretative out-
come, then the room for conflicting interpretations will be essentially smaller. It is 
this very question that attention will be now turned to. 
3. – A Gender Sensitive Interpretation of International Refugee Law 
Treaties 
International refugee law undoubtedly incorporates a wide range of rules; it is not 
only international treaties that frame international refugee law, as aside from its cor-
nerstones, namely aside from the Refugee Convention and the Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees,46 and aside from regional and international human rights trea-
ties and international humanitarian and international criminal law conventions, it is 
international customary law, general principles of international law, soft law regula-
tions and various other sources of law and guidance that compose the international 
legal framework for refugees’ and asylum seekers’ protection.47 However, as has 
been already mentioned, the paper at hand will focus on the rules and standards of 
international refugee law incorporated within international treaties for the purpose 
of the avoidance of complex issues regarding the (possibility of) customary rules’ 
and general principles’ interpretation, which exceed the matter being addressed 
within the paper at hand and for the purpose of reaching conclusions, which will be 
more or less generally endorsable. Thus, the present Section will focus on answering 
the question of whether a gender sensitive interpretative outcome could be extracted 
 
46
 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, signed on 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 
1967, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267. 
47
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, 
UN Doc. UN Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Policy on Refu-
gee Women, UN Doc. A/AC.96/754 (1990); NICHOLSON, KUMIN, A guide to international refugee protec-
tion and building state asylum systems: Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 27, 2017, Inter-Parliamentary 
Union and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017, p. 15-32. 
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from existing rules of international refugee law incorporated within international 
treaties, irrespectively of the fact that some of the provisions contained within such 
treaties have been subsequently acknowledged as incorporating customary rules of 
international law.48 To this end, guidance will be sought from the customary rules of 
interpretation,49 namely the interpretative rules enshrined in VCLT, as it is in accord-
ance with these interpretative rules – or the customary rules enshrined in VCLT – 
that the interpretation of international rules and standards of refugee law incorpo-
rated within international treaties shall take place.  
3.1. – The Interpretative Rule of VCLT Article 31  
3.1.1. The Interpretative Means of VCLT Article 31(1)  
Among the said wide range of rules composing the construction of international 
refugee law, many examples of treaty provisions granting a gender sensitive protec-
tion can be traced.50 Having been developed so as to address the specific needs and 
minimize the particular dangers related to refugee’s and asylum seeker’s sex,51 such 
treaty provisions leave no room to the interpreter than to adopt a gender sensitive 
interpretative outcome. The gender-protective purpose of such provisions is also re-
flected on the very wording used within such rules, the latter being itself gender-
 
48
 HATHAWAY, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge, 2005, p. 364. 
49
 AUST, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed., New York, 2007, pp. 12-13. 
50
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, cit. supra note 28; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 
1990, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, Arts. 22, 29(d); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Con-
vention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed on 15 November 2000, entered into force on 25 
December 2003, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2237, p. 319; African Union, Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, signed on 11 July 2003, entered 
into force on 25 November 2005, Art. 4, Art. 10(2)(b), Art. 11; Council of Europe, Council of Europe 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, signed on 11 
May 2011, entered into force on 1 August 2014, CoE Treaty Series No. 210, Art 4(3), Art 60; General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punish-
ment and Eradication of Violence against Women, cit. supra note 2, Art. 10..;  
51
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, cit. supra note 28, 
tenth and fifteenth preambular paragraphs; African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, cit. supra note 50, seventh, twelfth and fourteenth pream-
bular paragraphs; Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence, cit. supra note 50, sixth and twelfth preambular paragraphs; General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence against Women, cit. supra note 2, sixth preambular paragraph. 
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related. Specific pronouncements of “women” or “girls” as beneficiaries of a certain 
form of protection are to be found within such provisions. Hence, when called upon 
to interpret the treaty, fora will be led by VCLT Article 31(1) to do so “in good faith” 
and by paying attention to the “ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. As the ordinary 
meaning of such wordings and the object and purpose of such treaties is gender-
coloured, the correctness of a gender sensitive interpretative outcome and subse-
quently of a gender perspective in the application of such provisions is undoubted. 
What should be subsequently examined is whether such a similar interpretation could 
derive from more obscure provisions, within which no specific reference to female 
refugees or asylum seekers can be traced. This is the assumption that light will be 
now turned to. 
3.1.2. The Interpretative Means of VCLT Article 31(3)  
Indeed, gender perspectives in the application of treaty provisions and standards 
of refugee law are also promoted by the interpretative rule of Article 31(3) VCLT, 
which mainly draws the interpreter’s attention to the subsequent agreements52 and 
practice53 of the treaty’s Contracting Parties and to the “relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties”.54 For the purposes of the present 
paper, this Subsection will focus on highlighting those agreements and manifesta-
tions of state practice that should be used as interpretative tools during the perfor-
mance of the interpretative exercise of VCLT Article 31(3). To this end, it is agree-
ments and indications of state practice placed at a timeline pursuant to the conclusion 
of the Refugee Convention, that will be noted, despite the prior development of in-
ternational refugee law that gradually led to the conclusion of the said treaty,55 as it 
is still deemed as the cornerstone of international protection of refugees.56 However, 
it should be underlined that the indications to be analysed below could be used as 
interpretative tools not only for the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, but 
 
52
 VCLT Art. 31 (3)(a). 
53
 VCLT Art. 31 (3)(b). 
54
 VCLT Art. 31 (3)(c). 
55
 SKRAN, “Historical Development of International Refugee Law”, in ZIMMERMANN, DÖSCHNER, 
MACHTS (eds.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Com-
mentary, Oxford, 2011, p. 3 ff., pp.3-36. 
56
 KÄLIN, CARONI, HEIM, “Article 33 para. 1 1951 Convention”, in ZIMMERMANN, DÖSCHNER, MACHTS 
(eds.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary, 
Oxford, 2011, p. 1327 ff., p. 1395. 
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also of other, anterior or posterior to its conclusion, treaty provisions, which fall 
within the ambit of international refugee law, to the extent that the criteria to be 
mentioned below are met.  
Initially, it should be highlighted that the very conclusion of subsequent treaties 
granting gender sensitive protection to female refugees and asylum seekers could be 
seen as being of a significant interpretative value. The parties to the Refugee Con-
vention, bound by its provisions and bearing the obligations deriving from it in mind, 
decided to conclude subsequent treaties,57 particularizing the protection to be granted 
to female refugees in order to address their gender-related needs. Such posterior trea-
ties could be seen as subsequent agreements between the parties regarding the appli-
cation of the provisions of the treaty to be interpreted and could be thus seen as op-
erating as interpretative tools in accordance with VCLT Article 31 (3)(a). The fact 
that not all of the parties to the Refugee Convention (or to any convention falling 
within the ambit of international refugee law) are parties to the posterior treaties for 
the specification of the protection to be granted to female refugees, does seem to 
lessen the subsequent treaties’ interpretative value, as this overall participation of 
member-States is deemed as an essential prerequisite for the invocation of the inter-
pretative means of VCLT Article 31(3)(a),58 even though it has been argued that, if 
one or more of the parties to the initial treaty are involved by means of an instrument, 
to which the other parties have agreed (or which they have at least accepted),59 then 
the uniform interpretation of the treaty envisaged by Article 31 (3)(a) will be ful-
filled.60 In any case, if the said prerequisite is not met, then the aforementioned indi-
cations of state practice might be seen as either interpretative means in accordance 
with VCLT Article 31(3)(b) or with VCLT Article 32. However, given that within 
none of the subsequent treaties granting a gender sensitive protection to female ref-
ugees can an interpretative (or an application-specifying) purpose61 be spotted, such 
treaties should be seen as falling within the ambit of VCLT Article 31 (3)(c) instead. 
If that is the case, their interpretative value will not be lost, as it will rather move 
from being the one expressed in VCLT Article 31 (3)(a) to being the one described 
 
57
 See supra note 50. 
58
 International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Prac-
tice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/73/10 (2018), p.28, para. 4. 
59
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40 p. 429.  
60
 Ibid. 
61
 See AUST, cit. supra note 49, p. 239. 
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in Article 31 (3)(c). Given that there is no hierarchy among the interpretative means 
of VCLT Article 31,62 the classification of the said treaties as falling under the inter-
pretative tools provided for by VCLT Article 31(3)(a), 31(3)(b) or 31(3)(c), leaves 
their interpretative value unaffected.  
Hence, subsequent treaties concluded by all or some of the States-parties to the 
treaty to be interpreted, which serve the purpose of granting a sex-oriented protection 
to women constitute relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties in accordance with VCLT Article 31(3)(c). But so do any other 
applicable in the relations between the parties rules of international law, which are 
relevant with the subject-matter of the treaty term to be interpreted.63 No particular 
relationship is required between the treaty to be interpreted and the provision being 
taken into account in this regard, aside from the latter’s assistance in the interpreta-
tion of the former’s terms.64 Hence, even treaties concluded prior to the conclusion 
of the treaty to be interpreted or even treaties, which do not specifically address the 
matter of female refugees or female asylum seekers and which still concern the term 
to be interpreted, such as the Convention on the Political Rights of Women65 or the 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women66 or the Convention against Dis-
crimination in Education67 and so on, will serve as interpretative tools. Given the 
wide range of “relevant rules of international law” falling under the scope of VCLT 
Article 31 (3)(c), it is not only international or regional treaties that constitute inter-
pretative means in accordance with the said provision. On the contrary, customary 
rules and even the general principles of international law may be used for the purpose 
of treaty provisions’ interpretation.68 
 
62
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p. 436; METHYMAKI, TZANAKOPOULOS, “Masters of Puppets? Re-
assertion of Control through Joint – Investment Treaty Interpretation”, in KULICK (ed.), Reassertion of 
Control over the Investment Treaty Regime, Cambridge, 2016, p. 155 ff, p. 169.  
63
 International Court of Justice, Djibouti v. France (Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Crim-
inal Matters), Judgment of 4 June 2008, para. 112. 
64
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 38, p. 432. 
65
 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 193, p. 135, 
adopted on 31 March 1953, entered into force on 7 July 1954. 
66
 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 309, p. 65, 
adopted on 29 January 1957, entered into force on 11 August 1958. 
67
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention against Discrimina-
tion in Education, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 429, p. 93, adopted on 14 December 1960, entered 
into force on 22 May 1962. 
68
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p. 433. 
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All the aforementioned hold true provided that the “relevant rules of international 
law” to be used as interpretative means are indeed applicable in the relations between 
the parties. The applicability of the said rules will depend on the binding nature of 
the rule at stake, as well as on whether this binding effect applies to all the parties to 
the treaty at issue.69  
Additionally, the interpretative rule of VCLT Article 31(3)(b) will undoubtedly 
lead to a gender sensitive interpretative outcome as well. More specifically, taking 
into account “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”, the interpreter will 
find it hard to not be led to the said gender sensitive interpretation, as plenty of indi-
cations of subsequent practice undoubtedly evince the sex-oriented protection pro-
spects of the treaties’ provisions. What should be underlined is that for the purposes 
of VCLT Article 31(3)(b) it is any subsequent practice that is relevant and thus, in 
this way, the said article seems to complete Article 31(3)(a), as it expands the scope 
of interpretative tools covering indications of practice beyond subsequent agree-
ments.70 However, for state practice to fall into the authentic interpretative tool of 
subsequent practice resembled in VCLT Article 31(3)(b), it should be a conduct in 
the application of the treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty.71 This practice will constitute 
objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty72 
and should therefore establish the agreement all of the parties regarding the treaty’s 
interpretation,73 as well as their conception of the interpretation as binding upon 
them.74 Additionally, this active practice should be consistent, namely of a certain 
frequency.75 What should be subsequently highlighted is that the number of parties 
that must actively engage in subsequent practice in order to establish an agreement 
 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid., p. 431. 
71
 See International Law Commission, cit. supra note 58, Conclusion 4, para. 2, p. 27. 
72
 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of the 
second part of its seventeenth session, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1966, Vol. II, p. 221, para. 15. 
73
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p. 431; See International Law Commission, cit. supra note 58, p. 
31, para 16. 
74
 International Law Commission, Third Report on the law of treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/167 and Add.1-3 (1964), Yearbook of the International Law Com-
mission 1964, Vol. II p. 60, para. 25. 
75
 Ibid., p. 59 para 24. 
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under VCLT Article 31(3)(b) may vary.76 More specifically, silence on the part of 
one or more parties may constitute acceptance of the subsequent practice when the 
circumstances call for some reaction.77 Hence, the active practice of some of the par-
ties to the treaty to be interpreted might fulfil the common understanding of the par-
ties as to the treaty’s interpretation, envisaged by VCLT Article 31(3)(b),78 if no other 
party raises objections thereto.79 In line with the aforementioned, the European Court 
of Human Rights, applying VCLT Article 31(3)(b), held that the State practice at 
stake was “uniform and consistent”, despite the fact that it simultaneously recognized 
that two States possibly constituted exceptions,80 indicating that interpreters possess 
a certain discretion when assessing whether an agreement of the parties regarding a 
certain interpretation is established.81 
Pursuant to this brief analysis of the circumstances under which subsequent state 
practice should be taken into account by treaties’ interpreters as interpretative means 
of VCLT Article 31(3)(b), it is about time light was shed on whether such subsequent 
state practice, supporting refugee law treaties’ interpretation in a gender sensitive, 
protection-granting way actually exists. And the answer to this question is affirma-
tive, given that state practice has throughout the years followed a gender sensitive 
orientation.  
As the International Law Commission (ILC) has stated that subsequent practice 
under VCLT Articles 31 and 32 may consist of any conduct of a party in the appli-
cation of a treaty, whether in the exercise of its executive, legislative, judicial, or 
other functions,82 it is indications of such conducts that will be sought. Initially, it 
should be noted that indications of States’ national legislations, having been formed 
so as to provide a gender sensitive protection to female refugees are far from infre-
quent. Aside from specific legislative instruments adopted by certain States for the 
just evaluation of gender-related claims of asylum seekers and refugees,83it could be 
 
76
 International Law Commission, cit. supra note 55, Conclusion 10, para. 2, p. 75. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p. 431; See ILC, cit. supra note 74, p. 59, para. 18. 
80
 European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment of 23 
March 1995, paras. 79, 81. 
81
 See International Law Commission, cit. supra note 58, p. 76, para. 6. 
82
 Ibid., Conclusion 5 para. 1, p. 37. 
83
 FREEDMAN, Female Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in France, Protection Policy and Legal Advice 
Section (PPLAS) Division of International Protection Services United Nations High Commissioner for 
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noted that national legal frameworks of most States worldwide could be seen as 
granting the said gender sensitive protection, if the specific rules and standards of 
refugee law, as incorporated within national legal frameworks are invoked and ap-
plied in conjunction with provisions safeguarding the equality of genders and non-
discrimination. As treating different situations differently is a specific aspect of the 
principle of equality,84 such provisions could be seen as vehicles to the gender sensi-
tive application of rules and standards of refugee law within national legislation. It 
should be after all noted that European law has had a decisive impact on the expan-
sion of States that adopt and apply explicit gender sensitive measures, 85 when its 
provisions are incorporated in national legislations.86  
Furthermore, jurisprudence of national courts of States-parties to treaties that 
constitute parts of the international refugee law, operating as indications of state 
practice, could also provide for indications of such gender sensitive refugee protec-
tion. And so it does!87 National courts’ jurisprudence has indeed been granting a 
strong gender sensitive protection to refugees throughout the years, constituting this 
way a useful, gender-coloured tool for the interpretation of refugee law provisions.88 
 
Refugees, UN Doc. PPLAS/2009/01 (June 2009), p. 57; WALLACE, “Making the Refugee Convention Gen-
der Sensitive: The Canadian Guidelines”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 1996, p. 702 ff, 
pp.702-707; CRAWLEY, LESTER, Comparative analysis of gender-related persecution in national asylum 
legislation and practice in Europe; United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, Evaluation And 
Policy Analysis Unit, Department Of International Protection, And Regional Bureau For Europe, UN Doc. 
EPAU/2004/05 (May 2004), pp. 21-32. 
84
 BARNETT, Understanding Public Law, Oxon and New York, 2010, p. 44.  
85
 SANSONETTI, Female Refugees and Asylum Seekers: The Issue of Integration, EU publications; Di-
rectorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2017, p. 17. 
86
 See CRAWLEY, LESTER, cit. supra note 83, pp. 23-24. 
87
 EDWARDS, “Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee” in FELLER et al. (eds.) Refugee 
Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge, 
2003, p. 46 ff, pp. 52-57, 59-73; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and Guide-
lines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3 (Geneva, 2011), pp. 92-93, 
para. 6. 
88
 See for example; Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) (United States), Olympia Lazo-Majano v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 9 June 1987, No 813 F.2d 1432; Board of Immigration Appeals (United 
States), D.V. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 25 May 1993, Interim Decision No. 3252; Refugee 
Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), 29 August 1994, Refugee Appeal No. 915/92 Re S.Y; Commis-
sion des Recours des Réfugiés (France), Nadia El Kebir, 22 July 1994; Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) 
(United States), Parastoo Fatin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 20 December 1993, No. 12 
F.3d. 1233; Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) (United States), Fisher v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 1996, No. 79 F. 3d 955; Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), 12 February 1996, Refugee 
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Indicatively, since the early 1990s, an increasing number of jurisdictions have rec-
ognised female genital mutilation as a form of persecution in their asylum deci-
sions.89 Indeed, in its exemplary sentence, the Spanish National Court noted that, 
while it is true that sex or gender violence is not among the causes of persecution 
under Article 1(2) of the [Refugee] Convention, it can however fit into persecution 
by the membership of a particular ‘social group’ as contemplated in that provision.90 
As is evident, the said court interpreted the Refugee Convention in such a way that 
led to the interpretative result that female genital mutilation falls under the causes of 
persecution that requires the granting of the status of refugee. The Spanish courts 
moved further on to note that, regardless of whether such practices are officially 
 
Appeal No. 2039/93 Re M.N; Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), 30 July 1996, Refugee 
Appeal No. 2223/94; High Court of Australia, Applicant A and Another and Refugee Review Tribunal 
(joining) v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Appeal decision, 24 February 1997; Court of Ap-
peals (7th Circuit) (United States) Grajo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 4 August 1997, No. 
124 F.3d 203; House of Lords (United Kingdom), R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 25 
March 1999, Nos. 2AC629, 2All ER545; Board of Immigration Appeals (United States), 11 June 1999, 
Interim Decision No. 3403; Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), Refugee Appeal No. 
71427/99; Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority (United Kingdom), Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department v. Lyudmila Dzhygun, 17 May 2000, Appeal No. CC-50627-99 
(00TH00728); Board of Immigration Appeals (United States), 27 June 2000, Interim Decision No. 3433; 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (France), Haj Ahmed, 30 November 2000, No. T98-06186; Mehmet 
Brahimi v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Secretary of State for the Home Department, No. 
CO/2238/2001; Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) (United States), Aguirre-Cervantes v. Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service, 21 March 2001, No. 242 F.3d 1169; Administrative Court Frankfurt am Main (Ger-
many), 7 September 2001, No. 1 E 31666/97.A(1); Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) (United States), Fuentes 
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 7 September 2001, No. 127 F.3d 1105; Administrative Court 
(Verwaltungsgerichtshof, 3rd instance) (Austria), 31 January 2002, No. 99/20/0497-6; Court of Appeals (7th 
Circuit) (United States), Nwaokolo v Immigration and Naturalization Service, Appeal judgment, 314 F.3d 
303, 27 December 2002; High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) (United Kingdom), Court of 
Appeals (9th Circuit) (United States), Mohamed v Gonzales - Attorney General, Appeal judgment, 400 F3d 
785, 10 March 2005; High Court of Australia, Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Kha-
war, 11 April 2002, No. HCA 14; Asylum Court (Austria), 29 January 2013, No. E1 432053-1/2013; 13th 
Asylum Committee of the Hellenic Ministry of Interior (Greece), 24 October 2016, No. 22371. 
89
 Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (France), Aminata Diop, 164078, 18 September 1991; Com-
mission des Recours des Réfugiés, Mlle Kinda, 366892, 19 March 2001; Immigration and Refugee Board 
of Canada, Khadra Hassan Farah, Mahad Dahir Buraleh, Hodan Dahir Buraleh v. Canada, 10 May 1994; 
United States Board of Immigration Appeals, In re Fauziya Kasinga, Applicant File A73 476 695, 13 June 
1996; Immigration and Appeals Tribunal (United Kingdom), Appeal Number 00TH00493, 19 January 
2000; Austrian Federal Refugee Council, Independent Federal Asylum Senate, GZ (Cameroonian citizen), 
220.268/0-X1/33/00, 21 March 2002; Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers (Belgium), Jurisprudence n° 
979-1239, 25 July 2007. 
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prohibited by criminal laws of the countries of origin, an applicant should still be 
granted the refugee status, provided that circumstantial evidence of alleged persecu-
tion – but not complete or absolute evidence of the alleged facts – is brought, as 
female genital mutilation is eventually often carried out in private and the authorities 
of the country of origin are, in many cases, unable to provide effective protection 
against the abuse.91 Furthermore, even prior to these gender sensitive jurisprudential 
examples, the House of Lords had famously pronounced that female genital mutila-
tion “constitutes treatment which would amount to persecution within the meaning 
of the [Refugee] Convention”92 and “will almost inevitably amount either to torture 
or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”93. After all, the gender-sensitive 
attitude of States can be also traced within declarations of State representatives, who 
express their wishes and plans for the achievement of female refugees’ and asylum 
seekers’ protection – related goals.94 
In line with what has been already mentioned, such indications of state practice as 
the ones noted above, will be considered as means of interpretation in accordance with 
VCLT Article 31(3)(b) provided that they indicate at least an active practice of some 
(if not all) of the parties to the treaty to be interpreted, which is acquiesced by the other 
parties and against which other parties have not raised objections.95 The practice indi-
cated through national courts’ jurisprudence, national legislation or declarations of 
state representatives should therefore establish the agreement of the parties regarding 
the treaty’s interpretation.96 Such an agreement deriving from subsequent practice un-
der VCLT Article 31(3)(b) can result, in part, from silence or inaction by one or more 
 
91
 First instance Court of Spain, Margarita v Spain, Judgment no 2734, 21 June 2006, paras 3 – 4.. 
92
 House of Lords, Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) v. K (FC) (Appellant); 
Fornah (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) 18 October 2006, 
para. 25.  
93
 Ibid., para. 94.  
94
 See for example; Department for International Development of the UK, “UK steps up work to protect 
women and girls from trafficking and provide winter care for vulnerable refugees”, 3 February 2017, avail-
able at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-steps-up-work-to-protect-women-and-girls-from-traf-
ficking-and-provide-winter-care-for-vulnerable-refugees>; Media Center of the Irish Department of Jus-
tice and Equality, “Minister Stanton announces extended funding for female refugee employment projects”, 
4 December 2018, available at: <http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/press-release-041218-minister-
stanton-announces-extended-funding-for-female-refugee-employment-projects>; ALLWOOD and WADIA, 
Refugee Women in Britain and France, Manchester and New York, 2010, p. 5. 
95
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p. 431; See International Law Commission, cit. supra note 74, p. 
59, para 18. 
96
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p. 431. 
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parties.97 Lastly, for subsequent practice to be deemed as an interpretative means of 
VCLT Article 31(3)(b), it should be also of a certain frequency98 and should intend, 
possibly among other aims,99 to clarify the meaning of a treaty or how it is to be ap-
plied, whether a reference to this aim is explicit or implicit.100 
To the extent that these prerequisites are met, these indications of state practice 
that support a gender sensitive application of international refugee law will constitute 
interpretative means in accordance with VCLT Article 31(3)(b). The fulfilment of 
the aforementioned criteria will of course have to be examined on an ad hoc basis. 
However, even though the criterion of consistency and frequency will depend on the 
number of the States-parties of the treaty to be interpreted and their conduct, what 
should be underlined is that against the active gender sensitive application of provi-
sions of international refugee law by many States, no State has raised objections. 
Indeed, even when Sweden did not accept that the claims of women or those based 
on sexual orientation fit within the ‘particular social group’ ground of the refugee 
definition, it did not do so in order to lessen a gender sensitive protection to asylum 
seekers, publicly noting its intentions to adopt legislative changes for the purpose of 
correcting this inconsistency.101 States’ silence is determining as to the fulfilment of 
the criterion of consistency, as a gender sensitive specification of States’ obligations 
stemming from international refugee law seems to have arisen. If States did not wish 
to actually carry this gender sensitive burden, they would have explicitly stated so, 
the circumstances formed having called for a reaction in case of disagreement. How-
ever, the States did not do so. Whether the latter was an outcome of their sensitivity 
on the matter of female refugee’s and asylum seekers’ protection, or of the consid-
eration of their obligations arising from general rules of international law related to 
the said matter is irrelevant for the evaluation of the their subsequent practice as 
interpretative tools, indicating in fact a conduct that matches the one prescribed in 
VCLT Article 31(3)(b). At any rate, it should be underlined that even if the criterion 
of consistency is not met, the subsequent practice by one or more parties in the ap-
plication of the treaty, after its conclusion, will at any rate serve as a supplementary 
means of interpretation under VCLT Article 32.102  
 
97
 See ILC, cit. supra note 58, p. 73, para. 13. 
98
 See International Law Commission, cit. supra note 74, p. 59, para. 24. 
99
 See International Law Commission, cit. supra note 58, pp. 30-31, para. 13. 
100
 Ibid., p. 31, para. 14. 
101
 See EDWARDS, cit, supra note 88, p. 55. 
102
 See International Law Commission, cit. supra note 58, Conclusion 4, para. 2, p. 27. 
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Lastly, as to the interpretative aim of the indications of State conduct noted 
above, the need of an ad hoc evaluation is also undeniable. However, it should be 
also presumed that States would not wish to act conversely to their international ob-
ligations. Thus, the presumption that the aim of the fulfilment of their obligations 
stemming from international refugee law provisions is the incentive leading to the 
adoption of the appropriate legal framework and the issuance of appropriate juris-
prudence is at least probable.  
Hence, in line with all the aforementioned, the holistic exercise103 portrayed in 
VCLT Article 31 seems to determine a fate of gender sensitive interpretation and 
subsequently application of provisions of international refugee law, boosting the pro-
tection of female refugees and asylum seekers significantly.  
3.2 – The Interpretative Rule of VCLT Article 32  
Even though a gender-oriented view of international rules and standards incorpo-
rated in international conventions during the latter’s interpretation according to VCLT 
Article 31 does not seem to leave the provisions’ meaning ambiguous or obscure, or 
lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable,104 recourse could be had to 
the supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty 
and the circumstances of its conclusion, for the purpose of the confirmation of the 
meaning resulting from the application of VCLT Article 31. And so it will. 
Initially, what should be pointed out is that treaties’ travaux preparatoires, which 
indeed seem to indicate the “real” intentions of the drafters,105 are on most occasions 
difficultly approachable. However, on occasions that these are indeed available, they 
seem to enhance gender perspectives in the application of the subsequently con-
cluded convention. More precisely, even though the plight of women being perse-
cuted for reasons related to their gender as victims of systematic rape, sexual abuse 
and discriminatory patterns of traditional customs or behaviour is a matter not ad-
dressed directly by the Refugee Convention,106 a gender sensitive protection seems 
 
103
 WTO Appellate Body, United States v. China, WT/DS363/AB/R, Report of 21 December 2009, 
para. 348. 
104
 VCLT Art. 32 (a)-(b). 
105
 See VILLIGER, cit. supra note 40, p.444. 
106
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux 
préparatoires analysed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, available at: <https://www.un-
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to be indicated by the said Convention’s travaux preparatoires, as while drafting 
Articles 12 and 24, States seemed to bear in mind the rights and the needs of married 
women107 and female workers.108 Similarly, during the preparatory works of the ad 
hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, which eventually led to the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, particular con-
sideration seems to have been placed on the need of protection of female refugees 
and asylum seekers.109 
Moving on to the political, social and cultural factors surrounding treaties’ con-
clusion, which are also enumerated among the non-exhaustive list of supplementary 
interpretative tools noted in VCLT Article 32,110 it should be pointed out that milieu 
that seems to have had a decisive impact on the Contracting States’ decisions as to 
the form and content of the treaties that fall within the ambit of international refugee 
law could be seen as leading to a gender sensitive interpretation and application of 
these treaties. Precisely, the years prior to the conclusion of the Refugee Convention 
seem to have had tremendous impacts on female refugees,111 indicating the need for 
gender perspectives in the application of the provisions that were to be adopted. Ac-
cordingly, the historical background surrounding the drafting of CEDAW indicates 
that the Contracting States did have the female refugees’ and asylum seekers’ pro-
tection in mind as well.112  
Furthermore, the rational techniques of interpretation, such as per analogiam, a 
contrario, lex posterior derogat legi priori, lex specialis derogat legi speciali, etc. 
are to be also deemed as supplementary interpretative means.113 That being said, it 
 
hcr.org/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commen-
tary-dr-paul.html>, p. 9.  
107
 Ibid., pp. 64 - 66.  
108
 Ibid., pp. 115, 125 - 133. 
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 Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Revised draft Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc 
A/AC.254/4/Add.3/Rev.7 (2000), pp. 2, 13. 
110
 Ibid., p. 445. 
111
 DAVIS, “Belonging and ‘Unbelonging’: Jewish refugee and survivor women in 1950s Britain”, 
Women’s History Review, 2017, p. 130 ff, p. 130-146; GATRELL, The Making of the Modern Refugee, 
Oxford, 2013, pp. 283-296. 
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should be noted that the application of the supplementary interpretative technique of 
argumentum a contrario seems to also support the gender sensitive application of 
rules and standards enshrined in international treaties. As such a gender sensitive 
interpretation and application is not prohibited by neither the wording nor the pur-
poses of the treaties that constitute parts of the international refugee law regime, it is 
allowed. Lastly, what should be emphasised is that if the prerequisites for the classi-
fication of subsequent agreements, of subsequent state practice or of rules of inter-
national law as the means of interpretation provided for by the interpretative rules of 
VCLT 31(3)(a) – 31(3)(c) are not met, then the gender sensitive interpretative tools 
noted in Section 3,1 above will serve as supplementary means of interpretation, as 
the resilient wording of VCLT Article 32 allows for an extension of the indicative 
list of interpretative means it provides.114 Hence, the latter will also strengthen the 
gender perspectives in the interpretation of international refugee law provisions in 
this alternative way. 
At any rate, the fact that the supplementary character of the interpretative tools 
included within VCLT Article 32 precludes a contrary to the purpose of the treaty 
interpretation based on them,115 is certain. That not being doubted, it should be under-
lined that this gender sensitive interpretation of refugee law provisions indicated by 
the aforementioned interpretative tools is far from being contrary to treaties’ protective 
purposes, as they seem to rather enhance and complete them, no hesitation as to such 
a gender sensitive interpretation on such grounds is permitted. After all, given that the 
interpretative rule of VCLT Article 31 was proved to also lead to the said gender sen-
sitive interpretative outcome, which was also verified by the interpretative rule of 
VCLT Article 32, this gender-coloured interpretation seems to be the only correct one.  
4. – International Jurisprudence and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration 
As indicated in 3.2, jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals plays a 
determining role within the construction of international law generally and interna-
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 BERNARDEZ, “Interpretation of Treaties by the International Court of Justice following the Adoption 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, in HAFNER et. al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Professor 
Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern: In Honour of His 80th Birthday, The Hague, 1998, p. 721 ff, p. 726. 
115
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tional refugee law specifically, serving as a valuable subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of international law. What should be subsequently noted is the sig-
nificant role it plays as to the principle of systemic integration. The latter is consid-
ered to be the main antidote to what has been called the phenomenon of fragmenta-
tion of international law.116 And despite the fact that within international refugee law 
contradictory provisions are rather rare, the significance of a homogenous applica-
tion of these rules and standards, in line with the principle of systemic integration, is 
particularly essential, as conflicting interpretations of international law are also ca-
pable of leading to its fragmentation.117  
Indeed, if the jurisprudence of international fora does not adopt a homogenous 
gender sensitive interpretative attitude, then a heterogeneous interpretation might re-
sult to the abnormal outcome of relevant treaties pointing to different directions in 
their application by a party.118 Indicatively, a non gender sensitive interpretation of 
the provisions of human rights conventions might lead to an excuse of the State’s 
negligence to address the gender-based needs of female refugees and asylum seekers, 
but it will not alleviate the State from the violation of its obligations stemming from 
other treaties, such as CEDAW. Accordingly, if a homogenous interpretation is not 
adopted, systems of multiple levels of protection will arise.  
This unwished outcome would be effectively avoided through the elimination of 
conflicting jurisprudence. Homogenous jurisprudence could result from the situating 
of the rules invoked within the context of other rules and principles that might have 
bearing upon a case, namely through the referral to the wider legal environment, the 
“system” of international law as a whole.119 Such a systemic integrating attitude has 
been already extensively adopted by regional and international fora120 on various oc-
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casions. To this general attitude, the proper addressing of gender-based needs of ref-
ugees and asylum seekers should not be an exception. It seems as if an alteration to 
the integrating attitude could not be excused when gender sensitive asylum seekers’ 
and refugees’ issues are at stake.  
Furthermore, the integrating attitude is additionally boosted by the very fact that 
such a gender sensitive application of international rules and standards of refugee 
law has already taken place within international jurisprudence.121 Precisely, through 
the establishment of a constructive dialogue among international and regional fora,122 
legal certainty and homogenous application of international law will be achieved, 
whereas conflicting obligations enshrined in fora’s decisions will be diminished until 
deterioration.  
If the aforementioned chances for the enhancement of the wishing systemic inte-
gration are not grasped, the phenomenon of multiple levels of female refugees’ and 
asylum seekers’ protection will be confronted. This way the whole system of inter-
national refugee law will be also safeguarded from the erosion capable of intruding 
with its orderly function through its fragmentation. 
5. – Epilogue 
The paper at hand noted the reasons why existing rules and standards of interna-
tional refugee law, enshrined in international treaties, should be seen as granting 
gender sensitive protection, as well as why they should be applied in this way by the 
competent fora. Initially, it indicated that the establishment of an innovative juris-
prudence does constitute the key to a gender sensitive application of existing inter-
national rules and standards of refugee law, after underlining the mere determinative 
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and not obligations-modifying importance of jurisprudence within the system of in-
ternational law. Subsequently, an analysis of the rules of interpretation and of the 
elements that constitute interpretative tools according to these rules took place lead-
ing to the conclusion that the lege artis interpretation of refugee law provisions sup-
ports the ideal, gender sensitive interpretative outcome. Lastly, the significance of 
the said gender sensitive approach for the whole system of international refugee law 
was highlighted, as it seems to be guarding the latter from the adverse phenomenon 
of fragmentation. 
As the analysis herein evinces, a gender sensitive interpretation – and subsequently 
application – of existing rules and standards of international refugee law, is not a de 
lege ferenda interpretation, but the only permissible one instead, as any divergence 
from it would very probably lead to a divergence from the interpretative outcome sug-
gested by the customary rules of interpretation enshrined in VCLT. In other words the 
present paper demonstrated that gender sensitive interpretation of treaty rules on refu-
gees’ and asylum seekers’ protection should be deemed as the only appropriate and 
compatible with the rules on treaty interpretation. It then moved on beyond this con-
clusion to highlight that this gender-based, needs-addressing interpretation of interna-
tional refugee law provisions is significant to the contradiction of the worrying effects 
of the phenomenon of fragmentation, which is capable of rendering the framework of 
international refugee law that is called upon to address vulnerabilities, vulnerable. In 
this context, the analysis above indicated that gender perspectives cannot only contrib-
ute to the achievement of the desirable systemic integration within international (refu-
gee) law, but they also gradually flourish the old-fashioned, slowly changing refugee 
law regime with a much-needed stable gender sensitive refreshment. And as the signs 
of the times note, such a refreshment remains essential. 
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1. – Introduction and Scope of the Analysis 
According to the data included in the 2018 report of the International Organiza-
tion for Migration, women comprise marginally less than half of the global interna-
tional migrant stock.1 The share of female migrants has declined from 49.1 per cent 
in 2000 to 48.4 per cent (125 million) in 2017. The proportion of women migrating 
 
1
 IOM GMDAC, Global Migration Indicators 2018, p. 43, available at: <https://publica-
tions.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global_migration_indicators_2018.pdf>.  
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varies considerably across regions and since 2000 the proportion of female migrants 
slightly increased in all regions except for Asia.2  
Women have always migrated, and what has changed over the decades is not, or 
not significantly, the number of women leaving their country of origin, but rather the 
reasons for migration, the “causes and consequences of the migration gender bal-
ance, which [has shifted] over time and varies considerably across cultures and na-
tions”.3 What has been called the “feminization of migration” does not consist in “an 
absolute increase in the proportion of women migrants”,4 but rather in a “feminiza-
tion of international refugee law”, an increasing interest in female migrants’ rights, 
starting as late as the 1980s.5 The ‘absence’ of women from the narrative on migra-
tion mirrored the absence of women’s rights in the international arena and the late 
recognition of violence against women as a violation of human rights.6 And yet, even 
though the presence of women in international migration flows have been gradually 
recognised at the international level, women still face numerous obstacles to demon-
strate that they have been victims of gender-based violence, and, because of that, 
they are entitled to international protection.  
According to the definition that has consolidated at the international level, codi-
fied in the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating vi-
olence against women and domestic violence of 2011 (hereinafter the “Istanbul Con-
vention”), gender-based violence against women consists in “violence that is di-
rected against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women dispropor-
tionately”, a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women 
and shall mean “all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result 
in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, includ-
ing threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occur-
ring in public or in private life”.7 
 
2
 PAIEWONSKY, The Feminization of International Labour Migration, UN-INSTRAW, 2009, p. 4. 
3
 DONATO, GABACCIA, The Global Feminization of Migration: Past, Present, and Future, last 
update 2016, available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/global-feminization-migration-past-
present-and-future>. 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 SPIJKERBOER, Gender and Refugee Status, Farnham, 1999/2000, p. 1.   
6
 CHINKIN and CHARLESWORTH, The Boundaries of International Law, Manchester, 2000, p. 4. Vio-
lence against women was recognised at the international level as a violation of human rights in 1992 with 
the adoption of General Recommendation No. 19 of the CEDAW (A/47/38).  
7
 Istanbul Convention, Article 3, letters d) and a). In the General Recommendation No. 35, the CEDAW 
Committee stressed the importance of using the notion of “gender-based violence against women” to stress 
“gendered causes and impacts of the violence” (CEDAW/C/GC/35, 14 July 2017, para. 9). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the Istanbul Convention can be 
used as means of interpretation of national refugee laws and of the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in assessing the situation of women who 
request refugee protection to escape from gender-based violence, in particular from 
two forms of inter-personal violence, on which this analysis is focused, namely fe-
male genital mutilation (‘FGM’) and domestic violence. The choice of these two 
cases is determined by their being forms of inter-personal violence, committed by 
non-State actors, and because they constitute illustrative examples of “cultural” vio-
lence, rooted in societies. Despite these similarities, as we will see, the approach of 
the European Court of Human Rights has not been thus straightforward and will be 
investigated in these pages from a feminist human rights law perspective. The chap-
ter contends that judges should assess, in deciding the request for refugee status, or, 
in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, in determining whether viola-
tions of the woman’s rights have occurred, whether the State of origin – where the 
migrant woman could be expelled failing her application – complies with its due 
diligence obligations in preventing and prosecuting gender-based violence. We will 
start our analyses from the silences of international refugee law with regard to 
women, then we will explain the reasons and the means – mainly soft law, with the 
relevant exceptions of the Istanbul Convention and the European Union “Qualifica-
tion Directive”8 – through which gender-based persecution has been gradually rec-
ognised, we will then delve into issues of credibility of women asking for refugee 
status as a consequence of violence against women and we will assess how relevant 
the situation of the country where the woman can be expelled might be. We will then 
make some remarks on how the judges could use the Istanbul Convention as a means 
for interpretation of national and European law in the assessment of requests for ref-
ugee status coming from women who suffered forms of inter-personal violence be-
cause of their gender and/or as women. The chapter will limit the analysis to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, being its focus on the Istanbul 
Convention adopted within the legal framework of the Council of Europe.  
 
8
 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on stand-
ards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (Qualification Directive), OJ L 337, 20 December 2011, p. 9 ff. 
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2. – The Silence of the UN Convention on Refugee Status on Gender-
Based Violence as Ground to Recognise Refugee Status 
In immigration and nationality law, women have been treated differently from 
men.9 The 1951 Convention on the status of refugees (hereinafter the ‘Geneva Con-
vention’) defines the refugee as an individual who, “owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is un-
able to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country”. From the text, it is clear that it was drafted “in the male form”.10 The use 
of language that is not gender-neutral in the definition of refugee does not come as a 
surprise, given the time in which the Convention was adopted, but it is clear that the 
provisions of the Convention were not conceived to deal with cases of gender-based 
violence against women.11  
Women’s rights started to emerge at the international level in the 1970s only, 
thanks to the adoption of the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrim-
ination against women (‘CEDAW’), and violence against women was brought within 
the terms of the Convention as late as 1992 with the adoption of the General Recom-
mendation No. 19 on violence against women by the CEDAW Committee12. Women 
were absent and invisible in the international arena, relegated to the “private” realm, 
where States could not interfere. Being in the “private” sphere, women’s activities 
were denied the quality of “political”, which has traditionally belonged to men’s ex-
periences13. Even their rights as migrants were completely neglected, because women 
used to migrate with their family and, as part of the family and not as individuals 
entitled of rights, they were relevant for international refugee law14.  One could con-
tend that, in the definition of refugee provided by the 1951 Convention, there is the 
 
9
 See the evolution of the history of immigration and nationality law in BHABHA and SHUTTER, 
Women’s Movement: Women Under Immigration, Nationality and Refugee Law, Trentham Books, 1994.  
10
 SPIJKERBOER, cit. supra note 5, p. 1.  
11
 According to Kelly, another element should be added to explain the absence of women in interna-
tional refugee law: it is “a product of the general failure of refugee and asylum law to recognise social and 
economic rights and its emphasis on individual targeting and specific deprivation of civil and political 
rights”. KELLY, “Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women”, Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal, 1993/26, p. 625 ff., p. 627.   
12
 CEDAW Recommendation No. 19, cit. supra note 6.  
13
 INDRA, “Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience”, Refuge, 1987/7, p. 3 ff.  
14
 It refers to the fact that the application is generally filed by the husband and that the woman is heard 
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“catch-all category” of “membership of a particular social group”,15 in which women 
victims of violence might be always included. Nonetheless, asylum seekers must 
demonstrate that they have a “well-founded” fear of persecution for reasons of be-
longing to a particular social group. As Meyersfeld has pointed out, “this gives rise 
to a number of difficulties, not least whether ‘women’ can be said to comprise a 
particular social group.”16 Furthermore, “sex” was not a ground of discrimination 
explicitly mentioned in Article 3 of the Convention on the status of refugees. During 
the negotiations for the elaboration of the Convention, the Yugoslav representative 
proposed to add the words “or sex” after the words “country of origin” to the article 
on non-discrimination, but he was opposed by the representatives of Austria, Colom-
bia, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the US.17  
It can be argued that the ground for persecution “membership of a particular social 
group” alone cannot grasp the complexity of women’s experiences. As acknowledged 
by Firth and Mauthe, reporting the debate in international feminist legal scholarship, 
“framing all persecution of women as persecution because of gender has reinforced 
the image of men as the only ‘real’ refugees, and has also marginalised women by 
implying that only men have political or religious opinions, racial status, etc.”18 
The absence of women from the Geneva Convention was confirmed in legal 
scholarship. As outlined by Spijkerboer, female migrants did not receive much at-
tention until 1980s. In particular, he noted that in some classic works of international 
legal scholarship, women were mentioned “only in passing”, and that Goodwin-Will 
was the first to use “his or her” country of origin, although he had doubts on the 
 
by the authorities in the same room as her husband. 
15
 MEYERSFELD, Domestic Violence and International Law, London, 2010, p. 280.  
16
 Ibid. National jurisprudence has not been clear in the definition of the “particular social group”. See, 
for example, the controversial US jurisprudence. In 2014 only the Board of Immigration Appeals recog-
nised the particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relation-
ship” whose members can qualify for asylum. In Matter of A-R-C-G 26 I & N Dec. 388 (see the comment 
in Harvard Law Review, available at: <http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Matter-
of-ARCG.pdf>). See the position of the Board with regard to FGM as early as the 1990s in In re Kasinga 
of 1996 (21 I & N Dec. 357).  
17
 The Refugee Convention 1951. The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a commentary by Dr. 
Paul Weis, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-
travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html>, p. 36.  
18
 FIRTH and MAUTHE, “Refugee Law, Gender and the Concept of Personhood”, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, 2013, p. 470 ff., p. 482. See also MACKLIN, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of 
Categories”, Human Rights Quarterly, 1995, p. 213 ff.  
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possibility of recognising discrimination on the basis of sex, as such, “sufficient to 
justify the conclusion that [women], as a group, have a fear of persecution”.19 In 
1991, Hathaway clearly argued that rape can be a form of persecution, and that the 
refusal to wear a chador had to be considered as expression of a political opinion.20 
In the 1990s, women’s rights received much more attention at the international level, 
a fact that had an impact on international legal scholarship on refugee rights as well. 
This does not mean to equate the experiences of women and men, without consider-
ing the specificity of women’s experiences in migration. Women can flee from their 
country of origin because of the forms of violence to which women are subjected 
because they are women or because they are disproportionately affected. Experi-
ences of migration are not gender-neutral, they are determined by gender. The gen-
dered experience of migration characterises all phases of displacement: it starts with 
the reasons underlying the decision of fleeing a country, it continues during the jour-
ney, it persists after the arrival in the country of destination.21  
3. – Is Gender-Based Violence against Women a Form of Persecution? 
From the UN Guidelines to the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention 
Why and how gender-based violence against women entered the language of in-
ternational refugee law, to the point of being considered as a form of persecution 
which legitimises the recognition of refugee status to women that are subjected to 
violence? 
As for the reasons, it is necessary to go back to the public/private dichotomy that, 
as highlighted by feminist scholarship, characterises international law.22 International 
 
19
 SPIJKERBOER, cit. supra note 5, p. 2, referring to the work by GOODWIN-GILL, The Refugee in Inter-
national Law, Oxford, 1983. In the second edition of the book, of 1996, Goodwin-Gill dedicated to women 
two sections of the book.  
20
 SPIJKERBOER, cit. supra note 5, p. 2, referring to the work by HATHAWAY, The Law of Refugee 
Status, Cambridge, 1991.  
21
 See also objective No. 7 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted 
by the UN General Assembly on 19 December 2018 (A/RES/73/195): “(b) Establish comprehensive poli-
cies and develop partnerships that provide migrants in a situation of vulnerability, regardless of their mi-
gration status, with necessary support at all stages of migration, through identification and assistance, as 
well as protection of their human rights, in particular in cases related to women at risk, […] victims of 
violence, including sexual and gender-based violence”. 
22
 See, for example, SIFRIS, Reproductive Freedom, Torture and International Human Rights: Chal-
lenging the Masculinisation of Torture, Abingdon, 2014, p. 20.  
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law has traditionally regulated the public world, which is men’s, completely neglect-
ing the private world, characterised by issues that disproportionately affect women.23 
This perspective, simplistic that might be,24 explains the reasons why women have 
not been considered by international law for years, including international human 
rights and refugee law. Talking about domestic violence as torture, Rhonda Copelon 
wrote in 1994 that this form of inter-personal violence is “rooted in and perpetuates 
the culture as well as the structure of the patriarchal State”.25 The right to privacy has 
been invoked to justify the State’s refusal to interfere in matters of private violence 
against women.26  
International refugee law has ignored and marginalised the realities of migrant 
women subjected to violence for decades, even though, as we anticipated, women 
have always been present in migration flows. Violence occurring in interpersonal 
relations can be considered as a “threat of ‘private’ nature” and therefore not falling 
under the scope of the Geneva Convention.27 Domestic violence and female genital 
mutilation, the two examples that we have chosen for this analysis, do not constitute 
State conduct and it seems difficult, at first sight, to identify women subjected to 
these practices as a particularly persecuted group.28 Furthermore, it is challenging to 
assess whether there exists a minimum level of violence that justifies the use of the 
word “persecution”. The drafters of the Geneva Convention conceived persecution 
as a “broadly inclusive concept, premised on the risk of serious harm but not neces-
sarily of consequences of life and death proportion”.29 Even though it is not the pur-
 
23
 SIFRIS, cit. supra note 22, p. 21.  
24
 What about the State interference in women’s personal reproductive choice? See, in that respect, 
CHINKIN, CHARLESWORTH, WRIGHT, “Feminist Approaches to International Law”, American Journal of 
International Law, 1991, p. 613 ff., p. 627, and the analysis of the two dimensions of violence against 
women’s health in DE VIDO, Violence against women’s health in international law, forthcoming for the 
Manchester University Press 2020. 
25
 COPELON, “Recognizing the Egregious in Everyday: Domestic violence as Torture”, Columbia Hu-
man Rights Law Review, 1994, p. 291 ff., p. 297.  
26
 SIFRIS, cit. supra note 22, p. 118.  
27
 FREEDMAN, Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate, 2nd ed., Basingstoke, 2015, p. 
77. 
28
 FREEDMAN, cit. supra note 27, p. 45.  
29
 HATHAWAY, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection”, in MAHONEY and 
MAHONEY (eds), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century, Dordrecht, 1993, p. 659 ff., p. 668. In 1989, 
an author argued for a human rights-based definition of persecution, without necessarily introducing a new 
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pose here to delve into the notion of persecution and how it has evolved in interna-
tional and domestic jurisprudence, it is worth noting that the definition of refugee 
included in the 1951 Geneva Convention, broad it might be, seems however inade-
quate to grasp “pervasive, structural denial of rights”, such as pervasive and struc-
tural gender inequalities.30 As pointed out by Freedman, “the consideration of gen-
der-related claims is still a relatively arbitrary matter”, with the consequence that 
“women asylum seekers are still constructed in specific gendered ways which may 
mean that their claims will not be considered as ‘serious’”.31  
The disruption of the public/private dichotomy started in the 1990s with the 
recognition of States’ obligations in the prevention and repression of violence against 
women also committed by private actors. In terms of international refugee law, it 
meant to acknowledge the experiences of women facing violence as critical cause of 
their decision to leave their own country, and as reason for fearing persecution which 
entitles them of the right to obtain international protection.  
As to the second part of the question, how gender-based violence against women 
started to be considered as a form of persecution, the answer is that it mainly hap-
pened through acts of soft law, both at the international and national level, with the 
quite unique exception of the recent Istanbul Convention, which is binding for the 
ratifying States. It should be acknowledged that the issue of whether or not women 
victims of violence constitute a “particular social group” under the 1951 Convention 
has been tackled by national legislators and courts over time, without however de-
veloping a straightforward practice in that respect.32  
For the first time, in 1984, the European Parliament called upon States to recog-
nise that women who “face harsh or inhumane treatment because they are considered 
to have transgressed the social mores of the country” constituted a particular social 
group.33 The following year, the Executive Committee of the UN High Commission 
for refugee stated that States were “free to adopt the interpretation that women asy-
lum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed 
 
specific category of “gender”: GREATBATCH, “The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Dis-
course”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 1989, p. 518 ff.  
30
 CHINKIN, CHARLESWORTH, WRIGHT, cit. supra note 24, p. 632.  
31
 FREEDMAN, cit. supra note 27, p. 70.  
32
 FREEDMAN, cit. supra note 27, p. 76.  
33
 European Parliament Resolution of 13 April 1984 on the application of the Geneva Convention 
relating to the status of refugees, OJ C 127, 14.5.1984, p. 137. 
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the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a ‘particular 
social group’ within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 United Nations Ref-
ugee Convention”.34 The document also stressed the “special needs and problems” 
of refugee women in the international protection.35 Despite the positive step forward, 
both acts limited their scope to cases of women who did not respect the established 
rules in a given society (refusing to wear the veil, for example).  
In 1991, the UNHCR adopted a set of guidelines to increase international protec-
tion for women, and asked States to improve their standards of asylum and refugee 
determination procedures.36 These guidelines were followed by additional guidelines 
precisely dealing with the problem of sexual violence in 1995, and by the 2002 guide-
lines on international protection and gender-related persecution (‘Gender Guide-
lines’),37 which complemented the interpretative guidance in the UNHCR Hand-
book.38 In the “Gender Guidelines”, women are “a clear example of a social subset 
defined by innate and immutable characteristics [..] and who are frequently treated 
differently than men”.39 However, as the UNHCR has repeatedly stressed, “mere 
membership in the group will not itself establish a valid claim to refugee status; the 
applicant must also demonstrate that she is specifically at risk because of such mem-
bership”.40 Therefore, two cumulative requirements are needed: on one hand, the fact 
that the woman belongs to a particular group, for example women that are victims or 
risks to be victims of female genital mutilation, and, on the other hand, the fact that 
the applicant is “specifically” at risk.  
 
34
 UNHRC, EXCOM, Conclusion No. 39, Refugees, Women and International Protection (1985), con-
tained in United Nations General Assembly Document No. 12A, A/40/12/Add.1, letter k).   
35
 Ibid, letter i).  
36
 UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (1991), available at: <http://www.un-
hcr.org/3d4f915e4.html>. FREEDMAN, cit. supra note 27, p. 91.  
37
 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution within the Con-
text of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(2002), HCR/GIP/02/01 (hereinafter ‘Gender Guidelines’). See also the most recent guidelines on perse-
cution based on sexual orientation. Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender 
Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/12/09, 23 October 2012.  
38
 Handbook and guidelines on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status, reissued in 
2011. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html>. 
39
 Gender Guidelines, cit. supra note 37, para. 30.  
40
 UNHCR’s Views on Gender Based Asylum Claims and Defining “Particular Social Group” to En-
compass Gender, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/5822266c4.pdf>, November 2016, p. 3.  
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The Gender Guidelines pointed out that a “well-founded fear of persecution” de-
pends on the “particular circumstances of each individual case”, and listed some ex-
amples of violence that amounts to persecution: sexual violence, dowry-related vio-
lence, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and trafficking, whether perpe-
trated by State or private parties, as acts which inflict “severe pain and suffering – 
both mental and physical”.41 In the Guidelines, no reference is made to the “serious-
ness” of domestic violence. A law can also be “persecutory in itself” when it ema-
nates, according to the Guidelines, from “traditional or cultural norms and prac-
tices”.42 Other illustrative examples of persecution that legitimises the recognition of 
refugee status are the cases in which the State, though having prohibited the practice, 
condones it or is not able to stop it effectively; the cases of severe punishment for 
women who “by breaching law, transgress social mores in a society”; the implemen-
tation of laws or policies, such as those providing for forced abortions and forced 
sterilisations, which lead to “consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for 
the person concerned”.43 This approach is particularly interesting, because the 
UNHCR stresses the patterns of discrimination that emerge from State policies, and 
that materialise in specific cases of discrimination on which applicants can rely in 
presenting a request for refugee status. Discrimination on the basis of gender can 
amount to persecution “if the State, as a matter of policy or practice, does not accord 
certain rights or protection from serious abuse, then the discrimination in extending 
protection, which results in serious harm inflicted with impunity”.44 Examples are 
domestic violence or abuse of one’s differing sexual orientation. Valerie Oosterveld 
observed that, even though gender can be “the true cause of the applicant’s predica-
ment”, decision-makers “tend to adopt much narrower social groups”, such as 
“women belonging to a community where FGM are performed”.45 Alice Edwards 
pointed out that “if one is able to establish that a woman has been persecuted because 
she is a woman, or for reasons of gender, then it seems less relevant whether she 
 
41
 Gender Guidelines, cit. supra note 37, para. 9.  
42
 Gender Guidelines, cit. supra note 37,  para. 10.  
43
 Gender Guidelines, cit. supra note 37, paras. 11, 12, 13.  
44
 Gender Guidelines, cit. supra note 37, para. 15.  
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 OOSTERVELD, “Gender at the Intersection of International Refugee Law and International Criminal 
Law”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2014, p. 953 ff., p. 963.  
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belongs to a broad or narrow group of women”.46 Why then creating “artificial” con-
structs?47  The consideration of “women” as particular social group in itself hardly 
ever happens, though. It might be possible to argue that it cannot happen because 
women are discriminated in all societies on the basis of gender, and that the defini-
tion of persecution would remain excessively vague with the risk of potentially ex-
panding the recognition of refugee status ad infinitum. One could counter-argue, 
however, that “decision-makers have accepted social groups consisting of, for exam-
ple, ‘homosexuals’ or ‘homosexuals in a particular country’, in contrast to women’s 
claims on the basis of gender”,48 with the consequence of perpetuating discrimination 
against women by virtue of patriarchal norms that do not recognise how women can 
be persecuted because of their gender.  
At national level, guidelines have been adopted by national legislators, starting 
from Canada in 1993, and followed in 1996 by the United States.49 The Canadian 
“model” proposed four gendered categories of persecution: gendered forms of harm, 
such as sexual violence, persecution on the basis of kinship, state collusion or negli-
gence in protecting female citizens from severe discrimination or violence by private 
actors, and persecution for “transgressing certain gender-discriminating religious or 
customary laws and practices”.50   
General Recommendation No. 32, adopted by the CEDAW Committee in 2014, 
reinforced and complemented the UNHCR guidelines by noting that violence against 
women, as a form of discrimination against women,51 is “one of the major forms of 
persecution experienced by women in the context of refugee status and asylum”.52 
Forms of violence recognised as legitimate grounds for international protection in 
law and in practice may include: 
 
46
 Edwards, Gender, Migration and Human Rights, at the Conference of the European University In-
stitute, Florence, Italy, 18-19 June 2012, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/4ffd430c2.html%20>, pp. 10-11.  
47
 Ibid. 
48
 OOSTERVELD, cit. supra note 45, p. 964.  
49
 Canadian Guideline 4 on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, March 
1993, updated in November 1996. US Guidelines, Office of International Affairs, Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, regarding adjudicating asylum cases on the basis of gender (May 26, 1996).  
50
 Canadian Guideline, para. I. OOSTERVELD, “The Canadian Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecu-
tion: An Evaluation”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 1996, p. 569 ff.  
51
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The threat of female genital mutilation, forced/early marriage, threat of violence and/or so-
called ‘honour crimes’, trafficking in women, acid attacks, rape and other forms of sexual assault, 
serious forms of domestic violence, the imposition of the death penalty or other physical punish-
ments existing in discriminatory justice systems, forced sterilization, political or religious perse-
cution for holding feminist or other views and the persecutory consequences of failing to conform 
to gender-prescribed social norms and mores or for claiming their rights under the Convention. 
The General Recommendation highlighted the “seriousness” of forms of domestic 
violence without however providing a “level” to distinguish which act can be consid-
ered as serious and which one cannot. Is it not psychological violence as serious as, 
though less easy to prove than, physical violence?53 The General Recommendation 
also emphasised the existence of intersecting forms of discrimination, and the patriar-
chal attitude of many asylum systems, which “continue to treat the claims of women 
through the lens of male experiences”.54 In its resolution of 2017, the European Parlia-
ment included gender-based violence among the “root causes of forced displacement 
and migration”, along with armed conflict, persecution on any ground, bad govern-
ance, poverty, lack of economic opportunities and climate change.55 All the aforemen-
tioned instruments belong to the category of soft law, which surely has an impact in 
terms of State practice, but does not create legal obligations States must abide by.  
Moving to the regional level – and limiting the scope to the European system for 
the purpose of our analysis – two different binding legal instruments must be men-
tioned: the so-called “Qualification Directive” within the EU legal system, and the 
Council of Europe Istanbul Convention. As for the former, which is binding for the 
EU member States, it includes among the acts of persecution the “acts of gender-spe-
cific nature”:56 “Gender related aspects, including gender identity, shall be given due 
consideration for the purposes of determining membership of a particular social group 
or identifying a characteristic of such a group”.57 It is however very cautious when it 
comes to regulate the reasons for persecution. The preamble mentions some examples 
 
53
 See, in that respect, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular Vali-
uliene v. Lithuania, Application No. 33234/07, judgment of 26 March 2013, which considered minor inju-
ries as falling under Article 3 of the European Convention.  
54
 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 32, cit. supra note 52, para. 16.  
55
 European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing refugee and migrant movements: the 
role of EU External Action (2015/2342(INI)), para. 5.  
56
 Qualification Directive, cit. supra note 8, Article 9. 
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of acts that can amount to persecution: acts “related to certain legal traditions and cus-
toms”, resulting in genital mutilation, forced sterilisation or forced abortion, “in so far 
as they are related to the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution”.58 It is quite 
striking that domestic violence is not specifically mentioned; this form of violence, 
which is dramatically common in European countries, does not seem to be perceived 
as belonging to ‘other’ legal traditions, and, for this reason, it appears to lose the char-
acter of being ‘cultural’. We know, however, that all forms of violence against women 
are ‘cultural’ inasmuch as they rooted in societies and ‘normalised’.  
The most innovative binding legal instrument, adopted at regional level, on vio-
lence against women is the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention, which dedicates 
to migration issues an entire chapter (Chapter No. VII). The Convention, which de-
fines violence against women and gender-based violence, is based on the four pillars 
prevention, protection, prosecution, and policies, which correspond to specific legal 
obligations for States parties (34 at the time of writing).59 Despite its origin in a re-
gional legal system, it has the potential to become universal, given the fact that States 
that are not parties to the Council of Europe can ratify the treaty.60 Article 60 of the 
Convention provides that: 
1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that gender-
based violence against women may be recognised as a form of persecution within the mean-
ing of Article 1, A (2), of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and as a 
form of serious harm giving rise to complementary/subsidiary protection. 2. Parties shall 
ensure that a gender-sensitive interpretation is given to each of the Convention grounds and 
that where it is established that the persecution feared is for one or more of these grounds, 
applicants shall be granted refugee status according to the applicable relevant instruments. 
3. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to develop gender-sensitive 
reception procedures and support services for asylum-seekers as well as gender guidelines 
and gender-sensitive asylum procedures, including refugee status determination and appli-
cation for international protection. 
As clarified in the explanatory report, the Convention codifies what has emerged 
in international refugee law over time. The report, which complements and interprets 
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 Qualification Directive, cit. supra note 8, preamble, recital No. 30.  
59
 For a general analysis of the Convention, see DE VIDO, Donne, violenza e diritto internazionale. La 
Convenzione di Istanbul del Consiglio d’Europa del 2011, Milano, 2016. 
60
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the provisions of the treaty, acknowledges the “gender blindness” in the determina-
tion of refugee status, and the silence surrounding the requests of women fleeing 
from gender-based violence.61 Rape and other forms of gender-related violence, such 
as female genital violence, dowry-related violence, serious domestic violence, or 
trafficking, are “acts which have been used as forms of persecution, whether perpe-
trated by state or non-state actors”.62 The disruption of the public/private divide 
emerges when States are responsible for what occurs to women victims of violence 
perpetrated by non-State actors. The report also recognises that women can be per-
secuted because of their gender63 and as women.64 When gender-based violence con-
stitutes a form of serious harm, Parties must ensure that women are entitled to com-
plementary/subsidiary protection. It is worth pointing out that the report refers to all 
the grounds of persecution included in the Geneva Convention. If it is true that vic-
tims of gender-based violence have been considered as belonging to a “particular 
group”, a gender-sensitive interpretation of the Geneva Convention, which is encour-
aged by the Istanbul Convention, implies the understanding of how relevant the other 
grounds of persecution included in the definition of “refugee” are.65 For example, 
persecution on the ground of race or on the ground of nationality, combines – rectius, 
intersects – gender with other forms of discrimination. As acknowledged by a 
scholar, “women who transgress social norms are not being persecuted solely be-
cause they are women but because ‘they are actively opposing a political/religious 
norm”.66 When they form a “particular group”, women must share a “common innate, 
unchangeable or otherwise fundamental characteristic other than the common expe-
rience of fleeing persecution”.67 The use of the sole category of “particular social 
group” should not be encouraged, because it “fixes an opposition between ‘them’ 
and ‘us’, between ‘Western women’ and ‘other women’, which might obscure the 
real structures of gender inequalities in different societies”.68 
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 Explanatory report to the Convention, Details of Treaty No.210, para. 310.  
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63
 Explanatory report to the Convention, cit. supra note 61, para. 311.  
64
 Explanatory report to the Convention, cit. supra note 61, para. 313. 
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 Explanatory report to the Convention, cit. supra note 61, para. 312.  
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 CRAWLEY, Women as Asylum-Seekers: A Legal Handbook, London, 1997, p. 144-145.  
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Article 61 of the Istanbul Convention then invokes the well-consolidated princi-
ple of non-refoulement,69 which, when applied to the situation of migrant women 
victims/survivors of violence, means that States must ensure that women in need of 
protection “shall not be returned under any circumstances if there were a real risk, as 
a result, of arbitrary deprivation of life or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment”.70  
Learning the lessons from the precedent acts adopted at UN level, the Istanbul 
Convention clearly acknowledges how migration law cannot be gender-neutral, and 
how it is compelling to recognise the specific gendered experiences women face.  
4. – Violence Because They are Vomen or As They are Women. The Case 
of Female Genital Mutilation and Domestic Violence in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
We have chosen as case studies for our analysis female genital mutilation and 
domestic violence. Both forms of violence are rooted in societies, they are forms of 
discrimination against women, which perpetuate the unequal power relations be-
tween women and men. They are both paradigmatic cases to discuss with regard to 
international refugee law. Domestic violence, as stressed by Mullally, challenges 
“not only the boundaries of refugee law’s categories, but also the continuing gap 
between ‘private harms’ and State accountability”.71 Furthermore, the ‘seriousness’ 
of domestic violence is often difficult to prove. In other words, is psychological vi-
olence as serious as bodily harms? Is a livid on the face a better evidence than psy-
chological trauma? As posited by Freedman, “the normalisation of domestic violence 
is thus so pervasive that it is often not registered as being a proper ground for claim-
ing asylum”.72 Psychological and economic acts of violence are difficult to detect, 
but they constitute violence against women according to the definition provided by 
the Istanbul Convention. FGM also challenges the boundaries of international refu-
gee law with the addition of the fact that FGM, compared to domestic violence, is 
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 See, for example, ALLAIN, “The Jus Cogens of non-refoulement”, International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 2002, p. 533 ff.    
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 Explanatory report to the Convention, cit. supra note 61, para. 322. 
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Rights Law: A Progress Narrative?”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2011, p. 459 ff., 
p. 461.  
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often depicted as part of the culture of the “other”, from which women must be pro-
tected.73 However, both forms of violence are cultural, because they are rooted in 
society, normalised and absorbed.  
The difference between domestic violence and FGM can be seen in the fact that 
the former is a form of violence against a woman because she is a woman, whereas 
female genital mutilation is a form of violence against a woman both because she is a 
woman and as a woman. In the latter case, indeed, violence takes a particular form – 
the cutting of women’s genitalia – which is specific for women. “Because she is a 
woman” stresses the reasons underlying violence, whereas “as a woman” put emphasis 
on the specific forms of violence. Macklin explained that “the idea of women being 
persecuted as women is not the same as women being persecuted because they are 
women”.74 In Crawley’s words, “when social mores and norms dictate that women 
must be circumcised in order to access their social, cultural and economic rights, this 
may lead to discrimination which is sufficiently severe to constitute serious harm 
within the meaning of the refugee Convention”.75 Turning to domestic violence, we 
argue, borrowing Crawley’s thought, that when a woman is victim of psychological or 
physical abuse within the household, when she is prevented from having access to 
money or from working, this may lead to discrimination which is sufficiently severe 
to constitute serious harm within the meaning of the Geneva Convention.  
In this chapter, we are not interested in a comparative analysis of national jurispru-
dence regarding requests for refugee status coming from women escaping from their 
country of origin,76 but, rather, in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, with the specific aim to argue that the application of the Istanbul Convention 
could make a significant change if used as means of interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The same reasoning can be extended to the interpreta-
tion of national (countries which ratified the Istanbul Convention) refugee law.  
Let us start from the case of female genital mutilation, on which the European 
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Commission communication entitled ‘Towards the elimination of female genital mutilation’ 
(2014/2511(RSP), 6 February 2014.   
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Court of Human Rights has rendered the highest number of cases in relation to mi-
gration issues, even though none of the cases led to the recognition of the violation 
of the applicants’ rights.  
Female circumcision, female genital surgery, female genital mutilation and fe-
male genital cutting all describe procedures which affect female genital organs for 
non-medical reasons. Female circumcision seems the most misleading word, since 
the procedure does not resemble male circumcision.77 Female genital mutilation is 
the expression used by several international organisations, including the WHO, and 
NGOs, to describe “all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external 
female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical rea-
sons”, and is the expression that we are going to use in these pages.78 
In Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden, Emily Collins and Ashley Akaziebie, mother 
and child, Nigerian nationals from Delta State, complained that, if expelled from 
Sweden (where they had sought asylum) to Nigeria, they would have faced a ‘real 
risk’ of being subjected to FGM.79 The case was dismissed as inadmissible. It is worth 
noting that the government questioned the credibility of the applicant who did not 
mention during the first interview that she underwent FGM. The European Court of 
Human Rights first expressed the view that the applicants lived in a town situated in 
a province where the authorities passed laws prohibiting FGM; secondly, it endorsed 
the position of the government which doubted of the general credibility of the appli-
cant;80 thirdly, it questioned the fact that the applicant, instead of deciding to move 
to another part of Nigeria, put her life in the hands of a smuggler to reach Europe.81 
The European Court of Human Rights decided similar cases on FGM in Nigeria in 
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2011: Enitan Pamela Izevbekhai and others v. Ireland, and Mary Magdalene 
Omeredo v. Austria.82 The complaints were considered inadmissible, as occurred in 
the Collins and Akaziebie case. With regard to two other applications, the Court 
found the case admissible, but did not conclude in the sense that there was a violation 
of the applicants’ rights.83 In R.B.A.B. and others v. The Netherlands, the applicants 
were members of a family who had asked for refugee status in the Netherlands, fear-
ing that, once sent back to Sudan, their daughters X and Y would be subjected to 
female genital mutilation, whereas in Sow v. Belgium, a Guinean woman, aged 28, 
feared to be expelled back to her country of origin where she could be subjected to a 
mutilation of type I.84 In R.B.A.B. and others, the European Court considered the 
complaint admissible, but rejected it in the merits arguing that some provinces of 
Sudan, including the applicants’ one, passed laws prohibiting FGM as harmful prac-
tice affecting the health of the children, and that there was no real risk for a girl or a 
woman to be subjected to FGM at the instigation of persons who were not family 
members.85 Since the girl would have been deported along with her family, who was 
contrary to the practice, there was no risk for her to undergo the practice. As for Sow, 
the Guinean woman asking for refugee status in Belgium, the Court decided that the 
applicant was “not particularly vulnerable”, due to the fact that she received a pro-
gressive education and that her mother was herself contrary to the practice. The Court 
relied on the assessment conducted by national authorities, according to which the 
declaration of the applicant was not credible, and that she did not risk re-excision in 
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Guinea, not falling under the cases for which this practice was envisaged.86 No vio-
lation of Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention was found. The Court also 
used international reports on the situation of Guinea to conclude that, in the specific 
case of the applicant, despite the general situation of the country, the woman did not 
face a real risk of being forced to undertake the excision.87 
Turning to domestic violence as ground for persecution, the only case that can be 
found at the time of writing in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights is N. v. Sweden, decided in 2010.88 The applicant, of Afghan nationality, asked 
for refugee status in Sweden where she arrived with her husband in 2004. Their re-
quest for asylum was rejected several times. The year after their arrival, she separated 
from her husband and asked for divorce in Sweden in 2008. Swedish courts refused 
the request because they had no authority to dissolve the marriage, given the absence 
of a legitimate reason for the applicant to stay in Sweden. Her husband opposed to 
the divorce. The woman asked the authorities to reassess her case and to stop depor-
tation, claiming that she risked death penalty once back to Afghanistan due to her 
relationship with a Swedish man while in Sweden. Her family also refused to have 
her back. The Court acknowledged that “owing to the special situation in which asy-
lum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit 
of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their statements”; nonethe-
less, the applicant had to adduce evidence capable of proving that “there [were] sub-
stantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be imple-
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mented”, she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to a treatment con-
trary to Article 3.89 The Court noticed that women are at risk of ill-treatment in Af-
ghanistan “if perceived as not conforming to the gender roles ascribed to them by 
society, tradition and even the legal system”.90 The Court posited that, if deported to 
Afghanistan, according to the law in force, the man may decide to resume the married 
live together even against the applicant’s wish, and that, according to data and inter-
national reports, women who find themselves in this situation risk more often than 
others to be subjected to domestic violence.91 Even if there was no evidence substan-
tiating this affirmation, the Court concluded that it could not ignore “the general risk 
indicated by statistic and international reports”.92 The applicant argued that, if back 
to Afghanistan, she would risk persecution and she would be possibly sentenced to 
death, owing to her extramarital relationship in Sweden. Despite the absence of any 
relevant information submitted by the applicant in that respect, the Court acknowl-
edged that, had the applicant been successful in living separated from her husband, 
she could have faced the same limitations unaccompanied women or women lacking 
a male tutor usually encounter in her country of origin.93 The European Court of Hu-
man Rights concluded that, given the “special circumstances of the case”, there were 
substantial grounds for believing that if deported to Afghanistan, the applicant would 
run “various cumulative risks of reprisals which fall under Article 3 of the Conven-
tion from her husband X, his family, her own family and from the Afghan society”.94 
5. – How to Assess Violence against Women as a Form of Persecution? 
Issues of Credibility and the Situation in the Country of Origin 
To assess when violence against women is a form of persecution, judges and 
authorities must consider both the personal situation of the applicant and the situation 
of the country to which the woman can be expelled absent the recognition of refugee 
status.  
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It is not easy for a woman to demonstrate, as required by the courts, that she runs 
the risk of being persecuted because she has been victim/survivor of violence, and 
that the harm is “serious”.95 Credibility is highly problematic for claims where the 
experience of persecution is in some way related to a woman’s gender status.96 In-
consistencies in the declarations to the authorities may undermine credibility, but 
might be dictated by the procedure, by the fact that, for example, a woman is heard 
along with her husband at the beginning of the procedure, and alone in second stance 
only.97 Furthermore, medical evidence might not be available. In cases of rape and 
sexual violence that determined the escape from the country of origin, for example, 
physical evidence might be absent, unless the rape was particularly brutal or the 
woman was a virgin.98 It must also be acknowledged that violence can take the form 
of psychological and economic violence, which might be very difficult to prove un-
less the woman has medical evidence supporting her psychological condition. The 
‘likelihood’ of the risk of being subjected to violence should be determined by courts 
considering the ‘reasonable possibility’ of persecution. It seems obvious that the de-
cision should be taken on a case-by-case basis. However, the processes followed in 
international refugee law have proved to be ‘insensitive to gender’: for example, as 
outlined by Valerie Oosterveld, some applicants might not be informed of the gen-
der-related aspects of their experiences, interviews can be conducted without re-
specting the applicant’s privacy with the consequence of discouraging women from 
reporting episodes of rape or domestic violence or FGM, or interviews to women 
might be conducted by a male interviewer.99 Advocates might not be sufficiently pre-
pared to tackle cases of refugee women, with the consequence that “women’s cases 
are often formulated in ways which reflect the advocate’s understanding of the law 
rather than the reality of the applicant’s experiences”.100 The effects of culture, trauma 
and post-traumatic stress disorder are rarely taken into consideration in the procedure 
for the recognition of refugee status. Furthermore, as highlighted in the judgments 
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examined in the previous paragraph, there is another element taken into considera-
tion by courts: whether or not a person can move to another region of her country to 
escape from violence. Is relocation enough to protect women from violence, or, bet-
ter, to assess the capacity of a State to protect women from inter-personal violence? 
Turning to the second element, the situation of the woman’s country of origin, 
Crawley pointed out that “the State in the country of origin is frequently unwilling 
or unable to offer effective protection to women”, because of the existence of a leg-
islation that condones violence in the family, or because of the authorities’ refusal to 
investigate the individual case, or because of the incapacity (or unwillingness) of the 
police to respond to the woman’s plea for assistance.101 In the aforementioned Collins 
and Akaziebie case, the European Court of Human Rights considered both the situa-
tion in Nigeria and the personal situation of the applicant. With regard to the former 
aspect, however, the Court did not delve into the fact that, despite the adoption of 
laws by the country where the applicant was supposed to be expelled, a practice 
might be so well rooted in the society to be unavoidable, even if the family of the 
woman is against it. In the case regarding domestic violence decided in 2010, N. v. 
Sweden, the Court demonstrated a gender-sensitive approach, considering the capac-
ity of the State – as we will argue further, its capacity of respecting due diligence 
obligations – in protecting women from violence, through a series of reports elabo-
rated by international bodies and organs that showed the general situation for women 
in Afghanistan and how this could have affected the applicant. As Deborah Anker 
observed, “the most critical issue today in refugee determinations is the evidentiary 
burden faced by women claimants in establishing the lack of state protection”.102 In 
that respect, the application of the Istanbul Convention, with the definition of due 
diligence obligations States must abide by, could be considered as a useful tool to 
interpret in a more gender-sensitive way the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
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6. – States Due Diligence Obligations in Protecting Women from 
Violence: Setting a Higher Standard of Protection in Refugee Law in 
Light of the Istanbul Convention 
Under the Istanbul Convention, States have legal obligations to prevent and to 
repress violence against women and domestic violence, along with the obligation to 
protect the victims/survivors. According to Article 5 of the Istanbul Convention: 
1. Parties shall refrain from engaging in any act of violence against women and ensure that 
State authorities, officials, agents, institutions and other actors acting on behalf of the State act in 
conformity with this obligation. 2. Parties shall take the necessary legislative and other measures 
to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and provide reparation for acts of vio-
lence covered by the scope of this Convention that are perpetrated by non-State actors. 
As correctly pointed out in the explanatory report, due diligence obligations are 
obligations of means. It does not mean that all legal obligations included in the con-
vention are of due diligence nature. Obligations under the Convention are obligations 
of result, of means and of progressive realisation.103   
In this paragraph, we will show how the Istanbul Convention can be useful in 
applying the due diligence standard in the assessment of the adequacy of the protec-
tion granted by the State of origin to the woman who is fleeing from gender-based 
violence. This would determine a paradigmatic shift from the need for the woman to 
prove that she has no alternative to escape violence to the assessment by the Court, 
with which the request for refugee status has been filed, of the situation of the country 
of origin in protecting women from gender-based violence. Mullally already pointed 
out, in her remarkable work, how due diligence is never applied in asylum cases,104 
and how, as we will show, it should (and must according to the legal obligations 
stemming from the Istanbul Convention). The paradigmatic shift concerns the pas-
sage from the centrality of women credibility – of the woman that must prove to 
concretely fear of being persecuted and subjected to serious violence once back to 
her country of origin – to the examination of the capacity of the State of origin to 
grant protection to women. Only when the State of origin is capable of complying 
with due diligence obligations, then the request for refugee status can be refused.  
At first sight, this argument might seem an undue interference in the State of 
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origin’s sovereignty. We argue that it is not. Through this paradigmatic shift, the 
protection of women would occur par ricochet, by assessing whether the State of 
origin from which the woman escapes is capable of protecting her, in her specific 
situation, from violence. To borrow the legal reasoning which is applied in relation 
to the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, the State that refuses 
expulsion to a country where there is a risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment decides thus on the basis of international reports, and reports of NGOs, which 
depict the situation of the country. That is not seen as an interference with the State’s 
sovereignty. Why should it be in the case of examining the situation of a country 
from which a woman escapes fearing gender-based violence? In cases of FGM and 
domestic violence, the European Court of Human Right has applied Article 3 of the 
European Convention, namely the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment,105 without dwelling too much upon the “level of severity” of the harm suffered 
by the applicant. One could object that the standard of due diligence is applicable to 
those States of origin which ratified the Istanbul Convention only, but we can argue 
that, on the one hand, this standard is well established in international human rights 
law, and, on the other hand, that the protection of the woman’s right only occurs par 
ricochet, because the persecution derives from an inaction of the State of origin. This 
hypothesis is not thus far-fetched. As early as 1992, the UNHCR wrote in its Hand-
book on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status that: 
Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, 
they can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the 
authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection.106  
It means, in other words, that the State is not responsible for a direct violation of 
rights, but for an omission in its compliance with its due diligence obligations.107 
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Hathaway interestingly contended in 1993 that a “conceptualization of persecution 
as the failure of basic State protection demonstrated through the denial of core, in-
ternationally recognised human rights is a helpful means of breathing new life into 
refugee law”.108 He also added that, given the role of international human rights law 
in defining the basic duties of the States to their nationals, “individuals ought not to 
be required to endure life in societies which fail to meet its standards”.109 
Using this argument for our purposes, the question is the following: Has the State 
of origin put in place reasonable measures to protect women from violence? 
In the Collins and Akaziebie case, and in the other cases on FGM that have been 
examined by the European Court of Human Rights, the assessment conducted by 
national authorities and by the Strasbourg judges concerned the situation in the ap-
plicant’s country of origin in terms of adoption of laws prohibiting FGM. This argu-
ment – based on the obligation of result to adopt laws criminalising FGM – does not 
seem enough to effectively protect women from violence. The legal argument pro-
posed in N. v. Sweden, concerning domestic violence, was much more attentive in 
considering the situation of the State in which the woman could be forced to return 
whether expelled. The problem is that courts have hardly ever contextualised – which 
does not mean to adopt a relativistic approach to human rights law, but to consider 
the cultural and societal context in which the violation of women’s rights is perpe-
trated – the forms of violence that manifest in one country or the other. For example, 
the fact that a family is contrary to FGM in Sweden, or in another European country 
where the woman has escaped, does not automatically ensure that it will not be in-
duced by the society of origin to change its mind. 
As a consequence, relocation within the country, which is suggested in European 
Court of Human Rights decisions with regard to FGM, “puts the burden back on the 
[…] victim to escape the perpetrator(s) of abuse”.110 In domestic violence asylum 
cases, “the reasonableness of the relocation alternative […] and the effectiveness of 
State protection [….] tend to be assessed from the perspective of the resources and 
opportunities available to the asylum applicant, rather than through scrutiny of the 
actions of the State, or of its due diligence obligations”.111 The UNHCR Handbook 
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for the protection of women and girls illustrates the option of “voluntary relocation 
elsewhere in the country”,112 which sounds interesting to support our argument. The 
possibility of relocation should be contemplated whether the woman wishes to do so, 
and after scrutiny of the capacity of the State to comply with its due diligence obli-
gations. The obligation of the State to provide protection cannot be replaced by the 
work of NGOs or by the willingness of family members to protect the woman from 
violence. The European Court of Human Rights, except for the N. v. Sweden judg-
ment, has not followed this line of reasoning yet, but it could do so in the application 
of the Istanbul Convention as a tool for the interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of the European Convention of Human Rights, in particular the prohibition of torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to privacy, which are applicable in 
cases of FGM and domestic violence. The standard of due diligence, in particular, 
would determine the paradigmatic change in perspective and would enhance the pro-
tection of women’s rights, with no need to scrutinise the “seriousness” of the harm 
suffered by the woman.  
This approach is not new to domestic courts. In Italy, for example, the Italian 
Supreme Court, the Cassazione, decided on 5 December 2016 the appeal of a 
woman, of Moroccan nationality, whose request for international protection was de-
nied by the competent authorities.113 Her request for reconsideration of the case was 
dismissed by the court of first instance and later by the court of appeal in Rome. The 
woman asked for international protection because she feared of being subjected to 
domestic violence perpetrated by her former husband once back home. The authori-
ties rejected the application, arguing that she could receive protection in her country 
of origin. Not only she obtained divorce in Morocco, but also her former husband 
was criminally prosecuted and convicted for the perpetrated violence. The applicant 
complained that the protection offered by the Moroccan authorities was not enough, 
and that the Moroccan system did not grant forms of protection such as restraining 
or protection order. The Italian Court referred to Article 60 of the Istanbul Conven-
tion on gender-based asylum claims, pointing out that violence against women is a 
form of persecution under the 1951 Convention on refugee status, and that domestic 
violence suffered by the woman clearly fell under the notion of violence against 
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women. The Court interpreted the notion of “inhuman and degrading treatment” un-
der the Italian legislative Decree No. 251/2007,114 concerning international protec-
tion, as encompassing domestic violence. Such interpretation – the Court stressed – 
is not contrary to the text of the provision of domestic law, on the one hand, and is 
compulsory according to Article 60(1) of the Istanbul Convention, on the other hand. 
The Cassazione quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and referred the case back 
to the lower court to decide on the merits. The Cassazione did not focus on the ex-
istence of laws on domestic violence in Morocco, but rather considered whether Mo-
rocco “was able to offer her adequate protection”.115 The Italian Supreme Court 
stressed how the lower court “limited” its analysis “to circumstances which were not 
signal of adequate protection, such as, for example, the criminal conviction of the 
former husband […] or completely unrelated to forms of national protection, such as 
the support of the applicant’s family”.116 There was no reference to the “seriousness” 
of domestic violence.  
The standard of due diligence might reveal its usefulness also in the consideration 
of intersecting forms of discrimination against women,117 and to avoid the paternal-
istic position of judges that try to protect women from their culture of origin. When 
considering whether the State of origin has adequate measures to protect women 
from violence, judges should consider whether there are intersecting axes of perse-
cution.118 In other words, a woman can be persecuted as victim of domestic violence 
because she is a woman, but also because she belongs to another “particular” group 
or because she adheres to a certain political opinion. Applying the standard of due 
diligence would allow a legal analysis of what is done by the State of origin to protect 
women, and more specifically women that face intersecting forms of discrimination, 
 
114
 Decreto legislativo 19 novembre 2007 No 251, Attuazione della direttiva 2004/83/CE recante 
norme minime sull’attribuzione, a cittadini di Paesi terzi o apolidi, della qualifica del rifugiato o di persona 
altrimenti bisognosa di protezione internazionale, nonché norme minime sul contenuto della protezione 
riconosciuta.  
115
 Corte di Cassazione, n. 12333, para. 2.1.  
116
 Ibid.  
117
 On intersectionality, see, inter alia, CRESHAW, “Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity 
politics, and violence against women of color”, Stanford Law Review, 1991, p. 1241 ff.; BOND, “Interna-
tional intersectionality: a theoretical and pragmatic exploration of women’s international human rights 
law”, Emory Law Journal, 2003, p. 71ff.; BRAH and PHOENIX, “Ain’t I a woman? Revisiting intersection-
ality”, Journal of International Women’s Studies, 2004, p. 75 ff.; SOSA, Intersectionality in the Human 
Rights Legal Framework on Violence Against Women, Cambridge, 2017.  
118
 MULLALLY, cit. supra note 71, p. 480.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
328 Sara De Vido 
 
 
from interpersonal violence.  
The burden of proof should not be placed on the woman that must prove she can 
relocate. It would be up to courts to assess whether the State of origin has adequate 
measures to respect its due diligence obligations and whether relocation, when accepted 
by the woman, would be a feasible option. This can be done using the Istanbul Conven-
tion as a tool for interpretation of the provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and of domestic refugee laws, as the Italian case clearly demonstrates.119 
7. – Conclusions 
The Istanbul Convention can be a powerful tool for national judges and the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights alike when they interpret national law and the rights 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights in cases of women request-
ing refugee status. Given the provisions on migration included in the Convention and 
its conceptualisation of due diligence obligations, the Istanbul Convention can be 
used to assess, in the analysis of a request for refugee status, whether the State of 
origin complies with its due diligence obligations in preventing and prosecuting vi-
olence against women, as well as in protecting victims/survivors. The paradigmatic 
change from the centrality of women’s experience to the situation of the country of 
origin would be pivotal for the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, that only timidly approached the issue in the N. v Sweden case. As observed 
by Sjöholm, the Court has not adopted an overt gender-sensitive method in its case-
law so far, although ‘it has successfully integrated several forms of violence [of 
which women are victims], as human rights violations.’120 A gender-sensitive ap-
proach means to consider the gendered causes and effects of violence and to recog-
nise that harm exclusively or mainly affects women. It also implies the acknowl-
edgement of the gendered effects of a violation, such as the social stigma that women 
might face as a consequence of violence. A gender-based approach, which is possible 
through the Istanbul Convention, will imply that Courts should not only assess 
whether in the country of origin there is a legislation concerning domestic violence 
or female genital mutilation – the adoption of a law corresponds to an obligation of 
 
119
 See, extensively, forthcoming, DE VIDO, “The Council of Europe Istanbul Convention as interpre-
tative tool at European and national level”, in NIEMI, PERONI, STOYANOVA (eds), International Law and 
Violence Against Women: Europe and the Istanbul Convention, Abingdon, 2020. 
120
 SJÖHOLM, Gender-Sensitive Norm Interpretation by Regional Human Rights Law Systems, Lei-
den/Boston, 2018, p. 116.  
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result – but also evaluate whether the State complies with its due diligence obliga-
tions to prevent, to protect and to prosecute. This approach extends to issues of relo-
cation as well. The burden should not be on the woman that “might have escaped 
somewhere else”, but on courts that should assess whether in another area where the 
person could, and wishes, to relocate, the country of origin respects its obligations 
of prevention, protection and prosecution with regard to gender-based violence.  
When tackling cases of refugee status, there are however some risks that must be 
avoided. First, if, on one hand, persecution can never be “normalised” by invoking 
culture,121 on the other hand, it is necessary not to commit the mistake of stereotyping 
other States as “others” with the risk of considering courts in the so-called “Western 
countries” as the ones that can “save women” from the brutality of other cultures. 
We are perfectly aware indeed of the stereotypes and the biases existing in European 
and national courts as well. The approach should be gender-sensitive in the sense 
that it should shift from focusing on the woman – the woman that should have relo-
cated somewhere else, the woman who should have declared in the first interview to 
have been victim of violence, the woman who should demonstrate the “seriousness” 
of the harm suffered as a consequence of domestic violence – to focusing on the State 
of origin and its capacity of protecting women, and of preventing and prosecuting 
violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
121
 FREEDMAN, cit. supra note 27, p. 82. 
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1. – Introduction 
One of the major challenges in determining the status of ‘refugee’ is identifying 
– through a comprehensive and forward-looking assessment – the ‘real risk’ of being 
persecuted upon return.  
As well known, the 1951 Refugee Convention provides no specific procedural 
tools to establish the status of refugee. Neither does the European Union Qualifica-
tion Directive (henceforth ‘Qualification Directive’ or ‘QD’), 1 which does not even 
 
1
 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards 
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clearly specify any adequate model for setting common standards and criteria of risk 
assessment. Indeed, testing the actual risk of being persecuted remains the core issue 
of the whole decision-making in international-protection claims. 
Such test is generally carried out by anticipating what might happen were claim-
ants returned to their country of origin, specifically considering applicants’ personal 
circumstances and the country of origin’s situation. In this regard, given women’s 
special needs and vulnerability, ascertaining risk in asylum claims involving female-
refugees becomes crucial: specific risk factors are indeed typically intertwined in the 
assessment of the ‘real risk’ of persecution.  
This paper aims at sketching a ‘risk paradigm’ to be tested through in interna-
tional-protection case-laws, focusing on selected case-studies about women’s asy-
lum seekers. The core elements of this paradigm are the following: persecution (or 
serious harm), present threat and failure of the state of origin to provide protection. 
The coexistence of all these components reveals the existence of a “real risk”, which 
needs to ultimately pass the final test of the Internal Protection Alternative (‘IPA’), 
taking into account all the factors useful to individualise the risk.  
International legal scholars have extensively focused on all these elements,2 with-
out however scrutinizing the risk assessment question in international-protection 
 
for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protec-
tion, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content 
of the protection granted. The Directive uses the exact same definition of ‘refugee’ given in the Geneva 
Convention (Art. 1 A 2, Geneva Convention or GC) and adds the subsidiary protection. 
2
 See generally, GRAHL-MADSEN, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Leiden, 1966, Vol. I; 
CARLIER, “General Report,” in CARLIER et al. (eds.), Who is a Refugee? A Comparative Case Law Study, 
Den Haag, 1997, p. 683 ff.; CARLIER, “The Geneva Refugee Definition and the ‘Theory of the Three 
Scales”, in NICHOLSON and TWOMEY (eds.), Refugee Rights and Realities. Evolving International Concepts 
and Regimes, Cambridge, 1999, p. 37 ff.; CRAWLEY, Refugees and Gender: Law and Process, Bristol, 
2001; CRAWLEY and LESTER, Comparative Analysis of gender-related persecution in national asylum 
legislation and practice in Europe, UNHCR EPAU, 2004, available at: 
<https://www.unhcr.org/40c071354.pdf>;  GORLICK, Improving decision-making in asylum determination, 
UNHCR, Working Paper n. 119, 2005, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff164622.html>; 
NOLL, “Evidentiary Assessment under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the Intersubjectivity of 
Fear”, in NOLL (ed.), Proof, Evidentiary Assessment & Credibility in Asylum Procedures, Leiden, 2005, p. 
141 ff.;  GOODWIN-GILL and MCADAM, The Refugee in International Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2007; WOUTER, 
International Legal Standars for the Protection from refoulement: a legal Analysis on the prohibitions on 
refoulement cointaned in the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
International Covenant Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture, Antwerp-Oxford-
Portland, 2009; CHERUBINI, L’asilo dalla Convenzione di Ginevra al Diritto dell’Unione Europea, Bari, 
2012; PEERS et al. (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary), 2nd ed., Leiden, 2012; 
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claims, particularly when dealing with women’s asylum cases.  
Moreover, the idea of risk has been mostly analysed by legal literature in relation 
to the principle of non-refoulement. The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ 
or “the Court”), assessing applications for violations of Article 3 (Prohibition of tor-
ture) of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), has identified some 
principles embedded in the risk assessment that must necessarily be scrutinized when 
considering a possible return.  
Further, although both ECtHR’s and domestic courts’ judgments may concern 
the same issues, actually their outcomes are different. The former – being limited to 
the prohibition of refoulement and State’s responsibility for violations of ECHR – 
cannot bring (unlike judgments of domestic courts) any direct benefits such as resi-
dence permits or specific rights for the applicant. 
Thus, an empirical analysis on the rulings of domestic courts becomes crucial in 
order to duly investigate how the “risk paradigm” impacts international-protection 
claims. 
This chapter presents a brief review of selected domestic case-laws (UK, France 
and Italy) in international-protection claims concerning women victims of persecution 
as members of a particular social group, drawing the risk paradigm in the context of 
the Common European Asylum System (‘CEAS’). It provides an analysis of asylum 
cases about trafficking for sexual exploitation, considering the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
on procedural issues in international-protection claims. It aims at ascertaining how risk 
assessment generally works in the decision-making process about international protec-
tion (Section 1); it further outlines a tentative risk paradigm in women’s trafficking 
decisions, tested through a critical appraisal of both domestic courts and ECtHR ap-
proaches (Section 2), eventually exploring whether (and to what extent) the risk-as-
sessment question matches the ECtHR’s evaluating criteria on the prohibition of re-
foulement (Section 3). The analisys reveals that in women’s asylum claims European 
domestic courts generally use specific socio-economic risk factors in determining the 
refugee status, even if these factors are not mentioned in the provisions of the QD. By 
 
HATHAWAY and FOSTER, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2014; DRYWOOD, “Who’s in and 
who’s out? The Court’s emerging case law on the definition of a refugee”, Common Market Law Review, 
2014, p. 1093 ff.; STOREY, “What Constitute Persecution? Towards a Working Definition”, International 
Journal of Refugee Law, 2014, p. 272 ff.; DEL GUERCIO, La Protezione dei Richiedenti Asilo nel Diritto 
Internazionale ed Europeo, Napoli, 2016; HAMDAN, The Principle of Non-Refoulement Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Leiden, Boston, 2016. 
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examining the risk assessment carried out by the ECtHR in comparable cases, the 
chapter concludes that both jurisdictions (ECtHR and national asylum courts) adopt 
similar patterns of risk assessment in international protection cases. 
2. – The ‘Risk Assessment’ Paradigm in International-Protection 
Claims: a Proposal  
The 1951 Refugee Convention is the main international legal instrument framing 
the conditions for granting the refugee status. In the EU legal system, besides, a new 
form of protection (the subsidiary protection) was introduced by the Qualification 
Directive. According to the latter, both refugee status and subsidiary protection inte-
grate the so-called “international protection”.3 
Using the same definition provided by the Geneva Convention, the QD recognize 
the “refugee” as a third-country national (or a stateless person)  
“who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country […]”.4 
A “person eligible for subsidiary protection” is a third-country national (or a 
stateless person)  
“who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or 
in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would 
face a real risk of suffering serious harm […] and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling 
to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country”.5 
Thus, the qualification for international protection depends on the assessment of 
the risk of being persecuted (if present, the applicant is eligible for refugee status) 
and on the risk of facing a serious harm (to be eligible for subsidiary protection).  
Accordingly, the investigation for granting the refugee status or subsidiary pro-
tection should include the following elements: firstly, the applicant has to be a third-
country national or stateless person (personal scope) and he/she should be outside 
 
3
 QD, cit. supra note 1, Art. 2 (a). 
4
 Ibid., (d). 
5
 QD, cit. supra note 1, Art. 2 (f). 
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the country of origin (territorial scope); secondly, the existence of well-founded of a 
persecution connected to the five Geneva grounds or to a real risk to suffer serious 
harm; thirdly, the availability and accessibility of protection in the State of origin 
against such persecution/serious harm. 
In addition, the assessment includes: all relevant facts as they relate to the country 
of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application; the statements and doc-
umentations presented by the applicant including information (also taken motu pro-
prio by decision-makers) on whether he/she has been or could be exposed to perse-
cution or serious harm; the personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors 
such as background, gender, age and the situation in the country of origin.6 
In accordance with the opinion of the Court of Justice of European Union 
(‘CJEU’), the decision-making in the context of international protection includes a 
two-step process. The first stage concerns the establishment of factual circumstances 
which may constitute evidence that supports the application and involves gathering 
and evaluating information, the credibility assessment and the risk assessment. The 
second stage relates to the legal appraisal of that evidence, which entails deciding 
whether the substantive conditions for granting international protection are met (ref-
ugee status or subsidiary protection).7 
Looking at the first step, it should be stressed that information gathering and 
credibility assessment are the most challenging actions of this phase. Indeed, due to 
several factors, including the consideration that a person fleeing from persecution 
commonly arrives without personal documents and it is not so practical to recover 
evidence after, the ECtHR holds that the requirement of proof should “not be too 
strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in 
which an applicant for refugee status finds himself”.8 Still, if in doubt, the lack of 
evidence cannot be decisive per se. The special situation facing asylum seekers 
makes it necessary to grant them the benefit of the doubt when examining the credi-
bility of their claims and of the documents produced to support them.9  
 
6
 Ibid., Art. 4. 
7
 Case C-277/11, M. M. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, Attorney General, 
22 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:744, para. 64.  
8
 Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 (2011), 
available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html>, paras. 195-197. 
9
 European Court of Human Rights, J.K. and Others v. Sweden, Application no. 59166/12, Judgment 
of 23 August 2016, para. 95. 
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The Qualification Directive includes an ad hoc provision on the credibility test 
that describes some specific indicators of subjective authenticity to be applied when 
the applicant’s statements appear unlikely and are not supported by documentary or 
other evidence. Indeed, truthfulness can be assumed if the following criteria are met, 
to be taken into account cumulatively:10 
(a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his/her application; 
(b) all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, and 
a satisfactory explanation has been given regarding any lack of other relevant 
elements; 
(c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do 
not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the 
applicant’s case; 
(d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possi-
ble time, unless he/she can demonstrate good reasons for not having done so; 
and 
(e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.11 
 
Notwithstanding the positive adoption of these criteria to assess the credibility, 
there are still several obstacles that cannot be overcome through their implementa-
tion sic et simpliciter.  
As noted by UN High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), “some claimants, 
because of the shame they feel over what has happened to them, or due to trauma, 
may be reluctant to identify the true extent of the persecution suffered or feared. They 
may continue to fear persons in authority, or they may fear rejection and/or reprisals 
from their family and/or community”.12 Moreover, it is even more difficult to find 
 
10
 C‑148/13 to C‑150/13, A, B, C v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2 December 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2406, para. 58. 
11
 QD, cit. supra note 1, Art. 4(5). See NOLL, “Salvation by the Grace of State? Explaining Credibility 
Assessment in the Asylum Procedure,” in NOLL (ed.), cit. supra note 2, 2005, p. 197 ff.; KAGAN, “Is Truth 
in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determinations”, 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 2003, p. 367 ff. See also MACKEY and BARNES, “Assessment of 
Credibility in Refugee and Subsidiary Protection claims under the EU Qualification Directive. Judicial 
Criteria and Standards”, IARLJ, March 2013, p. 92, where other references on credibility assessment have 
also been developed; available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/557028564.html>. 
12
 Guidelines on International Protection no.1: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Arti-
cle 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d36f1c64.html, para. 35>. 
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evidences to support the demand, especially in cases of situations that fall within the 
private sphere, as well as of signs of violence suffered that are not always physical 
and therefore of lacking visible damages. Undeniably, evidences of psychological 
harm are the greatest challenge in determining facts.13 
On average, in cases involving women victims of violence, the credibility criteria 
suggested by QD cannot be applied automatically. 
First, due to post-traumatic disorders, a woman victim of violence will not sub-
stantiate her claim because she is usually unable to remember events. Second, it is 
likely that a satisfactory explanation has not been given about the lack of other rele-
vant elements (such as the proof of a forced marriage). Third, applicant’s statements 
will be contradictory when no information is detected by reports on the country of 
origin. Fourth, it is also possible that the application is not submitted in time because 
of the feeling of shame in telling traumatic experiences. Finally, due to the cultural 
background, the applicant will not generally be credible if she is not fully aware of 
the serious damage received.14 
In the Guidelines for Investigation and Evaluation of the Needs of Women for 
Protection it is stated that “there is often no reason to investigate painful abuse, such 
as sexual abuse in detail. The lack of detail in a woman’s story should therefore not 
be viewed as an indication that her information is not credible”.15 
In these particular circumstances, when the credibility test failed, the decision-
making process should go on with the risk assessment, notwithstanding the lack of 
evidence to support the claim.  
Therefore, the question arises whether it is possible to identify a different ap-
proach to consider just the risk assessment as determinative in establishing qualifi-
cation for international protection.  
Looking at the above definitions on “refugee status” and “subsidiary protection”, 
the evaluation for determining the “risk” as required by the international protection 
system could be summarized and exemplified by this formula, which supports the 
decision-making process: 
 
13
 CLAYTON et. al., BARNARD (ed.), Through her Eyes: Enabling women’s best evidence in UK asylum 
appeals, London, 2017, available at: <https://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/de-
fault/files/files/Through-Her-Eyes_Full-Report_Nov17.pdf>, p. 41. 
14
 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, UNHCR (1998), available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3338.html> para. 9. 
15
 Swedish Migration Agency, “Gender-Based Persecution: Guidelines for Investigation and Evalua-
tion of the Needs of Women for Protection”, 28 March 2001, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/3f8c1a654.html>, p. 15. 
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persecution / serious harm + present threat + failure of state protection  
= real risk 
 
This paradigm is finalized by the additional IPA test, i.e. the assessment of the 
possibility of being protected against the risks of persecution or serious harm outside 
the applicant’s own area, but still within the same country of origin.  
It is a prognostic decision-making method which alleviates the burden of proof 
and sets the judicial duty to cooperate in identifying elements corroborating the ap-
plications.   
3. – Testing the Risk Paradigm: the Real Risk of Being Trafficked for 
Sexual Exploitation 
This Section focuses on the functioning of the risk paradigm proposed, testing it 
on the real risk of persecution in cases of trafficking for sexual exploitation. By ana-
lyzing 40 selected cases from EU domestic courts (UK, France, and Italy) raised by 
female asylum-seekers victims of trafficking, the emerging trend shows that the refu-
gee status is increalinsgly based on the membership of a particular social group (PSG). 
Most of the cases analysed apparently follow the paradigm’s scheme and explain the 
prognostic factors typically recurring in trafficking jurisprudence and playing a crucial 
role in determining the level of risk to face persecution in case of return. 
3.1. – The Persecution 
One of the most controversial elements of the risk paradigm is the one of “perse-
cution”, specifically when it relates to features such as “womanhood”, “sex”, “gen-
der” and “homosexuality” as well as when it needs to be linked to a Geneva Conven-
tion (‘GC’) grounds (Article 1, A2 GC) such as race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership of a particular social group. 
Moreover, the determination of persecution in women’s asylum claims is gener-
ally connected with various treaties on the protection of women’s human rights and 
has been progressively developed by scholarly interpretation as well as by courts’ 
decisions on persecutions related to the PSG ground.16  
 
16SPIJKERBOER, Gender and Refugee Studies, Aldershot, 2000, p. 177. See also HELTON, “Persecution 
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As clearly stated by the UNHCR, “sex can properly be within the ambit of the 
social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined 
by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently 
to men. As such, they may constitute a particular social group”.17  
Also the 2011 Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on preventing and combat-
ing violence against women and domestic violence (henceforth, ‘Istanbul Conven-
tion’) acknowledges that gender-based violence is a form of persecution under Article 
1 A(2) (GC). Such recognition implies “that a woman may be persecuted because of 
her gender, i.e. because of her identity and status as a woman” and that States Parties 
to the Convention are thus required “to recognize that gender-specific violence may 
amount to persecution, and lead to the granting of refugee status”.18 
 
on Account of Membership in a Social Group As a Basis for Refugee Status”, Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review, 1983-1984, p. 39 ff.; ANKER, “Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm”, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2002, p. 133 ff.; RANDALL, “Refugee Law and State Accountability for 
Violence Against Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims 
Based on Gender Persecution”, Harvard Women’s Law Journal, 2002, p. 281 ff.; HAINES, “Gender-related 
persecution”, in FELLER, TÜRK, NICHOLSON (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law, UNHCR’s 
Global Consultations on International Protection, Cambridge, 2003, p. 319 ff.; HATHAWAY and FOSTER, 
“Membership of a Particular Social Group. Discussion Paper no. 4, Advanced Refugee Law Workshop 
International Association of Refugee Law Judges, Auckland, New Zeland, October 2002”, International 
Journal of Refugee Law, 2003, p. 477 ff.; MUSALO, “Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum 
Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence”, Depaul Law Review, vol. 52, 2003, p. 777 ff.; 
FOSTER, “Why we are not there yet: the particular challenge of “particular social group”, in ARBEL, 
DAUVERGNE and MILLBANK (eds.), Gender in Refugee Law. From the Margins to the Centre, New York, 
2014, p. 17 ff.; BEDNAR and PENLAND, “Asylum’s Interpretative Impasse: Interpreting Persecution and 
Particular Social Group Using International Human Rights Law”, Minnesota Journal of International Law, 
2017, p. 145 ff. See also House of Lords (Judicial Committee) (United Kingdom), Secretary of State for 
the Home Department (Respondent) v. K (FC) (Appellant); Fornah (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (Respondent), Opinions of 18 October 2006, para. 86, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_HL,4550a9502.html>.  See SAPIENZA, “La Convenzione sui rifug-
iati nella recente giurisprudenza della Camera dei Lords”, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2007, p. 
438 ff.  This trend of evaluating the persecution of women on the grounds of PSG was expressly criticized 
for overlooking the other reasons (see the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, para. 
312, available at: <https://rm.coe.int/16800d383a>). This does not mean that other reasons should be dis-
regarded, see Guidelines on International Protection no. 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons 
At Risk of Being Trafficked, HCR/GIP/06/07 (2006), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/443679fa4.html>, paras. 33-36 and 40. See also Guidelines on International Protection no.1, cit. supra 
note 13, para. 18. See Art. 60 of Istanbul Convention, cit. supra note 3. 
17
 Guidelines on International Protection no.1, cit. supra note 13, para. 12. 
18
 Istanbul Convention, Arts. 60-61 (emphasis added). See Explanatory Report to the Convention, cit. 
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The CEDAW Committee in General Recommendation no. 32 recognizes gen-
der-related forms of persecution, as “legitimate grounds for international protec-
tion”, including trafficking in women.19 
Finally, the QD mentions certain acts qualified as persecution, such “acts of phys-
ical or mental violence, including acts of sexual violence” and “acts of a gender-
specific or child-specific nature”.20 
In the judicial interpretation concerned with cases involving women’s gender-
specific claims, the approach appears to be either to merely grant the refugee status 
to women due to their membership of the group of “women”.21 In AZ (Trafficked 
women) Thailand case, a British Court considered the “social group of women” vic-
tims of trafficking, making it clear that the relevant social group was “young female 
victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation”.22  
Similarly, in SB Moldova case, the Court stated that the social group relied upon 
was not the broad one of gender. The past experience of having been trafficked is the 
immutable characteristic which is capable of identifying the group, without showing 
 
supra note 17, at para. 311. For an analysis of the Istanbul Convention, see DE VIDO, Donne, Violenza e 
Diritto Internazionale. La Convenzione del Consiglio d’Europa del 2011, Milano, 2016; DI STEFANO, 
“Violenza contro le donne e violenza domestica nella nuova Convenzione del Consiglio d’Europa”, Diritti 
Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2012, p. 169 ff. See also DI STEFANO (ED.), Gender Issues and Internatio-
nal Legal Standards, Catania, 2010. 
19
 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General rec-
ommendation No. 32 on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and stateless-
ness of women, 5 November 2014, CEDAW/C/GC/32, available at: <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/627/90/PDF/N1462790.pdf?OpenElement>, at para. 15. See also 
CHRISTENSEN, Trafficking for sexual exploitation: victim protection in international and domestic asylum 
law, New Issues In Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 206, 2011, available at: https://www.ref-
world.org/docid/4dc253a22.html DEMIR, “The Trafficking of Women for Sexual Exploitation: A Gender-
Based and Well-Founded Fear of Persecution?”, Working Paper no. 80, UNHCR, EPAU, Geneva, March 
2003, available at:  <https://www.unhcr.org/research/working/3e71f84c4/trafficking-women-sexual-ex-
ploitation-gender-based-well-founded-fear-persecution.html>, p.1. FREEDMAN, “Female Asylum-seekers 
and refugees in France”, UNCHR Legal and Protection Policy Series, PPLAS/2009/01, June 2009, availa-
ble at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a535e112.html>.  
20
 Art. 9 (2)(a)(f) QD. 
21
 Court of Appeal (England and Wales), R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shah, 23 July 
1997, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_CA_CIV,3ae6b67f0.html>. 
22
 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (United Kingdom), AZ (Trafficked women) 
Thailand v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 8 April 2010, paras. 139-140, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,4bd58d912.html>. 
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that there is discrimination in the wider sense against the former victims of traffick-
ing in the society in question.23 The Cour National de Droit d’Asile (‘CNDA’), in the 
case J.E.F., held that women victims of trafficking from Edo State were a PSG be-
cause they shared a common background and a distinct identity, being perceived as 
different by the surrounding community.24  
It is well accepted what constitutes a persecution and how to identify the nexus 
with the reasons of trafficking for sexual exploitation. Therefore, the first term of the 
paradigm is not so controversial and it requires an assessment on the presence of 
persecution. Yet the decision-making process must continue towards the assessment 
of the “risk” of suffering such persecution.  
3.2. – The Present Threat and Risk Factors 
Granting the refugee-status to trafficking victims is motivated and justified by 
their membership to a PSG. However, the recognition is not automatic since the 
prognostic judgement is characterised by several factors which, although not explicit 
in the relevant provisions, can be gathered from the courts’ decisions. 
The second element of the suggested paradigm is the consideration of the “pre-
sent threat” to be assessed at the time of judicial examination, not at the time when 
the application was lodged. It requires considering whether the troublesome circum-
stances of the individuals and the country of origin still exist at the time of the deci-
sion.  
Article 4.3 of the QD requires EU Member States to carry out a case-by-case 
assessment of the following elements: 
(a) all relevant facts relating to the country of origin at the time of taking a 
decision on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of 
origin and the manner in which they are applied; 
(b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant 
including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to 
persecution or serious harm; 
 
23
 Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Immigration Appellate Authority) (United Kingdom), SB (PSG 
- Protection Regulations - Reg 6) Moldova v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 26 November 
2007, para. 54, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_AIT,47837c902.html>. 
24
 Cour Nationale du droit d’asile (France), J.E.F., 24 March 2015, n. 10012810, available at : 
<https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/france-national-asylum-court-24-march-2015-decision-
no-10012810>. 
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(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, 
including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, 
on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to which the 
applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or 
serious harm; 
(d) whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were 
engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions 
for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether those activ-
ities would expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to 
that country.25 
The analysis of the domestic case-law helps then in identifying specific prognos-
tic factors in assessing those elements which are not limited to the “background, 
gender or age”. Judges generally take into account the family status (e.g. single 
woman, single parent, orphan), the level of education, the socio-economic situation, 
the availability of supporting networks like family or other, the relatives’ involve-
ment in the trafficking as well as the power of the traffickers.26 
All these factors allow to measure the risk level from low to enhanced and to 
establish the consequences in case of return, hence the present threat. 
In this sense, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) identified 
specific factors in AM and BM Albania cases.  
This decision also clarifies that granting the refugee status based on membership 
of a particular social group (trafficked women from Albania) cannot exempt the 
judge (i.e., the only one able to ascertain the existence of the same risk of persecu-
tion) from investigating the risk. The Court listed the risk factors as the following:  
1) social status and economic standing of trafficked women’s family;  
2) level of education of trafficked women or their family;  
3) trafficked women’s state of health, particularly mental health;  
4) presence of illegitimate children;  
5) area of origin of the trafficked women’s family;  
6) trafficked women’s age.27 
 
25
 Art. 4.3, QD. See Döring, “Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU” (Articles 1-10), in 
HAILBRONNER and THYM (eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law. A Commentary, 2nd ed., Munich, Ox-
ford, Baden-Baden, 2016, p. 1108 ff. 
26
 Guidelines on International Protection No. 7, cit. supra note, p.18. 
27
 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (United Kingdom), AM and BM (Trafficked 
women) Albania v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 18 March 2010, preamble, lett. f), available 
at: <http://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,4ba796112.html>. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framing the “Risk Assessment” Test in Women’s Asylum Claims … 343 
 
 
 
In this case, the decision identified, in addition to the socio-economic profiles, 
also the psychological aspect of the damage suffered28 and it also considered the vic-
tim’s “risk of suicide”, together with ostracism and stigmatization due to the pres-
ence of illegitimate children. 
The CNDA, assessing the risk, stated that the victims “ne peuvent espérer y re-
prendre une vie normale et s’exposent à un risque sérieux de marginalisation, y com-
pris vis-à-vis de leur propre famille, voire à une menace d’être renvoyées en Europe 
par le réseau”.29 
Similarly, in HD (Trafficked women) Nigeria, the risk factors were based on se-
verity, indicating an enhanced risk of being trafficked, like  
a. The absence of a supportive family willing to take her back into the family 
unit; 
b. Visible or discernible characteristics of vulnerability, such as having no 
social support network to assist her, no or little education or vocational skills, 
mental health conditions, which may well have been caused by experiences 
of abuse when originally trafficked, material and financial deprivation such 
as to mean that she will be living in poverty or in conditions of destitution; 
c. The fact that a woman was previously trafficked is likely to mean that she 
was then identified by the traffickers as someone disclosing characteristics of 
vulnerability such as to give rise to a real risk of being trafficked. On returning 
to Nigeria, it is probable that those characteristics of vulnerability will be en-
hanced further in the absence of factors that suggest otherwise. 
 
Then, the Court, indicated as factors of a lower risk of being trafficked: 
a. The availability of a supportive family willing to take the woman back into 
the family unit; 
 
28
 Ibid., lett. b). Furthermore, “in making an assessment whether an individual is vulnerable to abuse a 
careful analysis of all her personal characteristics is required to assess whether the indicators of risk, in-
cluding any mistreatment in her previous exploitative situation and the consequences of that for her per-
sonally”, see paras. 173-175. See also Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Author-
ity (United Kingdom), HC & RC (Trafficked Women) China v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
18 July 2009, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_AIT,4a6585cf2.html>. See also Cour 
Nationale du Droit d’Asile (France), 29 April 2011, no. 10012810, available at: <http://www.ref-
world.org/cases,FRA_CNDA,4fb173852.html>. 
29
 Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile (France), Mme F. alias F., 30 March 2017, no. 16015058 R, in 
Contentieux du Droit D’asile Jurisprudence du Conseil d’État et de la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (2017) 
available at : <http://www.cnda.fr/Ressources-juridiques-et-geopolitiques/Recueils-de-jurisprudence>. 
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b. The fact that the woman has acquired skills and experiences since leaving 
Nigeria that better equip her to have access to a livelihood on return to Nige-
ria, thus enabling her to provide for herself 30. 
 
Finally, in AZ case mentioned above, “[r]elevant factors will include the age, 
marital status, domestic background, educational level, qualifications and work ex-
perience of the appellant. The availability of employment and a familial or other 
support network will also be significant factors”.31 Therefore, the main risk of being 
re-trafficked lies in risk-enhancing socio-economic factors. 
The current threat depends on all these elements to be assessed with the possible 
consequences in case of return, such as the discrimination and the stigmatization by 
the society, the rejection by family, the difficulties in reintegrating in socio-cultural 
life.  
3.3. – The State-Failure Protection  
Once established the presence of persecution and the current threat, the decision-
maker must verify if State or non-state actors are unable to provide protection for 
such threat of persecution. 
The QD aknowledges the “protection theory”, according to which international-
protection applications must be accepted whenever: actions committed by de jure or 
de facto state agents result in persecution or serious harm; persecution or serious 
harm are attributed to non-state actors and the State is unable or unwilling to provide 
protection, and, finally, in cases of failed State.32 
According to article 7 of the QD, subjects who can provide protection against per-
secution or serious harm are the State and parties or organizations (including interna-
tional organizations) controlling the State or a substantial part of it.33 They must dis-
pose of an “effective legal system” contrasting persecution. Hence, requiring not the 
mere existence, but rather the effective implementation of relevant legal provisions. 
In this scenario, the HD case seen above is particularly interesting as it changes 
 
30
 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (United Kingdom), HD (Trafficked women) 
Nigeria, 17 October 2016, para. 2, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_ 
UTIAC,580724ed4.html>. 
31
 AZ case, cit. supra note 23. 
32
 Art. 6 QD. See DEL GUERCIO, cit. supra note 2, p. 309. 
33
 Several authors have criticized the decision to include non-state actors, which arguably do not have 
the power to enforce the rule of law, are not parties to human-right treaties and cannot be held liable in 
cases of serious violations. See DEL GUERCIO, cit. supra note 2, p. 312, at note 887. 
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the approach on the risk assessment, tracing different aspects: the distinction between 
persecution perpetrated by a single trafficker rather than by a structured criminal 
organization and the State of origin’s ability to offer effective protection.      
Before this decision, the case-law confined the recognition of refugee status to 
the existence of a presumption of protection by the government (in this case the Ni-
gerian government) for those victims recruited by traffickers outside the criminal 
organizations. An asylum seeker was therefore qualified as a ‘refugee’ only if re-
cruited by a “gang” because in such case the State’s protection capacity was not 
considered sufficient: this constituted a decisive risk factor on the probability of be-
ing recruited again.34 
The HD case, however, exceeds this pattern. Indeed, judges believed that the lack 
of evidence of involvement in a criminal organization was not a determining factor 
in defining whether or not the woman could be reintegrated into the Nigerian terri-
tory, and therefore protected.  
The fact that the government is able to offer protection only to victims of traf-
fickers “outside” the criminal organization is not a sufficient evidence to eliminate 
the real risk of a new recruitment.35 
Moreover, this capacity cannot be demonstrated by the mere presence of internal 
legislation or international organizations in the territory to protect victims of traf-
ficking. In PO (Trafficked Women) Nigeria case, the Court refused to accord the 
protection because in Nigeria was established an organization able to contrast traf-
ficking – the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other 
 
34
 Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority (United Kingdom), PO (Traf-
ficked Women) Nigeria, 23 November 2009, available at:  <https://www.ref-
world.org/cases,GBR_AIT,4b0ab38f2.html>, paras. 191-192. See also Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile, 
Mme O., 13 March 2012, n. 11016563 C, in Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d’État et 
de la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (2012), available at: <http://www.cnda.fr/Ressources-juridiques-et-
geopolitiques/Recueils-de-jurisprudence>; see also Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile, Mlle O., 3 April 2012, 
n. 11020945 C. See also Tribunale di Milano, 29 April 2016, r.g. 71577/2015, which recognizes subsidiary 
protection by virtue of “a series of retaliations against the victim of trafficking if only to recover the money 
invested to expatriate the applicant” (author’s translation). 
35
 See “Summary Conclusions: Gender-Related Persecution”, June 2003, adopted at the expert roundtable 
organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Institute of Human-
itarian Law, in the context of the Global Consultations on International Protection (San Remo, Italy, 6-8 Sep-
tember 2001), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/470a33b60.html>, para. 6. 
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related matters (‘NAPTIP’)36 – and also because there was an NGOs supporting vic-
tims – were circumstances implying with certainty the possibility to protect the vic-
tim from further persecution.37 
The HD case, however, goes beyond such assumption: “merely because Nigeria 
is ‘doing its best’ to meet its international obligations to prevent trafficking does not 
necessarily result in a finding that there is sufficiency of protection for those identi-
fied as being at risk of being trafficked”.38 
In other words, in considering the third element of the paradigm, the decision-
maker must verify the effective protection provided to the asylum-seekers against 
the persecution. 
3.4. – The IPA Test 
The effectiveness of the proposed paradigm must pass the final test about the 
likelihood of an internal relocation in the country of origin, free from risk of perse-
cution or serious harm. This element was defined as “an ‘antidote’ to the primary 
risk of persecution”.39 
Decision-makers must obtain accurate and up-to-date information from relevant 
sources, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Euro-
pean Asylum Support Office.40  
 
36
 This is the main organisation set up by the nigerian Government to combat the phenomenon of 
trafficking in human beings., see PO case, cit. supra note 35, para. 1. 
37
 Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile, 29 July 2011, 10020534, available at: <http://www.re-
fworld.org/cases,FRA_CNDA,4fc8d40a2.html>. 
38
 See HD case, cit. supra note 31, para. 172. For a contrasting view see Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority (United Kingdom), MP [Trafficking - Sufficiency of Protec-
tion] Romania v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 21 April 2005,  available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_AIT,43fc2d731f.html>; Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber) (United Kingdom) TD and AD (Trafficked women)(CG) v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, 23 February 2016, available at: <http://www.ref-
world.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,56cc86804.html>. In AZ case, cit. supra note 23, the Court hold that 
“[a]lthough anti-trafficking legislation has been implemented, the involvement of corrupt officials with 
traffickers and/or criminals has weakened the steps taken by the government to combat trafficking” (see 
preamble, para. 3). 
39
 HATHAWAY, “International Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Al-
ternative”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 1999, p. 131 ff., paras. 12-13. 
40
 Art. 8 QD “Internal Protection”, paras. 2-4. Not all EU Member States have implemented Art. 8 QD, 
such as Italy and Spain. 
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The international protection system lists three criteria for assessing internal pro-
tection: a part of the country of origin is safe for the applicant (“safety”); 2) the 
applicant has access to that part of the country (“accessibility”); and 3) the applicant 
can reasonably be expected to settle there (“reasonableness”).41 
In this scenario, potential risk factors can be, inter alia, human-rights compliance, 
access to adequate education and health, and the economic survival, taking into ac-
count the applicant’s standard of living once established in the designated area.42 
In addition, the European Union Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU), in estab-
lishing criteria for assessing the safety of the destination country, requires that the 
destination State must provide a protection system complying with the Geneva Con-
vention.43 
Applying the “reasonableness test” concerns the reasonable possibility that ap-
plicants may remain in those areas permanently rather than temporarily (e.g., while 
waiting for the situation to improve in their areas of origin). Yet, the IPA test is 
worthless when State or its agents are responsible for the persecution as the applicant 
could not benefit of any effective protection.44 
 
41
 International Association for Refugee Law Judges European Chapter, “Qualification for interna-
tional protection (Directive 2011/95/EU). A Judicial Analysis”, December 2016, p. 73, available at: 
<https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/QIP%20-%20JA.pdf>. See also Guidelines on Interna-
tional Protection No. 4: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/04 (2003), 
para. 7, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f2791a44.html>. 
42
 Ibid., para. 29. See also UNHCR, Position Paper on Relocating Internally as a Reasonable Alterna-
tive to Seeking Asylum (The So-Called “Internal Flight Alternative” or “Relocation Principle”), 9 February 
1999, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b336c.html>. Furthermore, see House of Lords 
(Judicial Committee) (United Kingdom), Januzi (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment (Respondent); Hamid (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respond-
ent); Gaafar (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent); Mohammed 
(FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) (Consolidated Appeals),15 
February 2006, para. 19, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_HL,43f5907a4.html>. 
43
 Art. 38, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, (henceforth Procedure Di-
rective or PD). See, HATHAWAY and FOSTER, cit. supra note 2, p. 357. See also European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), “Actors of Protection and the Application of the Internal Protection Alterna-
tive - European Comparative Report”, 2014, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/543bbb8f4.html>, p. 61. Furthermore see Januzi case, cit. supra note 43, para. 59. See also House of 
Lords (Judicial Committee) (United Kingdom) Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v. 
AH (Sudan) and Others (FC) (Respondents), 14 November 2007, paras. 3-5, available at: <http://www.ref-
world.org/cases,GBR_HL,473ae09c2.html>. 
44
 Recital 27, QD. 
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In case of relocation, the decision-makers must consider factors such as the indi-
vidual’s actual ability to move (as a durable solution). Hence, range of circumstances 
like transport, communication and information, cultural traditions, beliefs, customs, 
ethnic or linguistic differences, health care facilities, but also employment opportu-
nities could be relevant. Furthermore, the presence of the family or of NGOs must 
be adequate to support the applicant, providing practical assistance.45 
As far for women, other significant peculiarities or situations should be consid-
ered, such as those of divorced or unmarried women, widows, single parents, espe-
cially in those countries where male protection is expected. Thus, for example, if 
women are unable to work in the relocation areas or to obtain assistance or subsidies 
from the authorities, the alternative transfer must be considered unreasonable. As 
explained in HD case, gender-specific risks also include an assessment of the likeli-
hood of being subjected to sexual violence46 «particularly where she is vulnerable to 
abuse because of lack of skills, mental and psychological problems and isolation».47 
Essentially, the IPA test, as implemented by domestic asylum courts, is based on 
the existence of adequate socio-economic conditions for victims of trafficking in the 
area of relocation.  
4. – Sketching the Risk Assessment in the Case-law of ECtHR 
The proposed risk paradigm stems from a review of rules which, together, show 
patterns of assessment of the existence of a “risk” in determining the international 
protection. 
In order to establish the risk seriousness in relation to Article 3 of the ECHR, the 
European Court of Human Rights takes an approach coherent with the criteria estab-
lished by international protection system and referred to in EU-law standards. In in-
terpreting Article 3 ECHR through risk indicators and assessment principles, the 
Court has indeed produced a fundamental judgment-rule.48  
 
45
 See “Actors of Protection and the Application of the Internal Protection Alternative - European 
Comparative Report”, cit. supra note 44, p. 96. 
46
 See HD case, cit. supra note 31, para. 186. 
47
 Ibid. For a contrasting view see Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Author-
ity (United Kingdom) JO (Internal Relocation - No Risk of Re-Trafficking) Nigeria v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, 10 September 2004, available at: <http://www.ref-
world.org/cases,GBR_AIT,47a70794d.html>; see also HC & RC  case, cit. supra note 29. 
48
 BALDINGER, Rigorous Scrutiny versus Marginal Review, Standard on Judicial Scrutiny and Evi-
dence in International and European Asylum Law, Oisterwijk, 2013. 
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Then, the challenge here is to consider the case-law of ECtHR in the context of 
decision-making process of international protection (as exemplified in the risk para-
digm).  
Starting with the credibility issue, it is noteworthy that in Rustamov v. Russia the 
Court stated that “requesting an applicant to produce ‘indisputable’ evidence of a risk 
of ill-treatment in the requesting country would be tantamount to asking him to prove 
the existence of a future event, which is impossible, and would place a clearly dispro-
portionate burden on him”.  The allocation of the burden of proof is the same pre-
scribed in the QD and, in this regard, as noted in H.L.R. v. France in assessing the 
conditions in the receiving State, the Court takes also the material obtain proprio motu.  
As in the international protection decision-making, the analysis is based on the 
“assessment of a real risk”. This latter, as stated in Vilvarajah and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the applicant’s re-
moval to the country of destination in the light of the general situation there and of 
his or her personal circumstances.  In this connection, the assessment must also cover 
the general situation of violence existing in the country of destination.  
The Court’s decision-making focuses on the assessment of substantial grounds 
for believing that the applicant, if removed, would face a real risk of ill-treatment in 
the receiving State. It is a ‘predictive’ decision-making on what might happen in case 
of return, hence very close to the kind of assessment in the ‘risk paradigm’.  
The first element of the risk paradigm it is of course verifiable by the Court in 
light of article 3, outside of the meaning of the “international protection”. Yet, the 
Court takes into account the same aspects mentioned above. To establish the seri-
ousness of the ill-treatment, the Court considers the overall human rights situation in 
the country of origin and, in case of removal of female applicants, the situation of 
women in such countries. In Jabari v. Turkey, the applicant had a well-founded fear 
of persecution as she belonged to a particular social group, namely “women who 
have transgressed social mores according to the UNHCR guidelines on gender-based 
persecution”49 and the Court held that in case of deport the applicant to Iran, there 
would be a violation of Article 3.  
In this scenario, another principle laid down by the Court in Saadi v. Italy con-
cerns the “membership of a target group” in which the evidence of individualized 
risk provides for certain exceptions, such as where the applicant is a member of a 
 
49
 European Court of Human Rights, Jabary v. Turkey, Application no. 40035/98, Judgement of 11 
July 2000, para. 34. 
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group systematically suffering maltreatment. Indeed, such situations do not require 
the establishment of an individualized risk, in the meaning that the applicant must be 
able to distinguish his own situation from that of the general dangers existing in the 
destination country.50 
In the Court’s opinion, there is no doubt that trafficking constitutes inhuman and 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3.51 However, the general risk-
assessment principles must also be applied here, assessing whether can be verified 
substantial grounds that victims would face the same type of risk in the event of 
repatriation, according to their personal circumstances and those of their countries 
of origin.52  
Looking at the second element of the risk paradigm (“present threat”), in F.G. v. 
Sweden the Court sets out the principle of the ex nunc evaluation of the circum-
stances, assessing the risk at the time of the case’s examination53. Then the risk must 
be assessed first and foremost in light of the facts, which were known or ought to 
have been known to the authorities of the Contracting State at the time of expulsion. 
If, however, the claimant has not yet been expelled when the Court examines the 
case, the relevant time is the time of the proceedings. 
Moreover, in J.K. v. Sweden, the Court outlines a mechanism of presumption of 
a future risk of violation of Article 3 using the “past ill-treatment as a risk indication”, 
similar to that proscribed by Article 4(4) DQ, yet stating that presence of this element 
is not decisive for assessing the real risk’s existence.54 
As for the “risk factors”, in N.A. v. The United Kingdom, the Court specifically 
noted that 
“the assessment of whether there is a real risk must be made on the basis of all relevant 
factors which may increase the risk of ill-treatment. In its view, due regard should also be 
given to the possibility that a number of individual factors may not, when considered sepa-
rately, constitute a real risk; but when taken cumulatively and when considered in a situation 
 
50
 Id.,  Saadi v. Italy, Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/0628, Judgement of 28 February 2008, para. 
132. 
51
 ANNONI, “La tratta di donne e bambine nella recente giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo”, DEP., Deportate Esuli Profughe, 2011, p. 87 ff. 
52
 European Court of Human Rights, Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, Application no. 1948/04, Judg-
ment of 11 January 2007, para. 2. 
53
 Id., F.G. v. Sweden, Application no. 43611/11, Judgment 23 March 2016, para. 115. 
54
 Ibid., paras. 99-101. 
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of general violence and heightened security, the same factors may give rise to a real risk. 
Both the need to consider all relevant factors cumulatively and the need to give appropriate 
weight to the general situation in the country of destination derive from the obligation to 
consider all the relevant circumstances of the case”. 55 
In addition, the victim should only prove one strong peculiar feature which makes 
her distinguishable, such as the fact that “she has not earned the targeted amount of 
money and/or has not paid her debt as a result of which her trafficker might go to 
extreme lengths to find her; she has been trafficked by a trafficking organiza-
tion/gang which makes it more likely that upon return she might meet some of them; 
the traffickers believe that she holds incriminating information and she might testify 
against them in the country of origin; the victim is from a particular background, 
from a particular age group, belongs to a certain ethnicity or minority, has no edu-
cation and resides in certain areas of the country, which puts her at very high risk 
of re-trafficking”.56  
Contrasting to the HD case (see above para. 3), the Court in  L.O. v. France fo-
cuses on the assessment of elements which could eliminate the risk, such as the fact 
that the applicant was not recruited by a criminal organisation, but by a single person 
acting alone.57  
Other factors considered by the Court are very similar to those assessed by do-
mestic courts like the chance for the applicant to be able to live a normal life in the 
country of origin, or the existence of a social network to protect and support her/him, 
further the likelihood she/he could seek protection from the authorities or NGOs 
working in that State.58 
Taking into account the considerations about the State-failure protection (third el-
ement of the paradigm) in JK case, the Court observes that, although the level of pro-
tection in Iraq appears to be sufficiently adequate for the generality of Iraqis, the same 
 
55
 European Court of Human Rights, NA. v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 25904/07, Judgment 
of 17 july 2008, para. 130. See also N.A. v. Finland, Application no. 25244/18, Judgment of 14 November 
2019, para. 77. 
56
 See STOYANOVA, “Complementary Protection for Victims of Human Trafficking under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights”, Goettingen Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 777 ff. 
57
 European Court of Human Rights, L.O. v. France, Application no. 4455/14, Judgment of 26 May 
2015, paras. 33-34. 
58
 HAMDAN, cit. supra note 2, p. 240. 
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cannot be said for those who, like the applicants, are members of a group systemati-
cally suffering ill-treatment. Therefore, in view of the applicant’s particular conditions, 
it is acknowledged that the destination State cannot offer effective protection against 
al-Qaeda’s threats. In this regard, the Court mentioned the Article 7 QD.59 
In the L.O. v. France case, the Court, following the approach of the P.O. case 
(see above para. 3), based the decision on consideration that Nigerian authorities 
would protect the applicant from risks of inhuman and degrading treatment.60 
Eventually, in the decision-making process of the Court we find some indications 
about the final IPA test which must meet the threshold of Article 3 ECHR as noted 
in RH v. Sweden.61 As mentioned above, national courts assess the adequacy of socio-
economic conditions for victims of trafficking in the area of relocation. In Airey v. 
Ireland the Court does not, however, seem to be opposed to extending the application 
of the Convention to the sphere of social and economic rights.62 
Therefore, the real risk may also depend on a lack of material and psychological 
support, both in the State and in the family itself, but it must reach the threshold of 
inhuman and degrading treatment. Yet, with regard to refugees, this threshold of Ar-
ticle 3 ECHR appears too restrictive if compared to the one used in the assessment 
of international-protection claims by domestic courts. 
5. – Conclusions 
Starting from the legal understanding of international protection and the defini-
tion of “refugee status” and of “person eligible for subsidiary protection”, we have 
sketched out a prognostic-test based on the finding of a “real risk”, for the recogni-
tion of the protection. This approach allows us to outline a paradigm of the risk of 
persecution (or serious harm). Functional to the analysis of necessary requirements 
and to exemplify the method used in the decision-making process in the international 
 
59
 European Court of Human Rights, J.K. case, cit. supra note 10, para. 119. 
60
 Id., L.O. case, cit. supra note 61, paras. 35-37. 
61
 Id., RH v. Sweden, Application no. 4601/14, Judgment of 10 September 2015, paras. 73-74. In 
A.A.M. v. Sweden the Court did not find an infringement of Art. 3 ECHR because the applicant would 
return to a part of the country where Al-Qaeda did not constitute a threat amounting to real risk, see Id., 
A.A.M. v. Sweden, Application no. 68519/10, Judgment of 3 April 2014, para. 68. SCHULTZ, “The European 
Court of Human Rights and Internal Relocation: An Unduly Harsh Standard?”, in GAUCI, GIUFFRÈ and 
TSOURDI (eds.), Exploring the Boundaries of Refugee Law. Current Protection Challenges, Leiden, 2015, 
pp. 31 ff. 
62
 European Court of Human Rights, Airey v. Ireland, Application. no. 6289/72, Judgment of 9 October 
1979, para. 26. 
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protection claims. 
The comprehensive focus on the elements of the “risk paradigm” makes it possi-
ble to ascertain the existence of a risk. In order to determine whether this risk is a 
“real risk”, it must be further tested with the reasonable possibility of transferring the 
applicant to another area of the country of origin, where he/she would be able to lead 
a “normal” lifestyle (the so-called IPA test). 
The study of selected cases shows how decision makers take into account the 
socio-economic features of the destination area encompassing risk factors, such as 
those related to the possibility of economic survival, the ability to find employment, 
or the presence of an adequate health system. 
The risk assessment provided by domestic courts includes the essence of the vi-
olence against women as gender-related persecution in its social perspective, consid-
ering the economic, social and cultural rights of women asylum seekers as funda-
mental requirements to recognize the international protection. 
Some of the factors identified by the judicial rulings can also be distinguished as 
low and high risk of persecution. The identification of these elements can be useful 
in so far as they are taken as parameters to assess applications for international pro-
tection.  
It is noteworthy that the factors listed above, closely related to the socio-eco-
nomic conditions of the victims, are not included in the QD provisions.  
Against this background, the analysis of the risk assessment implemented by the 
ECHtR shows a clear impact on the decision-making method implemented by do-
mestic courts and then on the risk paradigm, although the protection of the ECtHR 
is complementary to the judgements on asylum seekers. The ECtHR has adopted a 
legal rationale comparable to those of national judges, invoking the provisions of the 
QD in cases of asylum-seekers refoulement. Yet, according to the “principle of sub-
sidiarity”, the Court’s intervention does not concern the appellant’s claims rejected 
by the authorities of the State Party, nor does it verify the exact fulfilment of the 
obligations of QD. Eventually, the Court only ascertains the existence of arbitrary 
refoulement by the resistant government, even though it is undeniable an interrelation 
between the ECHR’s case-law and that of asylum courts in the performance of the 
decision-making process in international-protection claims. 
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1. – Introduction 
During the spring and summer of 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement was all over 
the media and widely debated, especially in its political and moral repercussions.1 As 
we have passed its third anniversary, the Statement is far less in the spotlight. The 
fact remains, however, that the Statement is being given effect on a daily basis and 
similar agreements in the field of migration are being pursued by the European Union 
(‘EU’) and its Member States.  
 
1
 European Council, “EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016”, 18 March 2016, available at: 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>.  
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It thus appears appropriate to take stock of the rulings that have been delivered 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) concerning the Statement, either per se or as implemented; 
and to attempt a prognosis of these Courts’ future approach in the face of further 
complaints regarding the Statement as well as other arrangements concluded by the 
EU and/or its Member States with countries of origin and transit. 
Accordingly, this contribution first of all illustrates the essential elements of the 
EU-Turkey Statement and the context in which it came into being and has deployed 
its effects. The contribution subsequently analyses the rulings by the CJEU on the 
nature of the Statement and the first judgments by the ECtHR regarding the condi-
tions of asylum seekers in Greece following the enactment of the Statement. On these 
bases, the prospects are outlined for cases currently pending before the two judicial 
systems and for new cases that can potentially be brought. Finally, the relevance of 
the approach by the CJEU and the ECtHR to the EU-Turkey Statement for the as-
sessment of comparable arrangements is highlighted.  
2. – Prologue: Facts and Figures of the EU-Turkey Statement 
The EU-Turkey Statement was issued on 18 March 2016 as a response to the 
record number of migrants that had arrived in Greece from Turkey by sea in 2015 – 
i.e., 856,723, compared to 41,038 in 2014.2 The Statement, which sets out “to end 
the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU”, entails the commitment by Turkey 
to take back “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as 
from 20 March 2016”.3 It is notable that “irregular migrants” also include asylum 
seekers whose applications are found to be inadmissible on the ground that the ap-
plicants could receive protection in Turkey as a “first country of asylum” or a “safe 
third country”.4  
Correspondingly, the EU has accepted to resettle as many Syrians as are returned 
to Turkey from Greece (the so-called “one-for-one” scheme), within a limit of 72,000 
 
2
 UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), “Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. Mediterranean Situation – 
Greece”, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>.  
3
 EU-Turkey Statement, cit. supra note 1, fourth preambular paragraph and point 1).  
4
 As made clear, inter alia, in European Commission, “EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and An-
swers”, 19 March 2016, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_it.htm>. For 
details on the two concepts, see infra Section 5.  
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people; disburse up to 6 billion euros to improve the living conditions of beneficiar-
ies of international protection in Turkey; and step up the liberalisation of visas for 
Turkish citizens and the EU accession process of Turkey.   
The EU-Turkey Statement cannot be said to have been fully implemented to date 
– in particular, during more than three years, no progress has been made with regard 
to the Visa Liberalization Roadmap or the accession negotiations. On the other hand, 
the aspects of the Statement that are more closely related to the management of mi-
gration flows have been enacted more expeditiously: as of May 2018, all 3 billion 
earmarked for the “Facility for Refugees in Turkey” for the biennium 2016-2017 had 
been contracted and the new tranche of funds mobilised, while 13,313 Syrians had 
been resettled from Turkey to the EU.5  
Even though the number of readmissions to Turkey during approximately the 
same period was significantly lower (1,630),6 so that the “one-for-one” scheme has 
not operated as originally conceived, the main goal pursued by the EU and its Mem-
ber States seems to have been realised – i.e., the considerable decrease in the number 
of migrants reaching Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean route.7 The number 
of arrivals by sea dropped from 856,723 in 2015 to 173,450 in 2016 and further to 
29,718 in 2017.8 While in 2018 arrivals bounced back to 32,497 and the number of 
land arrivals also started to increase considerably (18,014, compared to 4,907 in 
2015),9 the flows are still significantly lower than during the period preceding the 
enactment of the EU-Turkey Statement. 
Supporters of the Statement have also pointed to the apparent reduction of the 
number of people dead or gone missing in the crossings – from 799 in 2015 to 441 
in 2016 and 59 in 2017, according to the data collected by the UN Refugee Agency 
(‘UNHCR’; but the death toll has started to rise again in 2018, with 174 fatalities).10 
 
5
 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Eu-
ropean Council and the Council. Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Mi-
gration”, 16 May 2018, COM(2018)301 final, pp. 7 and 18.   
6
 UNHCR, “Returns from Greece to Turkey”, 31 May 2018, available at: <https://data2.un-
hcr.org/en/documents/download/63916>.   
7
 The existence of a causal relation between the EU-Turkey Statement and the decrease in the number 
of arrivals is challenged by SPIJKERBOER, “Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number 
of Migrants and of Border Deaths?”, Border Criminologies, 28 September 2016, available at: 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminolo-
gies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-eu>.  
8
 Operational Portal, cit. supra note 2. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, detractors of the Statement have critically highlighted the ex-
ternalisation of the management of migration flows onto a third country, the unusual 
procedure by which the Statement came into being, as well as the harsh conditions 
of Greek reception centres and the risks for the safety of those asylum seekers that 
are sent back to Turkey. The two latter aspects, which concern the legal nature of the 
Statement and the human rights obligations of the EU and its Member States, are – 
in whole or in part – legal aspects and have been dealt with by the CJEU and the 
ECtHR respectively.   
3. – Act I: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Legal 
Nature of the Statement 
While the potential breach by the EU and its Member States of their human rights 
obligations featured prominently in the public debate, the uncertainties surrounding 
the drafting and entry into force of the Statement and the consequences for its validity 
and legal effects expectedly attracted much less attention beyond legal circles. 
A first issue is whether the instrument, which is titled ‘statement’ and was pub-
lished on the website of the European Council in the form of a press release, is to be 
considered binding. The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and the well-es-
tablished case-law of the International Court of Justice have made clear that sub-
stance prevails over form and that the “particular designation” of a text is not relevant 
for its identification as a binding instrument.11 The CJEU itself upheld this general 
principle of international law in various instances.12 It follows that a thorough exam-
ination is required of the intention of the parties to bind themselves, as can be derived 
from the text and context of the alleged treaty.  
 
11
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Art. 2 (and the almost identical Art. 
2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations, 21 March 1986). In the case-law of the International Court of Justice, 
see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment of 19 December 1978, para. 96; and Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Judgment of 1 July 1994, para. 23 in particular.  
On these bases, the binding nature of the EU-Turkey Statement has been asserted, among others, by 
CANNIZZARO, “Disintegration Through Law?”, European Papers, 2016, p. 3 ff, pp. 3-4; and SPIJKERBOER, 
“Minimalist Reflections on Europe, Refugees and Law”, European Papers, 2016, p. 533 ff., pp. 551-555. 
For the contrary opinion, see PEERS, “The draft EU/Turkey deal on migration and refugees: is it legal?”, 
EU Law Analysis, 16 March 2016, available at: <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.se/2016/03/the-draft-eutur-
key-deal-on-migration.html>.   
12
 See Opinion 1/75, Opinion given pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, 
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A second, related issue refers to the authors of the Statement – namely, to whether 
the Statement was agreed upon by Turkey on the one hand and the European Council 
on the other, or whether the EU Member States shall be considered parties instead. 
As both of these issues are relevant to establish the jurisdiction of the CJEU over the 
Statement, they were dealt with preliminarily by the General Court when ruling upon 
the request by three asylum seekers of Pakistani and Afghan origins to annul the 
Statement.13 
In addition to raising issues of substance such as the infringement of a number of 
provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights14 and the disputable qualification 
of Turkey as a “safe third country” (a cornerstone of the Statement, as it allows for the 
return of the majority of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey), the applicants before 
the General Court maintained that, for all purposes, the Statement ought to be consid-
ered an international agreement between the EU and Turkey, and that its adoption did 
not comply with the provisions in the EU treaties that regulate the conclusion of inter-
national agreements by the Union, which inter alia provide for the consent by the Eu-
ropean Parliament in relation to treaties with certain characteristics.15  
In its three identical orders of 28 February 2017, the General Court sought to 
retrace the tortuous path that led to the Statement and acknowledged that several 
ambiguities affect this act, starting with its authorship. Indeed, on the one hand, the 
Statement is defined as the outcome of a meeting between the “Members of the Eu-
ropean Council” and their Turkish counterpart, and the “action points” that form the 
Statement are said to be agreed upon by “the EU and Turkey”.16 Moreover, the online 
version of the Statement is labelled “Foreign affairs and international relations”, 
which should refer to the activities by the European Council.  
 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:145, Discussion, Section A; Case C-233/02, French Republic v Commission, 23 March 
2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:173, para. 42; and Joined Cases C-103/12 and C-165/12, Parliament and Commis-
sion v Council, 26 November 2014, para. 73.  
13
 Case T-192/16, NF v European Council; Case T-193/16, NG v European Council; and Case T-
257/16, NM v European Council, Orders of 28 February 2017. Hereafter, the NF case will be referred to 
when examining the reasoning of the General Court. 
14
 Namely, Arts. 1 (“human dignity”), 18 (“right to asylum”), and 19 (“protection in the event of re-
moval, expulsion or extradition”) of the Charter. 
15
 Art. 218(6) TFEU includes “agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union” and 
“agreements covering fields to which … the ordinary legislative procedure applies” among those which 
require the consent by the European Parliament to be concluded. The EU-Turkey Statement, whose provi-
sions largely relate to asylum policy and immigration, would appear to fall under both categories. 
16
 EU-Turkey Statement, cit. supra note 1. 
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On the other hand, the PDF version of the Statement bears the indication “Inter-
national Summit”, which should instead refer to the activities by the Member States. 
Furthermore, according to the European Council, namely the defendant in the pro-
ceedings before the General Court, the above-mentioned references in the Statement 
to the “EU” and the “Members of the European Council” would be the result of a 
“simplification of the words used for the general public” in a “journalistic context”.17 
Due to the “ambivalence” of these terms and categorisations, the Court ended up 
giving decisive importance to some organisational documents by the European 
Council and the Directorate for Protocol and Meetings of the Council setting out the 
details of the meeting which led to the adoption of the Statement in order to conclude 
that that meeting had taken place between the Head of Government of Turkey and 
the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States.18 On that basis, the 
Court overcame any inconsistencies in the wording of the Statement, concluded that 
“the European Council, as an institution, did not adopt a decision to conclude an 
agreement with the Turkish Government in the name of the European Union”,19 and 
declared its lack of jurisdiction over the cases.  
All in all, faced with contradictory elements, while reaffirming the principle by 
which the formal qualification of an act by the interested institution is not decisive 
for the purposes of the review by the CJEU,20 the General Court appears to have 
attributed greater weight to the arguments put forward by the European Council and 
other intervening EU institutions. 
Indeed, not only did the Court end up considering it irrelevant that the Statement 
refers to the “EU” and the “Members of the European Council”, but it also rather 
cursorily dismissed the observation that the President of the European Council was 
present at the meeting and had been highly involved in the negotiations leading to 
the meeting.21 The fact that the supposed meeting of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment of the EU Member States took place in the building where the European Coun-
cil holds its sessions, the day after a meeting of the European Council, was accepted 
as perfectly reasonable. In examining whether the European Council concluded the 
 
17
 NF case, cit. supra note 13, paras. 57-58. It should, however, be noted that there is no other official 
version of the Statement. 
18
 Ibid., paras. 61-66. 
19
 Ibid., para. 70. 
20
 Ibid., para. 45. 
21
 Ibid., paras. 67-68. 
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Statement on behalf of the EU, no consideration was given to the fact that the Euro-
pean Commission was to play a crucial role in monitoring the implementation of the 
Statement22 and to this end appointed a “EU Coordinator for the implementation of 
the EU-Turkey Statement”,23 that other EU agencies such as Frontex and the Euro-
pean Asylum Support Office were also to participate in the implementation of the 
measures,24 that the actions laid down in the Statement have been partially financed 
through the EU budget, and that returns to Turkey are also based on a readmission 
agreement previously concluded between Turkey and the EU.  
Even if the above elements were not considered sufficient to establish that the 
Statement constitutes an EU act, it has been noted how the Member States could not 
have concluded such an agreement, as the EU had already exercised its competence 
in various areas covered by the Statement and, according to the well-established 
ERTA doctrine and to current Article 3(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’), “the Union shall … have exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of an international agreement … in so far as its conclusion may affect 
common rules or alter their scope”.25 
The General Court, however, having excluded that the EU-Turkey Statement can 
be considered an EU act, refused to examine the issue of the competence of Member 
States, and that of the binding nature of the Statement, as outside its jurisdiction 
under Article 263 TFEU.26 Ultimately, matters falling within EU competence es-
 
22
 European Council, European Council conclusions, 17-18 March 2016, 18 March 2016, available at: 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/european-council-conclusions/>. 
23
 European Commission, “President Juncker appoints EU Coordinator to organize operational imple-
mentation in Greece”, 18 March 2016, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
942_it.htm>.  
24
 See the reports issued by the Commission on the implementation of the Statement: e.g., European 
Commission, “Seventh Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement”, 
6 September 2017, COM(2017)470 final, p. 4. 
25
 See, on this point, CANNIZZARO, cit. supra note 11, pp. 4-5; and IDRIZ, “The EU-Turkey statement 
or the ‘refugee deal’: the extra-legal deal of extraordinary times?”, ASSER Research Paper, 2017, p.1 ff., 
pp. 8-9. The ERTA case is formally known as Case C-22/70, Commission v. Council, ECR, 1971, 00263. 
26
 NF case, cit. supra note 13, para. 73. This line of reasoning appears to contrast with that followed 
by the Court of Justice in the ERTA case, cit. supra note 25, where the Court stated that, in order to establish 
whether the disputed act fell within those listed under Art. 173 of the EEC Treaty, “it is first necessary to 
determine which authority was, at the relevant date, empowered to negotiate and conclude” the interna-
tional agreement at issue (Grounds of judgment, para. 3). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
362 Chiara Tea Antoniazzi 
 
 
caped both the democratic control by the European Parliament and the judicial re-
view by the CJEU.27 
In light of the importance of the Statement and of the contentious issues raised 
by the orders of the General Court, high expectations surrounded the appeals lodged 
with the Court of Justice against the first-instance rulings. By an order of 12 Septem-
ber 2018, however, the Court declared the appeals inadmissible as incoherent, un-
clear, and “simply mak[ing] general assertions that the General Court disregarded a 
certain number of principles of EU law”.28 
Without there being any intention to question the assessment carried out by the 
Court of Justice, it certainly is a missed opportunity that the supreme judicial organ 
of the EU did not exercise its scrutiny over an act which has been so central to the 
public debate and whose dubious nature has raised fundamental issues for the EU 
legal order and institutional balance.29 
4. – Act II: The European Court of Human Rights and the Compliance 
of the Statement with Human Rights 
Meanwhile, various applications have been lodged with the ECtHR that deal with 
the consequences of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement for the funda-
mental rights of asylum seekers that have arrived in Greece from Turkey as from 20 
March 2016. While the ECtHR would not be able to rule on the validity of the State-
ment, it is competent to rule on the alleged infringement by States Parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) of their obligations under the 
Convention while implementing the EU-Turkey Statement. What matters to the EC-
tHR is whether the States Parties (Greece in particular), in giving effect to the State-
ment, have violated any of the rights protected by the ECHR; whether the Statement 
 
27
 CARRERA, DEN HERTOG and STEFAN, “It wasn’t me! The Luxembourg Court Orders on the EU-
Turkey Refugee Deal”, CEPS Policy Insights, 2017, p. 1 ff., pp. 7-10. See also, on the issue of judicial 
review, CANNIZZARO, “Denialism as the Supreme Expression of Realism: A Quick Comment on NF v. 
European Council”, European Papers, 2017, p. 251 ff., pp. 256-257; and, on the issue of democratic con-
trol, GATTI, “The EU-Turkey Statement: A Treaty That Violates Democracy (Part 2 of 2)”, EJIL: Talk!, 19 
April 2016, available at: <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-eu-turkey-statement-a-treaty-that-violates-democ-
racy-part-2-of-2/>.  
28
 Joined Cases C‑208/17 P to C‑210/17 P, NF, NG, NM v European Council, 12 September 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:705, paras. 16 ff.  
29
 See, on this point, CANNIZZARO, “Fundamental Values and Fundamental Disagreement in Europe”, 
European Papers, 2018, p. 469 ff., pp. 471-472. 
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is considered a binding instrument or otherwise, and whether it is authored by the 
European Council or the EU Member States is of little to no concern to the ECtHR.30  
On 25 January 2018, the ECtHR rendered its first judgment on the conditions of 
migrants on Greek islands following the publication of the EU-Turkey Statement, in 
the case of J.R. and others v. Greece.31 The applicants were three asylum seekers of 
Afghan origins who had arrived in Chios the day after the activation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement. They maintained that they had been arbitrarily detained in the VIAL recep-
tion centre (violation of Article 5(1) ECHR), that they had not been informed of the 
reasons for their detention (Article 5(2)), and that the living conditions in the centre 
amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.  
As far as the detention of the applicants is concerned, the Court determined that 
since 21 April 2016 the hotspot32 at issue had ceased to be a detention centre, so that 
the complaints under Article 5 ECHR could be considered admissible up to that date 
only.33 That conclusion had an impact on the examination on the merits of the alleged 
violation of Article 5(1), as the Court found that the Greek authorities acted in good 
faith, that the detention pursued the legitimate aim enshrined in Article 5(1)(f) ECHR 
(detention with a view to deportation or extradition) and had a basis in national law, 
and, finally, that the month-long deprivation of liberty ought not to be considered 
excessive.34 On the other hand, the Court found a breach of Article 5(2) ECHR inso-
far as the leaflets distributed to migrants were not clear on the reasons for their de-
tention and on available remedies against it, and the wording of the brochures was 
hardly accessible to the applicants.35  
Finally, as regards the alleged violation of Article 3 ECHR, the Court made ref-
erence to its precedent Khlaifia and others v. Italy, where it had taken into account 
 
30
 Except for the application of the “equivalent protection test” in the event that the Statement is con-
sidered a binding EU act (see infra in this section).  
31
 European Court of Human Rights, J.R. and others v. Greece, Application no. 22696/16, Judgment 
of 25 January 2018. 
32
 Hotspots are first reception facilities that have been created in Italy and Greece with a view to iden-
tifying, registering, and fingerprinting asylum seekers arriving by sea; these procedures are managed by 
the competent national authorities in cooperation with EU agencies such as EASO and Frontex. The 
“hotspot approach” was first outlined by the European Commission in its “European Agenda on Migration” 
of May 2015.  
33
 European Court of Human Rights, J.R. and others case, cit. supra note 31, paras. 83-87. 
34
 Ibid., paras. 108-116. 
35
 Ibid., paras. 119-124. 
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“the situation of extreme difficulty” faced by the Italian authorities;36 it further main-
tained that the reports by international monitoring bodies and NGOs were either in-
sufficiently detailed or not particularly critical of the conditions of the centre where 
the applicants lived;37 and it again underlined the relatively short period during which 
the applicants had actually been detained in the centre.38 On those grounds, the Court 
concluded that the threshold of severity required by Article 3 had not been reached. 
The O.S.A. and others case,39 whose circumstances were essentially analogous to 
those of J.R. and others, had a similar outcome. The complainants were a group of 
Afghan asylum seekers who had arrived in Chios on 20 March 2016 and had been 
detained in the VIAL reception centre. The Court confirmed its previous findings as 
to the (non-)arbitrariness of the applicants’ detention and the (non-)attainment of the 
threshold set out in Article 3.  
The main difference between the two cases consists in the finding of a violation 
of Article 5(4) (which had not been raised in J.R. and others), as a “speedy” review 
of the lawfulness of the detention was unavailable. In this respect, the Court noted 
that the decisions ordering the applicants’ detention and expulsion and outlining the 
respective remedies were in Greek, a leaflet which they might have received was 
unclear, there was no court on the island of Chios, and the applicants had no access 
to legal assistance.40 In the opinion of the Court, the finding of such a violation of 
Article 5(4) made it unnecessary to examine the alleged violation of Article 5(2), 
also put forward by the applicants in the case.  
A violation of Article 5(4) was also found by the Court in the Kaak and others 
case, which concerned a group of asylum seekers residing either in the VIAL centre 
or in the SOUDA centre.41 On the other hand, the claims under Articles 3 and 5(1) 
were once again rejected, also in light of the fact that, the SOUDA centre being an 
open centre, the applicants’ stay there could not be considered detention and any 
overcrowding would have been alleviated. The alleged violation of Article 5(2) was 
not examined.   
 
36
 Ibid., para. 143; and Id., Khlaifia and others v. Italy, Application no. 16483/12, Judgment (Grand 
Chamber) of 15 December 2016, paras. 178-185. 
37
 European Court of Human Rights, J.R. and others case, cit. supra note 31, para. 144 
38
 Ibid., paras. 145-146. 
39
 Id., O.S.A. and others v. Greece, Application no. 39065/16, Judgment of 21 March 2019. 
40
 Ibid., paras. 53-58. 
41
 Id., Kaak and others v. Greece, Application no. 34215/16, Judgment of 3 October 2019.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Tale of Two Courts: The EU-Turkey Statement … 365 
 
 
In all of these cases, predictably, the Court did not dwell much on the legal nature 
of the EU-Turkey Statement. In J.R. and others, the ECtHR indeed referred to it as 
an agreement between “the Member States of the European Union and Turkey”,42 
thus apparently accepting the ruling in this respect by the General Court; however, 
the ECtHR would not be primarily concerned with the authors of the Statement as 
long as States Parties to the ECHR are acting to implement it.  
At most, had Greece claimed that the Statement is a binding EU act, the ECtHR 
could have applied the “equivalent protection” test that it has developed exactly with 
respect to obligations flowing from membership in the EU.43 According to this test, 
States Parties to the ECHR are presumed to act in accordance with the Convention 
when they implement EU obligations, as the rights enshrined in the ECHR receive 
“comparable” protection in the EU legal order. This presumption can nonetheless be 
rebutted “if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protec-
tion of Convention rights was manifestly deficient”.44 Therefore, paradoxically, in 
the ECHR system, the fact that the EU-Turkey Statement has been disowned by the 
EU should render the scrutiny by the ECtHR more rigorous, as the presumption of 
“equivalent protection” does not hold.  
In sum, the ECtHR, taking into account the particular circumstances of the cases 
submitted to it, including especially the relatively brief period of deprivation of lib-
erty suffered by the applicants and the conditions of the reception centres in question 
(which were considered not to be too severe), established that Greece did not breach 
Articles 3 and 5(1) ECHR, while it did breach either Article 5(2) or Article 5(4), in 
giving effect to the EU-Turkey Statement vis-à-vis the applicants in the above-men-
tioned cases.45   
 
42
 Id., J.R. and others case, cit. supra note 31, para. 7. 
43
 The test was fully developed in Id., Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. 
Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 30 June 2005, paras. 152-158. On this 
ruling and the concept of “equivalent protection”, see, among others, COSTELLO, “The Bosphorus Ruling 
of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, Human 
Rights Law Review, 2006, p. 87 ff.; and RYNGAERT, “The European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to 
the Responsibility of Member States in Connection with Acts of International Organizations”, Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Quarterly, 2011, p. 997 ff. 
44
 European Court of Human Rights, Bosphorus case, cit. supra note 43, para. 156. 
45
 See, on the consideration that the J.R. and others judgment was highly influenced by the particular 
circumstances of the case, PIJNENBURG, “JR and Others v Greece: what does the Court (not) say about the 
EU-Turkey Statement?”, Strasbourg Observers Blog, 21 February 2018, available at: <https://stras-
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Incidentally, it should be noted that the ECtHR also declared inadmissible, be-
cause of the non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies, a case submitted by a Syrian 
family complaining about the harsh conditions suffered on Greek mainland, where 
they were transferred from Lesbos following the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement.46 According to the ECtHR, the applicants, who lodged their case with the 
Court once they were not subjected anymore to the conditions that they complained 
about and thus sought an ex-post recognition of the violation suffered and compen-
sation, should have filed an action for damages in accordance with Article 105 of the 
Introductory Law to the Greek Civil Code.47 
Another potentially relevant application submitted by an Afghan national has been 
struck out of the list of cases of the ECtHR, as the Court considered that “the applicant 
[did] not intend to pursue his application”.48 Finally, in a case concerning the prolonged 
detention of a Syrian asylum seeker in a police station on the island of Lesbos, the 
parties reached a friendly settlement.49 The applicant had lamented the violation of his 
rights under Articles 3, 3 in combination with Article 13, and 5(4) ECHR.  
5. – Is This the End of the Story? The Future of the EU-Turkey Statement 
before the Two Courts 
Do the rulings by the CJEU and the ECtHR examined above end the judicial 
review of the EU-Turkey Statement by international courts? As far as the annulment 
of the Statement is concerned, it would appear so. After the decision by the Court of 
Justice to declare the appeals inadmissible, the orders by the General Court have 
become final; and while a future overruling by the CJEU is theoretically possible, it 
is difficult to imagine that new proceedings for the annulment of the Statement could 
successfully be instituted, also in light of the time limit for bringing action.  
 
bourgobservers.com/2018/02/21/jr-and-others-v-greece-what-does-the-court-not-say-about-the-eu-tur-
key-statement/>.  
46
 European Court of Human Rights, Abdulla and others v. Greece, Application no. 62732/16, Decision 
of 19 June 2018.  
47
 Ibid., paras. 30-34. 
48
 As he had not submitted observations upon request of the Court: Id.,  Abdullah Meelad Kaberi v. 
Greece, Application no. 19557/17, Decision of 12 June 2018. 
49
 Id., M.D. v. Greece, Application no. 30275/17, Decision of 20 February 2018. For more details, see 
the case as communicated to the Government, from which it emerged inter alia that M.D. had also applied 
to the Greek Council of State (on whose decision see infra in the next section). 
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Nonetheless, the CJEU could be called upon to rule, especially by means of the 
preliminary ruling procedure, on EU provisions that are related to the implementa-
tion of the Statement.50 The Court might, for instance, be requested to clarify the 
notions of “first country of asylum” and “safe third country”, which are enshrined in 
the so-called EU Asylum Procedures Directive51 and are crucial for the implementa-
tion of the Statement, which is premised on the qualification of Turkey under either 
category in order to return asylum seekers to that country from Greece. 
Under Article 35 of the Directive, the concept of first country of asylum applies 
when the individual has already been recognised as a refugee in another country, or 
when he/she can otherwise receive “sufficient protection” in that country. This “suf-
ficient protection” implies, at a minimum, that the applicant does not risk being re-
turned to a country where he/she might be subjected to persecution. On the other 
hand, if a person has not already applied for international protection in a country with 
which he/she has a “reasonable connection”, and in that country the person could 
apply for refugee status and would not risk being persecuted or seriously harmed nor 
returned to another country where a risk of persecution or mistreatment exists, then 
that country would be considered a “safe third country” and the applicant could be 
returned there (Article 38 of the Directive).  
In both instances, the assessment of the ‘safety’ of the country for an asylum 
seeker must be individualised, and the asylum seeker must be able to challenge the 
application of those concepts to his/her particular situation. Nonetheless, the Euro-
pean Commission readily expressed the position that the two concepts could apply 
to Turkey,52 and it openly stated that it “continued to support Greece by providing it 
with all the elements to conclude that Turkey is a safe third country and/or a country 
of first asylum … for the purpose of returning to Turkey irregular migrants … under 
the terms of the EU-Turkey Statement”.53  
 
50
 Under Art. 267 TFEU, the CJEU can “give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of 
the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union”, upon request from a national court. 
51
 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, OJ L 180, 29 June 2013, pp. 60–95.  
52
 See supra note 4.  
53
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council. Second Report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, 15 June 
2016, COM(2016)349 final, p. 5. In light of the asylum system in Turkey (on which see infra in this section), 
the “first country of asylum” concept could apply to Syrian applicants, who are entitled to a generalised form 
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Notwithstanding the uncertainties surrounding the two concepts54 and their im-
portance for the implementation of the Statement, the Greek Council of State, which 
had been seized by two asylum seekers challenging, inter alia, the qualification of 
Turkey as a safe third country for them, by a small majority of thirteen to twelve 
judges decided not to submit the issue to the CJEU and held that Turkey can indeed 
be considered a safe third country.55 Apart from the fact that the legal analysis carried 
out by the Council of State does not appear entirely convincing and dissenting opin-
ions from judges of the panel were attached to the ruling, this is a missed opportunity 
to finally allow the CJEU to give its authoritative interpretation of Articles 35 and 
38, the scope of which is debated and critical to the application of the Directive.  
As the matter does not appear to be settled definitively and at least some Greek 
Appeal Committees, which review first-instance decisions on asylum requests, are 
reluctant to concur with the conclusions of the Council of State,56 it cannot be ex-
cluded that the interpretive issue will be submitted to the CJEU by a Greek court in 
the future; alternatively, it could be that the courts of other Member States raise the 
issue in different contexts and that consequences could be derived for the implemen-
tation of the EU-Turkey Statement as well. Preliminary rulings on the interpretation 
 
of “temporary protection”, while the “safe third country” concept could apply to all other nationals. 
54
 See UNHCR, “Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to 
Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country 
and first country of asylum concept”, 23 March 2016, available at: <https://www.un-
hcr.org/56f3ec5a9.pdf>. 
55
 A summary of the ruling in English is provided by European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 
“Greece: The Ruling of the Council of State on the Asylum Procedure Post Eu-Turkey Deal”, 4 October 
2017, available at: <https://www.asylumineurope.org/news/04-10-2017/greece-ruling-council-state-asy-
lum-procedure-post-eu-turkey-deal>. On the difficulties of considering Turkey a “safe country” for asylum 
seekers, see LABAYLE and DE BRUYCKER, “The EU-Turkey Agreement on migration and asylum: False 
pretences or a fool’s bargain?”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 1st April 2016, available at: 
<http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-eu-turkey-agreement-on-migration-and-asylum-false-pretences-or-a-
fools-bargain/>; and ROMAN, BAIRD, and RADCLIFFE, “Analysis: Why Turkey is Not a “Safe Country”, 
Statewatch, 2016, available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-283-why-turkey-is-not-a-safe-
country.pdf>. See also infra in this section.  
56
 See “Committees at odds with Council of State over refugees’ safety in Turkey”, Ekathimerini, 26 
October 2017, available at: <http://www.ekathimerini.com/222741/article/ekathimerini/news/committees-
at-odds-with-council-of-state-over-refugees-safety-in-turkey>; see also, more recently, Administrative 
Court (First Instance) of Athens, “Decisions 20802/25.9.2018 and 20898/26.9.2018 of the 9th Independent 
Appeals Committee (administrative body, second instance)”, 25 September 2018, available at: 
<https://www.refworld.org/cases,GRC_ACA,5bc8c2a64.html>. On Greek Appeal Committees, see infra 
notes 80 and 81 and accompanying texts. 
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of the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that enshrine the right to 
asylum and protection in the event of removal could also have a bearing on the im-
plementation of the Statement, but they are not in sight.  
Applications before the ECtHR are likely to yield more prompt and concrete re-
sults for asylum seekers stranded on Greek islands, even though the first rulings of 
the kind by the Court were not particularly favourable to the applicants. Yet, the 
Court has repeatedly found violations of Articles 5(2) and 5(4) ECHR and, while it 
seems to have downplayed the reports by international organisations and NGOs on 
the conditions of the reception centres at issue, its findings would not automatically 
apply to other complaints, especially if these were to refer to other reception centres 
and longer periods of detention. 
For instance, the applicant in the pending Sedo case57 complains about the de-
grading conditions she endured in the hotspot of Samos, in a police station and in a 
detention centre for migrants due to be expelled; the success of her case will arguably 
depend on the reports available on the conditions of these facilities as well as on 
additional specific circumstances of her case (e.g., the applicant fled Samos at a cer-
tain point and was detained as a result). 
Two other pending cases, AL H. and others and F.J. and others58 and Ansar,59 
deal with the detention of asylum seekers in Moria, a centre on the island of Lesbos 
which has often made the headlines because of its poor conditions. These cases are 
also exemplary of another aspect which can affect the assessment by the Court – i.e., 
the personal circumstances of the applicants, and particularly their vulnerability. In 
this respect, the applicants in the first case are identified as “vulnerable people”, 
while the applicant in the second case is an unaccompanied minor.  
Indeed, as regards alleged violations of Article 3, the level of severity required to 
attain inhuman or degrading treatment is not only determined by objective conditions 
such as the duration of the mistreatment, but also by personal circumstances such as 
“sex, age and state of health”.60 Therefore, for instance, in the Popov v. France case, 
 
57
 European Court of Human Rights, Sedo v. Greece, Application no. 2080/19, communicated on 20 
October 2019. 
58
 Id., AL H. and others v. Greece and F.J. and others v. Greece, Applications nos. 4892/18 and 
4920/18, communicated on 26 February 2019. 
59
 Id., Ansar v. Greece, Application no. 23413/16, communicated on 7 May 2019. 
60
 See, among others, Id., Price v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 33394/96, Judgment of 10 July 
2001, para. 24. 
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concerning the administrative detention of a family of asylum seekers with a view to 
removal, the Court considered that “the length of detention of the children, over a 
period of fifteen days, whilst not excessive per se, could be perceived by them as 
never-ending, bearing in mind that the facilities were ill-adapted to their accommo-
dation and age” and found that France had violated Article 3 ECHR in respect of the 
children (only).61   
While in the Kaak and others case the presence of vulnerable people was not 
decisive for the finding of a violation, the outcome might differ in the the AL H. and 
others and F.J. and others and Ansar cases, should the conditions of the Moira camp 
be found unbearable for vulnerable categories of asylum seekers such as pregnant 
women, families with minors, unaccompanied minors, LGBTI persons and persons 
with disabilities or illnesses. Additionally, both cases raise a further issue which has 
not been dealt with by the ECtHR to date in relation to the Statement, namely the 
obstacles faced by the complainants in applying for reunification with family mem-
bers residing in other EU Member States, which could amount to a violation of Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR.  
The personal circumstances of the applicants assume prominent importance also 
in the pending case of Qaateh and others,62 where two of the three Syrian applicants 
are gravely ill. Indeed, their conditions appeared so serious that they were transferred 
from Chios to a hospital in Athens. The applicants complain under Article 3 ECHR 
about the inadequacy of the medical care received, as well as under Article 8 about 
the lack of information, in a language that they could understand, on the medical 
procedures to which they were subjected, so that no free and informed consent could 
be given by them. A violation of Article 13 ECHR is also alleged by the applicants. 
Similarly, in the case of Al Yamani and others,63 some of the seventeen Syrian ap-
plicants complaining about the living conditions in various reception centres in Greece 
maintain that they have medical conditions and have not received adequate care. The 
application is not strictly related to the EU-Turkey Statement as the applicants would 
appear to have arrived by land and were hosted in reception centres on the mainland 
 
61
 Id., Popov v. France, Applications nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, Judgment of 19 January 2012, 
paras. 100-103.  
62
 Id., Qaateh and others v. Greece, Application no. 59758/16, Case communicated on 20 January 
2017.  
63
 Id., Al Yamani and others v. Greece, Application no. 26657/16, Case communicated on 30 March 
2017.  
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only. Nonetheless, the application was introduced after the activation of the Statement, 
in the context of a considerable increase in the migration flows from Turkey and of the 
proliferation of official and unofficial reception centres on both the islands and the 
mainland. The centres where the applicants in the case have lived include the camp of 
Idomeni, which has been repeatedly described as close to collapse.64  
Most of the applications currently pending before the ECtHR thus deal with the 
living conditions in Greek reception centres and the lawfulness of the detention of 
asylum seekers in these centres. The assessment by the Court of such complaints 
under Articles 3 and 5 ECHR is likely to depend on the duration of the detention, the 
availability and accessibility of remedies, the specific objective conditions of the 
centres, and the personal circumstances of the applicants.  
Nonetheless, the standards usually applied by the Court, especially as far as the 
living conditions in camps are concerned, would probably be stretched in light of the 
“exceptionally difficult” situation likely faced by the Greek authorities in 2015 and 
2016 with the surge in the number of arrivals, in application of the ratio decidendi 
expressed in Khlaifia and others v. Italy, which has been explicitly referred to by the 
ECtHR in J.R. and others. In Khlaifia, the Grand Chamber, to which the case was 
referred upon request of the Italian Government, confirmed that the Italian authori-
ties had incurred in a violation of Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 5(4) ECHR, but it overruled 
the Chamber’s judgment as far as the infringement of Article 3 was concerned by 
holding that  
“while the constraints inherent in such a [migration] crisis cannot, in themselves, be used 
to justify a breach of Article 3, the Court is of the view that it would certainly be artificial to 
examine the facts of the case without considering the general context in which those facts 
arose. In its assessment, the Court will thus bear in mind … that the undeniable difficulties 
and inconveniences endured by the applicants stemmed to a significant extent from the situ-
ation of extreme difficulty confronting the Italian authorities at the relevant time”.65  
Even more controversially, the Grand Chamber reversed the Chamber’s ruling 
by finding no violation of Article 4 of Protocol no. 4, which prohibits the collective 
 
64
 See, among many, SMITH, “Migration crisis: Idomeni, the train stop that became an ‘an insult to EU 
values’”, 17 March 2016, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/migration-cri-
sis-idomeni-camp-greece-macedonia-is-an-insult-to-eu-values>.   
65
 European Court of Human Rights, Khlaifia case, cit. supra note 36, para. 185.  
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expulsion of aliens. The latter aspect is, however, of less relevance to the cases ex-
amined here as no application before the ECtHR concerning the EU-Turkey State-
ment has invoked a violation of this provision. Indeed, while the wording of the 
Statement had raised fears that asylum seekers arriving on Greek islands would be 
collectively expelled to Turkey without an assessment of their individual situations,66 
in practice this risk appears to not have materialised.67 
At any rate, there exists a further case pending before the ECtHR which is con-
cerned with aspects other than the conditions in Greek reception centres and the law-
fulness of the deprivation of liberty in those centres – namely, with the fairness and 
effectiveness of the asylum procedures in Greece, the qualification of Turkey as a 
safe third country, and the risk of refoulement.68  
J.B., a Syrian and Armenian Christian, arrived on the island of Lesbos on 6 May 
2016 and was detained in the Moria camp and in the police station of Mytilene.69 The 
application by J.B. describes how his asylum request, for the filing of which he had 
not received any legal assistance, was rejected as inadmissible on the ground that 
Turkey could be considered a safe third country for him. His appeal against this de-
cision was rejected, as was his challenge against the decision to return him to Turkey. 
A further appeal is pending, while the applicant is currently wanted by the police. 
The applicant raises various grievances under Article 3 ECHR, which do not only 
concern his detention conditions. He complains of several shortcomings in the asylum 
procedure as carried out by the Greek authorities in cooperation with the European 
Asylum Support Office, including the inadequate examination of his asylum applica-
tion and of the conditions of returnees in Turkey, the insufficient statement of reasons 
for the decision of inadmissibility, the lack of a hearing, and the lack of legal and lin-
guistic assistance. These pitfalls would amount to a violation of Articles 3 and 13 
ECHR. Furthermore, the applicant complains under Article 3 ECHR that, if returned 
to Turkey, he would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, especially as 
 
66
 See PEERS, “The final EU/Turkey refugee deal: a legal assessment”, EU Law Analysis, 18 March 
2016, available at: <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.se/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html>.  
67
 As asylum seekers have mostly been given the opportunity to individually challenge their removal 
to Turkey; on the effectiveness of these proceedings, see infra in this section.  
68
 European Court of Human Rights, J.B. v. Greece, Application no. 54796/16, communicated on 18 
May 2017.  
69
 On the situation in Lesbos, see OXFAM, “Vulnerable and Abandoned”, 9 January 2019, available at: 
<https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/vulnerable-and-abandoned>.  
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an Armenian Christian, and he would be at risk of refoulement to Syria.70  
Indeed, various reports have emerged on how asylum seekers have been detained 
in Turkey without an assessment of their individual circumstances, prevented from 
applying for asylum, forcibly returned to their countries of origins or precluded to 
enter Turkey (in particular from Syria and Iraq); some of these reports also refer to 
the period prior to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement.71 Additionally, 
the risk of refoulement has increased following the failed coup in July 2016, as the 
already precarious statuses of the beneficiaries of international protection in Turkey 
can now be more easily revoked (by administrative decision, inter alia if the indi-
vidual is considered a “supporter of a terrorist organisation”) and appeals against 
deportation do not have suspensive effects anymore.72  
Besides, even before the attempted coup, it is doubtful whether the protection 
afforded by the Turkish legal order could be considered sufficient to qualify Turkey 
as a first country of asylum or safe third country. In Turkey, European nationals only 
can apply for full refugee status, while some forms of protection for non-Europeans 
have been afforded since 2014 by the Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
which, among others, introduced the “conditional refugee status”. As it is clear from 
its name, however, this kind of protection is more limited in scope than the full ref-
ugee status, excluding in particular long-term residence permits in Turkey and the 
right to family reunification.73 
As for Syrian nationals, they have been entitled to an ad hoc form of “temporary 
protection” which includes the right to stay in Turkey and the rights to free health 
 
70
 These aspects have been contextualised in two third-party interventions by well-known NGOs, 
which also rely on the reports by other NGOs and international organisations: GISTI and FIDH, “Third-
party intervention in case J.B. v. Greece, application n°54796/16”, 20 September 2017, available at: 
<https://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/tierce_interv_gisti-fidh.pdf>; and AIRE Centre et al., “Written Submis-
sions on Behalf of the Interveners”, 4 October 2017, available at: <http://www.asylumlawdata-
base.eu/sites/www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/files/aldfiles/Greece-JB_v_Greece-ECtHR-amicus-ICJothers-
final-eng-2017.pdf>.  
71
 See, among others, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “Turkey: Syrians Pushed Back at the Border”, 23 No-
vember 2015, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/23/turkey-syrians-pushed-back-border>; 
and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Turkey: Illegal Mass Returns of Syrian Refugees Expose Fatal Flaws in 
EU-Turkey Deal”, 1st April 2016, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/tur-
key-illegal-mass-returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-fatal-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal/.>  
72
 ALPES et al., “Post-deportation risks under the EU-Turkey Statement: What happens after readmis-
sion to Turkey?”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies – Policy Brief, 2017, p. 1 ff., p. 3. 
73
 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Country Report: Turkey”, 2017, pp. 97-106. 
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care and basic education, whereas the opportunity to work has been granted since 
January 2016.74 Yet, this kind of protection cannot result in long-term integration in 
the country and, being based on an executive act, can be terminated by the Turkish 
Government at its will.75 
In addition to the legal framework outlined above, the situation on the ground 
must be considered, including the unrest in the predominantly Kurdish parts of Tur-
key, the concrete difficulties experienced by Syrians and other foreigners in having 
access to housing, health care, education, and jobs,76 as well as acts of intolerance 
against Syrians in particular.77 
At any rate, according to the well-established case-law of the ECtHR, the exam-
ination of whether a country can be considered “safe” for the applicant needs to be 
based on reliable sources and to be individualised. In a recent case concerning the 
expulsion of two asylum seekers from Hungary to Serbia on the ground that the latter 
could be considered a safe third country for the applicants,78 the Court noted how, 
until the issuance of a governmental decree in 2015, Serbia was not considered a safe 
third country by Hungarian authorities. In the opinion of the Court, the presumption 
of the safety of Serbia on the basis of the decree constituted an “abrupt change in the 
Hungarian stance on Serbia from the perspective of asylum proceedings”,79 which 
might not be reflected on the ground.  
Indeed, the Hungarian authorities did not appear to have undertaken an appropriate 
examination of the widely available reports on the situation in Serbia (and in North 
Macedonia and Greece, where the applicants risked being subsequently returned) nor 
of the evidence submitted by the applicants; on the contrary, they appeared to have 
based their determinations solely on the inclusion of Serbia in the list of safe third 
 
74
 Ibid., pp. 110-116 and 122-150. 
75
 Ibid., pp. 110-111 and 123-125. 
76
 Ibid., 131-142; and KINGSLEY, “Fewer than 0.1% of Syrians in Turkey in line for work permits”, 
The Guardian, 11 April 2016, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/11/fewer-than-
01-of-syrians-in-turkey-in-line-for-work-permits>.  
77
 See SHARMA, “Turks lash out in second summer of hate against Syrian refugees”, Middle East Eye, 
6 July 2017, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrians-face-second-summer-hate-turkey-turns-refu-
gees-518017936>. See also, on cross-party anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey, ERDOĞAN and SEMERCI, “At-
titudes towards Syrians in Turkey-2017”, Istanbul Bilgi University-Center for Migration Research, 2018, 
available at: <https://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2018/03/15/turkish-perceptions-of-syrian-refugees-
20180315_Y0gYZoI.pdf>. 
78
 European Court of Human Rights, Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, Application no. 47287/15, Judgment 
of 14 March 2017. 
79
 Ibid., para. 120. 
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countries as approved by the Hungarian Government. Also considering that the appli-
cants were not given sufficient information on the asylum proceedings and were pre-
vented from consulting with their lawyer in preparation to the court hearing, the Court 
held that “the applicants did not have the benefit of effective guarantees which would 
have protected them from exposure to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment” and thus found a violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
It remains to be seen whether the ECtHR would reach the same conclusion in 
respect of the Greek authorities and their qualification of Turkey as a safe country. 
While it appears that asylum seekers are entitled to submit their views on why Turkey 
would not constitute a safe country for them, the Court might want to more closely 
ascertain whether the evidence submitted by the applicants and the reports compiled 
by international organisations and respected NGOs have been carefully considered 
by the competent Greek authorities. In this respect, it is noteworthy that, right after 
the entry into force of the EU-Turkey Statement, the Greek Appeal Committees, 
which were called upon to review asylum applications that had been declared inad-
missible at first instance, consistently maintained that Turkey could not be consid-
ered a safe third country, as no refugee status nor other kind of adequate protection 
was available and a concrete risk of refoulement existed.80  
Strikingly, after the composition of the Committees was amended, these started 
to consistently uphold first-instance inadmissibility decisions on the ground that Tur-
key could be considered a safe third country.81 This change of stance, which has sub-
sequently been endorsed by the Greek Council of State,82 would seem at least as “ab-
rupt” as that shown by the Hungarian authorities in respect of Serbia, and it appears 
 
80
 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “A Blueprint for Despair: Human Rights Impact of the EU-Turkey 
Deal”, 14 February 2017, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur25/5664/2017/en/>, p. 
14. These committees, also known as Backlog Committees, consisted of three members appointed by the 
Interior or Justice Ministries, UNHCR, and the Greek National Commission for Human Rights respec-
tively. For an analysis of the decisions delivered by these committees, see GKLIATI, “The Application of 
the EU-Turkey Agreement: A Critical Analysis of the Decisions of the Greek Appeals Committees”, Eu-
ropean Journal of Legal Studies, 2017, p. 81 ff., pp. 93-115. 
81
 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, cit. supra note 80, pp. 14-15; and Greek Council for Refugees, “Safe 
Third Country – Greece”, 3 April 2018, available at: <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/coun-
try/greece/asylum-procedure/safe-country-concepts/safe-third-country#footnoteref11_py3x6su>. The new 
Appeal Committees are made up of two judges from the Greek Administrative Court and a third member 
put forward by UNHCR or the National Commission for Human Rights. 
82
 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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strictly related to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement.83 Since the con-
clusions as to the “safety” of Turkey appear to be mostly based on diplomatic assur-
ances from the Turkish Government and on the assessment by the European Com-
mission (which actively promoted the drafting of the Statement), a thorough and in-
dependent examination by the ECtHR would be appropriate.84  
In closing, it should be reminded that Turkey is also a party to the ECHR. How-
ever, limited access to lawyers, especially for those asylum seekers that are detained 
or have been returned to their countries of origin, arguably mostly explains why no 
case appears to have been communicated to date by the ECtHR to the Turkish Gov-
ernment in relation to the implementation of the Statement.  
6. – Beyond the EU-Turkey Statement: Other Arrangements in the Field 
of Migration 
On 2 February 2017, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Italian 
Government and the Government of National Accord led by Al Sarraj in Libya.85 
Essentially, through the Memorandum, the Libyan Government undertakes to stem 
“illegal” migratory flows in exchange for technical support to the Libyan border and 
coast guard, funds for the reception centres for migrants, and development aid espe-
cially for those regions in Libya that are most affected by migration as well as for 
the countries of origin of migrants. 
As can be seen, the content of the Memorandum does not differ substantially 
from that of the EU-Turkey Statement. Additionally and similarly, a clause has been 
inserted according to which “the Parties commit to interpret and apply the present 
Memorandum in respect of the international obligations and the human rights agree-
ments to which the two Countries are parties”.86 However, any push back to Libya as 
well as, more generally, cooperation with the Libyan authorities in border manage-
ment activities should be carefully examined by Italy in light of the situation of con-
flict that affects wide areas of Libya and the unbearable conditions of migrants and 
 
83
 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
84
 On the criteria used by the ECtHR to evaluate the quality and reliability of diplomatic assurances, 
see European Court of Human Rights, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 
8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012, para. 189. 
85
 An unofficial translation in English is available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf>.  
86
 Ibid., Art. 5. 
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asylum seekers specifically in the country.87 Indeed, not only does Libya not recog-
nise any form of protection for people fleeing persecutions or wars (not even with 
the restrictions applied in Turkey), but numerous reports by international bodies and 
NGOs have uncovered widespread patterns of prolonged deprivation of liberty, tor-
ture, ransom, and slavery to which migrants are subjected in the country.88  
While the EU is not a party to the Memorandum, Italy has sought to garner political 
support from the Union and its Member States and obtained it in the form of a “Dec-
laration by the members of the European Council”,89 through which the latter expressed 
their support for the Memorandum and undertook to “step up [their] work with Libya” 
with particular regard to the main points identified in the Memorandum itself – namely, 
the training of the Libyan border and coast guard, support for the development of local 
communities in Libya, resources for better conditions in reception centres, as well as 
the contribution to assisted voluntary return activities.90 EU funds have been earmarked 
for the fulfilment of those objectives.91 Therefore, while in this case the EU is more 
clearly on the sidelines, at least formally, its role is still significant.  
In parallel, the EU has sought to boost its involvement in the area of returns of 
people who are not eligible for international protection by promoting the conclusion 
of “joint ways forward”, “standard operating procedures”, and “good practices”.92 
 
87
 On the responsibilities of European States conducting border management operations in cooperation 
with third countries, see European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, Application 
no. 27765/09, Judgment of 23 February 2012; EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Scope of the principle 
of non-refoulement in contemporary border management: evolving areas of law”, 2016, available at: 
<https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/scope-principle-non-refoulement-contemporary-border-man-
agement-evolving-areas-law>; and SKORDAS, “A ‘blind spot’ in the migration debate? International re-
sponsibility of the EU and its Member States for cooperating with the Libyan coastguard and militias”, EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 30 January 2018, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-
blind-spot-in-the-migration-debate-international-responsibility-of-the-eu-and-its-member-states-for-co-
operating-with-the-libyan-coastguard-and-militias/>. 
88
 See, among many, UN Support Mission in Libya and Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, “Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in 
Libya”, 20 December 2018. 
89
 European Council, “Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external 
aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route”, 3 February 2017, available at: 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-declaration/>. Note again the 
uncertain authorship of the Declaration. 
90
 Ibid., para. 6. 
91
 Ibid., para. 7.  
92
 European Commission, “EU readmission developments – State of play October 2017”, 14 Novem-
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
378 Chiara Tea Antoniazzi 
 
 
Apart from the fact that these documents have been described as instrumental to the 
bilateral actions undertaken by Member States, with the result of a persistent blurring 
of the respective competences of the EU and its Member States in the area,93 what is 
even more striking is the systematic recourse to non-binding instruments of cooper-
ation in lieu of formal readmission agreements, whose conclusion would need the 
assent of the European Parliament.  
The same applies to the means used by the Italian and Libyan Governments, 
namely a memorandum of understanding, which has been the subject of legal dis-
putes in both countries as potentially trumping the domestic laws on the conclusion 
of treaties (which, in the case of Italy, would have required the approval of Parlia-
ment).94 Admittedly, this trend of informalisation in the management of migration 
flows is not peculiar to the EU and its Member States and has recently been sanc-
tioned at the world level by means of the Global Compacts on migrants and refugees 
negotiated in the UN context.95 
While the European Commission has justified this approach by pointing to al-
leged “internal political considerations” in third countries,96 the fact that informal 
arrangements circumvent parliamentary approval and more easily escape judicial re-
view (including by creating confusion over their authors and binding nature) has 
been clearly demonstrated with regard to the EU-Turkey Statement.  
In addition to the issue of their uncertain legal nature, the content of these ar-
rangements is also debated, particularly as far as the procedures for readmission are 
concerned. Indeed, the efforts by the EU to increase the rate of returns, both through 
the conclusion of new instruments and through amendments to the Return Directive 
with a view to “improving the effectiveness of returns”,97 potentially create risks of 
 
ber 2017, available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/nov/eu-com-letter-to-ep-readmis-
sions.pdf>; for an analysis of these instruments, see CASSARINO and GIUFFRÉ, “Finding Its Place in Africa: 
Why Has the EU Opted for Flexible Arrangements on Readmission?”, University of Nottingham – Forced 
Migration Unit Policy Brief Series, 2017, available at: <https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/pb-
1-finding-its-place-in-africa.pdf>.  
93
 See CASOLARI, “Il ricorso dell’Unione europea a strumenti informali per il contrasto all’immigra-
zione irregolare”, Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 2019, p. 539 ff. 
94
 See infra notes 98 and 99.  
95
 See CATALDI and DEL GUERCIO, “I Global Compact su migranti e rifugiati. Il soft law delle Nazioni 
Unite tra spinte sovraniste e potenziali sviluppi”, Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2019, p. 189 ff. 
96
 European Commission, cit. supra note 92, p. 1. 
97
 European Commission, “State of the Union 2018: Stronger EU rules on return – Questions and 
Answers”, 12 September 2018, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-
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collective expulsions and violations of the principle of non-refoulement. 
The increase in the number of these arrangements and of returns is likely to give 
rise to multiple applications before national and international courts, regarding both 
the form and the substance of the arrangements. The conclusion of the Memorandum 
between Italy and Libya has already led to the submission of a constitutional appeal in 
Italy alleging the infringement of parliamentary prerogatives,98 whereas court proceed-
ings brought in Libya to challenge the legality of the Memorandum ultimately failed.99  
Additionally, the implementation of the Memorandum has prompted the lodging 
with the ECtHR of an application against Italy by a group of seventeen migrants who 
survived a shipwreck in the Central Mediterranean; some of them were taken to Italy, 
while others were returned to Libya. Complaints have been raised among others un-
der Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 to the ECHR as well as under Article 3 ECHR, on the 
grounds that the lives of the applicants were allegedly put at risk when the rescue 
operations by the NGO Sea Watch were obstructed by the Libyan coast guard and 
that migrants returned to Libya were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment 
in reception centres in the country.100   
The ECtHR might indeed be preferred by individuals because of its accessibility 
and broader jurisdiction, as well as for its focus on the protection of human rights. On 
the other hand, the particular circumstances of each case play a significant role in the 
rulings by the ECtHR, so that while the decisions that the Court adopted and will adopt 
on the applications regarding the EU-Turkey Statement might be indicative of its ap-
proach towards this kind of arrangements, they will hardly be conclusive.  
Conversely, interventions by the CJEU through annulment proceedings or pre-
liminary rulings would have broader consequences and more effectively prevent fu-
ture violations, yet the “passivism”101 of the CJEU with respect to the EU-Turkey 
 
5713_en.htm>.   
98
 The appeal was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court because of the lack of legal stand-
ing of the group of parliamentarians that initiated the proceedings: Corte costituzionale, Order no. 163, 19 
July 2018. 
99
 The suspension of the effects of the Memorandum ordered by Tripoli Appeals Court was revoked 
by the Libyan Supreme Court in August 2017: ASSAD, “Supreme Court annuls verdict that suspended im-
plementation of Italy-Libya MoU”, 26 August 2017, available at: <https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/su-
preme-court-annuls-verdict-suspended-implementation-italy-libya-mou>. 
100
 European Court of Human Rights, S.S. and others v. Italy, Application no. 21660/18, communicated 
on 26 June 2019.  
101
 See GOLDNER LANG, “Towards ‘Judicial Passivism’ in EU Migration and Asylum Law? Prelimi-
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Statement does not appear promising. Nonetheless, the Court might be called upon 
to take a firmer stance against the trend, described above, of ‘informalisation’ and 
‘nationalisation’ of agreements with third countries, which appear to violate those 
provisions of the EU treaties that, after Lisbon, have brought additional matters under 
the competence of the EU and reinforced the democratic principle in the Union. The 
fact remains that the CJEU avenue is more likely to succeed if it is activated by the 
European Parliament complaining about the infringement of its prerogatives rather 
than by individuals, whose standing before this Court is, moreover, restrictive. 
While the matter of arrangements between the EU/its Member States and third 
countries in the field of migration (and of returns specifically) would appear to pro-
vide particularly fertile ground for a ‘dialogue’ between the ECtHR and the CJEU, 
similarly to that which took place with regard to the implementation of the Dublin 
system, the formalistic approach adopted by the CJEU so far has to date prevented 
such an interaction. Should this approach change and the CJEU examine the instru-
ments at issue on their merits and as they are applied in practice, the protection of 
the rights of migrants and asylum seekers in Europe would arguably be strengthened 
– as would legal certainty and the rule of law.  
 
nary Thoughts for the Final Plenary Session of the 2018 Odysseus Conference”, EU Immigration and Asy-
lum Law and Policy, 24 January 2018, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/towards-judicial-pas-
sivism-in-eu-migration-and-asylum-law-preliminary-thoughts-for-the-final-plenary-session-of-the-2018-
odysseus-conference/>.  
BRUNO, PALOMBINO, DI STEFANO (eds.), Migration Issues before International Courts and Tribunals, Rome, CNR 
Edizioni, 2019, ISBN 978 88 8080 367 6, pp. 381-407. 
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SUMMARY: 1. 1. Introduction – 2. The Legal Framework: The Dublin System and EU Solidarity 
Provisions in Asylum Matters – 3. A Pragmatic-But-Not-Bold Approach by the ECJ – 3.1. 
The Limited Role of Article 80 in Itself in Disputes before the ECJ Involving the EU Insti-
tutions… – 3.2. … and the Member States – 3.3. The Full Effectiveness of Solidarity-Based 
Measures Provided for in the EU Secondary Law – 4. Concluding Remarks. 
 
1. – Introduction 
The currently pending reform of the Common European Asylum System 
(‘CEAS’) in the European Union (‘EU’) – whose future is still unknown in the 2019-
2024 European Parliamentary term – is largely affected by sharp contrasts between 
the Member States on the reform of the allocation criteria of the so-called ‘Dublin 
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eignty and Human Rights: Open Legal Issues”. Principal Investigator: Prof. Angela Di Stasi (prot. 
20174EH2MR). 
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system’,1 due to the difficulty of finding a mutually acceptable solution to the re-
sponsibility-sharing dilemma. The Dublin III Regulation,2 as its predecessors,3 set 
out a strict hierarchy of criteria4 aimed at figuring out which State is responsible for 
applications lodged by asylum seekers arrived in the territory of those Member 
States. Despite some family and sovereignty clauses, the main criterion is indeed the 
‘State of the first entry’ one, either legal or illegal. Due to the actual migration flows 
in Europe, the problem lies in the fact that the Member States of the first entry are 
usually those located at the southern external borders (i.e. Greece, Italy, Spain, 
 
1
 See CAGGIANO, “Ascesa e caduta della rotta balcanica. Esternalizzazione contro solidarietà per i 
richiedenti asilo”, Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2016, p. 221 ff., p. 235 ff.; DI FILIPPO, “The Reform of 
the Dublin System and the First (Half) Move of the Commission”, SIDIBlog, 12 May 2016, available at: 
<http://www.sidiblog.org/2016/05/12/the-reform-of-the-dublin-system-and-the-first-half-move-of-the-
commission>; MORI, “La proposta di riforma del sistema europeo comune d’asilo: verso Dublino IV?”, 
Eurojus, 7 September 2016, available at: <http://rivista.eurojus.it/la-proposta-di-riforma-del-sistema-euro-
peo-comune-dasilo-verso-dublino-iv>; VITIELLO, “Du vin vieux dans de nouvelles outres? Réflexions sur 
la proposition de reglement ‘Dublin IV’”, European Papers - European Forum, 27 December 2016, avai-
lable at: <http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/europeanforum/du-vin-vieux-dans-de-nouvelles-outres-refle-
xion-sur-la-proposition-de-reglement-dublin-iv>; FAVILLI, “La crisi del sistema Dublino: quali prospet-
tive?”, in SAVINO (ed.), La crisi migratoria tra Italia e Unione europea: diagnosi e prospettive, Napoli, 
2017, p. 279 ff., p. 293 ff.; MAIANI, “The reform of the Dublin system and the dystopia of ‘sharing people’”, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2017, p. 622 ff.; MORGESE, “Principio di solida-
rietà e proposta di rifusione del regolamento Dublino”, in TRIGGIANI et al., (eds.), Dialoghi con Ugo Villani, 
Bari, 2017, p. 471 ff.; DE PASQUALE, “Verso la refusione del regolamento ‘Dublino III’”, Studi sull’inte-
grazione europea, 2018, p. 267 ff.; MOSCHETTA, “I criteri di attribuzione delle competenze a esaminare le 
domande d’asilo nei recenti sviluppi dell’iter di riforma del regime di Dublino”, Federalismi.it, 2018, No. 
5; RIZZA, “La riforma del sistema di Dublino: laboratorio per esperimenti di solidarietà”, Diritto, immigra-
zione e cittadinanza, 2018, No. 1; VITIELLO, “The Dublin System and Beyond: Which Way Out of the 
Stalemate?”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2018, p. 463, p. 473 ff.; MORGESE, “Dublin System, 
‘Scrooge-Like’ Solidarity and the EU Law: Are There Viable Options to the Never-Ending Reform of the 
Dublin III Regulation?, Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2019, No. 3; NICOLOSI, “La riforma del 
sistema europeo comune di asilo tra impasse negoziale e miopia normativa”, Rivista trimestrale di diritto 
pubblico, 2019, No. 2, p. 521 ff.; POLLET, “All in vain? The faith of EP positions on asylum reform after 
the European elections”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 23 May 2019, available at: 
<http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/all-in-vain-the-faith-of-ep-positions-on-asylum-reform-after-the-euro-
pean-elections>. 
2
 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, OJ 
L 180, 29 June 2013, p. 31 ff. 
3
 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one 
of the Member States of the European Communities, signed in Dublin on 15 June 1990, OJ C 254, 19 
August 1997, p. 1, and Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003, OJ L 50, 25 February 
2003, p. 1. 
4
 Infra, Section 2. 
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Malta, Cyprus). As a consequence, the ‘First Entry Rule’ has put a considerable bur-
den on the latter States over the years. 
In this chapter, starting from a legal analysis of both the Dublin III Regulation 
and solidarity provisions set out in the TFEU (Section 2), attention will be paid to 
the applicable European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’ or ‘the Court’) case-law regarding 
the possibility to ease the Dublin system’s strict allocation criteria in a fairer respon-
sibility-sharing way (Section 3). Attention will be paid to the ECJ pragmatic ap-
proach aimed at preserving the overall Dublin system, where on the contrary a 
sharper approach has been put in place in case of those mandatory solidarity-based 
provisions adopted in 2015 by the EU Council as a temporary derogation to the Dub-
lin III Regulation itself. 
2. – The Legal Framework: The Dublin System and EU Solidarity 
Provisions in Asylum Matters 
The Dublin III Regulation is considered a cornerstone of the CEAS, insofar as its 
hierarchy of criteria “clearly allocates responsibility for the examination of asylum 
application”.5 Based on the principles of mutual trust between the Member States 
and (albeit in principle) equal treatment of asylum seekers in every Member State, 
the Regulation aims at ensuring that at least one, and only one, Member State shall 
examine an asylum application,6 thus removing the possibility of multiple examina-
tions and the risk of positive/negative conflicting decisions.7 In so doing, Chapter III 
of the Regulation set out the above mentioned hierarchy of criteria. First of all, where 
an applicant is an unaccompanied minor, responsibility for examining its application 
lies with the Member State where a family member, a sibling or a relative is legally 
present, provided that it is in the best interests of the minor8 (Article 8). Secondly, 
responsibility lies with the Member State where the applicant has a family member 
who is beneficiary of (Article 9) or applicant for (Article 10) international protection. 
 
5
 See European Council, The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Pro-
tecting Citizens, OJ C 115, 4 May 2010, p. 1 ff., para. 6.2.1.  
6
 Article 3(1). 
7
 See also GARLICK, “The Dublin System, Solidarity and Individual Rights”, in CHETAIL, DE 
BRUYCKER and MAIANI (eds.), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Ref-
ugee Law, Leiden-Boston, 2016, p. 159 ff., p. 161. 
8
 In the absence of such family members, siblings or relatives, the Member State responsible is the one 
where the unaccompanied minor has lodged his or her application. 
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In the absence, the First Entry Rule does apply insofar as the Member State respon-
sible is the one (a) that issued to an applicant a visa or residence document (Article 
12), (b) that waived a visa for such applicant (Article 14), (c) whose external borders 
the applicant has irregularly crossed (Article 13), or (d) in whose international transit 
area of an airport the application has been lodged (Article 15). Where no Member 
State can be designed as responsible, the first Member State “in which the application 
for international protection was lodged shall be responsible for examining it” (Article 
3(2), first subparagraph). 
It is important to take into account that – except subsequent transfers of compe-
tence due to the expiry of specific time limits related to taking charge and tacking 
back procedures9 – the hierarchy of criteria set out above may be derogated only in 
three cases: where a non-responsible Member State independently decide to examine 
an asylum application (“sovereignty clause”: Article 17(1)); where the responsible 
Member State requests a non-responsible one to take responsibility of an applicant 
“in order to bring together any family relations, on humanitarian grounds” (“human-
itarian clause”: Article 17(2)); and where the transfer of an applicant to the respon-
sible Member State proves to be impossible “because there are substantial grounds 
for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the recep-
tion conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment” (Article 3(2), second subparagraph).10 
The strict criteria foreseen in the Dublin III Regulation and the lack of a mecha-
nism aimed at redistributing asylum responsibilities between the Member States in a 
fairer way, especially in cases of massive influx of asylum seekers, have become 
important shortcomings over time. Leaving aside the question of whether or not each 
Member State is always able to comply with its fundamental rights obligations even 
in the case of massive inflow of asylum seekers and, consequently, to what extent 
the principle of mutual trust enshrined in the Dublin system is suitable of working 
properly without an intra-EU fair sharing of burdens,11 we should face with the ques-
tion whether other EU legal provisions are capable of counterbalancing the negative 
 
9
 Chapter IV, Articles 20-33. 
10
 In such case, the non-responsible Member State must continue to examine the criteria in order to 
find another Member State that can be designated as responsible; in the absence, the former State shall take 
responsibility. This provision takes into account the Court’s decision in the Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-
493/10, N. S. and others, 21 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865 (hereinafter, the “N.S. case”). 
11
 On the topic, see the ECJ decision in the N.S. case (cit. supra, note 10) further explained infra, note 
40 and accompanying text. 
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redistributive impact of the Dublin system criteria. 
At first glance, the First Entry Rule seems to be in contrast with the wording of 
at least two provisions, namely Articles 67(2) and 80 TFEU. Following the former, 
“[the EU] shall frame a common policy on asylum […] based on solidarity between 
Member States […]”. Such a Treaty provision seems to be programmatic in nature 
insofar as, on the one hand, it stresses the fundamental character of intra-EU solidar-
ity in the common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control but, 
on the other hand, it says nothing about the resulting obligations on Member States 
themselves.12  
In turn, Article 80 TFEU states that “[t]he policies of the Union set out in this 
Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and 
fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Mem-
ber States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter 
shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle”. 
It must be pointed out that such a provision – unlike Article 78 – does not contain 
a stand-alone legal basis for the adoption of EU asylum acts promoting solidarity 
among the Member States. Indeed, nothing in Article 80 indicates a legislative pro-
cedure to be followed13 or at least the EU Institution(s) competent to adopt non-leg-
 
12
 See MORGESE, La solidarietà tra Stati membri dell’Unione europea in materia di immigrazione e 
asilo, Bari, 2018, p. 59. 
13
 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European 
Union, 6 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631 (hereinafter, the “relocation case”), para. 62. See 
LABAYLE, “Solidarity is not a value: Provisional relocation of asylum-seekers confirmed by the Court of 
Justice”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 11 September 2017, available at: <http://eumigra-
tionlawblog.eu/solidarity-is-not-a-value-provisional-relocation-of-asylum-seekers-confirmed-by-the-
court-of-justice-6-september-2017-joined-cases-c-64315-and-c-64715-slovakia-and-hungary-v-council>; 
MESSINA, “La Corte di giustizia afferma la validità giuridica del meccanismo provvisorio di ricollocazione 
obbligatoria dei richiedenti protezione internazionale. A quando la volontà politica di alcuni Stati membri 
UE di ottemperarvi?”, Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, 2017, available at: <http://www.rivi-
staoidu.net/sites/default/files/1_paragrafo_1_CGUE_4_2017.pdf>, p. 603 ff.; OBRADOVIC, “Cases C-643 
and 647/15: Enforcing solidarity in EU migration policy”, European Law Blog, 2 October 2017, available 
at: <https://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/10/02/cases-c-643-and-c-64715-enforcing-solidarity-in-eu-migra-
tion-policy>; PEERS, “A Pyrrhic victory? The ECJ upholds the EU law on relocation of asylum- seekers”, 
EU Law Analysis, 8 September 2017, available at: <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/09/a-pyrrhic-
victory-ecj-upholds-eu-law-on.html>; PENASA, “La relocation delle persone richiedenti asilo: un sistema 
legittimo, giustificato e … inattuato? Brevi riflessioni sulla sentenza Slovacchia e Ungheria c. Consiglio”, 
DPCE on line, 2017/3, available at: <http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/451>, p. 
735 ff.; RIZZO, “Ricollocazione infracomunitaria e principio di solidarietà: un nuovo paradigma per le 
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islative acts. Given that EU asylum policy and its implementation shall be “gov-
erned” by the solidarity principle “whenever necessary” and with “appropriate 
measures”, the material scope of Article 80 seems rather to be supplementary to EU 
asylum acts adopted pursuant to Article 78. In other words, Article 80 should be 
understood as an enabling rule giving EU Institutions, whenever necessary, the 
power to supplement asylum acts adopted (or to be simultaneously adopted) follow-
ing Article 78 TFEU with appropriate solidarity and responsibility-sharing 
measures.14 Furthermore, it is not even strictly required to indicate Article 80 TFEU 
as a joint legal base together with Article 78 TFEU (as the European Parliament 
suggests),15 having EU Institutions not made use of such an opportunity so far.16 
Even though we are dealing with a single principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, where the latter is a specification of the wider concept of the former,17 
 
politiche d’asilo dell’Unione”, La Comunità Internazionale, 2017, p. 397 ss.; DE WITTE and TSOURDI, 
“Confrontation on relocation - The Court of Justice endorses the emergency scheme for compulsory relo-
cation of asylum seekers within the European Union: Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council”, Common 
Market Law Review, 2018, p. 1457 ss. 
14
 See MCDONNELL, “Solidarity, Flexibility, and the Euro-Crisis: Where Do Principles Fit In?”, in 
ROSSI and CASOLARI (eds.), The EU after Lisbon. Amending or Coping with the Existing Treaties?, Cham-
Heidelberg-New York-Dordrecht-London, 2014, p. 57 ff., p. 66; PEERS et al. (eds.), EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law. Volume 3: EU Asylum Law, Leiden, 2015, p. 14; HAILBRONNER and THYM, “Legal Frame-
work for EU Asylum Policy”, in HAILBRONNER and THYM (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law. A 
Commentary, München-Oxford-Baden-Baden, 2016, p. 1023 ff., p. 1044; ROSENFELDT, “The European 
Border and Coast Guard in Need of Solidarity: Reflections on the Scope and Limits of Article 80 TFEU”, 
31 March 2017, available at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2944116>, p. 10. Contra GARLICK, Solidarity un-
der Strain, Doctoral Thesis, Radboud University, 19 September 2016, p. 230. 
15
 Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU 
approach to migration (2015/2095(INI)), para. 1. 
16
 For instance, the so-called “relocation decisions”, while indicating Article 80 TFEU in their prem-
ises, were only based on Article 78(3) TFEU: see Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523, of 14 September 
2015, OJ L 239, 15 September 2015, p. 146 ff.; and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, of 22 September 
2015, OJ L 248, 24 September 2015, p. 80 ff. 
17
 See MORGESE, “Solidarietà e ripartizione degli oneri in materia di asilo nell’Unione europea”, in 
CAGGIANO (ed.), I percorsi giuridici per l’integrazione. Migranti e titolari di protezione internazionale tra 
diritto dell’Unione e ordinamento italiano, Torino, 2014, p. 365 ff., p. 373; DE BRUYCKER and TSOURDI, 
“The Bratislava Declaration on migration: European irresponsibility instead of solidarity”, EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law and Policy, 27 September 2016, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-brati-
slava-declaration-on-migration>; PAPA, “Crisi dei rifugiati e principio di solidarietà ed equa ripartizione 
delle responsabilità tra gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea”, Costituzionalismo.it, 2016, No. 3, p. 287 ff., 
p. 290; MORANO-FOADI, “Solidarity and Responsibility: Advancing Humanitarian Responses to EU Mi-
gratory Pressures”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2017, p. 223 ff., pp. 230-231; MORENO-LAX, 
“Solidarity’s reach: Meaning, dimensions and implications for EU (external) asylum policy”, Maastricht 
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it is crucial to stress out that that principle is not further defined in Article 80 or else-
where in the EU law. What should be meant by ‘solidarity’? When can we assume that 
a responsibility sharing is ‘fair’? The lack of definition is actually a major obstacle in 
finding a proper balance between responsibilities of the Member States under the Dub-
lin system and solidarity among themselves, insofar as the vagueness of the first sen-
tence of Article 80 leaves room for different possible interpretation of the principle. It 
is no secret that, on the one hand, frontlines Member States ask for more solidarity 
calling upon, above all, a reform of the Dublin system allocation criteria in a more 
redistributive way, either by reforming the hierarchy of criteria in order to set aside 
such a rule or introducing a corrective mechanism capable of mitigating their bur-
dens18. On the other hand, the ‘Visegrad Group’ of Member States (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) persistently advocates more responsibility to frontlines 
Member States and a “voluntary” or “flexible” approach to solidarity,19 thus refusing 
to take into account any amendments of those criteria. In general, those Member States 
less affected by migration flows from third countries are not just enthusiastic to put in 
place such amendments20. In the absence of a clear interpretation of what the principle 
 
Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2017, p. 740 ff., p. 751. Contra GRAY, “Surveying the Foun-
dations: Article 80 TFEU and the Common European Asylum System”, Liverpool Law Review, 2013, p. 
175 ff., p. 180. 
18
 Supra note 1. 
19
 Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, Bratislava, 16 September 2016, 
available at: <https://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrum/aktualne/Bratislava-V4-Joint-Statement-final-
15h30.pdf>. See also the Slovak Presidency Non-Paper on “Effective Solidarity: a way forward on Dublin 
revision”, November 2016, available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/nov/eu-council-slovak-
pres-non-paper-dublin-effective-solidarity-11-16.pdf>. See GRAY, cit. supra note 17, pp. 182-185; VÉGH, 
“‘Flexible solidarity’. Intergovernmentalism or differentiated integration: the way out of the current im-
passe”, Visegrad Insight, 19 December 2016, available at: <https://visegradinsight.eu/flexible-solidarity>; 
DEN HEIJER, “Corrective allocation or effective solidarity? The Slovak Presidency non-paper on the revi-
sion of the Dublin system”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 10 March 2017, available at: 
<http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/corrective-allocation-or-effective-solidarity-the-slovak-presidency-non-
paper-on-the-revision-of-the-dublin-system>; MORANO-FOADI, cit. supra note 17, pp. 240-241. Some-
times, the voluntary approach to solidarity has been stressed also by EU Institutions: see JUNCKER, “State 
of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe - a Europe that protects, empowers and defends”, 14 
September 2016, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm>.  
20
 See for instance KÜÇÜK, “The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More 
than Window Dressing?”, European Law Journal, 2016, p. 448 ff., p. 453, with respect to the fact that the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark decided not to participate in the 2015 relocation agreement (supra, 
note 16). 
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of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility means (or should mean), each interpre-
tation can be considered as legitimate in principle. 
In my opinion,21 taking into account the overall solidarity provisions laid down 
in the EU Treaties together with both the aims of the EU asylum policy and the le-
gitimate expectations of beneficiaries of Article 80 (i.e. the Member States), the term 
“solidarity” should be understood as a non-selfish way of carrying out that policy. In 
turn, it means that Member States and EU Institutions should have responsibility 
both (i) to avoid in advance that other Member States find themselves in trouble and 
(ii) to give assistance to those Member States facing difficulties or an emergency 
situation, due to unbalances stemming from the implementation of the CEAS. As 
part of such a broad notion of solidarity in asylum matters, the concept of ‘fair shar-
ing of responsibility’ should be intended as the mutual support between the Member 
States aimed at helping those States most affected by the management of migration 
flows. If this is true, the single principle referred to in Article 80 TFEU should play 
a threefold role: (i) a preventive one, consisting in prior mutual assistance between 
the Member States especially in modifying existing EU asylum legislation if neces-
sary, before problems arise; (ii) a rebalancing role, consisting in mutual assistance 
between the Member States in order to counterbalance the existing responsibility-
sharing proved to be unfair in difficult cases; and (iii) an emergency role, consisting 
in mutual assistance between the Member States with the aim of providing practical 
assistance to those Member States facing genuine emergency situations, especially 
in the case of massive inflows of asylum seekers. 
However, even if we agree to the above, the inherent vagueness of the solidarity 
principle is further accentuated by the fact that, following the second sentence of 
Article 80, EU asylum law shall contain “appropriate” solidarity measures “when-
ever necessary”. As a result of the wording, the EU Institutions enjoy a wide margin 
of discretion in deciding whether and to what extent such measures are required. In 
the absence at least of an objective system of assessment of the Member States’ re-
ception capacities, suitable to point out with a certain degree of predictability the fair 
or unfair nature of the EU asylum law and its implementation (including responsi-
bility allocation provided for in the Dublin system), it must be concluded that Article 
80 – read together with the EU (shared) competence under Article 78 – essentially 
gives the Institutions a huge discretionary power to decide (i) whether or not an EU 
action in asylum matters is needed due to the inadequacy of corresponding Member 
 
21
 Further explained in MORGESE, cit. supra note 12, p. 74 ff. 
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States’ actions, (ii) whether or not such action is likely to affect the Member States 
in case of difficulties or emergency, and (iii) whether or not one or more preventive, 
rebalancing or emergency EU solidarity measures are likely to lessen or remove the 
adverse effect on the Member States. After all, it is not a case that the Institutions 
have so far decided in a wide discretionary manner whether or not one or more Mem-
ber States were in a difficult or emergency situation and which kind of solidarity 
measures (financial, technical or physical) to adopt. 
Therefore, it can be stated that Article 80 in itself, insofar as it requires to take 
appropriate solidarity measures only if necessary, imposes no positive obligations on 
the Institutions: the latter are only allowed but not required to put in place appropriate 
solidarity measures. Even more, Article 80 in itself cannot impose positive obligations 
on the Member States: firstly, due to the fact that a fairer responsibility-sharing scheme 
does unavoidably require the adoption of collective measures, one or more Member 
States acting alone in a spirit of solidarity would bring some relief but not a sustainable 
solution in the event of inaction at the EU level;22 secondly, on the contrary, some 
national unfair measures are currently permitted in accordance with the EU law.23 
Rather, the principle of effet utile lets us to stem from the general aim of Article 
80 in itself – i.e. preventing the EU asylum policy and its implementation to be det-
rimental to the Member States – a (quite narrow) negative obligation on both the EU 
Institutions and the Member States. Indeed, the Institutions should avoid, as far as 
possible, to take measures that are clearly and entirely in conflict with the core of the 
solidarity principle as defined above:24 such a negative obligation would be a sort of 
‘shield’ for the Member States aimed at preventing the adoption of clearly unfair EU 
asylum acts.25 Likewise, the Member States should refrain from national conducts 
 
22
 See, for instance, some recent events concerning migrants arrived by sea in Italy and the subsequent 
relocation agreements between some Member States. See PAPASTAVRIDIS, “Recent ‘Non-Entrée’ Policies 
in the Central Mediterranean and Their Legality: A New Form of “Refoulement”?, Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, 2018, p. 493 ff.; CARRERA and CORTINOVIS, “Search and rescue, disembarkation and relo-
cation arrangements in the Mediterranean: Sailing Away from Responsibility?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty 
and Security in Europe, No. 2019-10, available at: <www.ceps.eu>. 
23
 See, for instance, those national measures concerning temporary reintroduction of internal border 
controls, in line with the Schengen Borders Code and aimed at preventing movements of third-country 
nationals in the Schengen area. 
24
 It would be quite a stand-still obligation similar to that imposed to the Member States in case of 
directives that have not yet been implemented: see Case C-129/96, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, 18 De-
cember 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:628, para 45. 
25
 See also KÜÇÜK, cit. supra note 20, p. 458. 
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leading to the violation of the negative obligation stemming from Article 80 in itself, 
provided however that unfair national measures in accordance with the EU law could 
never be regarded as a violation of such negative duty.26 
3. – A Pragmatic-But-Not-Bold Approach by the ECJ  
So far, the ECJ case-law related to Article 80 TFEU is very limited in number. 
This is the reason why it is important to review the Court’s overall approach to soli-
darity-related asylum matters. Bringing forward the end of the story, such approach 
could be seen as pragmatic but certainly not bold,27 insofar as the Court seems quite 
determined to keep the EU Institutions’ room for manoeuvre safe, and not to impose 
obligations on the Member States other than those deriving from secondary binding 
acts adopted by the Institutions themselves. 
3.1. – The Limited Role of Article 80 in Itself in Disputes before the ECJ 
Involving the EU Institutions… 
First of all, as regards the possibility for a Member State to bring an action against 
the Institutions for failure to act consistently with the principle of solidarity referred 
to in Article 80, it should be recalled the Court’s case-law on the Institutions’ margin 
of appreciation whenever an open-ended legal provision – and even more a principle 
as manifold and contested as the solidarity one – involves complex evaluations of a 
political, economic or social nature, which in turn requires a judicial review limited 
to the existence of manifest errors of assessment.  
For instance, in Racke the ECJ stated that “because of the complexity of the rules 
in question and the imprecision of some of the concepts to which they refer, judicial 
review must necessarily […] be limited to the question whether […] the Council 
made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those 
rules”.28 Likewise, in Vodafone it has been argued that “in the exercise of the powers 
conferred on it the [EU] legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas in 
 
26
 On the contrary, as discussed below, solidarity-based measures provided for in EU mandatory acts 
(as the second relocation decisions: supra, note 16) are binding for the Member States. 
27
 Here I refer to and rephrase the title of a paper of MAIANI and HRUSCHKA, “The Report of the 
European Parliament on the reform of the Dublin system: certainly bold, but pragmatic?”, EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law and Policy, 20 December 2017, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-report-
of-the-european-parliament-on-the-reform-of-the-dublin-system-certainly-bold-but-pragmatic>. 
28
 Case C-162/96, Racke, 16 June 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293, para. 52. 
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which its action involves political, economic and social choices and in which it is 
called upon to undertake complex assessments and evaluations”.29 Furthermore, in 
Star Fruit the ECJ recalled that, on procedural ground, whenever an Institution “is 
not bound to [act] but in this regard has a discretion[, it] excludes the right for [the 
applicant] to require that institution to adopt a specific position” pursuant to Article 
265 TFEU.30  
Due to the fact that the necessity and appropriateness of solidarity measures are 
left entirely to the discretion of the Institutions in accordance with Article 80, second 
sentence, then it would be very difficult – if not impossible at all – for a Member 
State to find out a positive obligation on those Institutions and, as a result, to bring 
an action for failure not only to adopt a specific solidarity-based measure but also to 
modify the Dublin III Regulation in a manner consistent with Article 80. Such a 
conclusion does not seem to be at odds with two Court’s statements in the relocation 
case.31 In para. 252, the ECJ stressed that  
“the Council, when adopting the [EU Council Decision 2015/1601], was in fact re-
quired, as is stated in recital 2 of the decision, to give effect to the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Mem-
ber States, which applies, under Article 80 TFEU, when the EU common policy on asy-
lum is implemented”.  
Furthermore, in para. 291, the Court stated that 
“[w]hen one or more Member States are faced with an emergency situation within 
the meaning of Article 78(3) TFEU, the burdens entailed by the provisional measures 
adopted under that provision for the benefit of that or those Member States must, as a 
rule, be divided between all the other Member States, in accordance with the principle 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States, since, in ac-
cordance with Article 80 TFEU, that principle governs EU asylum policy”. 
While the Court apparently claimed the existence of a solidarity obligation on the 
EU Institutions, the afore-mentioned statements should however be framed in the light 
 
29
 Case C-58/08, Vodafone and Others, 8 June 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:321 para. 52. 
30
 Case 247/87, Star Fruit v. Commission, 14 February 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:58 para. 11. 
31
 Cit. supra note 13. 
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of the overall relocation case, dealing with an action for annulment of a binding Coun-
cil decision establishing a relocation scheme (in temporary derogation to the Dublin 
III Regulation) on, inter alia, the substantive ground of the breach of the principle of 
proportionality, and where the reference to the solidarity principle was quite second-
ary.32 Here, the Court was only asked to state whether or not there had been a manifest 
error of assessment by the Council in its decision to adopt such a temporary relocation 
measure, considered as disproportionate by Slovakia and Hungary. In doing so, the 
ECJ recognised that, before the adoption of the contested decision, 
“the Council found that many actions had already been taken to support the Hellenic 
Republic and the Italian Republic in the framework of the migration and asylum policy 
and […] that, since it was likely that significant and growing pressure would continue to 
be put on the Greek and Italian asylum systems, the Council considered it vital to show 
solidarity towards those two Member States and to complement the actions already taken 
with the provisional measures provided for in the contested decision” (para. 251).33 
As a consequence,  
“there [was] no ground for complaining that the Council made a manifest error of as-
sessment when it considered, in view of the particular urgency of the situation, that it had to 
take – on the basis of Article 78(3) TFEU, read in the light of Article 80 TFEU and the 
principle of solidarity between the Member States laid down therein – provisional measures 
imposing a binding relocation mechanism, such as that provided for in the contested deci-
sion” (para 253). 
In my opinion, it clearly shows that the assumed Council obligation to act con-
sistently with Article 80 (para. 252) has been linked by the ECJ both to the previous 
verification of the need to show solidarity towards those Member States in difficulty 
(para. 251) and the assessment of the appropriateness of the temporary relocation 
scheme among other possible solidarity measures. In other words, saying that Article 
80 TFEU is mandatory only whenever appropriate solidarity measures are necessary 
is another way to state that the Institutions have a wide margin of appreciation in 
deciding if and to what extent a solidarity action has to be taken. So, it can be con-
cluded that the Institutions themselves are not bound to act consistently with Article 
80, at least as long as such a need has not been previously acknowledged. 
 
32
 See PENASA, cit. supra note 13, p. 740. 
33
 Emphasis added. 
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The same ample room for manoeuvre that the Institutions enjoys in deciding 
when and to what extent to take a solidarity action would prevent one or more Mem-
ber States to successfully bring an action before the ECJ for annulment of an act 
considered to be inconsistent with the principle of solidarity in itself. 
It is true that there is no ruling on the issue yet,34 but the Court would hardly 
deviate from its previous case-law in similar cases. For instance, in the relocation 
case, concerning an action for annulment of a solidarity-related measure albeit not 
based on the breach of Article 80, the Court stressed that “the EU institutions must 
be allowed broad discretion when they adopt measures in areas which entail choices, 
in particular of a political nature, on their part and complex assessments”.35 Bearing 
in mind the above-mentioned negative obligation lying on the Institution to avoid, as 
possible, measures that would be clearly and entirely in conflict with the core of 
Article 80,36 one can assume that only an act in a very manifest breach of the princi-
ple of solidarity might be annulled according to Article 263 TFEU: i.e., due to its 
inherent anti-solidarity balance, the lack of any other measures intended to lessen its 
adverse effect, the non-temporary nature of the contested act or the seriousness of 
the injury suffered by the applicant State(s), and so on. 
The main point at stake is, therefore, whether the Dublin III Regulation could be 
deemed in a manifest breach of the principle provided for in the Article 80. Despite 
the fact that the Dublin system constitutes, to a certain degree, the antithesis of soli-
darity and the result of an unfair responsibility-sharing,37 it seems nonetheless not so 
easy to declare its manifestly anti-solidarity nature. On the one hand, the First Entry 
Rule is not the only criterion for the allocation of Member States’ responsibility; on 
the other hand, the Regulation itself lays down some subsequent responsibility-shift-
ing clauses that allow other Member States to bear responsibility instead of the States 
of the first entry: one may refer to Article 16 of the Dublin Regulation, according to 
which the Member States have the obligation to keep together or reunify “dependent” 
 
34
 This is because the relocation case was dealing, on the contrary, with an action for annulment of an 
act assumed to be, in short, too solidarity-based. 
35
 Cit. supra note 13, para. 124. See also Case C-358/14, Poland v. Parliament and Council, 4 May 
2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:323, para. 79. 
36
 Supra, Section 2. 
37
 See MORGESE, cit. supra note 17. See also BAST, “Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate 
Solidarity in EU Migration Law”, European Public Law, 2016, p. 289 ff., p. 296, and GARLICK, cit. supra 
note 14, p. 29 ff.. 
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applicants among themselves; or the above-mentioned “sovereignty clause” and “hu-
manitarian clause”.38 
Pending further clarification from the ECJ, the question is therefore whether the 
latter provisions are enough to counterbalance – or at least to mitigate – those ine-
qualities stemming from the application of the First Entry Rule. If this is the case, 
one may conclude that the Dublin III Regulation remains fully valid; otherwise, the 
latter should be deemed as invalid in its entirety. What it seems inadmissible, how-
ever, is a declaration of invalidity of the First Entry Rule as such: in that case, there 
would be a legal void that would not be possible to overcome in an interpretative 
way; moreover, strictly speaking, it would not result in a fairer responsibility-sharing 
due to the fact that, in the absence of the First Entry Rule, an increased and unfair 
responsibility would fall in the end on “the first Member State in which the applica-
tion for international protection [has been] lodged”39. 
In my opinion, the rationale according to which judicial introduction of a fairer 
responsibility-sharing system for some Member States would likely result in an un-
fair one for other States is behind the pragmatic-but-not-bold ECJ case-law aimed at 
preserving the overall balance of rights and duties laid down in the Dublin III Regu-
lation and, in the end, leaving the EU Institutions a wide political margin for further 
amendments. Even though such a jurisprudence has been developed following some 
references for interpretative preliminary ruling according to Article 267 TFEU, its 
conclusions are relevant also for future direct proceedings. 
In N.S. – a case concerning the return of an Afghan national from the U.K. to 
Greece under the Dublin Regulation – the Court stated that the presumption that 
every Member State as such is safe for asylum seekers cannot be conclusive40 and 
 
38
 Supra, Section 2. 
39
 Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation. 
40
 N.S. case, cit. supra note 10, para. 103. See MORGESE, “Regolamento Dublino II e applicazione del 
principio di mutua fiducia tra Stati membri: la pronunzia della Corte di giustizia nel caso N.S. e altri”, Studi 
sull’integrazione europea, 2012, p. 147 ff.; MORGADES-GIL, “The Discretion of States in the Dublin III 
System for Determining Responsibility for Examining Applications for Asylum: What Remains of the 
Sovereignty and Humanitarian Clauses After the Interpretations of the ECtHR and the CJEU?”, Interna-
tional Journal of Refugee Law, 2015, p. 433 ff., p. 441 ff. In N.S., the ECJ had partly complied with the 
European Court of Human Rights’ case-law referred to in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 
30696/09, Judgement of 21 January 2011: see ITALIANO, “La protezione dei diritti dei richiedenti asilo 
nella CEDU e nell’Unione europea non è necessariamente equivalente?”, Gli Stranieri, 2011, p. 117 ff.; 
LABAYLE, “Le droit européen de l’asile devant ses juges: précision ou remise en question?”, Revue fran-
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that, as a consequence, a Member State should not transfer asylum seekers to the 
responsible Member State where there are substantial grounds for believing that asy-
lum seekers would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment in cases of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception 
conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State.41 Inter alia, the Court stressed 
that such a rule could be derived from the fact that “Article 80 TFEU provides that 
asylum policy and its implementation are to be governed by the principle of solidar-
ity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between 
the Member States”.42  
That very short reference to Article 80 in N.S. has been welcomed as an (albeit 
indirect) example of a solidarity-based interpretation of the Dublin Regulation43. 
However, from the purely incidental reference to Article 80, one can conclude that 
in the N.S. case the Court has only limited the automatic adverse effects of the Dublin 
system on the protection of asylum seekers’ human rights, where a fairer responsi-
bility-sharing among the Member States were just an indirect, quite accidental sec-
ondary effect:44 in fact, should the Member State concerned by the N.S. rule be not a 
frontline one (unlike Greece in the N.S. case), such a case-law would have, on the 
contrary, anti-solidarity effects also for overloaded frontline States, insofar as they 
would be forced to “continue to examine the criteria set out in [the Dublin Regula-
tion] in order to establish whether one of the following criteria enables another Mem-
ber State to be identified as responsible for the examination of the asylum applica-
tion”45 and, where necessary, to “examine the application in accordance with the pro-
cedure laid down in Article 3(2)” of that Regulation. 
In Cimade and GISTI,46 also the financial burden-sharing resulting from asylum-
seekers’ minimum reception obligations held by the Member States following the 
 
çaise de droit administratif, 2011, p. 273 ff., p. 287 ff.; MARCHEGIANI, “Regolamento ‘Dublino II’ e Con-
venzione europea dei diritti umani: il caso M.S.S. c. Belgio e Grecia”, Studi sull’integrazione europea, 
2011, p. 357 ff. 
41
 N.S. case, cit. supra note 10, para. 106. 
42
 Ibid., para. 93. 
43
 See GRAY, cit. supra note 17, p. 179; CASOLARI, “EU Loyalty After Lisbon: An Expectation Gap to 
Be Filled?”, in ROSSI and CASOLARI (eds.), cit. supra note 14, p. 93 ff., p. 126; MITSILEGAS, “Solidarity 
and Trust in the Common European Asylum System”, Comparative Migration Studies, 2014, No. 2, p. 181 
ff., p. 190. 
44
 See also ROSENFELDT, cit. supra note 14, p. 5. 
45
 N.S. case, cit. supra note 10, para. 107. 
46
 Case C-179/11, Cimade and GISTI, 27 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:594.  
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Dublin system has been left untouched by the ECJ. The reference for a preliminary 
ruling concerned the interpretation of the so-called Reception Directive47 on the issue 
whether or not the obligation, incumbent on the Member State of the first reception, 
to guarantee the minimum reception conditions ceased at the moment of the ac-
ceptance decision by the Member State to which the applicants were to be transferred 
under the Dublin system and, in particular, which Member State should assume the 
financial burden of providing the minimum reception conditions during the period 
between the decision of a Member State to call upon another Member State consid-
ered responsible (or the latter’s acceptance decision) and the effective transfer. The 
Court, recalling that a Member State of the first reception has to grant the minimum 
reception conditions until applicants have actually been transferred to another Mem-
ber State,48 stated that the related financial burden “is usually assumed by the Mem-
ber State which is subject to the obligation to satisfy those requirements […] unless 
European Union legislation provides otherwise”,49 irrespective of other solidarity-
based burden-sharing than those possible financial assistance instruments provided 
for in the EU law itself.50 
The Court’s pragmatic approach is also present in Halaf,51 a case concerning a 
reference for preliminary ruling on the interpretation, inter alia, of the “sovereignty 
clause”.52 Called upon to rule on whether such a clause could be interpreted to be in 
line with Article 80 TFEU in the absence of any other solidarity provisions, the ECJ 
has merely stressed that “the exercise of that option is not subject to any particular 
 
47
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003, OJ L 31, 6 February 2003, p. 18, now replaced by 
Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, OJ L 180, 29 June 
2013, p. 96.  
48
 Cimade and GISTI, cit. supra note 46, para. 58. 
49
 Ibid., para. 59. 
50
 Ibid., para. 60, according to which “[i]t should furthermore be added that, with a view to responding 
to the need to share responsibilities fairly between Member States as concerns the financial burden arising 
from the implementation of common policies on asylum and immigration – a need which can in particular 
manifest itself in the case of major migration flows – the European Refugee Fund […] provides for the 
possibility of financial assistance being offered to the Member States with regard, inter alia, to reception 
conditions and asylum procedures”. 
51
 Case C-528/11, Halaf, 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:342. 
52
 Supra, Section 2. 
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condition”,53 thus simply avoiding to provide a response on the submitted question 
from the referral court.54 
The ECJ’s will to preserve the overall balance of the Dublin system is even more 
clear in those decisions issued after the 2015 refugee crisis. In X. and X.,55 a case 
concerning some Syrian nationals that had submitted applications for visas with lim-
ited territorial validity on humanitarian grounds (“humanitarian visas”) at the Bel-
gian Embassy in Beirut on the basis of Article 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code,56 with a 
view to applying for asylum immediately upon their arrival in Belgium, the Court 
highlighted that the Member States are not obliged to issue such visas. Due to the 
fact that “no measure has been adopted, to date, by the EU legislature […] with re-
gard to the conditions governing the issue by Member States of long-term visas […] 
on humanitarian grounds, the applications at issue in the main proceedings fall solely 
within the scope of national law”.57 It is of paramount importance to note that, in the 
ECJ’s view, a different conclusion would allow “third‑country nationals to lodge 
applications for [humanitarian visas] in order to obtain international protection in the 
Member State of their choice, which would undermine the general structure of the 
system established by [the Dublin Regulation]”.58 
An even more unequivocal reasoning – maybe a closing one – can be found in 
the A.S. and Jafari cases,59 where the Court stated that the Dublin system cannot be 
 
53
 Halaf, cit. supra note 51, para. 36. 
54
 KÜÇÜK, cit. supra note 20, p. 464. 
55
 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X, 7 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:173. See CAGGIANO, “Are You 
Syrious? Il diritto europeo delle migrazioni dopo la fine dell’emergenza alla frontiera orientale 
dell’Unione”, Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, 2017, No. 2, p. 7 ff., pp. 14-16; 
CELLAMARE, “Sul rilascio di visti di breve durata (VTL) per ragioni umanitarie”, Studi sull’integrazione 
europea, 2017, p. 527 ff.; DEL GUERCIO, “La sentenza X. e X. della Corte di giustizia sul rilascio del visto 
umanitario: analisi critica di un’occasione persa”, European Papers - European Forum, 12 maggio 2017, 
available at: <http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/europeanforum/la-sentenza-x-e-x-della-corte-di-giusti-
zia-sul-rilascio-del-visto-umanitario>; FAVILLI, “Visti umanitari e protezione internazionale: così vicini 
così lontani”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2017, p. 553 ff. 
56
 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 13 July 2009, OJ 
L 182, 29 June 2013, p. 1. 
57
 X. and X. , cit. supra note 55, para. 44. 
58
 Ibid., para. 48 (emphasis added). Therefore, no relevance has been given to the opposite Opinion of 
the Advocate General: see Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X (Opinion), 7 February 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:93, 
para. 174. 
59
 Case C-490/16, A.S., 26 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:585, and case C-646/16, Jafari, 26 July 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:586. See DI STASIO, “Il ‘sistema Dublino’ non è derogabile: note a margine della sen-
tenza della Corte di giustizia del 26 luglio 2017, causa C-646/2016, Jafari”, Dirittifondamentali.it, 2017, 
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derogated even in the event of a massive refugee crisis. The issues at stake concerned 
some Syrian and Afghanistan nationals that, after having entered Europe from Tur-
key during the refugee crisis of the summer of 2015, taken the so-called “Western 
Balkan route”, crossed some other Member States’ borders and here lodged their 
asylum applications. National asylum authorities refused to examine (in the A.S. 
case) or rejected (in the Jafari case) those applications on the ground that the State 
of the first entry was Croatia: such a Member State, indeed, faced with the arrival of 
an unusually large number of third-country nationals seeking transit through its ter-
ritory in order to lodge an application for international protection in other Member 
States, had simply tolerated the entry of such nationals who do not fulfilled the entry 
conditions. Moving away from the Advocate General’s Opinion,60 in the Court’s rea-
soning even a refugee crisis must be seen as an ‘ordinary’ irregular crossing situation 
under the Dublin III Regulation, “irrespective of whether that crossing was tolerated 
or authorised in breach of the applicable rules or whether it was authorised on hu-
manitarian grounds by way of derogation from the entry conditions generally im-
posed on third-country nationals”.61 Unambiguously, the ECJ concluded that “[t]he 
fact that the border crossing occurred in a situation characterised by the arrival of an 
unusually large number of third-country nationals seeking international protection 
cannot affect the interpretation or application of […] the Dublin III Regulation”.62 
As to the main question of whether or not the Dublin system is enough solidarity-
based, the Court in Jafari also recalled that, on the one hand, there is a “direct link 
between the responsibility criteria established in a spirit of solidarity and common 
efforts towards the management of external borders, which are undertaken […] in 
the interest not only of the Member State at whose external borders the border control 
is carried out but also of all Member States which have abolished internal border 
 
No. 2, 4 September 2017, available at: <http://www.dirittifondamentali.it/fascicoli/anno-2017/numero-
22017/c-di-stasio-il-sistema-dublino-non-è-derogabile-note-a-margin>; FERRI, “Il regolamento ‘Dublino 
III’ tra crisi migratoria e deficit di solidarietà: note (dolenti) sulle sentenze Jafari e A.S.”, Studi sull’inte-
grazione europea, 2018, p. 519 ff.; THYM, “Judicial maintenance of the sputtering Dublin system on asylum 
jurisdiction: Jafari, A.S., Mengesteab and Shiri”, Common Market Law Review, 2018, p. 549 ff. 
60
 Cases C490/16, A.S., and C646/16, Jafari (Opinion), 8 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:443, para. 
262: see CAGGIANO, cit. supra note 55, p. 16 ff. 
61
 Jafari, cit. supra note 59, para. 92. 
62
 Ibid., para. 93 (emphasis added). 
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control”;63 and that, on the other hand, in the event of massive influx of asylum seek-
ers, the demand of solidarity under the Article 80 could be met by other means than 
interpretative derogations of the Dublin III Regulation, such as the enactment of the 
sovereignty clause,64 the mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis man-
agement,65 the mechanism provided for in the Temporary Protection Directive66 and 
those provisional measures that could be adopted under Article 78(3) TFEU.67 
It is apparent that the Court does not seem willing to change its mind, as recently 
stated in X.: indeed, while the Advocate General recalled that “the automatic nature 
of the transfer of responsibility is difficult to reconcile with the principles of sincere 
cooperation and solidarity between Member States underpinning the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System and the Dublin III Regulation”,68 the Court concluded in brief 
that “this is a result of the choices made by the EU legislature”.69 
In view of the above, even the option for the Member States not to comply with 
the Dublin Regulation – like any other EU asylum binding provision – as a reaction 
to the lack of solidarity by the Institutions does not seem a feasible one.  
Indeed, the fact that the Member States cannot act upon the inadimpleti non est 
adimplendum rule as a reaction against unfair EU asylum provisions stems from the 
mere conclusion that such conduct would constitute a breach of the principle of loy-
alty according to Article 4(3) TEU. Following the latter, the Member States are 
bound to take all the appropriate measures to implement EU obligations and facilitate 
the fulfilment of Institutions’ tasks, in addition to avoiding undermining the imple-
mentation of the EU common objectives. So, it is not a case that in Commission v. 
Italy70 the ECJ had linked the breach of the solidarity between the Member States to 
 
63
 Ibid., para. 85. 
64
 Ibid., para. 100, according to which “the taking charge in a Member State of an unusually large 
number of third-country nationals seeking international protection may also be facilitated by the exercise 
by other Member States – unilaterally or bilaterally with the Member State concerned in a spirit of solidar-
ity, which, in accordance with Article 80 TFEU, underlies the Dublin III Regulation – of the [sovereignty 
clause], to decide to examine applications for international protection lodged with them, even if such ex-
amination is not their responsibility under the criteria laid down in that regulation”. 
65
 Ibid. para. 95. Such a mechanism is laid down in Article 33 of the Dublin Regulation. 
66
 Jafari  cit. supra note 59, para. 97. See Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, OJ L 212, 7 
August 2001, p. 12. 
67
 Jafari, cit. supra note 59, paras. 98-99. 
68
 Case C-213/17, X (Opinion), 13 June 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:434, para. 99. 
69
 Case C-213/17, X, 5 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:538, para. 39. 
70
 Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy, 7 February 1973, ECLI:EU:C:1973:13. 
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a violation of the duty of loyal co-operation, stating that “for a State unilaterally to 
break, according to its own conception of national interest, the equilibrium between 
advantages and obligations flowing from its adherence to the Community brings into 
question the equality of Member States before Community law and creates discrim-
inations”,71 and that, as a consequence, “[t]his failure in the duty of solidarity ac-
cepted by Member States by the fact of their adherence to the Community strikes at 
the fundamental basis of the Community legal order”.72 Moreover, the inadimpleti 
non est adimplendum rule does usually work in bilateral contracts as a response to 
the lack of the owed consideration by the counterpart: in the case of Article 80 TFEU, 
the lack of positive obligations on the Institutions does remove ex ante any owed 
consideration by the latter (that therefore are, technically speaking, not counterparts 
of the Member States), so making such a rule simply not applicable. 
Accordingly, a Member State not complying with EU asylum provisions – even 
if deemed as unfair – would be exposed to an infringement procedure according to 
Article 258 TFEU and following, facing a quite likely declaration of failure to fulfil 
its obligations under EU law. This could be, for instance, the case of the infringement 
procedures brought by the Commission against Italy, Greece and Croatia in Decem-
ber 2015 for their failure to correctly implement the Eurodac Regulation.73 Such non-
compliance has been somewhat a reaction by those three Member States for the non-
response of the Institutions to their reiterated requests for a fairer and solidarity-
based responsibility-sharing of asylum seekers. But it remains the case that the Com-
mission has decided to send three letters of formal notice74 and, after the closure of 
the procedures against Italy and Greece for the latter’s subsequent almost fully com-
pliance,75 to continue the procedure against Croatia sending to the latter a reasoned 
opinion.76 
3.2. – … and the Member States 
It is also highly questionable whether the Commission or a Member State could 
bring an action against other Member States for their assumed lack of solidarity. 
 
71
 Ibid., para. 24. 
72
 Ibid., para. 25. 
73
 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, OJ 
L 180, 29 June 2013, p. 1. 
74
 IP/15/6276, 10 December 2015. 
75
 IP/16/4281, 8 December 2016. 
76
 MEMO/17/1577, 14 June 2017. 
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Actually, it would be impossible for the Commission under Article 258 TFEU 
(or a Member State after it has brought the matter before the Commission, following 
Article 259 TFEU) to bring an infringement procedure against other Member States 
for their failure to adopt positive solidarity measures based on Article 80 in itself. 
Indeed, where the Institutions have not (yet) decided to adopt such measures, it is a 
matter of fact that there would be no unfulfilled obligations on the Member States to 
bring before the ECJ. It seems equally difficult to bring an infringement procedure 
against those Member States that failed to fulfil the above-mentioned negative obli-
gation aimed at refraining from the adoption of national measures that are manifestly 
contrary to the spirit of Article 80. In such a case, the Commission and the Court 
should consider not only specific national acts or omissions but rather the overall 
national legislation and practice: to this effect, therefore, only national legal systems 
acknowledged as fully and manifestly against the solidarity principle in itself could 
– maybe – lead to an infringement decision by the ECJ. Obviously, the option for a 
Member State not to comply with EU law as a reaction to the lack of solidarity by 
other Member States seems as unfeasible as in the case concerning EU Institutions, 
already discussed above. 
This is why one can also conclude that Article 80 in itself is not directly applica-
ble in the Member States. Indeed, if according to the Van Gend en Loos case-law77 
only those Treaties provisions that are clear and unconditional should be considered 
as having direct effect, Article 80 cannot be deemed as such due to its lack of clarity 
and the need for implementing measures by the Institutions.78 As a consequence, 
while no obligation can be imposed by national courts on the Member States as well 
as natural and legal persons, it would be difficult to find even those rights of individ-
uals that the direct application of Article 80 should protect.79 Moreover, it is not even 
entirely clear whether or not EU solidarity-based acts – as the relocation decisions – 
would be deemed by national courts as having direct application against the Member 
States concerned: according to some Dutch courts, such decisions have no direct 
 
77
 Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos, 5 February 1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
78
 See DE BRUYCKER and TSOURDI, “Building the Common European Asylum System beyond Legis-
lative Harmonisation: Practical Cooperation, Solidarity and External Dimension”, in CHETAIL, DE 
BRUYCKER and MAIANI (eds.), cit. supra note 7, p. 473 ff., pp. 499-500. 
79
 See MORGESE, cit. supra note 12, pp. 110-112. 
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effect;80 on the contrary, the Tribunal Supremo has recently sentenced the Spanish 
government for its failure to completely relocate its quota of asylum seekers.81 
3.3. – The Full Effectiveness of Solidarity-Based Measures Provided for in 
the EU Secondary Law 
In contrast, what seems unquestionable is the acknowledgement of the fullest 
possible effect to those solidarity-based provisions laid down in EU mandatory acts 
of the Institutions. Indeed, in the case of the adoption of solidarity-based emergency 
asylum measures according to Article 78 TFEU – irrespective of whether or not those 
measures are jointly based on Article 80 or make a mere reference to it – the Member 
States are therefore bound to give them full effect82 and, in the case of a non-com-
pletely or incorrect implementation, it could be brought actions pursuant to Articles 
258 and following. 
This could be, for instance, the case concerning the alleged incorrect implemen-
tation of Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601.83 With those Decision the EU 
Council had put in place – on the emergency legal basis of Article 78(3) TFEU –84 a 
temporary derogation to the Dublin III Regulation through an emergency relocation 
of 40.000 and 120.000 asylum seekers, respectively, from Italy and Greece to other 
States, due to the massive migratory inflows occurring in the 2015 summer. It must 
 
80
 See OOMEN and RODRIGUES DE OLIVEIRA, “Relocation and its Numbers - Which Role for the 
Courts?”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 31 May 2017, available at: <http://eumigrationlaw-
blog.eu/relocation-and-its-numbers-which-role-for-the-courts>. 
81
 See MOYA, “Are National Governments Liable if They Miss Their Relocation Quota of Refugees?”, 
Verfassungsblog, 20 July 2018, available at: <https://verfassungsblog.de/are-national-governments-liable-
if-they-miss-their-relocation-quota-of-refugees>; PELACANI, “Il Tribunal Supremo condanna il Governo 
spagnolo per l’inadempimento dei suoi obblighi di ricollocazione, ma è bene non farsi illusioni”, SIDIBlog, 
9 October 2018, available at: <http://www.sidiblog.org/2018/10/09/il-tribunal-supremo-condanna-il-go-
verno-spagnolo-per-linadempimento-dei-suoi-obblighi-di-ricollocazione-ma-e-bene-non-farsi-illusioni>; 
ROSANO, “La sentenza del Tribunal Supremo di Spagna del 9 luglio 2018 sui meccanismi di ricollocazione 
di migranti del 2015: note a prima lettura”, Eurojus, 31 July 2018, available at: <http://rivista.eurojus.it/la-
sentenza-del-tribunal-supremo-di-spagna-del-9-luglio-2018-sui-meccanismi-di-ricollocazione-di-mi-
granti-del-2015-note-a-prima-lettura>. 
82
 Relocation case, cit. supra note 13, para. 291, according to which “the burdens entailed by the pro-
visional measures adopted under [Article 78(3) TFEU] for the benefit of that or those Member States must, 
as a rule, be divided between all the other Member States”. 
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 Cit. supra, note 16. 
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be stressed that Decision 2015/1601 – unlike Decision 2015/1523 – set out a national 
binding quota of asylum applications to be examined by the Member States (and 
some EEA States) other than Italy and Greece. While Decision 2015/1523 had been 
unanimously adopted insofar as the distribution would have been made “reflecting 
the specific situations of Member States”,85 the mandatory relocation scheme pro-
vided for in the Decision 2015/1601 was adopted by only a majority of the Member 
States (with Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary voting against). The 
subsequent implementation of such measures has been strongly opposed by the Vis-
egrad Group of Member States, that have substantially failed to fulfil their obliga-
tions. Moreover, Slovakia and Hungary has brought actions before ECJ for annul-
ment of the Decision 2015/1601. Having the ECJ dismissed in their entirety those 
actions in September 2017,86 the Commission in the following December has decided 
to refer the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the ECJ for a declaration of 
failure to fulfil their obligations on relocation.87 
In October 2019, Advocate General Sharpston has provided her Opinion on the 
matter, suggesting to the ECJ to declare the infringement proceedings brought by the 
Commission admissible and, as a consequence, that Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic have failed to fulfil their obligations under EU law.88 In short, Advocate 
 
85
 European Council Conclusions of 25-26 June 2015, EUCO 22/15, para. 4(b). 
86
 Relocation case, cit. supra in note 13. 
87
 Cases C-715/17, Commission v. Poland; C-718/17, Commission v. Hungary; and C-719/17, Com-
mission v. Czech Republic. See FULLERTON, “Borders, Bans, and Courts in the European Union”, Roger 
Williams University Law Review, 2018, p. 393 ff., p. 414 ff. 
88
 Cases C‑715/17, European Commission v. Republic of Poland, C‑718/17, European Commission v. 
Republic of Hungary, C‑719/17, European Commission v. Czech Republic (Opinion), 31 October 2019, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:917 (hereinafter: relocation infringement case). See COLOMBO, “Le conclusioni dell’Av-
vocato Generale Sharpston sulle Relocation Decisions: la condanna dei Paesi convenuti per preservare lo 
Stato di diritto e il principio di solidarietà”, Eurojus, 25 November 2019, available at: < http://rivista.euro-
jus.it/le-conclusioni-dellavvocato-generale-sharpston-sulle-relocation-decisions-la-condanna-dei-paesi-
convenuti-per-preservare-lo-stato-di-diritto-e-il-principio-di-solidarieta>; FERRI, “L’assassino è il mag-
giordomo? Primi rilievi sulle conclusioni dell’Avvocato generale nel giudizio di infrazione contro Polonia, 
Ungheria e Repubblica ceca in materia di ricollocazioni”, SIDIBlog, 20 November 2019, available at: < 
http://www.sidiblog.org/2019/11/20/lassassino-e-il-maggiordomo-primi-rilievi-sulle-conclusioni-dellav-
vocato-generale-nel-giudizio-di-infrazione-contro-polonia-ungheria-e-repubblica-ceca-in-materia-di-ri-
collocazioni>; KIRST, “The Three Villains and the Lifeblood of the European Union Project – Advocate 
General Sharpton’s Opinion in C-715/17 (the asylum relocation mechanism)”, EU Law Analysis, 27 No-
vember 2019, available at: < http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/11/the-three-villains-and-lifeblood-
of.html>; PENASA, “La relocation come ‘minaccia’ alla sicurezza nazionale? Prerogative statali, obblighi 
di solidarietà e spinte sovraniste nelle Conclusioni dell’Avv. Gen. Sharpston (casi C-715/18, C-718/18 e 
C-719/18, 31 ottobre 2019)”, ADiM Blog, November 2019, available at: < http://www.adimblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/ADiM-Blog-Novembre-2019-Analisi-Opinioni-Penasa_DEF.pdf>. 
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General stressed, on the one hand, that any consideration related to the maintenance 
of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security should have been resolved, 
by the three States, in a spirit of cooperation and mutual trust between all the other 
Member States involved, rather than peremptorily disregard their obligations under 
those Decisions; and, on the other hand, that any practical risk inherent in processing 
large numbers of applicants should have been addressed by applying for and obtain-
ing temporary suspensions of relocation obligations under those decisions, and cer-
tainly not by deciding unilaterally that compliance with the Relocation Decisions 
was not necessary.  
While the matter is still under consideration, it would be very hard for the Court 
not to come to a solution other than the one discussed here. Indeed, one must consider 
that the issue at stake in the relocation infringement procedures is not so much a 
breach of Article 80 in itself but the breach of the general duty of a proper imple-
mentation of EU law by the Member States. In other words, the violation of the prin-
ciple of solidarity here is only one part of a much wider violation of the principle of 
loyalty provided for in Article 4(3) TEU. This conclusion is in line with the Advocate 
General’s Opinion in the relocation case, according to which  
“the non-application of the [Decision 2015/1601] also constitutes a breach of the obliga-
tion concerning solidarity and the fair sharing of burdens expressed in Article 80 TFEU. To 
my mind there is no doubt that, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations on this matter, the 
Court would be entitled to remind the offending Member States of their obligations, and to 
do so in no uncertain terms, as it has done in the past”.89 
and with the Advocate General’s Opinion in the relocation infringement case, by 
which 
“under the principle of sincere cooperation, each Member State is entitled to expect other 
Member States to comply with their obligations with due diligence. That is, however, mani-
festly not what has happened [in the case of the implementation of the relocation deci-
sions]”.90 
It should also be recalled that it would be very difficult for the Czech Republic, 
 
89
 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European 
Union (Opinion), 26 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:618, para. 242. 
90
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Hungary and Poland to justify their non-implementing conduct on the ground of the 
previous non-completely implementation of other EU asylum provisions by those 
Member States that were beneficiaries of the relocation measures:91 actually, it would 
constitute an unlawful application of the inadimpleti non est adimplendum rule that, 
in a reverse order, has been discussed and rejected above. 
In the end, it can be observed that only the non-appropriate nature of solidarity-
based measures for attaining the objective which they pursue could be a strong ar-
gument for a Member State not to fulfil its obligations. This argument would involve 
the scope of application of the proportionality principle and, in turn, a review of the 
wide margin of manoeuvre of the Institutions “in areas which entail choices on their 
part, including of a political nature, and in which they are called upon to undertake 
complex assessments”.92 While the topic has been yet discussed above,93 it can be 
useful to remind in short that, in the ECJ’s view, only a manifestly inappropriate 
measure could be deemed as unlawful,94 in particular where “another measure that 
was less restrictive, but equally effective, could [be] adopted within the same pe-
riod”.95  
It is important, therefore, to bear in mind that, where not manifestly inappropri-
ate, such a choice by the Institutions “is an essentially political choice, the appropri-
ateness of which cannot be examined by the Court”.96 The latter would be the case, 
for instance, where solidarity-based measures (like the relocation decisions) have an 
adverse impact on some Member States as a consequence of a re-balance between 
the different interests involved: indeed, such a re-balance “tak[es] into account not 
the particular situation of a single Member State, but that of all Member States”,97 
which is in accordance to the very nature of Article 80.98 After all, following the 
 
91
 Relocation case, para. 210: indeed, one of the arguments of the Slovakia for the annulment of Deci-
sion 2015/1601 was its inappropriateness “for attaining that objective because the relocation mechanism 
for which it provides is not capable of redressing the structural defects in the Greek and Italian asylum 
systems. Those shortcomings, which relate to lack of reception capacity and of capacity to process appli-
cations for international protection, need to be remedied before the relocation can actually be imple-
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 Relocation case, cit. supra note 13, para. 207. 
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 Supra, subsection 3.1. 
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Advocate General in the relocation infringement case, on the one hand, 
 “[i]n what was clearly an emergency situation, it was the responsibility of both the front-
line Member States and the potential Member States of relocation to make that mechanism 
work adequately, so that relocation could take place in sufficient numbers to relieve the in-
tolerable pressure on the frontline Member States. That is what solidarity is about”;99  
and, on the other hand,  
“[s]olidarity is the lifeblood of the European project. Through their participation in that 
project and their citizenship of European Union, Member States and their nationals have 
obligations as well as benefits, duties as well as rights. Sharing in the European ‘demos’ is 
not a matter of looking through the Treaties and the secondary legislation to see what one 
can claim. It also requires one to shoulder collective responsibilities and (yes) burdens to 
further the common good”.100 
4. – Concluding Remarks 
It can be concluded that, at the present time, there is very little room for a judicial 
solidarity-based interpretation or amendment of the allocation criteria of the Dublin 
III Regulation. Indeed, as explained above, the Court does seem very unwilling to 
undertake a breakthrough review of what is still considered “a cornerstone in build-
ing the CEAS”,101 limiting itself to – we might say – apply the law, the whole law, 
and nothing but the law. 
Such an approach depends in part from quite an ‘original sin’, i.e. the wording of 
Article 80 TFEU: linking the legal force of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility to the necessity and appropriateness of its implementation by the 
Institutions resulted in depriving the ECJ of the possibility of giving such a Treaty 
provision in itself full binding effects and, as a consequence, implementing it 
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 Relocation infringement case (Opinion), para. 234 (emphasis added). 
100
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continent. It is the antithesis of being a loyal Member State and being worthy, as an individual, of shared 
European citizenship. If the European project is to prosper and go forward, we must all do better than that” 
(para. 254).  
101
 The Stockholm Programme, cit. supra note 5, para. 6.2.1.  
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‘against’ the unfair responsibility-sharing system resulting from the strict application 
of the Dublin system. But such a conclusion also depends in part from the ‘political’ 
will of the Court not to substitute its own solidarity-based vision of the CEAS, if any, 
to the one of the Institutions and the Member States. To this effect, refusing to 
acknowledge that “the Dublin III Regulation was not conceived as an instrument to 
deal with determining the Member State responsible for international protection in 
the event of a massive inflow of people”102 and therefore maintaining the First Entry 
Rule ‘alive and kicking’ even in times of refugee crisis,103 the ECJ has opted for a 
somewhat purely technical and formalistic approach to the Dublin system that has 
been suggestively defined as ‘judicial passivism’.104 
How the contrast between the high symbolic value of the solidarity principle and 
its judicial implementation – as well as the tension between the need to preserve the 
administrative integrity of the Dublin system and the potentially broad constitutional 
function of Article 80 – should be resolved, is still an open and debatable question.105 
What does seem unquestionable is that, on the one hand, where solidarity-based 
measures are enacted by the EU Institutions, they should have to be fully respected 
even by those Member States unwilling to act in a spirit of solidarity; and, on the 
other hand, that the very problem lies in the persistent political unwillingness of the 
Member States to resolve in a mutually acceptable manner the ‘solidarity conun-
drum’, on which the Court is showing to be reluctant to intervene. 
 
 
 
 
102
 As the Advocate General stated in A.S. and Jafari, cit. supra note 60, para. 171. 
103
 See POULARAKIS, “Responsibility drifting in the sea – Search and rescue operations and the Dublin 
Regulation”, European Database of Asylum Law, 25 June 2018, available at: <http://www.asylumlawda-
tabase.eu/en/journal/responsibility-drifting-sea---search-and-rescue-operations-and-dublin-regulation>. 
104
 See GOLDNER LANG, “Towards ‘Judicial Passivism’ in EU Migration and Asylum Law? Prelimi-
nary Thoughts for the Final Plenary Session of the 2018 Odysseus Conference”, EU Immigration and Asy-
lum Law and Policy, 24 January 2018, available at: <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/towards-judicial-pas-
sivism-in-eu-migration-and-asylum-law-preliminary-thoughts-for-the-final-plenary-session-of-the-2018-
odysseus-conference>. 
105
 See also THYM, cit. supra note 59, p. 561 ff. 
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1. – Introduction 
The project of a single European market, and that of European integration more 
generally, have been crucially advanced by the use of the mechanism of mutual recog-
nition.1 The logic of the mechanism is that products and services should circulate freely 
within the internal market, since the national regulatory frameworks on which they are 
 
1
 Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral, Judgment of 20 February 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42. 
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based serve a common objective and thus, while different in each Member State, 
should be mutually recognized by them as equivalent.2 Such mutual recognition is in-
extricably linked to mutual trust, in the sense that the former presupposes but also 
generates trust among Member States (‘MS’) that all of them apply correctly within 
their autonomous national regulatory orders the requisite safeguards and thus, offer a 
similar level of protection.3 In other words, MS of the European Union (‘EU’) are re-
quired to treat products, services etc. of another Member State as if they were their 
own because they trust the guarantees and controls of the country of origin.4 
It is in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (‘AFSJ’) that the principle of 
mutual recognition found its full effectiveness. From early on,5 the free circulation of 
judicial and administrative decisions, as well as of people, was deemed necessary for 
the embedment of cooperation on civil and criminal matters and was achieved partly 
due to the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust,6 and partly due to the 
various legislative initiatives at the EU level aiming at the harmonization of national 
regulatory standards and procedures in this area.7 The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’) makes multiple references to the principle of mutual recog-
nition,8 though provisions on mutual trust are conspicuously absent from the constitu-
tive treaties and have been only inserted in the relevant secondary legislation.9  
 
2
 Commission White Paper, ‘Completing the Internal Market’ COM(85) 310 final, 14 June 1985, para. 
58. 
3
 LABAYLE, “La confiance mutuelle dans l’Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice”, in JOCHUM, 
FRITZMEYER and KAU (eds.), Grenzüberschreitendes Recht – Crossing Frontiers. Festschrift für Kay Hail-
bronner, Heidelberg, 2013, p. 153 ff., p. 160. 
4
 KORNEZOV, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Light of the EU Accession to the 
ECHR – Is the Break-up Inevitable?”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 2013, p. 227 ff., 
p. 230. 
5
 EU Council, 1-16 October 1999, Conclusions of the Presidency (SN 200/1/99 REV 1). 
6
 See the analysis in BLANCHET, “Aie confiance! – La confiance mutuelle peut-elle se décréter?”, in 
CZUCZAI and NAERT (eds.), The EU as a Global Actor – Bridging Legal Theory and Practice. Liber Ami-
corum in Honour of Ricardo Gosalbo Bono, Leiden, 2017, p. 174 ff. 
7
 From that perspective, the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the AFSJ differs from 
its application in the framework of the single European market. 
8
 See, indicatively, Arts. 67(4), 81(1) and 82(1) TFEU. 
9
 For instance, see Recitals 16 and 17 of Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of the Council of 22 December 2000 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; Recital 
10 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States. 
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The same logic underpins the Common European Asylum Policy (‘CEAS’), even 
if references to mutual recognition and mutual trust are scarce.10 The Dublin system, 
CEAS’ main pillar, is founded on a list of responsibility allocation criteria, which, 
when applicable, impose a duty upon the designated Member State to take up the 
asylum seeker and review his/her application, recognizing that other MS are not re-
sponsible thereof.11 Hence, the system has been described as one of negative mutual 
recognition.12 The automatic effects of the allocation criteria are justified by refer-
ence on the one hand, to the trust placed by other EU MS that asylum procedures in 
the designated State provide the requisite protection of the asylum seekers’ human 
rights and on the other hand, to asylum standards harmonization processes under-
taken during the last two decades on the basis of a series of relevant EU regulations.13 
The automaticity of the asylum allocation criteria means that national authorities 
of the sending Member State are not normally supposed to review the impact a Dub-
lin transfer might have on the fundamental rights of an asylum seeker.14 In other 
words, other MS are presumed to be safe countries with respect to fundamental rights 
protection allowing the refoulement of the asylum seekers.15 Nevertheless, an auto-
matic transfer to the responsible Member State without review of the circumstances 
there, could entail a serious risk for the asylum seeker’s fundamental rights in case 
asylum conditions in that State were generally deficient.  
The ensuing tension between automaticity based on mutual trust and a presumed 
 
10
 Mutual trust is only mentioned in Recital 22 of the Dublin III Regulation 604/2013 of the Council 
of 26 June 2013. Nevertheless, its logic permeates the whole system. For instance, Protocol no. 24 annexed 
to the TFEU establishes a presumption that EU Member States constitute safe countries of origin for all 
the purposes of the CEAS. See also LEBOEUF, Le droit européen de l’asile au défi de la confiance mutuelle, 
Bruxelles, 2016. 
11
 MITSILEGAS, “The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From 
Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual”, Yearbook of European Law, 
2012, p. 319 ff., p. 334. 
12
 GUILD, “Seeking Asylum: Strom Clouds between International Commitments and EU Legislative 
Measures”, European Law Review, 2004, p. 198 ff., p. 206. 
13
 DE SCHUTTER and TULKENS, “Confiance mutuelle et droits de l’homme. La Convention européenne 
des droits de l’homme et la transformation de l’intégration européenne”, in Liège, Strasbourg, Bruxelles: 
parcours des droits de l’homme. Liber Amicorum Michel Melchior, Bruxelles, 2010, p. 947 ff., pp. 958-
959. 
14
 MITSILEGAS, “Humanizing Solidarity in European Refugee Law: The Promise of Mutual Recogni-
tion”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2017, p. 721 ff., p. 729. 
15
 COSTELLO, “Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored”, 
Human Rights Law Review, 2012, p. 287 ff., pp. 313-316. 
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harmonization of asylum standards on the one side, and fundamental rights protec-
tion on the other, has been at the center of a testy jurisprudential exchange between 
the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (‘CJEU’) that influenced heavily the function of the Dublin system. 
We will attempt to highlight the evolution of the two Courts’ case-law and the dia-
logue developed between them while focusing on some unresolved issues. 
2. – The Scope of the ECtHR’s Powers of Review Regarding the Dublin 
System 
As the Dublin system forms part of the EU integration project, the ECtHR had to 
initially establish whether the doctrine of equivalent protection enunciated in the 
Bosphorus case was applicable or not. According to this doctrine, State action im-
plementing strict obligations undertaken in the framework of an international organ-
ization would be justified as long as the relevant organization offers equivalent – that 
is, comparable but not identical – substantive and procedural guarantees for the pro-
tection of human rights.16 Thus, in the case of the Dublin system, the Strasbourg 
Court had to determine whether states implementing the Dublin allocation criteria 
and returning asylum seekers to the responsible State were constrained to do so be-
cause of the Dublin rules – and thus the Bosphorus doctrine was applicable – or 
enjoyed a margin of discretion thereof. 
The Dublin system itself, while relying on a rationale of automatic returns on the 
basis of a presumption – stemming from the principle of mutual trust – that all MS 
constitute safe countries, includes a proviso that allows a Member State other than 
the one responsible per the Dublin allocation criteria to proceed itself to the exami-
nation of an asylum claim.17 This so-called ‘sovereignty clause’ or ‘discretionary 
clause’ is phrased in a permissive rather than an obligatory way.18 Consequently, one 
 
16
 European Court of Human Rights, Bosphorus v. Ireland, Application No. 45036/98, Judgment of 30 
June 2005, para. 155. 
17
 See Art. 3(4) of the Dublin Convention, 15 June 1990, OJ (1997) C254/1, replaced by Art. 3(2) of 
the Dublin II Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of the Council of 18 February 2003 (Dublin II Regulation). 
This proviso survives in the recast Regulation under the name ‘discretionary clause’; see Art. 17(1) Dublin 
III Regulation: “By way of derogation from Article 3(1), each Member State may decide to examine an 
application for international protection lodged with it by a third-country national or a stateless person, even 
if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation”. 
18
 STUBBERFIELD, “Lifting the Organisational Veil: Positive Obligations of the European Union Fol-
lowing Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights”, Australian International Law Journal, 
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would have expected the ECtHR to dismiss any argument concerning the application 
of the Bosphorus doctrine of equivalent protection, since any return effectuated un-
der the Dublin system was not an implementation of a strict obligation stemming 
from EU law as a Member State could invoke the “sovereignty clause” in order to 
prevent a return that would violate the State’s obligations under the European Con-
vention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’).19 
Still, at first, the ECtHR oscillated between finding that on the basis of the ‘sov-
ereignty clause’ MS enjoyed a wide margin of discretion in implementing the Dublin 
criteria and, in contrast, assuming that the automaticity of the returns under the Dub-
lin system stemmed from a strict obligation of MS to act in conformity with the re-
sponsibility allocation criteria. More specifically, in the T.I. case,20 the ECtHR was 
confronted with the UK’s refusal to examine both an asylum claim and the claimant’s 
allegations that a return to Germany would constitute an indirect refoulement in vi-
olation of the ECHR, as the latter did not adhere to the ECtHR’s case-law on indirect 
refoulement when the risk of torture originated from non-State actors.21 The UK was 
arguing that any review of the ECHR’s implementation by Germany would run coun-
ter to the effectiveness of the Dublin system founded on the presumption of automa-
ticity.22 The ECtHR dismissed these arguments noting that the United Kingdom could 
not “rely automatically…on the arrangements made in the Dublin Convention con-
cerning the attribution of responsibility between European countries for deciding 
asylum claims”23 but it had to ensure that the asylum procedure in the receiving State 
afforded sufficient guarantees with regard to the safeguards under Article 3 ECHR.24 
Thus, the presumption of compliance was not absolute and irrebuttable and there was 
no obligation whatsoever upon the UK stemming from the Dublin Convention to 
proceed to the refoulement.  
 
2012, p. 117 ff., p. 120. 
19
 MORENO-LAX, “Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece”, European Journal 
of Migration and Law, 2012, p. 1 ff., p. 14. 
20
 European Court of Human Rights, T.I. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 43844/98, Decision of 
7 March 2000. 
21
 NOLL, “Formalism v. Empiricism: Some Reflections on the Dublin Convention on the Occasion of 
Recent European Case Law”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 2001, p. 161 ff., pp. 176-180. 
22
 See European Court of Human Rights, T.I. case, cit. supra note 20, p. 12. 
23
 Ibid., p. 15. 
24
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, Judg-
ment of 21 January 2011, para. 342. 
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In the K.R.S. case, however, the Court curiously insinuated that the Bosphorus rul-
ing was applicable with regard to the Dublin II Regulation as the return of an asylum 
seeker to another EU Member State on the basis of the Dublin criteria was, according 
to the Court, “the implementation of a legal obligation on the State in question which 
flows from its participation in the asylum regime created by that Regulation”.25 Yet, at 
the same time, the Court confusingly stated that “the Dublin Regulation itself would 
allow the UK Government, if they considered it appropriate, to exercise their right to 
examine asylum applications under Article 3.2 of the Regulation”.26  
The Court’s ambivalence vis-à-vis Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation re-
flected the contemporaneous practice of some EU MS, which statutorily or jurispru-
dentially provided for an irrebutable presumption of safety regarding several coun-
tries, thus depriving the asylum seekers of a remedy for the review of the transfer 
decision in the sending State.27 The idea of implementing a ‘strict obligation’ was 
also supported by the CJEU’s finding that the principle of mutual trust, which un-
derpinned the CEAS, imposed on States an obligation to recognize and enforce 
quasi-automatically the judgments and extrajudicial decisions of other EU MS in 
their respective legal orders and therefore, required national courts to abstain from 
reviewing the observance of human rights by the other MS and to apply a presump-
tion that the latter respect Union law and fundamental rights, unless such a ground 
for refusal was provided for in the relevant document or exceptional circumstances 
warranted so.28  
Nevertheless, none of these developments fully endorsed the ECtHR’s view that 
the Dublin II Regulation mandated MS to automatically return an asylum seeker at 
all circumstances. State practice concerned a State-enacted, absolute presumption of 
safety that went beyond the Dublin system and, in any case, did not eliminate MS’ 
margin of discretion, if they deemed it opportune, to refuse the return and examine 
 
25
 European Court of Human Rights, K.R.S. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 32733/08, Decision 
of 2 December 2008, p. 16. 
26
 Ibid., p. 17. For a sympathetic to the Court’s approach analysis, see GRAGL, “The Shortcomings of 
Dublin II: Strasbourg’s M.S.S. Judgment and its Implications for the European Union’s Legal Order”, Eu-
ropean Yearbook on Human Rights, 2012, p. 123 ff., pp. 127-128. 
27
 See DE BRUYCKER et al., Setting up a Common European Asylum System, Study for the LIBE Com-
mittee PE425.62, 2010, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu>, pp. 129-130.  
28
 Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights, 
Opinion of 18 December 2014, paras. 191-194. 
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the asylum request themselves.29 Moreover, the CJEU’s Opinion No. 2/13 included 
an important caveat allowing States to overrule the precepts of mutual trust on the 
basis of a relevant provision or in exceptional circumstances, exceptions respectively 
reflected in the sovereignty and humanitarian clauses of the Dublin Regulations. 
As a result, it comes as no surprise that the Strasbourg Court ultimately found in 
the M.S.S. case that the presumption of equivalent protection is inapplicable with re-
spect to Dublin transfers as such transfers “did not strictly fall within Belgium’s inter-
national legal obligations” due to the Member State’s possibility to invoke the ‘sover-
eignty clause’ in order to avoid them.30 Consequently, the Court proceeded to a full 
review of the Belgian acts and concluded that Belgium, in returning the asylum seeker 
back to Greece despite numerous reports and evidence suggesting that the Greek asy-
lum system faced systemic deficiencies, had violated the obligation of non-re-
foulement stemming from Article 3 ECHR.31 The Court reached this conclusion after 
determining that under the aforementioned circumstances the presumption of safety 
that Greece enjoyed on the basis of the Dublin system was rebutted32 and Belgian au-
thorities could have freezed the removal of the asylum seeker, since they knew or 
ought to have known that, because of the situation in Greece, there were substantial 
grounds “for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk 
of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country”.33  
3. – Setting the Stage for the Dialogue between the ECtHR and the CJEU 
on the ‘Sovereignty Clause’: the M.S.S. Case 
The Court further offered in its seminal judgment on the M.S.S. case some clues 
on how the Dublin system must work when a return to another Member State might 
entail a risk of a serious violation of fundamental rights of the asylum seeker. First 
of all, the ECtHR elucidated the issue of the remedies that should be provided by the 
 
29
 See MAIANI and NÉRAUDAU, “L’arrêt M.S.S./Grèce et Belgique de la Cour EDH du 21 janvier 2011. 
De la détermination de l’Etat responsable selon Dublin à la responsabilité des Etats membres en matière 
de protection des droits fondamentaux”, Revue du droit des étrangers, 2011, p. 3 ff., p. 8. 
30
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. case, cit. supra note 24, paras. 338-340. See also VICINI, 
“The Dublin Regulation between Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Reshaping Non-Refoulement in the Name 
of Mutual Trust?”, European Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, p. 50 ff., p. 59. 
31
 M.S.S. case, cit. supra note 24, paras. 367-368. 
32
 Ibid., para. 353. 
33
 Ibid., para. 365. 
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sending State against Dublin transfers. In the K.R.S. case, the Strasbourg Court had 
initially summarized its relevant case-law, according to which the applicant should 
have effective access to a remedy, endowed with automatic suspensive effect, ena-
bling him/her to challenge its transfer and resulting to a meaningful and rigorous 
assessment of the applicant’s claim,34 only to then declare that because of Greece’s 
presumption of compliance with international refugee law and the Dublin standards, 
the applicant’s fundamental rights could be effectively protected after his/her return 
by the available legal remedies in Greece and the ECtHR.35 The Court’s insistence 
on the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies in the receiving State high-
lighted its deferential stance towards the principle of mutual trust, as exemplified 
also in other similar cases.36 The ensuing logic is that fundamental rights can be suf-
ficiently protected through the use of legal remedies in the Member State that is pre-
sumed to be compliant with human rights precepts; use of legal remedies in the other 
MS would presumably undermine the automaticity of mutual recognition and ulti-
mately, the AFSJ cooperation regime, which is premised on mutual trust.37  
This approach has been squarely set aside, however, in the M.S.S. case, where the 
Strasbourg Court summarily dismissed the Belgian allegations that the asylum seeker 
had failed to voice his fears about the return to Greece. The Court acerbically de-
scribed the procedure before the Belgian Alien Office as virtually preventing the 
applicant from raising his concerns about his transfer and criticized the Alien Of-
fice’s form to be filled in, because it did not contain a section for such comments.38 
Consequently, the Court imposed an obligation on MS to provide for a relevant rem-
edy, thus granting an opportunity to the asylum seeker to raise his/her claim.39 
 
34
 European Court of Human Rights, T.I. case, cit. supra note 20, p. 15. 
35
 Ibid., p. 17. See also CLAYTON, “Asylum Seekers in Europe: M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece”, Human 
Rights Law Review, 2011, p. 758 ff., p. 761.  
36
 See, European Court of Human Rights, Stapleton v. Ireland, Application No. 56588/07, Decision of 
4 May 2010, para. 29, concerning a challenge to the execution by Ireland of a EAW issued by the United 
Kingdom. In this case, the ECtHR determined that it would be more appropriate for the courts of the State 
of origin to review the applicant’s claims. In the same vein, see European Court of Human Rights, Avotiņš 
v. Latvia, Application No. 17502/07, Judgment of 23 May 2016, para. 121. See also CORTÉS-MARTÍN, “The 
Long Road to Strasbourg: The Apparent Controversy Surrounding the Principle of Mutual Trust”, Review 
of European Administrative Law, 2018, p. 5 ff., pp. 20-21 and 23-24. 
37
 LABAYLE, “Droit d’asile et confiance mutuelle: regard critique sur la jurisprudence européenne”, 
Cahiers de droit européen, 2014, p. 501 ff., p. 509. 
38
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. case, cit. supra note 24, para. 351. 
39
 BROUWER, “Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU 
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Secondly, and more crucially, the Court determined that the asylum seeker, when 
objecting to his/her refoulement on grounds of risk of torture, should not bear exclu-
sively the burden of proof concerning the establishment of the requisite threshold for 
the prevention of the return. For the ECtHR, the public knowledge of the specific cir-
cumstances of systemic deficiencies in the Greek asylum system meant that the Bel-
gian authorities had “to first verify how the Greek authorities applied their legislation 
on asylum in practice”, even if the asylum seeker had failed to sufficiently establish an 
individualized risk.40 In this way, the Court laid down the principle that when general 
deficiencies are confirmed, a presumption of individualized risk is established, thus 
shifting the burden of proof to the national authorities of the sending State.41 
These crucial clarifications notwithstanding, the ECtHR’s judgment left many 
issues unresolved. For instance, it is not altogether clear from the Court’s reasoning 
whether systemic deficiencies create for the authorities of the sending State an obli-
gation to verify ex officio the conditions for determining the existence of a risk that 
would prevent the refoulement or whether there must be a certain objection raised 
by the asylum seeker before proceeding to the verification. Moreover, the Court has 
not sufficiently explained the repercussions of a finding that the presumption of 
safety was rebutted: is the obligation to withhold the return of the asylum seeker 
supplemented by a faculty of the sending State to examine itself the asylum request, 
as Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation stipulated, or is such a faculty transformed 
into an obligation? And where do these obligations (of non-return and of own assess-
ment) stem from? More importantly, one may wonder what is the requisite threshold 
for imposing a duty of non-return upon the sending State: individualized risk, sys-
temic deficiencies, or maybe both? And finally, is the above construction only rele-
vant for Article 3 ECHR violations? The CJEU was confronted with these and other 
questions immediately after the M.S.S. case and its answers set the stage for a testy 
dialogue between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts.  
 
 
 
 
and the Burden of Proof”, Utrecht Law Review, 2013, p. 135 ff., p. 142. 
40
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. case, cit. supra note 24, paras. 352 and 358-359. 
41
 IPPOLITO and VELLUTI, “The Relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR: The Case of Asylum”, 
in DZEHTSIAROU et al. (eds.), Human Rights Law in Europe: The Influence, Overlaps and Contradictions 
of the EU and ECHR, London, 2014, p. 156 ff., p. 171. 
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4. – The CJEU’s Response and the Ensuing Dialogue: The N.S./M.E. 
Case and Beyond 
4.1. – The Dublin System under the Influence of the Systemic Deficiencies 
Saga: The Factual Contours of the Sovereignty Clause 
4.1.1. The Conundrum between Systemic Deficiencies and Individualized Risk 
The CJEU reacted to the M.S.S. judgment when it gave a preliminary ruling on 
the N.S./M.E. case. In that case the Luxemburg Court was asked by British and Irish 
courts to clarify whether EU fundamental rights precluded the operation of an ir-
rebutable presumption of compliance of the responsible State with Union law, and if 
that was answered in the affirmative, whether the sending States were obliged to 
assess the compliance of the receiving Member State with Union law and to examine 
the asylum request themselves in case of violations in the responsible State.42 In its 
reply, the Court confirmed the ECtHR’s finding that MS are obliged to respect fun-
damental rights when proceeding to Dublin transfers and thus, no irrebutable pre-
sumption of safety could be recognized. It then declared that MS may not transfer an 
asylum seeker to the responsible Member State when they “cannot be unaware that 
systemic deficiencies…[in the responsible State] amount to substantial grounds for 
believing that the asylum seeker would face risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment” per Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’). 
Yet, the CJEU’s formulation raised the question whether the presumption of 
safety could only be rebutted in case of systemic deficiencies and thus, whether only 
in such cases a Member State was obliged to assess the situation in the responsible 
State and/or refrain from returning the asylum seeker. Some authors suggested so43 
relying on the CJEU’s insistence that not any, minor, or the slightest infringement of 
Union law by the responsible State could impede the transfer of the asylum seeker 
to it, as such a construction would undermine the Dublin system and empty the prin-
ciple of mutual trust, upon which the system is founded, of its substance44; according 
 
42
 C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S./M.E. and others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, paras. 50 and 53. 
43
 See, indicatively, LABAYLE, cit. supra note 37, pp. 517 and 519; MORGADES-GIL, “The Discretion 
of States in the Dublin III System for Determining Responsibility for Examining Applications for Asylum: 
What Remains of the Sovereignty and Humanitarian Clauses after the Interpretations of the ECtHR and 
the CJEU?”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2015, p. 433 ff., p. 442. 
44
 N.S./M.E. cases, cit. supra note 42, paras. 82-85. 
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to the Court, only systemic deficiencies resulting to torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment would rebut the absolute presumption of safety and thus, render such a 
transfer incompatible with Article 4 CFR.45  
This idea of the CJEU choosing the criterion of systemic deficiencies as the 
threshold for rebuttal of the safety presumption was further corroborated by the sub-
sequent preliminary ruling on the Abdullahi case, where the Luxembourg Court ar-
gued that the only way for an asylum applicant to challenge the applicability of the 
Dublin criteria is by pleading the existence of “systemic deficiencies in the asylum 
procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum” in the 
designated State.46 Consequently, the Court indirectly recognized that in case of in-
dividual risk, the State can remove the asylum seeker since the latter could not plead 
systemic deficiencies.47 According to the Court, this restrictive approach was justi-
fied in view of the rationale of the Dublin II Regulation, which aimed at organizing 
relations between the MS through the allocation of mutual duties rather than vesting 
individuals with procedural rights.48 Moreover, the Court argued that this approach 
was in harmony with the principle of mutual trust.49 
At the same period, the ECtHR in section formation, had also repeatedly sug-
gested that only evidence of systemic failure could rebut the safety presumption, thus 
giving rise to a transfer that would violate Article 3 ECHR.50 This concordant juris-
prudence led various authors to argue that within the Dublin system the “substantial 
grounds for assuming individualized risk” test for the activation of the obligation of 
non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR was replaced by the much stricter “systemic 
flaws/deficiencies” test.51  
 
45
 Ibid., paras. 86, 94 and 106. 
46
 C-394/12, Abdullahi, Judgment of 10 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:813, paras. 60-62 (empha-
sis added). See also C-4/11, Puid, Judgment of 14 November 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:740, para. 30. 
47
 BANK, “The Potential and Limitations of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Shaping 
International Refugee Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2015, p. 213 ff., p. 234. 
48
 See C-620/10, Kastrati, Judgment of 3 May 2012, Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, para. 29; 
Puid case, cit. supra note 46, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 58. 
49
 Abdullahi case, cit. supra note 46, paras. 52-53; Puid case, ibid., para. 62. 
50
 See, indicatively, European Court of Human Rights, Samsam Mohammed Hussein and Others v. the 
Netherlands and Italy, Application No. 27725/10, Decision of 2 April 2013, para. 78; Id., Mohammadi v. 
Austria, Application No. 71932/12, Decision of 3 July 2014, para. 74. See also COSTELLO, The Human 
Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law, Oxford, 2016, pp. 271-272. 
51
 See TINIERE, “Confiance mutuelle et droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne”, in Mélanges 
en l'honneur du Professeur Henri Oberdorff, Paris, 2015, p. 71 ff., p. 78; BRIBOSIA and WEYEMBERGH, 
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This restrictive approach was justifiably criticized, since it was considered that it 
was leading to a de facto irrebuttable presumption, where a transfer would be incom-
patible with the ECHR only in extreme circumstances.52 For that reason, various au-
thors offered other interpretations on the “systemic deficiencies” criterion in an effort 
to harmonize its application with the case-law of the ECtHR from the Soering case 
onwards, which insisted on “individual” risk as the relevant criterion for non-re-
foulement.53 On the one hand, some authors tried to allay any fears of collision be-
tween the ECtHR and the CJEU, noting that the divergence between the two Courts 
was more apparent than real, in that it could be explained by the specificities of each 
case.54 Ultimately, so the argument goes, the two criteria of “systemic deficiencies” 
and “individualized risk” refer to different facets of the same idea each being suffi-
cient on its own in order to stop a transfer.55 This line of reasoning seems, however, 
unpersuasive, all the more that the CJEU did not recognize a right to a remedy for 
pleading “individual risk” under Article 19 Dublin II Regulation, as we saw above. 
In contrast to this approach, some other authors tried to empty the “systemic de-
ficiencies” criterion of much of its substance arguing that it should simply be treated 
as one of the elements – alongside individualized risk – taken into account for risk 
assessment.56 Others took a step further by claiming that when systemic deficiencies 
are substantiated, there is no need for the applicant to also prove the existence of 
individualized risk, thus significantly lowering the threshold of proof.57 In other 
words, the systemic deficiencies criterion was treated either as shifting the burden of 
 
“Confiance mutuelle et droits fondamentaux: ‘back to the future’”, Cahiers de droit européen, 2016, p. 469 
ff., p. 487. 
52
 VEDSTED-HANSEN, “Reception Conditions as Human Rights: Pan-European Standard or Systemic 
Deficiencies?”, in CHETAIL, DE BROUYCKER and MAIANI (eds.), Reforming the Common European Asylum 
System, Leiden, 2016, p. 317 ff., pp. 334 and 346. This was the CJEU’s logic in Opinion 2/13, cit. supra 
note 28, para. 191. 
53
 European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgment 
of 7 July 1989, para. 88. 
54
 LENAERTS, “La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet not Blind) Trust”, Common 
Market Law Review, 2017, p. 805 ff., p. 832; CORTÉS-MARTÍN, cit. supra note 36, p. 16. 
55
 LÜBBE, “‘Systemic Flaws’ and Dublin Transfers: Incompatible Tests before the CJEU and the EC-
tHR”, IJRL, 2015, p. 135 ff., p. 137; DÜSTERHAUS, “In the Court(s) We Trust – A Procedural Solution to 
the Mutual Trust Dilemma”, Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, 2017, p. 26 ff., p. 40. 
56
 VEDSTED-HANSEN, cit. supra note 52, p. 344. 
57
 COSTELLO, “Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an End to Blind Trust across the EU?”, Asiel en Migran-
tenrecht, 2012, p. 83 ff., p. 89; BATTJES and BROUWER, “The Dublin Regulation and Mutual Trust: Judicial 
Coherence in EU Asylum Law?”, Review of European Administrative Law, 2015, p. 183 ff., p. 214.  
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proof to the sending State, which had then to prove that despite systemic flaws there 
was no individualized risk and thus a transfer could proceed, or, even more radically, 
as creating an irrebutable presumption that any transfer to that State would automat-
ically violate the fundamental rights of the asylum seeker.58 
The conflict between the ECtHR and the CJEU, however, took a new turn when 
the former explicitly confirmed in the Tarakhel case its Soering jurisprudence de-
claring that “[t]he source of the risk…does not exempt the State ordering the person’s 
removal…from carrying out a thorough and individualized examination of the situ-
ation of the person concerned and from suspending enforcement of the removal order 
should the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment be established”.59 Thus, the State 
was always obliged to conduct an individualized assessment and refuse the re-
foulement if the Soering threshold was attained, even in cases where no systemic 
flaws could be substantiated.60 This criterion seems to be both more generous and 
stricter for the asylum seeker than that of systemic deficiencies. It is more generous 
in the sense that it requires neither the existence of systemic deficiencies and indi-
vidualized risk, as some have suggested,61 nor the presentation by the asylum seeker 
of a fully proven claim of systemic deficiencies for the sending State to be obliged 
to withhold the removal, as was argued in Abdullahi. Instead, what needs to be shown 
is the existence of substantial grounds for believing that the person might face a real 
risk of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment.62 Nevertheless, it is arguendo 
stricter than the systemic deficiencies in the M.S.S. judgment, where general infor-
mation about such deficiencies was deemed enough for the sending State to be 
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 COSTELLO and MOUZOURAKIS, “Reflections on Reading Tarakhel: Is ‘How Bad Is Bad Enough’ 
Good Enough?”, Asiel en Migrantenrecht, 2014, p. 404 ff., p. 404. 
59
 European Court of Human Rights, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application No. 29217/12, Judgment of 
4 November 2014, para. 104. 
60
 Ibid., para. 115; MONTALDO, “On a Collision Course! Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Recent Case-law of the Court of Justice”, European Papers, 2016, 
p. 965 ff., p. 986. 
61
 PRECHAL, «Mutual Trust before the Court of Justice of the European Union», European Papers, 
2017, p. 1 ff., p. 15. 
62
 European Court of Human Rights, Tarakhel case, cit. supra note 59, para. 93. See the observations 
of COSTELLO and MOUZOURAKIS, cit. supra note 58, p. 410; LAGEOT, “Les enseignements de l’affaire 
Tarakhel: le raisonnement enrichi des juges à la source d’une protection renforcée des migrants en Europe”, 
Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2016, p. 245 ff., p. 250. Contra seems to be THYM, “Judicial 
Maintenance of the Sputtering Dublin System on Asylum Jurisdiction: Jafari, A.S., Mengsteab and Shiri”, 
Common Market Law Review, 2018, p. 549 ff., p. 564.  
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obliged to review the return and probably even refrain from removing the asylum 
applicant.63 
At the same period, however, the EU legislator, following the N.S./M.E. case, 
consecrated the “systemic deficiencies” criterion, as the only one explicitly activat-
ing the State’s duty to prevent the return of the asylum seeker.64 Thus, the question 
was raised whether other categories of risk (i.e. individualized) could act as a bar on 
removals.65 In other words, was the ECtHR’s Tarakhel judgment an exception justi-
fied by the vulnerability of the applicants or could it be generalized, thus rendering 
Article 3(2) Dublin III Regulation an unnecessarily restrictive codification of the 
non-refoulement rule?66 Consequently, in spite of the EU’s willingness to incorporate 
in the Dublin Regulation the N.S./M.E. pronouncement that supposedly reflected the 
M.S.S. judgment of the ECtHR, the tension between the two Courts appeared intact.  
Ultimately, it was the CJEU that “blinked” first, confirming, albeit not whole-
heartedly, the Tarakhel test of individualized risk in the C.K. case.67 The case con-
cerned the transfer from Slovenia to Croatia of a family of asylum seekers, who ar-
gued that the transfer itself could constitute inhuman and degrading treatment as it 
could contribute to a significant and permanent deterioration in the wife’s already 
impaired mental health. Since there were no systemic deficiencies in Croatian asy-
lum procedures and reception conditions – all the more that the applicants would 
have been relocated to a center intended for vulnerable groups – the Advocate Gen-
eral (AG) Tanchev argued that the removal could not be prevented.68 Τhe CJEU, on 
its part, diverged from the AG’s opinion and ruled that the transfer should be sus-
pended irrespective of systemic flaws in case of individual risk within the meaning 
of Article 4 CFR.69 The Luxembourg Court reached this decision despite the clear 
language of Article 3(2) Dublin III Regulation and the Court’s previous pronounce-
 
63
 MARIN, ““Only You”: The Emergence of a Temperate Mutual Trust in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice and its Underpinning in the European Composite Constitutional Order”, European Papers, 
2017, p. 141 ff., p. 145. 
64
 Art. 3(2) Dublin III Regulation. 
65
 HRUSCHKA and MAIANI, “Dublin III Regulation”, in HAILBRONNER and THYM (eds.), EU Immigra-
tion and Asylum Law: A Commentary, 2nd ed., München, 2016, p. 1478 ff., p. 1499.  
66
 COSTELLO and MOUZOURAKIS, cit. supra note 58, p. 411. 
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 C-578/16 PPU, C.K. et al., Judgment of 16 February 2017. 
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 Ibid., para. 52. 
69
 Ibid., paras. 71 and 90-91. 
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ments in the Abdullahi case. In a balancing act, the CJEU observed that such a con-
clusion was admissible, on the one hand, because of the absolute character of Article 
4 CFR and the clear precedent thereon, and on the other hand, because this case dealt 
with a claim under the Dublin III Regulation that the transfer itself entailed a risk of 
inhuman and degrading treatment.70 
The Court’s line of argumentation warrants a series of observations. Primo, it is 
not altogether obvious what is the impact of the fact that in the C.K. case the risk of 
inhuman and degrading treatment concerned the transfer itself. Does this mean, for 
instance, that in case of non-systemic flaws in the reception conditions or the asylum 
procedures where, however, an individualized risk within Article 4 CFR can be sub-
stantiated, the sending State is not obliged to suspend the transfer?71 This can be 
plausibly sustained, as the CJEU declared that the exceptional circumstances of the 
case at hand were crucial for enlarging the scope of the non-refoulement obligation 
under the Dublin system.72  
The recent CJEU judgment in the Jawo case remains ambivalent. On the one 
hand, the Luxemburg Court expanded the assessment obligation incumbent upon the 
courts of the sending State beyond the asylum procedures and the reception condi-
tions in the responsible State so as to also include the expected living standards of 
the applicant in the latter State after being granted individual protection. Thus, it 
considered that a situation of extreme material poverty leading to absolute destitution 
could amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.73 On the other hand, the Court 
stressed that such a situation could be produced only when there were “deficiencies, 
which may be systemic or generalized, or which may affect certain groups of people” 
attaining “a particularly high level of severity”.74 Consequently, the obligation of 
non-refoulement could be triggered only in exceptional circumstances pertaining to 
systemic flaws or to the unique vulnerability of that particular applicant. 
 
70
 Ibid., para. 94. 
71
 See IMAMOVIĆ and MUIR, “The Dublin III System: More Derogation to the Duty to Transfer Indivi-
dual Asylum Seekers?”, European Papers, 2017, p. 719 ff., pp. 726-727; BRIBOSIA and RIZCALLAH, “Arrêt 
‘C.K.’: transfert ‘Dublin’ interdit en cas de risque de traitements inhumains et dégradants tenant à la situa-
tion particulière d’un demandeur”, Journal de droit européen, 2017, p. 181 ff., p. 183. 
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 C.K. case, cit. supra note 67, para. 92. 
73
 C-163/17, Jawo, Judgment of 19 March 2019, paras. 91-93, citing the M.S.S. judgment, cit. supra 
note 24, para. 254. 
74
 Ibid., paras. 91-92, citing C-404/15 and 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Judgment of 5 April 
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Secundo, the Court’s observation that its change of heart with regard to Dublin 
transfers is partly due to the more explicit and expanded fundamental rights safe-
guards included in the Dublin III Regulation75, raised an important issue. More spe-
cifically, some authors wondered whether the Court’s aforementioned admission sig-
nified that if MS decide to backtrack from this pro-human rights choice in the next 
amendment to the Dublin system, the CJEU could again limit the obligation of non-
refoulement only to “systemic flaws”, a choice widely perceived to be at variance 
with the ECtHR’s case-law.76 Such a scenario seems nowadays increasingly doubtful 
taking into account the subsequent case-law of the CJEU. More particularly, while 
the Court initially paid particular attention to the drafting differences between Dublin 
II and Dublin III regarding fundamental rights protection,77 such references are ab-
sent in later cases. In the Jafari case, for example, the Court applied Article 3(2) 
Dublin III Regulation without explicitly referring to the systemic flaws criterion or 
to the differences with the Dublin II Regulation.78 Further clarifications were adduced 
by the CJEU in the recent M.A. case, where it was explicitly mentioned that funda-
mental rights in the framework of Dublin transfers are protected not only by Article 
3(2) concerning systemic flaws, but also by the MS’ obligations under Article 4 CFR 
and the case-law of the ECtHR on Article 3 ECHR.79  
Consequently, the obligation to not proceed with a Dublin transfer under circum-
stances entailing a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment beyond the “systemic 
flaws” criterion cannot stem solely from the human rights-friendly language of the 
Dublin III Regulation; it is firmly grounded on the MS’ international human rights 
obligations, which cannot be derogated via secondary Union law. 
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 C.K. case, cit. supra note 67, paras. 62 and 94. 
76
 See IMAMOVIC and MUIR, cit. supra note 71, p. 725; THYM, cit. supra note 62, p. 565. This scenario 
of backtracking from the advanced human rights protection offered in the Dublin III Regulation is envis-
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final. 
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 C-63/15, Ghezelbash, Judgment of 7 June 2016, para. 34. 
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 C-646/16, Jafari, Judgment of 26 July 2017, para. 101. 
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 C-661/17, M.A. et al., Judgment of 23 January 2019, para. 84; Jawo case, cit. supra note 73, paras. 
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4.1.2. Can the Presumption of Safety Be Rebutted in Situations not Involving a 
Risk of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment?  
A further issue concerns the possibility of activating the obligation of non-re-
foulement for other human rights violations beyond those related to Article 3 
ECHR/4 CFR.80 The ECtHR offers a series of such examples81 – though none of them 
has been expounded by the Court in the framework of Dublin transfers. For instance, 
the Strasbourg Court has found that flagrant breaches of human rights under, among 
other, Articles 4,82 5,83 6,84 885 and 986 ECHR might potential give rise to an obligation 
of non-refoulement. In the Othman case, while examining an allegation of a flagrant 
denial of justice under Article 6 ECHR, the Court explained that to be flagrant a 
breach should be “so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction of 
the very essence, of the rights guaranteed”.87 This legal construction illustrated a dis-
tinction between violations of absolute and non-derogable rights, which require sub-
stantial grounds for believing that there will be a real risk of violation, and other 
human rights, where the threshold is “flagrant breach”.88 
In contrast, and despite the reference to a right to asylum in Article 18 CFR and 
the AG’s opinion in the N.S./M.E. case that any serious risk of violation of a funda-
mental right could give rise to an obligation of non-refoulement89, the CJEU rejected 
in that case the view that minor or the slightest infringements of other human rights 
 
80
 HAILBRONNER and THYM, “Legal Framework of EU Asylum Policy”, in HAILLBRONNER and THYM 
(eds.), cit. supra note 65, p. 1023 ff., pp. 1051-1052; PEERS et al. (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law, 
Vol. 3: EU Asylum Law, 2nd ed., Leiden, 2015, pp. 105-106.  
81
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tive Legal Practice and Theory, Leiden, 2016, p. 180 ff., pp. 197-203; KTISTAKIS, Protecting Migrants 
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2016, pp. 100-105. 
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tion Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Judgment of 4 February 2005, paras. 88 and 91. 
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 Id., Othman v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012, para. 260. 
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 Id., Soering case, cit. supra note 53, para. 88. 
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or of the secondary legislation on the CEAS could give rise to such an obligation90, 
while remaining non-committal about cases of more serious human rights violations 
going beyond Article 4 CFR.91 The CJEU’s evading strategy, validated in the Ibrahim 
case, where despite the invocation of Article 18 CFR, the Court considered that sys-
tematic violations of the Qualifications Directive by the responsible State did not 
give rise to an obligation of the returning State to non-refoulement,92 and the EC-
tHR’s vague, and admittedly unduly stringent,93 threshold led various authors to sug-
gest their own criteria for the freezing of Dublin transfers, such as ‘serious risk of 
violation94 of absolute fundamental rights’,95 ‘manifest and disproportionate 
breaches’96 or ‘systematic violations of core fundamental rights’.97  
This cacophony and the lack of consistent judicial practice might be changing 
lately on the basis of a string of judgments by the CJEU, which recognize a right to 
challenge a Dublin transfer decision on various procedural reasons, such as the non-
respect of time limits or the incorrect application of the Dublin criteria. While the 
CJEU has not explicitly declared that such claims might activate the obligation of 
non-refoulement, the outcome of this jurisprudential development might be the 
blocking of Dublin transfers because of procedural defaults.98 
4.2. – From Discretion to Obligation and Back: The Legal Contours of the 
‘Sovereignty Clause’ 
Dublin transfers are further complicated by the existence of procedural layers, 
where each one of them gives rise to a discussion whether the sending State is bound 
to perform a specific duty or, instead, enjoys a margin of discretion thereto. More 
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92
 C-297, 318, 319 and 438/17, Ibrahim, Judgment of 19 March 2019, paras. 99-100. See also Jawo 
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specifically, controversies over the extent of State obligations under Dublin transfers 
touch upon three different aspects of the procedure: firstly, whether the sending 
State’s national authorities are obliged to examine the relevant circumstances in or-
der to assess the extent of risk of inhuman and degrading treatment (obligation to 
assess) and correlatively, whether these authorities should proceed to the assessment 
ex officio; secondly, whether a sending State is obliged to not return an asylum seeker 
to the responsible Member State and under what circumstances (obligation of non-
refoulement); and thirdly, when is a Member State other than the responsible State 
obliged to examine itself an asylum application and when is it simply free to do so 
(obligation to examine the application).  
4.2.1. The Scope of the Obligation to Assess the Risk 
In asylum cases, as in any other case, it is in principle “for the applicant to adduce 
evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he/she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3” on the basis of the transfer.99 Only afterwards a duty arises for the compe-
tent national authorities to review any evidence and challenge this belief in order to 
be able to proceed to the removal.100 For that precept to be fully realized, the applicant 
must be firstly given the opportunity to present such evidence before the Member 
State reaches or executes the transfer decision, that is, he/she must be granted a rem-
edy that will allow for the presentation of his/her views and the contestation of a 
removal decision.101 
Two developments in the case-law of both the ECtHR and the CJEU have chal-
lenged this perception. On the one hand, there has been a tendency to circumscribe 
the asylum seeker’s right to a remedy in the framework of the Dublin system. Such 
a strategy was feasible under the Dublin II Regulation, which in its Article 19(2) 
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provided that the decision not to examine the application and the obligation to trans-
fer the applicant “may be subject to an appeal or a review”, giving the impression 
that States had a discretion on whether to grant a remedy or not to the asylum appli-
cant.102 This restrictive approach reflected the principle of mutual trust, as already 
explained: any challenge to the presumption of compliance of MS with human rights 
was treated as undermining and disrupting the Dublin system.103 That logic, which 
permeated the K.R.S. case,104 also inspired the CJEU in the Abdullahi case, as we 
highlighted, where the Luxemburg court considered that only a remedy against a 
transfer pleading systemic deficiencies was admissible; any other challenge to the 
application of the Dublin criteria or allegations on violations of his/her fundamental 
rights could not be raised with the transferring authorities.105  
On the other hand, and in stark contrast to the above approach that placed a heavy 
burden of proof on the applicant, the M.S.S. and the N.S./M.E. cases recognized a 
different, more constructive, role for the criterion of “systemic deficiencies”. In the 
M.S.S. case, as we have argued, the attainment of the “systemic deficiencies” thresh-
old allowed to shift the burden of proof to the national authorities of the sending 
State.106 Some even suggested, on the basis of the N.S./M.E. judgment, that publicly 
known “systemic deficiencies” obliged the sending State to assess the possible risk 
resulting from the transfer proprio motu, that is, even when the asylum seeker had 
not raised a specific objection to that effect.107 Such a solution of relieving the appli-
cant of any burden of proof seems fair taking into account the inherent vulnerability 
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106
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. case, cit. supra note 24, paras. 352 and 358-9; N.S/M.E. 
cases, cit. supra note 42, para. 91. For the use of the ‘systemic deficiencies’ criterion for determining the 
burden of proof, see MORGADES-GIL, cit. supra note 43, p. 446; IPPOLITO and VELLUTI, cit. supra note 41, 
p. 171. 
107
 N.S./M.E. cases, cit. supra note 42, paras. 94 and 106. See BROUWER, “Mutual Trust and Human 
Rights in the AFSJ: In Search of Guidelines for National Courts”, European Papers, 2016, p. 893 ff., p. 
908; BILLING, cit. supra note 101, p. 90. 
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of the asylum seeker and the complete control of MS over a Dublin transfer proce-
dure.108 Thus, there is no doubt that under both prongs of this second approach when 
there are systemic deficiencies the national authorities are obliged to assess the risk 
before proceeding to a transfer.109  
It is still, however, disputed whether the asylum seeker is enabled to also chal-
lenge his/her transfer for other reasons, namely whether national authorities are 
obliged to assess the risk from a Dublin transfer in cases beyond the ones encom-
passing ‘systemic deficiencies’. This more egalitarian iteration of the Dublin system 
became increasingly plausible recently in view of the more prominent role recog-
nized to asylum applicants under the Dublin III Regulation, where the right to a rem-
edy and legal safeguards are guaranteed “in fact and in law [and in accordance with 
Article 47 CFR] against a transfer decision” covering “both the examination of the 
application of [the] Regulation and of the legal and factual situation in the Member 
State to which the applicant is transferred”.110 This broader consecration of a right to 
an effective remedy has been confirmed by the case-law of both the ECtHR111 and 
the CJEU.112 The latter Court has stressed, however, that the asylum seeker must raise 
a relevant claim for the Dublin transfer to be challenged, thus rejecting the idea of 
an ex officio assessment113, and it additionally determined recently in a preliminary 
ruling concerning the effects of Brexit that the remedy of Article 27 Dublin III Reg-
ulation does not cover a refusal of a Member State to examine an asylum application 
under the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) Dublin III Regulation.114 
 
108
 BROUWER, cit. supra note 39, p. 144. 
109
 NEVEU, “Reconnaissance mutuelle et droits fondamentaux: quelles limites à la coopération judi-
ciaire pénale? ”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2016, p. 119 ff., p. 129; VEDSTED-HANSEN, cit. 
supra note 52, pp. 342-343. 
110
 Art. 27(1) and Recital 19, respectively, of the Dublin III Regulation; Ghezelbash case, cit. supra 
note 77, paras. 34-44. See also the observations in DEN HEIJER, cit. supra note 102, pp. 859-861. 
111
 European Court of Human Rights, Tarakhel case, cit. supra note 59, paras. 103-104, and the com-
ments by MITSILEGAS, “Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights after Lisbon”, in 
MITSILEGAS, BERGSTRÖM and KONSTANTINIDES (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law, Chel-
tenham, 2016, p. 148 ff., p. 161. 
112
 C.K. case, cit. supra note 67, paras. 75-77; Ghezelbash case, cit. supra note 77, para. 37; C-670/16, 
Mengeasteab, Judgment of 16 July 2017, para. 62. 
113
 C.K. case, cit. supra para. 94; Jawo case, cit. supra note 73, para. 90; C-582/17 and 583/17, H. and 
R., Judgment of 2 April 2019, para. 84. See also THYM, cit. supra note 62, p. 564; BRIBOSIA and 
RIZCALLAH, cit. supra note 71, p. 183. 
114
 M.A. case, cit. supra note 79, paras. 75 and 78-79, adding, however that such a refusal could be 
indirectly challenged through the use of the above remedy against the transfer decision. More recently, the 
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Consequently, it is by now widely accepted that the asylum seeker must have the 
possibility to raise a claim against a transfer decision. Such a claim might concern 
the circumstances in the responsible State pertaining to the reception or living con-
ditions before or after the granting of international protection respectively, and/or 
other defects in the transfer procedure, such as the violation of time limits or the 
incorrect application of the Dublin criteria by the sending State. In all those circum-
stances, it is indirectly established that the national authorities of the sending State 
are obliged to assess the claim and the risk entailed from the transfer.  
4.2.2. Between the Obligation to Prevent the Return of the Asylum Seeker and the 
Discretion to Examine His/Her Application: The Ambiguities of the Dublin 
Regime 
The interrelation between the obligation of non-return and the examination of an 
asylum application is another area where the case-law of the two supranational courts 
is not strictly aligned. For a start, it must be borne in mind that while an obligation 
of a third Member State to examine an asylum application inescapably means also 
an obligation not to return the asylum seeker to the responsible – per the Dublin 
criteria – State, the opposite is not always true, as we will see, meaning that a State 
could be obliged to withhold the transfer while remaining free to search for another 
responsible Member State that could take up the asylum request. 
The successive Dublin Regulations have shaped the legal contours of the sover-
eignty clause in varied ways. The Dublin II Regulation’s only relevant proviso was 
Article 3(2) establishing a State’s faculty to examine an application it was not re-
sponsible for per the Dublin criteria. There was instead no reference to an obligation 
to not return asylum seekers, as the safety presumption underpinning the Dublin sys-
tem meant that returns between EU MS could be automatic. This was challenged by 
the ECtHR’s judgment in the M.S.S. case, which declared that if substantial grounds 
existed for believing that an asylum seeker would be exposed through a Dublin trans-
fer to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, the national authorities of the 
sending State could – and actually should – refuse the transfer on the basis of the 
sovereignty clause.115  
 
CJEU has also determined that while the remedy under Article 27 Dublin III Regulation covers ‘take 
charge’ or ‘take back’ procedures, it cannot be used in this procedural framework to challenge the criteria 
for determining the responsible State; H. and R. case, cit. supra note 113, para. 85. 
115
 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. case, cit. supra note 24, paras. 358-360. 
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Yet, the ECtHR did not clarify the legal basis upon which the non-refoulement 
obligation was grounded leading to multiple legal constructions thereon. For some 
authors, the fleeting reference to Article 3(2) Dublin II Regulation in the M.S.S. judg-
ment meant that the duty to refuse transfer could be based on that provision.116 But 
since this clause did not mention anything about non-refoulement, it was countered 
that in the above circumstances the discretionary clause of Article 3(2) turned man-
datory solely regarding the examination of the asylum request and only reflectively, 
that obligation also meant an obligation to not return the asylum seeker.117 However, 
the Court had not explicitly said that any obligation whatsoever stemmed from Arti-
cle 3(2). Consequently, it is more accurate to say that in the ECtHR’s judgment the 
duty of non-refoulement stemmed from the MS’ obligations under the ECHR, while 
that State remained free to examine or not the asylum application under the sover-
eignty clause.118 In other words, when the M.S.S. circumstances were at play, nothing 
prevented the said Member State, after implementing its non-refoulement obligation, 
from transferring the asylum seeker to the next in line responsible, per the Dublin 
criteria, State. 
The CJEU further clarified this point in the N.S./M.E. and Puid cases. Firstly, it 
confirmed that in case of systemic deficiencies in the responsible State, any other 
Member State should not return an asylum seeker there.119 The absence of any refer-
ence to Article 3(2) Dublin II Regulation at that point validates the view that the 
obligation of non-refoulement cannot stem from or be materialized through the sov-
ereignty clause. Secondly, the CJEU held that the sending State was only obliged to 
continue searching for the next in line responsible State and that under Article 3(2) 
it still enjoyed discretion on whether to treat itself the asylum application, unless the 
above search took an unreasonable length of time leading to a deterioration of the 
human rights situation of the asylum applicant.120 
 
116
 MORENO-LAX, cit. supra note 19, p. 6. 
117
 MORGADES-GIL, cit. supra note 43, p. 439.  
118
 BOSSUYT, “Belgium Condemned for Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Due to Violations by Greece 
of EU Asylum Law: M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, 
January 21, 2011”, European Human Rights Law Review, 2011, p. 581 ff., p. 584. 
119
 N.S./M.E. case, cit. supra note 42, para. 94. 
120
 Ibid., paras. 107-108. The Court upheld the finding that a MS is not obliged to take up the asylum 
application itself under Article 3(2) in the Puid case, cit. supra note 46, para. 37. For a correct reading of 
the case, see LABAYLE, cit. supra note 37, p. 521; BANK, cit. supra note 47, p. 232. Contra GRAGL, cit. 
supra note 26, pp. 133-134; BROUWER, cit. supra note 39, p. 143, speaking about an obligation to examine. 
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Eventually, the EU legislator amended the Dublin Regulation and incorporated 
these findings in the recast Regulation. More specifically, Article 3(2) Dublin III Reg-
ulation prohibits any transfer in case of systemic flaws in the responsible Member State 
and further provides that in such a case, the “sending” State “shall continue to examine 
the criteria…in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as 
responsible” and only if no other such State can be found or if the search takes an 
unreasonable length of time,121 it becomes the one responsible for the asylum applica-
tion.122 Consequently, under Article 3(2) the obligation of non-refoulement does not 
give rise to an immediate obligation of the Member State to examine itself the asylum 
request. Moreover, the Regulation retains the sovereignty clause in Article 17(1), ac-
cording to which a State, which is not responsible under the Dublin criteria, can under 
this clause take up the asylum application itself.123 In this framework, a Member State 
enjoys a wide margin of discretion on whether to take up the asylum request and thus, 
to not return the asylum seeker to the responsible State. 
Apart from the case of systemic flaws regulated in Article 3(2), however, it has 
already been shown that a duty of non-refoulement might equally exist under differ-
ent circumstances.124 This was confirmed in the Tarakhel and the C.K. cases, while 
there is also a developing jurisprudence on an obligation of non-refoulement in the 
context of flagrant violations of other human rights, as we illustrated.125 The addi-
tional to Article 3(2) obligation of non-refoulement is usually justified by reference 
to the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) Dublin III Regulation, which under the 
aforementioned circumstances is allegedly transformed into a mandatory clause that 
imposes on the sending State an obligation to examine the asylum request and, cor-
relatively, an obligation to not return the asylum seeker to the responsible State.126  
This legal construction cannot, however, explain why the consequences of the 
activation of non-refoulement are different, and actually more severe for the sending 
 
121
 For the view that we should read into Art. 3(2) Dublin III Regulation this condition enunciated in 
the N.S. case, see HRUSCHKA and MAIANI, cit. supra note 65, pp. 1500-1501. 
122
 See VICINI, cit. supra note 30, p. 68. The imposition of the responsibility has been described as 
constituting a transformation of the sovereignty clause of Art. 17(1) into a mandatory one; see HRUSCHKA 
and MAIANI, ibid. Nevertheless, the Regulation itself makes in Art. 3(2) no reference to Art. 17(1). 
123
 See BRIBOSIA and WEYEMBERGH, cit. supra note 51, p. 488. 
124
 See supra, p. 422 f. 
125
 See supra, p. 425 f. 
126
 This approach underpins the analysis in HRUSCHKA and MAIANI, cit. supra note 65, pp. 1499-1500 
and 1535; VEDSTED-HANSEN, cit. supra note 52, p. 347. Contra MORENO-LAX, cit. supra note 19, p. 30. 
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State, in the case of individualized risks compared to systemic flaws. More particu-
larly, in the former case the application of Article 17(1) signifies that the sending 
State must examine the application itself, while in the latter case Article 3(2) only 
forces the sending State to continue searching for the next in line responsible State.127 
Additionally, the above construction is confronted with the CJEU’s persistent find-
ing that the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) remains optional notwithstanding 
the existence of an obligation of non-refoulement.128 As the CJEU has recently held, 
Article 17(1) consecrates an unconditional and absolute right of the State to take up 
the asylum application, reflecting its sovereign prerogative to grant international pro-
tection.129 Such wide margin of discretion is not overturned, according to the Court, 
by any fundamental rights considerations.130  
Accordingly, as in the case of Article 3(2), the obligation of non-refoulement for 
situations beyond systemic flaws, which itself stems from outside the Dublin III Reg-
ulation as we have explained131, cannot be linked to an obligation to examine the 
asylum request. Nevertheless, such an obligation can arise if the search for the next 
in line responsible State takes an unreasonable amount of time threatening the human 
rights of the asylum seeker132 or if, as in the C.K. case, the refugee’s state of health 
continues to prevent the transfer for more than six months.133 
5. – Conclusion 
The ECtHR and the CJEU have lately engaged in a jurisprudential dialogue on the 
Dublin Regulations that has been both testy and fertile for the CEAS. Despite the con-
vergence in their case-law, there remain some gray areas that warrant a more system-
atic treatment. This will contribute to a more effective implementation of the Dublin 
Regulation and the better protection of the asylum seeker. New challenges, such as the 
Brexit or the mass refugee flows, pose an extraordinary challenge for the smooth im-
plementation of the Dublin stipulations but they also offer an opportunity to fine-tune 
the CJEU’s case-law and re-align it even closer to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  
 
127
 HRUSCHKA and MAIANI, ibid., p. 1500. 
128
 See, indicatively, Puid case, cit. supra note 46, para. 29; C.K. case, cit. supra note 67, para. 88.  
129
 M.A. case, cit. supra note 79, paras. 58-60. 
130
 Ibid., para. 72. 
131
 See supra, p. 424 f. 
132
 See supra, p. 431 f. 
133
 Art. 29(2) Dublin III Regulation, cited by BRIBOSIA and RICZALLAH, cit. supra note 71, p. 182. 
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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction and Scope of Scrutiny – 2. The Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit of the 
Return Directive – 3. The CJEU Jurisprudence on the Return Directive and International 
Human Rights Law – 4. Reasons behind the CJEU’s Distancing from International Human 
Rights Law – 5. Concluding Remarks. 
 
1. – Introduction and Scope of Scrutiny 
The Return Directive1 of the European Union (‘EU’) was adopted in December 
2008 to provide common standards and procedures to be applied by EU Member 
States to third-country nationals (non-EU nationals) who do not fulfil the conditions 
for entry, stay or residence in a Member State, with a view to promoting an effective 
 
*
 The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and its content does not necessarily 
represent the views or the position of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 
1
 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 
(OJ L 348, 12.24.2008, pp. 98-107) (hereinafter: ‘Return Directive’). 
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return policy. The directive lays down common, harmonised rules related to the is-
suing of ‘return decisions’2 and the enforcement of removals (forced returns),3 the 
use of pre-removal detention as well as procedural safeguards, including due process 
guarantees and access to effective remedies. This keystone legal instrument of the 
Union’s return acquis integrates into the EU return policy a set of principles stem-
ming from international law (including the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights4 – ‘ECHR’) and EU law (including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights5 – 
hereinafter, the ‘Charter’). 
The Return Directive entered into force on 13 January 2009 (pursuant to Article 
22 of the directive). EU Member States bound by it,6 as well as the four Schengen 
Associated Countries,7 had to transpose its provisions into their domestic legislation 
until 24 December 2010 (with the exception of the free legal assistance and/or rep-
resentation for which the transposition deadline expired one year later – see Article 
20(1) of the directive). 
Since its entry into force more than ten years ago (and even before, during the 
negotiations phase), the Return Directive has been subject to heated policy debates;8 
 
2
 According to the definition in Art. 3(4) of the Return Directive, a ‘return decision’ “means an ad-
ministrative or judicial decision or act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country national to be illegal 
and imposing or stating an obligation to return.” ‘Return’ is defined in paragraph (3) of the same article as 
follows: “the process of a third-country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an 
obligation to return, or enforced – to: […] his or her country of origin, or […] a country of transit in 
accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or […] another 
third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he 
or she will be accepted.” 
3
 Art. 3(5) of the Return Directive defines ‘removal’ as “the enforcement of the obligation to return, 
namely the physical transportation of [the person] out of the Member State.”. 
4
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 
1950, ETS No. 005. 
5
 See OJ C 202, 7.06.2016, p. 389 ff. 
6
 The Return Directive is not applicable to Ireland and the United Kingdom pursuant to Protocol (No. 
21) on their respective positions in the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the founding Trea-
ties; and these EU Member States did not subsequently opted-in either. 
7
 Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland (see also recitals (27)-(30) in the preamble of the 
directive).  
8
 See e.g. PHILLIPS, “Global Outcry against EU Immigration Directive”, EU Observer, 19 June 2008, 
available at: <https://euobserver.com/justice/26354> (quoting the then UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Louise Arbour); United Nations, “Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants, Jorge G. Bustamante: Addendum: Communications Sent to Governments and Replies 
Received”, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/7/Add.1, 20 May 2009, paras. 81-103 (ten UN independent experts sent a 
joint communication to France, which held the rotating Presidency of the EU Council during the second 
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harsh criticism by multiple civil society organisations;9 and a number of academic 
commentaries.10 One of the recurring aspects of the discussions and controversies 
over the directive’s contents and standards relates to its (non-)compliance with hu-
man rights stemming from either universal (United Nations – ‘UN’) or regional (pri-
marily Council of Europe – ‘CoE’) instruments. The scholarly writings on the di-
rective, however, have not yet really engaged with the role of international human 
rights law in the ever-growing case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’) unfolding and clarifying various provisions of the Return Directive. 
 
half of 2008 when the directive was adopted); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR 
Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Common Standards and Proce-
dures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals COM(2005)391 final”, 
Geneva, December 2005; Id., “UNHCR Position on the Proposal for a Directive on Common Standards 
and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals”, Geneva, 16 
June 2008. 
9
 See, inter alia, SAVE THE CHILDREN, “Comments on ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally 
Staying Third-Country Nationals’”, September 2005; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL EU OFFICE, “Returning 
‘irregular’ migrants: The Human Rights Perspective: Amnesty International’s Comments on the Draft Di-
rective on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third 
Country Nationals COM (2005) 391 Final”, May 2006; EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, 
“Comments from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Re-
turning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals (COM(2005)391 Final)”, CO2/5/2006/ExtPC, May 
2006; RED CROSS EU OFFICE, “Position Paper: European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Return-
ing Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals”, July 2006. 
10
 For leading in-depth academic commentaries on the directive, see e.g. LUTZ and MANANASHVILI, 
“Return Directive 2008/115/EC” in HAILBRONNER and THYM (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law. A 
Commentary, Munich/Oxford/Baden-Baden, 2016, 2nd edition, p. 658 ff.; PEERS, EU Justice and Home 
Affairs Law: Volume I: EU Immigration and Asylum Law, Oxford, 2016, 4th edition, sub-section 7.7, p. 501 
ff.; ACOSTA ARCARAZO and GUILD, “The Returns Directive”, in PEERS, GUILD, ACOSTA ARCARAZO, 
GROENENDIJK and MORENO-LAX (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): Second 
Revised Edition, Leiden, 2012, p. 483 ff.; ACOSTA ARCARAZO, “The Returns Directive: Possible Limits 
and Interpretation” in ZWAAN (ed.), The Returns Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues, and Imple-
mentation in Selected Member States, Nijmegen, 2011, p. 7 ff.; BALDACCINI, “The EU Directive on Return: 
Principles and Protests”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2009, p. 114 ff.; BALDACCINI, “The Return and Re-
moval of Irregular Migrants under EU Law: An Analysis of the Returns Directive”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, 2009, p. 1 ff.; BOELES, DEN HEIJER, LODDER and WOUTERS, European Migration Law, 
Antwerp/Oxford/Portland, 2009, p. 411 ff.; MARTUCCI, “La directive ‘retour’: la politique européenne 
d'immigration face à ses paradoxes”, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 2009, p. 47 ff.; CARLIER, “‘La 
directive retour’ et le respect des droits fondamentaux”, L’Europe des Libertés – Revue d’actualité jurid-
ique, 2008, p. 13 ff. 
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Against this backdrop, this contribution aims at mapping and analysing the ap-
proach of the CJEU, which is the guardian that “the law is observed” in the interpreta-
tion and application of the EU Treaties,11 towards international human rights law in 
the context of EU return law and policy. While doing so, the piece focuses on the 
Return Directive as the central element of the EU return acquis, and it seeks to explore 
and understand the place and role of international human rights law (including the 
ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’),12 seated 
in Strasbourg) in the CJEU’s return-related jurisprudence based on the directive. 
2. – The Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit of the Return Directive 
‘Expulsion of aliens’ (in the UN language) 13, or ‘returning illegally staying third-
country nationals’ (expression used in the EU legal parlance) 14 does not take place in 
a legal vacuum.15 Rather, it is subject to a comprehensive set of human rights16 protect-
ing returnees’ rights, given that such coercive measures performed by the immigration 
law enforcement authorities of the host country may easily result in drastic changes 
involving serious consequences on the life and future of the persons concerned.17  
 
11
 Art. 19(1), Treaty on European Union (see OJ C 202, 7.06.2016, p. 1 ff). 
12
 For a well-structured and recent overview of the ECtHR jurisprudence relating to the expulsion of 
aliens, see SCUTO, “‘Aliens’ protection against expulsion and prohibition of collective expulsion by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, Federalismi.it – Rivista di diritto pubblico ital-
iano, comunitario e comparato, 2018, p. 1 ff. On the changing dynamics in the expulsion related adjudica-
tion of the Strasbourg Court, consider FARAHAT, “Enhancing Constitutional Justice by Using External Ref-
erences: The European Court of Human Rights’ Reasoning on the Protection against Expulsion”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2015, p. 303 ff. 
13
 International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, Draft Articles on the 
Expulsion of Aliens, GAOR, 69th session, Supplement No. 10 (A/69/10) (2014). 
14
 See the title of the Return Directive as well as its Art. 3 on the definitions.  
15
 For a scholarly account of legal boundaries when expelling aliens (non-nationals) under international 
law, see e.g. WOJNOWSKA-RADZIŃSKA, The Right of an Alien to be Protected against Arbitrary Expulsion 
in International Law, Leiden, 2015. 
16
 MAJCHER, The European Union Returns Directive and its Compatibility with International Human 
Rights Law, Thesis submitted at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in fulfil-
ment of the requirements of the PhD degree in International Law, Thesis No. 1214, Geneva, 2017, p. 46 
[manuscript is with the author]. 
17
 MOLNÁR, “Limitations on the Expulsion of Aliens Imposed by the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. A Retrospect of 50 Years”, in SZABÓ, LÁNCOS and VARGA (eds.), Hungarian Year-
book of International Law and European Law 2017, The Hague, 2018, pp. 84-104. 
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The Return Directive refers quite a few times to international human rights law 
in general and as embodied in specific treaties. The Return Directive attributes dif-
ferent roles to internationally protected human rights in its scope of application, 
which can be summarised as follows: 
- conceiving international human rights law as standards of conformity for EU 
law (see recitals (17), (22)-(24) and Articles 1 and 5); 
- providing such norms of international origin priority vis-à-vis EU law (Arti-
cles 5 and 9); and 
- applying ‘without prejudice’ or ‘non-affectation’ clauses, which make the ap-
plication of international human rights treaties and standards possible where 
these rules lay down more favourable conditions for the irregular migrant 
subject to a return procedure (recital (23) and Article 4(1)). 
The international human rights conventions which serve as yardsticks to assess 
the legality of the application of the Return Directive – and also as interpretative 
tools for the EU Court and national courts – comprise the ECHR, the 1951 Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees18 and its 1967 New York Protocol,19 
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’),20 coupled with all other 
relevant treaties concluded by the Member States, the European Union or both, 
which contain more favourable provisions for the migrants subject to expulsion (e.g. 
CoE Istanbul Convention on combatting violence against women and domestic vio-
lence;21  or the CoE Warsaw Convention against Trafficking in Human Beings22). 
 
18
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, UNTS No. 2545, Vol. 189, p. 
137. 
19
 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, 31 January 1967, UNTS No. 8791, Vol. 606, 
p. 267. 
20
 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989, UNTS No. 
27531, Vol. 1577, p. 3. 
21
 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic 
violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011 (CETS No. 210), Arts. 59 (residence status) and 61 (non-refoulement). 
The EU signed this convention in June 2017 – see the Council Decisions on the signing of the Istanbul 
Convention on behalf of the EU with regard to judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Decision (EU) 
2017/865) and asylum and non-refoulement (Decision (EU) 2017/866). Ratification by the EU is expected 
to follow soon. Nonetheless, on the occasion of a plenary debate held by the European Parliament on 13 
May 2018 on the state of play, i.e. one year on from the signature of the Convention by the EU, the Euro-
pean Commission’s First Vice President noted that there was strong opposition to the Convention in some 
Member States (see the proceedings available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get-
Doc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20180613+ITEM-004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>). 
22
 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Warsaw, 16 May 
2005 (CETS No. 197), Art. 13 – No expulsion is allowed during the recovery and reflection period of at 
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Content-wise, besides general references to ‘international law’, ‘refugee protec-
tion’ and ‘fundamental rights/human rights obligations’, the operative provisions of 
the Return Directive name a few concrete international human rights norms and 
principles. These include the principle of the best interests of the child, the right to 
family life, the principle of non-refoulement, the principle to provide humane and 
dignified detention conditions as well as the principle to respect dignity and psychi-
cal integrity of irregular migrants subject to return procedures.  
Some other provisions have been clearly inspired by Council of Europe human 
rights standards and mirror their language. For instance, Articles 16-17 of the Return 
Directive on detention conditions are a good illustration for that, which have been 
largely based on the CoE Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return.23 The revised EU Re-
turn Handbook, which is a set of non-binding recommendations providing guidance to 
national authorities competent for carrying out return related tasks on the application 
of the directive, expressly mentions this connection.24  Similarly, Article 13(1) of the 
Return Directive on the right to an effective remedy against return related decisions is 
closely modelled after the same CoE guidelines on forced returns (see Guideline No. 
5.1) and it should be interpreted in accordance with relevant case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights as stipulated in the EU Return Handbook.25   
What is more, the EU Return Handbook contains further references to interna-
tional human rights law relevant for migrants. This European Commission recom-
mendation, which is addressed to the Member States and Schengen Associated 
Countries bound by the directive, essentially deals with the correct implementation 
of common standards and procedures in Member States for returning irregular mi-
grants. This soft law instrument is based on secondary EU legislation regulating this 
issue (essentially the Return Directive) and related CJEU case-law. The Return 
Handbook seeks to ensure an effective and uniform application of the Return Di-
rective across the Union. It specifies, for instance, that in relation to the detention of 
 
least 30 days. All EU Member States have ratified it, but the EU is not party to this convention, although 
this CoE treaty allows the EU to accede to it (see Art. 42(1)). 
23
 Twenty Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Forced Return, 
adopted at the 925th Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, Strasbourg, 4 May 2005. 
24
 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/2338 of 16 November 2017 establishing a common ‘Re-
turn Handbook’ to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out return-related tasks, 
OJ L 339/83, 19.12.2017, Annex. 
25
 Ibid., sub-section 12.4 (p. 70). 
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children and families, standards developed by the European Committee for the Pre-
vention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CPT’)26 
must be applied beyond the text of the directive. Likewise, in the case of non-remov-
able irregular migrants, be it due to legal or humanitarian impediments, practical 
obstacles or policy choices, access to education for such children as laid down in the 
Return Directive (Article 14(1)(c)) should be provided in accordance with the CRC 
and General Comment No. 6 (2005) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
relating to the treatment of unaccompanied and separated children in the context of 
migration,27  as required by the revised EU Return Handbook. 
Summing it up, the above-presented provisions as well as the travaux prépa-
ratoires of the Return Directive28 showcase that the EU co-legislators (the Council 
and the Parliament), but also the European Commission (see the Return Handbook) 
have had a vision of a fairly international law friendly approach when codifying the 
common EU standards and procedures for returning irregularly staying third-country 
nationals. Compliance with fundamental rights, which comprise norms laid down in 
international human rights instruments, is originally meant to be a cardinal principle 
of interpretation of the Return Directive. The following section examines to what 
extent the EU Court of Justice developed its case-law on returns in line with the 
legislature’s openness to international human rights law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26
 This anti-torture monitoring body, belonging to the Council of Europe structures, was established 
under the 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (ETS No. 126), as amended by Protocols No. 1 (ETS No. 151) and No. 2 (ETS No. 152) 
which entered into force on 1 March 2002. For compilations of its key standards pertaining to immigration 
detention, see CPT, “Safeguards for irregular migrants deprived of their liberty”, Extract from the 19th 
General Report of the CPT CPT/Inf(2009)27-part; CPT, “Factsheet on Immigration detention”, 
CPT/Inf(2017)3, March 2017. 
27
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of Unac-
companied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin”, CRC/GC/2005/6, 1 September 2005. 
28
 See LUTZ, The Negotiations on the Return Directive. Comments and Materials, Nijmegen, 2010, pp. 
73-80. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
442 Tamás Molnár 
 
 
3. – The CJEU Jurisprudence on the Return Directive and International 
Human Rights Law 
As a preliminary remark, jurisprudence of international, EU and national courts 
illustrates well the complexity of legal issues involved in the return procedures, in 
particular how returns may affect the human rights of the persons concerned.  
The CJEU has been playing an ever-important role in the development of European 
return law since its initial ruling on this matter in the Kadzoev case delivered in No-
vember 2009,29 which interpreted for the first time the provisions of the Return Di-
rective. Since the entry into force of the Return Directive (13 January 2009), the EU 
Court of Justice has delivered 27 rulings interpreting the directive (as at September 
2019).30 Remarkably enough, there was practically no case-law relating to the inter-
pretation of other legal instruments of the EU return acquis, predating the Return Di-
rective. The lone preliminary reference asking for the interpretation of Directive 
2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of expulsion decisions31 was not considered in 
the merits due to the EU Court’s manifest lack of jurisdiction.32 Two other infringe-
ment procedures were initiated against Portugal and Spain for purely formal reasons,33 
i.e. not transposing into their national law, within the prescribed period, Directive 
2003/110/EC on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air.34   
The CJEU’s jurisdiction to rule in preliminary references as well as in other ac-
tions (e.g. in infringement procedures other than the failure of transposition within 
 
29
 Case C-357/09 PPU, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), 30 November 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:741. 
30
 For a very good overview of the CJEU return-related case-law, consider the Quarterly Overviews of 
CJEU judgments and pending cases published by the Centre for Migration Law at the Radboud University 
of Nijmegen, available at: <https://www.ru.nl/law/cmr/documentation/cmr-newsletters/cjeu-overview/>. 
31
 Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of 
third country nationals, OJ L 149, 2.6.2001, pp. 34-36. 
32
 Case C-456/14, Manuel Orrego Arias v. Subdelegación del Gobierno en Ciudad Real, 3 September 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:550. 
33
 See, Case C-4/07, Commission of the European Communities v. Portuguese Republic, 27 September 
2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:558; and Case C-58/07, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of 
Spain, 14 February 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:93. 
34
 Council Directive 2003/110/EC of 25 November 2003 on assistance in cases of transit for the pur-
poses of removal by air, OJ L 321, 12.6.2003, pp. 26-31. 
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the set deadline35) has a substantial impact on the definitional and interpretative guid-
ance of EU legislation on returning irregular migrants.36 It does not come by surprise, 
given that the CJEU has the monopoly to authentically interpret the whole body of 
EU law,37 including the return acquis. Judgments of the EU Court are all the more 
instrumental given that as described above in Section 2, black letter EU law on re-
turns makes explicit reference to international treaties and human rights law. Putting 
the evolution within the EU law and international law duality under scrutiny in light 
of this case-law in order to see where it is developing in times of large scale migra-
tory movements is particularly worthy of academic attention. 
Looking carefully at this fairly abundant CJEU’s case-law unfolding various stip-
ulations of the directive, one can notice a rather EU-law centred argumentative strat-
egy, without genuinely engaging with applicable international human rights law 
standards, including the ECHR and relevant ECtHR judgments. More generally, tak-
ing the CJEU jurisprudence as a whole, as opposed to regularly highlighting the 
“special significance” of the ECHR,38 the EU Court has only occasionally referred 
to the ICCPR,39 the CRC,40  the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,41 and the 1961 European Social Charter (adopted under the CoE 
 
35
 See, for instance, the ongoing infringement procedure against Hungary before the CJEU concerning 
domestic incompatibles with the Return Directive. According to the European Commission, Hungary failed 
to ensure that return decisions are issued individually and include information on legal remedies. As a 
result, apprehended migrants in an irregular situation risk being returned without the appropriate safeguards 
and in breach of the principle of non-refoulement. (European Commission, Press Release – IP/18/4522, 
Brussels, 19 July 2018, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4522_en.htm>.  
36
 TAYLOR, “The CJEU and its interaction with international law in the Qualification Directive: a cal-
culated selectivity?”, EDAL Journal, 12 February 2015, available at: <http://www.asylumlawdata-
base.eu/en/journal/cjeu-and-its-interaction-international-law-qualification-directive-calculated-selectiv-
ity>. 
37
 See Art. 19(1) and (3) TEU and Arts. 263, 267 and 344 TFEU. 
38
 Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Pros-
sopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, 18 June 
1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254, para. 41; Case C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, 29 May 
1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:254, para. 14. 
39
 See e.g., Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd, 17 February 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, 
para. 44; Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council, 27 June 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, para. 37. 
40
 See e.g., Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council, 27 June 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, 
paras. 37, 50 and 57; Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, 14 February 
2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:85, paras. 39-40. 
41
 See e.g., Case C-73/08, Nicolas Bressol and Others and Céline Chaverot and Others v. Gouverne-
ment de la Communauté française, 13 April 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:181, paras. 3-4, 83-88.  
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aegis)42 as sources of fundamental rights being general principles of EU law. Such 
references are sporadic and often not elaborated.43 Some scholars noted that the 
CJEU failed “to appreciate the nature and status of the ICCPR as well as the role of 
the HRC”,44 when, for example, it considered that the UN Human Rights Committee 
“is not a judicial institution”,45 contrary to a generally accepted (quasi-)judicial func-
tion of the latter. This exclusionary approach towards international human rights in-
struments other than the ECHR appears thus to be a general pattern across all EU 
policy fields. The Advocate Generals (‘AG’), in their submissions, were more will-
ing to refer to the ECHR and some relevant ECtHR case-law, but not beyond this 
regional human rights protection regime. Other pertinent and applicable international 
law instruments have not been thus used in the argumentative toolkit of the Advocate 
Generals, who have otherwise been fairly open to holistic approaches as well as 
multi-layered legal reasoning, including the international legal order, and a ‘joined-
up approach to fundamental rights’46 (see some examples below in Table 1). 
Table 1 gives an overview of the various references to international law in gen-
eral, and to international human rights law instruments and case-law in particular 
(essentially but not exclusively ECtHR jurisprudence) which have been so far re-
ferred to either by the Advocate Generals or the EU Court in cases pertaining to the 
interpretation and application of the Return Directive. 
 
 
42
 See e.g., Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, 
15 June 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:130, para. 28. 
43
 PEERS, “International law, human rights law, and EU asylum and migration policy”, in MAES, 
FOBLETS, DE BRUYCKER, VANHEULE and WOUTERS (eds.), External Dimensions of EU Migration and Asy-
lum Law and Policy/Dimensions Externes du Droit et de la Politique d’Immigration et d’Asile de l’UE, 
Bruxelles, 2011, p. 82; ZIEGLER, Autonomy: From Myth to Reality – or Hubris on a Tightrope? EU Law, 
Human Rights and International Law, University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 15-25 
(2015), p. 20, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665725. 
44
 DE JESÚS BUTLER and DE SCHUTTER, “Binding the EU to International Human Rights Law”, Year-
book of European Law, 2008, p. 285, cited by ZIEGLER, cit. supra note 43, p. 21. 
45
 Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd, 17 February 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 46. 
46
 For this term, see the EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s toolkit entitled ‘Joining up fundamental 
rights’, available at: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/joinedup/home>.  
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As shown in Table 1, the CJEU has only sporadically referred to international 
human rights law, including the 1951 Refugee Convention, when interpreting differ-
ent provisions of the Return Directive. First and foremost, such a source of interna-
tional origin relied on by the EU Court is the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR. 
True, this is a clearly set duty of the CJEU under the Charter to duly take into account 
the ECtHR case-law when interpreting Charter rights corresponding to those laid 
down in the ECHR (see Article 52(3) of the Charter). For instance, as far as Article 
7 of the Charter and Article 8(1) of the ECHR are concerned (right to respect for 
private and family life), the CJEU has explicitly confirmed that “Article 7 of the 
Charter must […] be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8(1) of 
the ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”.47 
Furthermore, in the context of human rights applicable in the return procedure, it has 
been rightly observed that  
“[t]he obligation of the Court and the Advocate General to consult the relevant Stras-
bourg case law derives in first place from Article 1 of the [Return Directive]’, which lays 
down that the Directive must be applied ‘in accordance with fundamental rights as general 
principles of [EU] law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human 
rights obligations.”48   
References to the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law vary. It ranges from acknowl-
edging States’ sovereign powers to decide on admitting and expelling non-nationals 
(see the Advocate Generals’ View in the Kadzoev,49  El Dridi50  and Mahdi51 rulings), 
through applying the ECtHR’s proportionality test in the context of the length of im-
migration detention (see the El Dridi judgment52) and the grounds of pre-removal de-
tention as well as the judicial review of the detention order in light of the ECtHR case-
 
47
 Case C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v. L. E., 5 October 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, para. 53. 
48
 DE BRUYCKER and MANANASHVILI, “Audi alteram partem in immigration detention procedures, 
between the ECJ, the ECtHR and Member States: G & R”, Common Market Law Review, 2015, p. 569 ff. 
49
 Case C-357/09 PPU, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), View of Advocate General Mazák, 
10 November 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:691, para. 5. 
50
 Case 61/11 PPU, Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi Karim, View of Advocate General Mazák, 1 April 
2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:205, para. 29. 
51
 Case C-146/14 PPU, Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi, View of Advocate General Szpunar, 14 May 
2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1936, para. 45 and footnote 9. 
52
 Case 61/11 PPU, Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi Karim, ECLI:EU:C:2011:268, paras. 43-44. 
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law (see the Advocate General’s View in Mahdi53), to interpreting the principle of non-
refoulement as set out in Article 19(2) of the Charter in respect of serious health issues 
in accordance with the Strasbourg jurisprudence (see the Abdida ruling54). Summary 
references to ECtHR jurisprudence have also occurred, used by some Advocate Gen-
erals to confirm the outcome of the textual interpretation of certain provisions of the 
Return Directive.55 In some other cases, the CJEU has only briefly mentioned a given 
right protected by the ECHR or a concept of international law, but did not draw any 
significant conclusions from its wording for the Return Directive.  
In addition, the Council of Europe Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return have 
been mentioned and used on one occasion by the EU Court as a general standard of 
conformity for national law to comply with EU law (see the El Dridi judgment56). In 
other words, CoE Guideline No. 8 (‘Length of detention’) has been considered in 
this case as an interpretative tool, which fills in with normative content certain terms 
of the Return Directive on the length of pre-removal detention and also to define 
their concrete meaning with which Member States’ legislation must conform. Fur-
thermore, the Council of Europe Twenty Guidelines of Forced Return in general and 
CoE Guideline No. 9 (‘Judicial remedy against detention’) specifically were subse-
quently invoked by Advocate General Szpunar in his View in Mahdi as sources of 
inspiration and interpretive contexts for certain provisions of the Return Directive.57 
Similarly, Advocate General Mazák used CoE Guideline No. 7 (‘Obligation to re-
lease where the removal arrangements are halted’) as a benchmark to assess the le-
gality of Member State authorities’ actions depriving someone’s liberty in Kadzoev.58  
As Table 1 showcases, Advocate Generals were more keen on referring to interna-
tional human rights law than the judges of the EU Court, and not only to the ECHR 
and the related Strasbourg jurisprudence (although their dominance is clear), but also 
 
53
 Case C-146/14 PPU, Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi, View of Advocate General Szpunar, cit. supra 
note 51, para. 2 and footnotes 14, 17-18, 20 and 33. 
54
 Case C-562/13, Centre public d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve v. Moussa Abdida, 18 
December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453, paras. 47, 51-52. 
55
 See Case C-146/14 PPU, Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi, View of Advocate General Szpunar, cit. supra 
note 51, paras. 2 and 90. 
56
 Case 61/11 PPU, Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi Karim, ECLI:EU:C:2011:268, paras. 43-44. 
57
 Case C-146/14 PPU, Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi, View of Advocate General Szpunar, cit. supra 
note 51, paras. 45 and 51. 
58
 Case C-357/09 PPU, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), View of Advocate General Mazák, 
10 November 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:691, footnotes 17 and 35. 
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to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a number of (soft law) instruments elaborated within 
the CoE and – once – the quasi case-law of the UN Human Rights Committee, too. 
When widening the channels through which international human rights law, in-
cluding those of procedural nature, can flow into the EU Court’s jurisprudence on 
the Return Directive, the category of ‘general principles of EU law’ need to be men-
tioned as well. It is a well-established judge-made doctrine that fundamental rights 
form an integral part of the general principles of Union law.59 Regarding the identi-
fication of possible sources of fundamental rights protected by and within the EU 
legal order, the EU Court stipulated long ago:  
“international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the member states 
have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines [in identifying fun-
damental rights as general principles of EU law] which should be followed within the frame-
work of Community law.”60 
This has been subsequently confirmed in primary EU law, ever since the Treaty of 
Maastricht, in respect of the ECHR (and its Protocols ratified by all EU Member States, 
I would add), qualifying fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR as ‘general prin-
ciples of EU law’ (Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Some general 
principles of EU law have a particular relevance to coercive measures regulated under 
the Return Directive, such as the principle of proportionality which entails that a meas-
ure should be proportionate to the legitimate goal pursued.61 As Majcher rightly ob-
served, the CJEU relied on the principle of proportionality in a few cases relating to 
 
59
 The leading cases in this respect are Case, 29-69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm – Sozialamt, 12 
November 1969, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, para. 7; Case 11-70, International Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- 
und Vorratsstelle Getreide, 17 December 1970, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114; and Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- 
und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Commission of the European Communities, 14 May 1974, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, para. 13. 
60
 First pronounced in Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 14 May 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51. In subsequent jurisprudence, see e.g., Case 
44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland Pfalz, 13 December 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290; or Case C-36/02, Omega 
Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 14 October 
2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614, para. 35. 
61
 See e.g, Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 11 July 
2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434, paras. 42-45; Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, 17 September 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, paras. 90-94; Case C-200/02, Kunqian 
Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 19 October 2004, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, para. 32; and C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport, 
8 July 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:419, para. 45. For more on the principle of proportionality as a general 
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the Return Directive.62 In the Z.Zh. and I.O. ruling, the EU Court held that the principle 
of proportionality applies to all decisions taken under the directive and this key prin-
ciple requires an individualized assessment of the adequacy of a return measure.63 
Hence, in accordance with the general principles of EU law, including the principle of 
proportionality, decisions taken under the directive need to be adopted on a case-by-
case basis and properly take into account the fundamental rights of the person con-
cerned.64 Later on, the CJEU added in the Mukarubega judgment that prior to the adop-
tion of a return decision, the person concerned has the right to be heard which stems 
from the right of the defence as a general principle of EU law.65 
Summing up the preceding analysis, in contrast to the Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit 
advanced by the EU legislator, as depicted in the forgoing Section, the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU has been rather reluctant so far to refer to international human rights 
law when interpreting the Return Directive. Despite the CJEU’s expanding case-law 
relating to the Directive (beyond the 27 rulings delivered since the first one in Kad-
zoev in November 2009, two further cases were pending at the time of submitting 
the manuscript66), the EU judiciary seemed, up to now, to be unwilling to step out of 
the EU law framework when shaping its case-law on returns. This in spite of some 
suggestions from the Advocate Generals and their more inclusive, ‘joined-up’ ap-
proach towards external sources of human rights applicable in the return context. 
Certainly, not each and every case offers a stepping stone for the EU Court to 
engage more with international human rights law. It depends on the subject-matter 
of the individual case, the type of the procedure/legal action, and is limited by the 
(narrow) questions the referring national court may ask. Nevertheless, cases seeking 
the interpretation of procedural safeguards such as the right to be heard and the right 
 
principle of EU law, consider e.g. HOFMANN, “General Principles of EU law and EU Administrative Law” 
in BARNARD and PEERS (eds.), European Union Law, Oxford, 2014. 
62
 MAJCHER, cit. supra note 16, p. 43. 
63
 Case C‑554/13, Z. Zh. v. Staatssecretaris Voor Veiligheid En Justitie and I. O. v. Staatssecretaris 
Voor Veiligheid En Justitie, 11 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:377, paras. 49 and 69. 
64
 Ibid., para. 69. 
65
 Case C‑166/13, Sophie Mukarubega v. Préfet de Police and Préfet de La Seine-Saint-Denis, Judg-
ment of the Court of 5 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336, paras. 44-45. 
66
 These were the following as at 1 September  2019: 1) Case C-526/18, AA v. Migrationsverket, which 
concerns issues of identifying third-country national children under the Return Directive (no further devel-
opments after the request for a preliminary ruling by the Förvaltningsrätten i Göteborg (Sweden) lodged 
on 13 August 2018, OJ C 381, 22.10.2018, pp. 16-17); and 2) Case C-806/18, JZ, which concerns entry 
bans under Art. 11(2) of the Return Directive (reference by the Dutch Supreme Court lodged on 27 No-
vember 2018, OJ C 122, 1.4.2019, p. 8). 
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to an effective judicial review of the return decision and the detention order (also set 
out under the ECHR protection regime); or those relating to the grounds of detention 
and detention conditions (massively developed by the CPT standards) could have 
provided more room for using international human rights norms at least as interpre-
tative tools. The pending cases may provide the CJEU with further occasions to 
strengthen its engagement with relevant elements of international human rights law, 
especially as protected and developed in the ECtHR case-law. 
One of the pending cases concerns issues of identifying third-country national 
children under the Return Directive (AA v. Migrationsverket), whereas another case 
touches upon the issue of the length of the entry bans if the third-country national 
represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security (JZ – 
preliminary reference by the Dutch Supreme Court).  
4. – Reasons behind the CJEU’s Distancing from International Human 
Rights Law 
Mapping and analysing the CJEU’s above judicial practice allowed to explore 
the possible reasons and motivations behind the CJEU’s more guarded approach to-
wards international human rights law in EU return law and policy. The conceivable 
explanations are manifold. In scholarly works, these range from the desire to pre-
serve the autonomy of EU law to the more extensive, if not exclusive reliance on the 
EU Charter instead of international human rights law instruments, in particular the 
ECHR.67   
With regard to the former consideration, the EU Court’s position in the J.N. ruling 
(case C-601/15 PPU) is fairly illustrative, when the Explanations to the EU Charter 
have been used to confine the boundaries of ensuring necessary consistency between 
the meaning and scope of Charter rights and the ECtHR jurisprudence (which obliga-
tion stems from Article 52(3) of the Charter68). According to the judges in Luxem-
bourg, the need for such a consistency must be “without [...] adversely affecting the 
 
67
 See PEERS, cit. supra note 43, pp. 83-84; ZIEGLER, cit. supra note 43, pp. 20-29, 54; KROMMENDIJK, 
“The Use of the ECtHR Case Law by the Court of Justice after Lisbon. The View of Luxembourg Insiders”, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2015, pp. 831-832; and TOMUSCHAT, “The Rela-
tionship between EU Law and International Law in the Field of Human Rights”, Yearbook of European 
Law, 2016, pp. 609, 619. 
68
 Art. 52(3) of the Charter: “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guar-
anteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
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autonomy of Union law and [...] that of the Court of Justice of the European Union”.69 
The same dictum has been later reiterated in the J.Z. judgment (case C-294/16),70 and 
subsequently highlighted specifically in the return context.71 This jurisprudence shows 
that the EU Court has tried to minimalise the effects of Article 52(3) of the Charter,72 
which requires consistency in the interpretation of Charter rights with ECtHR case-
law in relation to corresponding rights enshrined in the ECHR. 
As far as the gradual downplaying of the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law is con-
cerned, empirical research demonstrates that after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon in December 2009, the CJEU has examined and cited the Strasbourg case-
law less frequently and extensively.73 Commentators have noted that after the Treaty 
of Lisbon vested the Charter with the legal value of primary EU law, the CJEU 
started using the Charter as the “EU’s own bill of rights” at the expense of references 
to the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law. Glas and Krommendijk coined this phenom-
enon as an “increasing Charter centrism of the CJEU”.74 Several reasons have been 
put forward explaining this, primarily on the basis of the observations of interviewed 
CJEU judges, former judges and référendaires as to the EU Court’ readiness to cite 
the Strasbourg case-law. These include a growing awareness that both European 
apex courts are different as well as strategic reasons related to the wish to develop 
an autonomous interpretation of the Charter. 75 A few years ago, the then president of 
the CJEU, Vassolios Skouris held that “the Court of Justice is not a human rights 
court: it is the Supreme Court of the European Union”.76  As a result of this approach, 
 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall 
not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” 
69
 Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, 15 February 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, para. 47. 
70
 C-294/16, J.Z. v. Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź — Śródmieście, 28 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:610, 
para. 50. 
71
 C-175/17, X v. Belastingdienst/Toeslagen, 26 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:776, para. 35. 
72
 See similarly, ISPOLINOV, “Consequences of the delay: the perspective of a non-EU member state”, 
Kazan University Law Review, 2018, p. 8. 
73
 KROMMENDIJK, cit. supra note 67, pp. 812-835; LEHTINEN, The European Court of Justice and Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights: A Complex Interaction and Coexistence between the Two Courts, Work-
shop in the ECHR – Tampere 2015, available at: <https://blog.uta.fi/ECHRwork-
shop/2016/03/07/lehtinen>. 
74
 GLAS and KROMMENDIJK, “From Opinion 2/13 to Avotiņš: Recent Developments in the Relationship 
between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts”, Human Rights Law Review, 2017, p. 573. 
75
 KROMMENDIJK, cit. supra note 67, pp. 830-833. 
76
 BESSELINK, “The CJEU as the European ‘Supreme Court’: Setting Aside Citizens’ Rights for EU 
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cases are often solved on the basis of the primarily applicable secondary EU law 
(here: the Return Directive) and the CJEU’s own pre-existing case-law, without re-
lying on otherwise relevant standards of international human rights law and interna-
tional (primarily ECtHR) case-law. It is especially the case when the given piece of 
EU acquis stroke a certain balance between clashing fundamental rights claims, or 
fundamental rights and State interests, which essentially holds true for the Return 
Directive as well. Furthermore, the CJEU’s distancing from human rights treaties 
other than the ECHR in developing the ‘general principles of EU law’ can also be 
seen in its dismissal of the validity of UN monitoring treaty bodies’ interpretations 
of human rights provisions in one case.77 In Grant, the EU Court rejected the weight 
of UN Human Rights Committee findings, stating that it “is not a judicial institution” 
and that its findings “have no binding force in law”.78 
A further development needs to be considered, too. As the Luxembourg case-law 
on the Return Directive has been building up over the years, the CJEU rather referred 
to its already delivered rulings on the directive in new cases, instead of quoting in-
ternational human rights law, especially the ECHR and the ECtHR pertinent juris-
prudence. It might be a technique to find a clever way around, allowing the EU Court 
to remain self-referential and to avoid direct engaging with Strasbourg case-law. 
However, one might also argue that the CJEU introduced the substance of inter-
national human rights law into its return related case-law via the EU Charter or by 
packaging certain human rights norms as ‘general principles of EU law’ (e.g. the 
principle of proportionality; the right to be heard), without labelling them expressly 
as flowing from international human rights law. In other words: the EU Court was 
cognizant of the substance of various international human rights standards and en-
gaged with the relevant human rights norms – but when doing so, it labelled them as 
EU law and not as international human rights law or ECtHR jurisprudence. The rea-
son for this ‘labelling’ may be institutional or internal as well as a self-restraint not 
to be seen as interpreting international law norms for which other international courts 
 
Law Supremacy”, Verfassungsblog, 18 August 2014, available at: <http://www.verfassungsblog.de/CJEU-
european-supreme-court-setting-aside-citizens-rights-eu-law-supremacy/>. 
77
 REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
The EU and International Human Rights Law, Brussels, 2011, p. 11, available at: <https://www.eu-
rope.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf>. 
78
 Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd, Judgment of the Court of 17 February 1998, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 46. 
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or treaty bodies are competent. All this is paired with the EU Court’s desire, follow-
ing the French and continental tradition of constructing judgments, to keep the rul-
ings as concise and minimalistic as possible,79 without any dissenting or concurring 
opinions as other international/regional courts do (e.g. the International Court of Jus-
tice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, or the ECtHR).  
5. – Concluding Remarks 
This contribution attempted to understand the quite controversial perception of 
the role and place of international human rights law in the CJEU case-law interpret-
ing the Return Directive. The main question was – and to some extent, still remains 
to be – why different EU institutions (legislature versus judiciary) follow remarkably 
diverging treatment of international human rights law when shaping and developing 
the EU return acquis. 
Given that the Return Directive has been repeatedly and harshly criticised in ac-
ademia and civil society for falling short of certain international human rights stand-
ards (called as ‘the Directive of Shame’ by many) ,80 the CJEU, using such hooks in 
the directive, could have been in a position to address these alleged shortcomings. In 
particular, the EU Court could have developed an interpretation of the Return Di-
rective which fully takes into account and builds upon the at times higher standards 
and more developed safeguards offered by international human rights law, especially 
the ECtHR jurisprudence. This silent ignorance of external norms is even more strik-
ing if compared to the CJEU case-law on asylum matters, which is much more open 
to international (refugee) law (see e.g. the rulings in Bolbol,81  El Kott,82  Bundesre-
publik Deutschland v. Y and Z,83  and Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X, Y and 
 
79
 KROMMENDIJK, cit. supra note 67, pp. 827-829. 
80
 On the very harsh critiques of the Return Directive from Latin American countries, see e.g. ACOSTA 
ARCARAZO, “Latin American Reactions to the Adoption of the Returns Directive”, CEPS Liberty and Se-
curity in Europe Publication Series, November 2009, available at: <https://www.ceps.eu/sys-
tem/files/book/2009/11/latin-american-reactions-adoption-returns-directive.pdf>. Consider also LUTZ, cit. 
supra note 28, pp. 73-80. 
81
 Case C-31/09, Nawras Bolbol v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal, 17 June 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:351. 
82
 Case C-364/11, Abed el Karem El Kott and Others v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal, 19 
December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:826. 
83
 Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z, 5 September 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:518. 
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Z84). In a similar vein, the CJEU’s omission to adequately integrate the ECtHR case-
law in its reasoning in return-related cases is also surprising in mirrors of the EU 
Family Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86/EC) ,85 which also includes refer-
ences to the ECHR (in recital (2)) as the Return Directive does. The EU Court clearly 
stated in the Chakroun ruling that relevant provisions of the Family Reunification 
Directive “must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights and, more par-
ticularly, in the light of the right to respect for family life enshrined in […] the 
ECHR.”86  
This distancing from the Strasbourg Court-developed human rights standards is 
despite the fact that Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that the rights contained in 
the Charter that correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR are to have the same 
meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR and interpreted by the Stras-
bourg Court. Nonetheless, while acknowledging that fundamental rights recognised 
by the ECHR constitute ‘general principles of EU law’ (Article 6(3) TEU) and the 
cardinal role of the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law as interpretive tools when adju-
dicating Charter rights, the CJEU has constantly underlined that the ECHR does not 
constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument 
which has been formally incorporated into EU law. Therefore, as such the European 
Convention is not legally binding on the European Union as a distinct legal entity.87 
The recent autonomy-centred pronouncements in the aforementioned J.N., J.Z. and 
X cases seem to make this reliance on the ECHR and its case-law in the context of 
interpreting the Charter even more conditional – despite the clear primary EU law 
instructions in Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
Here, at the intersectionality of laws (EU and international law) in a specific do-
main called ‘expulsion of aliens’ (in the language of the UN International Law Com-
 
84
 Joined Cases C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X, Y and Z v. 
Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, 7 November 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:720. 
85
 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ L 251, 
3.10.2003, pp. 12-18). 
86
 Case C-578/08, Rhimou Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 4 March 2010, 
EU:C:2010:117, para. 44. In the legal literature, see also DE BRUYCKER and MANANASHVILI (2015), cit. 
supra note 48, p. 578. 
87
 Case C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia Sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bol-
zano (IPES) and Others, 24 April 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:233, para. 62; Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. 
Hans Åkerberg Fransson, 26 February 2013, EU:C:2013:105, para. 44; Case C-398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit 
Kanatami and Others v. Commission, 3 September 2015, EU:C:2015:535, para. 45. 
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mission) or ‘return of illegally staying third-country nationals’ (in the EU vocabu-
lary), one can clearly witness the CJEU’s firm preference to one of the competing 
legal orders. As shown in the forgoing, the EU Court has generally squeezed out 
other human rights norms of international origin when interpreting and further de-
veloping the edifice of EU return law.  Nonetheless, one might still claim that alt-
hough this practice is contrary to the intention of the co-legislators (i.e. the text of 
the directive) from a purely formalistic perspective, substance-wise quite a number 
of internationally protected human rights and principles have been packaged in the 
CJEU rulings as EU law standards. Hence, it is also arguable that international hu-
man rights law do play a role, behind the scenes when the bench in Luxembourg 
deliberates, but do not surface in the judgments themselves. The ever-evolving juris-
prudence of the EU Court will provide further responses and clarifications to the 
main question, whereas further empirical and legal sociological research still needs 
to be done to nuance our understanding of the apparently “exclusionary” approach 
of the EU judiciary towards international human rights law in return law and policy. 
Presently, it is beyond doubt that the EU Court expressed a strong autonomy-driven 
position in this specific field of EU migration law and policy.  
Looking at the future, once and if the proposed (currently negotiated), fairly re-
strictive changes to the Return Directive88 will be adopted, the CJEU might need to 
look for legal yardsticks other that those found in the EU toolkit to uphold with au-
thority certain standards and safeguards protecting returnees’ rights. In this eventual 
quest for additional, external legal benchmarks that can trump secondary EU law, with 
the aim not to allow the directive to go below a fil rouge, the ECHR and ECtHR case 
 
88
 European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nation-
als”, COM(2018)634 final, 2018/0329(COD); Brussels, 12 September 2018. The June 2019 Justice and 
Home Affairs Council reached a partial general approach on the proposal (except for the border procedure) 
– see <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/07/migration-policy-council-
agrees-partial-negotiating-position-on-return-directive/>.  
For thorough and detailed, fundamental-rights centred analyses of the proposal, see EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, The recast Return Directive and its fundamental rights implications – Opinion of the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, FRA Opinion – 1/2019 [Return], Vienna, 10 January 
2019, available at: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2019/returns-recast>; European Parliament, The pro-
posed Return Directive (recast) – Substitute Impact Assessment, Brussels, European Parliamentary Re-
search Service, February 2019, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg-
Data/etudes/STUD/2019/631727/EPRS_STU(2019)631727_EN.pdf>. For a more succinct presentation of 
the main issues of concern, see MAJCHER, “The Recast of the EU Returns Directive: Human Rights Lost 
Again?”, RLI Blog on Refugee Law and Forced Migration, 29 May 2019, available at: 
<https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2019/05/29/the-recast-of-the-eu-returns-directive-human-rights-lost-again/>. 
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law on the expulsion of aliens, alongside other international instruments and jurispru-
dence upholding returnees’ rights can finally become the EU Court’s natural allies to 
stop the watering down of existing return-related protection regimes. Such a scenario 
will definitely present a good opportunity to put the CJEU return-related jurisprudence 
under a similar scrutiny anew. The intellectual adventure has hereby begun. 
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1. Judicial Responses to the Migration Crisis: The Role of Courts in the 
Creation of a European Identity (Carola Lingaas)  
 
This chapter analyses the connection between the judicial creation of an ostensi-
ble European identity, domestic policy, and public opinion. It provides insight into 
the role of the European regional courts for the construction of a (perceived) Euro-
pean identity, contrasted to the identity of the ‘others’ from beyond Europe. The 
jurisprudence of the European courts is an effective tool to influence popular and 
political views on migration. Current developments suggest that the courts constrain 
the attribution of rights and adjust to expectations and perceptions of their constitu-
ency.  
The EU Global Strategy (2016) explicitly emphasises that “remaining true to our 
values is a matter of law as much as of ethics and identity”. It treats migration as a 
challenge. Such value narratives are indicators of the community’s understanding of 
social relations and can influence the European judiciary. If the Courts underpin their 
legal analysis with references to policy documents, then the narratives of migration 
contained therein are likely to be reflected in their judgments. 
 
 
2. Questions of Jurisdiction and Attribution in the Context of Multi-Actor 
Operations in the Mediterranean (Fulvia Staiano) 
 
On 8 May 2018, an application was filed before the European Court of Human 
Rights concerning the Sea Watch-3 incident of 6 November 2017. The application 
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hinges on Italy’s responsibility for violations of several provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This chapter stems from the consideration that the 
application at issue offers the occasion to reflect on key questions of international 
law that are being raised with increasing frequency and urgency in the context of 
multi-actor operations at sea. First, this chapter reflects on the possibility to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the grounds of the criterion of effective control over 
events occurring on the high seas. Second, this chapter enquires on matters of attrib-
ution of conduct and of allocation of responsibility between different state and non-
state actors involved in multi-actor operations at sea when international law viola-
tions are committed in such contexts.  
 
 
3. Allocating Responsibility for Refugee Protection to States: Actual and 
Potential Criteria in International (Case) Law (Ruben Wissing) 
 
This chapter analyses legal criteria adopted by international law and jurispru-
dence for allocating and attributing responsibility to States, and evaluates which are 
or have the potential to be applicable in international refugee law.   
Global numbers of persons fleeing violence and persecution are high, but refu-
gees unequally distributed among States. Some countries are overburdened. This is 
due to natural factors and migrant aspirations, but also deliberate migration policies. 
Quality of and access to protection are under pressure, fundamental refugee and hu-
man rights increasingly threatened. 
International refugee law does not provide for a specific distribution mechanism 
or criteria to allocate responsibility for refugee protection to States. The traditional 
attribution of legal responsibility in international law on the basis of jurisdiction does 
not suffice to distribute those burdens equitably. This article looks at relevant case-
law to identify alternative criteria that have the potential of allocating responsibility 
for refugee protection to States beyond their borders.   
Besides assessing the potential of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the article explores 
two interesting responsibility allocating candidates: the principles of international 
cooperation and solidarity, and the Responsibility to Protect-doctrine. 
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4. Les réfugiés en mer devant les juridictions internationales : vers la protection 
d’un droit international de l’hospitalité ? (Edoardo Stoppioni) 
 
La réflexion sur les réfugiés en philosophie politique oscille entre deux pôles 
discursifs opposés, l’approche individualiste et l’approche communautariste de la 
migration. Cette enquête sur le discours juridictionnel sur les réfugiés en mer montre 
que le droit international contemporain fonctionne à partir d’une dialectique argu-
mentative qui rappelle ce même mouvement de balancier. 
Dans une optique davantage individualiste, les juridictions internationales em-
ployé le droit international des droits de l’homme pour façonner des garanties 
procédurales permettant une prise en compte réelle du statut de réfugié. Selon une 
tendance plutôt communautariste, les juridictions internationales continuent à refuser 
de lire le droit international du droit de la mer comme une branche irriguée par des 
droits individuels. La fragmentation du droit international constitue encore une limite 
à ce que l’on pourrait appeler une sanction juridictionnelle du droit international de 
l’hospitalité, telle que postulée par Étienne Balibar. 
 
 
5. The Problematic Management of Migratory Flows in Europe and its Impact 
on Human Rights: the Prohibition of Collective Expulsion of Aliens in the Case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights (Francesco Luigi Gatta) 
 
This chapter argues that the process of ‘securitization’ and restrictive border man-
agement put in place by European frontline States in reaction to the so-called “refu-
gee crisis” has produced a direct impact on migrants’ human rights. This is demon-
strated by looking at the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning 
the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights). It is indeed possible to identify a parallel-
ism and a direct interrelation between the growing engagement of the Court with 
such violation of the Convention and the border practices recently adopted by Euro-
pean States in response to the increasing migratory pressure. 
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6. The Russian Law on Refugees through the Lens of the European Court of 
Human Rights (Maria Sole Continiello Neri) 
 
Migration is a pivotal issue for Russia. Migrants came to almost 8% of the overall 
Russian population. According to the UNHCR in 2016, 322,856 people have sought 
international or temporary protection in the Russian Federation. The migration emer-
gency in Russia is not only tied to the massive arrival of Ukrainians but also stems 
from refugee and asylum seekers from other theatres of war – like Syria and Afghan-
istan – or authoritarian regimes such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The latter face 
several difficulties with asylum procedures and the recognition of their status. The 
European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly highlighted the shortcomings of the 
Russian Refugee Law. Moreover, since 2010, the Court condemned the Russian Fed-
eration for the extraditions and 'undercover” transfers of Uzbek and Tajik asylum 
seekers in violation of the Court interim measures. During the past years, the deci-
sions of the Court have stimulated a jurisprudential openness, however, a few legis-
lative steps have been done.  
 
 
7. Refoulement at the Border Undermines the Best Interest of the Child: 
Preliminary Remarks (Patrizia Rinaldi) 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights concerning both refoulement at the border and indiscriminate ex-
pulsions. They are examined in contrast with the paramount principle of the best 
interests of the child as sanctioned by article 3 of the UNCRC and article 24 (2) of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The migration phenomenon is a complex problem in which several actors inter-
vene and which is composed of various  phases.The first outpost is a physical and 
legal frontier for those who become migrants.The lack of legal pathways and the 
outsourcing of border controls are responsible for most human rights violations. At 
the border, and without any age assessment, minors can also be rejected, with the 
motivation of family reunification in their country of origin, or they can be consid-
ered irregular migrants, without any discrimination based on age. 
. 
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8. The Protection of the Migrant Parent-Child Relationship in Spanish and 
Supranational Jurisprudence: a Sensitive or a Sensible Approach? (Encarnación 
La Spina) 
 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union concerning the right to family unity has had an unequal impact 
on the jurisprudence of Spanish Courts. This has been particularly so when cases 
concerned the protection of the migrant parent-child relationship involving migrant 
parents with an irregular migrant status or criminal records and their Spanish chil-
dren. This chapter is focused on the “sensible and sensitive approach” identified in 
the interpretive guidelines at both national and supranational levels in the light of 
two cases in Spain: Decision No. 186/2013 of the Tribunal Constitucional and De-
cision No. 15/2017 of the Tribunal Supremo in the application of C-165/14, Rendón 
Martín v Spain case. 
 
 
9. Migration Issues in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: the 
Development of an increasingly Humane Jus Migrandi (Luca Paladini, Nicolás 
Carrillo Santarelli) 
 
The chapter explores Inter-American standards on the protection of migrants, as 
developed and identified mostly by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Some salient thematic issues that have been paid special attention are identified, 
namely the rights of workers with an irregular status, rights of migrant children, na-
tionality, non-devolution, rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, prohibitions of 
mass expulsions, obligations to protect migrants from non-state abuses, and tensions 
between sovereignty and duties towards migrants. Concerning these issues, the Court 
has recalled that deporting individuals without carrying out an individualized analy-
sis of their situation is unlawful; that workers must have their labour rights respected 
and protected regardless of status; that non-devolution is not only applicable to ref-
ugees; that due process guarantees must be respected in regard to all individuals, 
whatever their origin; that children are entitled to special protection; and that States 
must protect from xenophobia, intolerance, and abuses of private parties. 
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10. Gender Perspectives in the Application of Existing International Rules and 
Standards of Refugee Law (Spyridoula Katsoni) 
 
The chapter explains the reasons why existing rules and standards of international 
refugee law, enshrined in international treaties, should be seen as granting gender 
sensitive protection. Initially, it indicates that an innovative jurisprudence constitutes 
the key to the establishment of the said gender sensitive application, after underlining 
the mere determinative and not obligations-modifying importance of jurisprudence 
in international law. Subsequently, an analysis of the rules on treaty interpretation 
takes place to be followed by a thorough presentation of elements that constitute 
interpretative tools according to the said rules and lead to the conclusion that the lege 
artis interpretation of refugee law provisions supports the gender sensitive interpre-
tative outcome. Lastly, the significance of the said interpretative approach for the 
whole system of international refugee law is highlighted, as it seems to be capable 
of guarding the latter from the adverse phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
 
11. Escaping Violence: the Istanbul Convention and Violence against Women 
as a Form of Persecution (Sara De Vido) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the Council of Europe Istanbul 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence can be used as means of interpretation of national refugee laws and of the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in assessing the situation 
of women who request refugee protection to escape from gender-based violence, in 
particular from two forms of inter-personal violence, on which this analysis is fo-
cused, namely female genital mutilation and domestic violence. The chapter con-
tends that judges should assess, in deciding the request for refugee status, or, in the 
case of the European Court of Human Rights, in determining whether violations of 
the woman’s rights have occurred, whether the State of origin – where the migrant 
woman could be expelled failing her application – complies with its due diligence 
obligations in preventing and prosecuting gender-based violence. 
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12. Framing the ‘Risk Assessment’ Test in Women’s Asylum Claims: A 
Critical Analysis af Domestic Jurisprudence  vs. the European Court  of 
Human Rights’ Approaches (Maria Manuela Pappalardo) 
 
This chapter provides a review of the decision-making process in international-
protection claims, based on the “risk assessment” of being persecuted. Lacking spe-
cific procedural tools to predict what might happen were claimants returned to their 
countries of origin, this contribution aims at sketching a “risk paradigm” tested in 
international-protection cases (UK, France and Italy). Focusing on selected case-
studies about female asylum seekers as members of a particular social group, the 
chapter shows that domestic courts use specific socio-economic risk factors in deter-
mining refugee status, even if these factors are not mentioned by the relevant rules. 
Taking into account the risk analysis carried out by the ECtHR in comparable cases, 
a comprehensive method of risk assessment can be drawn through the similar pat-
terns followed by domestic and international jurisdictions (ECtHR and national asy-
lum courts) in international-protection case-laws. These shared approaches eventu-
ally frame the forward-looking assessment used in determining the real risk of per-
secution (or serious harm). 
 
 
13. A Tale Of Two Courts: The Eu-Turkey Statement Before The Court Of 
Justice Of The European Union And The European Court Of Human Rights 
(Chiara Tea Antoniazzi) 
 
From a legal perspective, the controversy surrounding the EU-Turkey Statement, 
which provides for the return of “irregular migrants” from the Greek islands to Tur-
key, would appear to be settled after both the CJEU and the ECtHR dealt with it. 
While the former unexpectedly held that the Statement is not an EU act, and thus 
refused to examine the merits of the complaints, the latter only found relatively minor 
violations of the rights of migrants held in Greek reception centres following the 
enactment of the Statement.    
Are these decisions the final words of the two Courts as regards the validity and 
human rights-compliance of the Statement? This contribution argues that it is prem-
ature to say so. The rulings of the ECtHR appear inextricably linked to the specific 
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circumstances of the cases lodged with it, while the CJEU has, inter alia, yet to clar-
ify the notion of “safe third country” and whether Turkey can qualify as such. The 
Tale of Two Courts might not have come to an end yet. 
 
 
14. The Dublin System vis-à-vis EU Solidarity before the European Court of 
Justice: The Law, The Whole Law, and Nothing But The Law! (Giuseppe 
Morgese) 
 
The chapter aims at exploring the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case-law con-
cerning the relationship between the Dublin system and the solidarity principle en-
shrined in Article 80 of the TFEU. Starting from a legal analysis of Article 80, atten-
tion is paid to some decisions (e.g. N.S., X. and X., A.S. and Jafari, the “relocation” 
case), in which the ECJ has followed a cautious approach. Notably, it held, on the 
one hand, that responsibility criteria of the Dublin system cannot be derogated for 
solidarity reasons (even by way of interpretation or in the case of massive inflows of 
asylum seekers); on the other hand, that solidarity has to be implemented in legisla-
tive acts in order to fully reach its goals, being understood that a breach of such acts 
by some “reluctant” Member States is, first of all, a violation of the of the principle 
of loyalty provided for in Article 4(3) TEU. 
 
 
15. The ‘Sovereignty Clause’ of the Dublin Regulations in the case-law of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU: The Mirage of a jurisprudential convergence? (Vassilis 
Pergantis) 
 
The chapter offers an updated analysis of the dialogue between Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg on the sovereignty clause included in succeeding Dublin Regulations. 
It presents the initial tension in the jurisprudence between the two Courts and the 
gradual convergence of their case-law and indicates those issues that remain unre-
solved, such as the saga between systemic deficiencies and individualized risk, 
whether non-refoulement can be activated in cases not involving a risk of Art. 3 
ECHR/4 CFR violations, and the scope of the obligations involved in Dublin trans-
fers. It highlights the ambiguities in recent case-law (M.A., Jawo, Ibrahim, H and R.) 
concerning the obligation to assess the risk, and the interplay between the obligation 
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to prevent the return of the asylum seeker in cases involving non-refoulement and 
the discretion to examine the asylum application. Finally, it briefly tackles the ques-
tion of the burden and threshold of proof in relevant cases. 
 
 
16. The Case-Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Return Directive and the 
Role of International Human Rights Law: ‘With or Without You’? (Tamás 
Molnár) 
 
The CJEU plays an ever-important role in the development of EU return acquis 
when interpreting the Return Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC). The Return Di-
rective refers quite a few times to international human rights law. The Directive con-
ceives this body of law as standards of conformity for EU law; and applies “without 
prejudice” clauses, which make the application of international human rights law 
possible where these rules formulate more favourable provisions. In contrast, when 
looking at the CJEU’s case-law in this domain, one can notice a rather EU-law cen-
tred argumentative strategy, without genuinely engaging with international human 
rights standards, including the ECHR and ECtHR judgments. This contribution aims 
at mapping and analysing the approach of the CJEU towards international human 
rights law in EU return policy. The chapter explores the possible reasons and moti-
vations behind the CJEU’s more guarded approach towards international human 
rights law in this field. The main question remains: Why different EU institutions 
(legislature versus judiciary) follow remarkably diverging treatment of international 
human rights law when shaping and developing the EU return acquis. 
 
 
 

  
 

BRUNO, PALOMBINO, DI STEFANO (eds.), Migration Issues before International Courts and Tribunals, Rome, CNR 
Edizioni, 2019, ISBN 978 88 8080 367 6, pp. 471-473. 
AUTHORS’ AND EDITORS’ BIOS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chiara Tea Antoniazzi is a postdoctoral researcher at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in 
Pisa. She holds a PhD in International Studies from the University of Trento. She has researched 
on various aspects of the promotion and protection of human rights at the national, regional, and 
international levels. 
 
Giovanni Carlo Bruno is Researcher of International Law at the Institute for Research on Inno-
vation and Services for Development of the National Research Council of Italy, where he is carry-
ing out researches on international human rights law, with a particular focus on vulnerable groups. 
 
Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli is Professor of International Law at La Sabana University. He holds 
a PhD degree on International Law and Relations from the Autónoma de Madrid University, a 
Master’s on Human Rights from Alcalá University, and Law degree from the Externado Univer-
sity. He has conducted research on different legal issues that have been addressed by the IACtHR. 
 
Maria Sole Continiello Neri is a Post-doctoral researcher and Lecturer in Public International 
Law and International Human Rights Law at the NRU Higher School of Economics, Moscow. 
She obtained the Ph.D. in Human Rights Law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and 
collaborated with the European Commission, the Italian Red Cross. 
 
Sara De Vido is Associate Professor of International Law at Ca’ Foscari University in Venice, 
Italy. She is affiliate to the Manchester International Law Centre, UK. Among her publications, 
the book Violence against Women’s Health in International Law, forthcoming for the Manches-
ter University Press (2020). 
 
Adriana Di Stefano is Associate Professor of European Union Law at the Law Department of 
the University of Catania where she researches and teaches on core areas of public international 
law, with a special focus on international human rights law and European migration law. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
472 Migration Issues before International Courts and Tribunals 
 
 
Francesco Luigi Gatta is Research Fellow at the Université Catholique de Louvain and member 
of EDEM – Equipe Droits Européens et Migrations. He holds a double PhD in EU Law (Univer-
sities of Padova and Innsbruck) and has been visiting research fellow at the European University 
Institute and at the Université de Strasbourg. 
 
Spyridoula Katsoni holds an LL.B and an LL.M. in Public International Law with distinction 
from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. She is currently an LL.M. (Public 
International Law) candidate at the University of Groningen and holds a grant awarded by “Ale-
xandros Svolos Foundation” to this end. She is an Attorney-at-Law and member of the Athens 
Bar Association. Her research interests include Public International Law, International Human 
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law. 
 
Encarnación La Spina is Postdoctoral researcher and Professor Ramón y Cajal programme 
Spanish Ministry of Innovation, University and Science at School of Law and Human Rights 
Institute, University of Deusto. Her research focuses mainly on human rights, migrant families, 
diversity, vulnerability, refugee and migrant integration policies, paying special attention to the 
legal comparative approach. 
 
Carola Lingaas is an Associate Professor of Law at VID Specialized University in Oslo with a 
PhD in international law from the University of Oslo. Her PhD on ‘The Concept of Race in 
International Criminal Law’ has been published by Routledge. Carola holds a Master of Laws 
(University of Zurich) and an LL.M. in Public International Law (University of Oslo). 
 
Tamás Molnár is a legal research officer on asylum, migration and borders at the EU Funda-
mental Rights Agency in Vienna. He studied law in Budapest and Brussels and holds a PhD in 
international law (Budapest). Before joining the Agency in autumn 2016, he worked for a decade 
in various ministries in Hungary in the fields of international and EU migration law. He is also a 
visiting lecturer on international migration law at the Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute 
of International Studies (where he was an adjunct professor between 2003 and 2018). From 2016, 
he has been a module convenor in the e-learning MA in Refugee Protection and Forced Migration 
Studies at the University of London, School of Advanced Studies. 
 
Giuseppe Morgese is Research Fellow, EU Law, University of Bari “Aldo Moro”. Ph.D., Inter-
national and European Union Law. Aggregate Professor of EU Law and Migration Law. 
 
Luca Paladini is Lecturer in European Union Law at the University for Foreigners, Siena. He 
holds a Ph.D. in EU Law from the University of Bologna and he was Jean Monnet Fellow and 
then Visiting Fellow at the European University Institute (Florence). He has conducted research 
and published works on EU law (mainly on EU External Action) and international law (with a 
specific focus on the IACtHR case-law). 
 
Fulvio Maria Palombino is Professor of International Law at the Law Department of the Uni-
versity of Naples Federico II, Adjunct Professor of International Law at the Law Department of 
Luiss Univerisity (Rome) and Vice-President of the European Society of International Law. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors’ and Editors’ Bios 473 
 
 
Maria Manuela Pappalardo is a Ph.D. student, University of Catania, Law Department. 
 
Vassilis Pergantis is Assistant Professor on Public International Law at the Faculty of Law, 
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. He has published extensively, in English, French 
and Greek, and he is the author of a monograph on The Paradigm of State Consent in the Law of 
Treaties (Elgar, 2017). 
 
Patrizia Rinaldi is a PhD candidate at Comillas Pontifical University of Madrid with the thesis: 
“Unaccompanied Migrant Minors: Transition to Adulthood”. She completed her Master’s pro-
gramme in Migration and Development Studies with the dissertation: “The best interest of the 
child: the Tabhita case”. 
 
Fulvia Staiano is an Adjunct Professor of International law and European Union Law at Giustino 
Fortunato University and an Associate at CNR-IRISS. Her current research focuses on issues of 
transnational criminal law, international law of the sea as well as international and European 
migration law. 
 
Edoardo Stoppioni is a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law 
of Luxembourg and teaching assistant for the Faculty of Law of the University of Luxembourg. 
Edoardo holds a Master in International Economic Law and a Ph.D. in International Law from 
the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. His thesis focused on a critical analysis of the dis-
course of the WTO judge and of the investment arbitrator on unwritten law. He is an Associate 
Editor of the JWIT and was Post-Doctoral fellow at Hitotsubashi University. Before joining the 
Max Planck Institute Luxembourg, he was a Research and Teaching Assistant at the Department 
of European and International Law of the Sorbonne Law School. 
 
Ruben Wissing is a PhD researcher at the Migration Law Research Group at Ghent University, 
and affiliated with the Centre for the Social Study of Migration and Refugees the Human Rights 
Centre. 
 
  
 
 


Angela Petrillo
Graphic project : Angela Petrillo
© Cnr Edizioni
P.le Aldo Moro 7
00185 Roma
ISBN 978 88 8080 367 6
